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Abstract 
In the years that immediately followed the victory of the rebel forces in 1959. the 
new leaders of the Cuban Revolution seemed to approach the task of revolutionary 
governance as a continuation of the guerrilla campaign in the sierra. The 
leadership's empirical management of the Revolution in power betrayed its guerrilla 
roots, and resulted in an inchoate political system headed by charismatic guerrilleros. 
By the end ofthe first decade, however, it seemed that the Revolution's guerrilla past 
had been all but forgotten, as it established closer ties with the Soviet Union and 
subsequently underwent a process of 'institutionalisation'. Since that time, many 
Western scholars of Cuba have commented on the increased role of the military in 
the revolutionary leadership, and in other aspects of the Revolution which would 
normally be considered to be beyond the remit of most armed forces. These scholars 
have concluded that the pervasive presence of the military is evidence of the 
'militarisation' of the Cuban Revolution. 
This thesis calls into question this notion of a 'militarised' Revolution by arguing 
that such a perspective overlooks the guerrilla origins of both the Cuban armed 
forces and the Revolution more broadly, in addition to the signs and symbols that 
point to an on-going legacy of these origins in revolutionary Cuba. Using evidence 
derived from an analysis of the hegemonic discourse of the Revolution at different 
stages in its trajectory, this study demonstrates that the lived experience of guerrilla 
warfare has shaped the beliefs and values that have underpinned the Revolution since 
1959. Together, these beliefs and values comprise a unique political culture in which 
the figure of the guerrillero is revered, and in which the guerrilla campaigns of the 
Cuban historical narrative are presented as unfinished struggles. The thesis argues 
that the active cultivation of this political culture has contributed to legitim ising the 
long-standing presence of former guerrilleros in the revolutionary leadership, and 
has helped to gamer the support of civilians for the revolutionary project. In addition 
to challenging the idea of a 'militarised' Revolution, this study also undermines the 
widely accepted notion that the Revolution was thoroughly 'Sovietised' during its 
second decade. An examination of the hegemonic discourse of the 1970s reveals 
that, while the Revolution transformed structurally during those years, the guerrilla 
ethos which had buttressed the revolutionary project in the 1960s remained 
unchanged. 
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Introduction 
On 24 February 2008, Raul Castro officially succeeded his brother Fidel as President 
of both the Council of State and the Council of Ministers of Cuba, following a 
nineteen-month period in which he had provisionally held these positions, owing to 
Fidel's poor health. Fidel's choice of successor was by no means a surprise, given 
that Raul already occupied the posts of First Vice-President of the Council of State, 
and Minister of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias (FAR). Raul was thus the 
obvious choice to take over the reins of power. 
Even less surprising, perhaps, has been Raul's selection of new members, along with 
the promotion of existing ones, for the Council of State since his succession. As the 
Minister of the FAR since 1959, Raul had always been considered first and foremost 
a military man, as someone more suited to instilling tough military discipline than 
negotiating revolutionary politics (Bardach, 2009; Dumont, 1974; Latell, 2005). The 
long-standing commentator on the Cuban Revolution, Irving Horowitz, for example, 
recently described Raul Castro as 'the orthodox military figure' who 'has become the 
spokesman for all things military and the heir apparent to the revolution itself. His 
orthodoxy extends to the cut of his uniform' (Horowitz 2008, 137). Accordingly, 
then, Raul wasted little time in surrounding himself with men cut from a similar 
cloth. Several well-known raulistas have been awarded membership of the Council, 
while others have been granted a direct vertical promotion. I Among the latter was 
seventy-two-year-old Julio Casas Regueiro who, having held the position of First 
Vice-Minister of the FAR up until that point, found himself promoted to one of five 
vice-presidencies of the Council, in addition to replacing Raul as the Minister of the 
I Rau/istas is the term used to describe those loyal to Raul Castro within the revolutionary leadership. 
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FAR.2 Similarly, Ramiro Valdes Menendez, one of only three men to have been 
awarded the title Comandante de fa Revofucion. occupies a vice-presidential post on 
both the Council of State and the Council of Ministers.3 He had previously been 
made Minister of Information and Communications following Fidel's temporary 
hand-over of power in 2006. The perhaps inevitable upshot of these new 
appointments was a purging of numerous officials in the Cuban leadership, notably 
the comparatively young and reformist figures of Carlos Lage, former Vice-President 
ofthe Council of State, and Felipe Perez Roque, hitherto Foreign Minister. 
As mentioned, the ascendancy of high-profile military figures into the upper 
echelons of the Cuban leadership is in keeping with Raul Castro's long-established 
image as, above all, a military man. Yet, for many observers, not only was this 
increase in power and influence awarded to the military fitting with the picture of 
Raul, but of the Cuban Revolution in general. In other words, there exist a large 
number of Western academics who, since the early years of the Revolution, have 
commented on the supposed 'militarism' of the Revolution and, in turn, its 
transformation of Cuban society into a populace that could be described as 
'militarised' (Bonachea and San Martin, 1972; Bunck, 1994; Dumont, 1974; 
Horowitz, 2008). The granting of additional authority to members of the armed 
forces has therefore caused little alarm; on the contrary, it is widely seen as a 
vindication of this long-held view that the Revolution is a militarised system of 
governance. Other events of recent years have also served in some ways to confirm 
this widespread perception: Bastion 2004, for instance, a strategic military defence 
2 Julio Casas Regueiro passed away on 3 September. 20 II. 
3 The other two figures upon whom the title of Comandanle de la Revoluci6n has been bestowed are 
Juan Almeida Bosque and Guillermo Garcia Frias. both former guerril/eros who played prominent 
roles in the Revolution's insurrectionary phase. 
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exercise involving hundreds of thousands of Cubans (both members of the armed 
forces and civilians), is perhaps an explicit example of the so-called 'militarisation' 
ofthe Cuban Revolution. 
In turn, many academics are of the opinion that such a 'militarisation' process is 
central to understanding the longevity of the political careers of prominent military 
figures such as Raul Castro. The literature which attests to the "militarism' of the 
Revolution has viewed the process as one which has legitimised the revolutionary 
leadership's long-standing hold on power through its accompanying authoritarian 
approach to disciplining the Cuban population, the creation of a hierarchical society, 
the concentration of political power in the hands of a select few, and the active 
promotion of a 'siege mentality'. It is widely accepted that, combined, these factors 
have played a key role in the survival of the Revolution since the late-1960s, and 
have enabled those at the helm of the revolutionary project to maintain a firm grasp 
on the reins of power (Goure, 1989; Horowitz, 2008; Malloy, 1971; Petras and 
Morley, 1985). 
However, such a perspective overlooks another defining feature of these high-
ranking military officials, which may help to explain their political endurance. Not 
only are men like Raul Castro prominent members of the armed forces, they are also, 
inescapably, former guerrilleros. Raul, Casas Regueiro and Valdes Menendez all 
played pivotal roles in the sierra during the uprising against the then dictator, 
Fulgencio Batista, which commenced with the landing of the Granma in eastern 
Cuba on 2 December 1956, and ended in January 1959 with the flight of Batista from 
Cuban shores, and the subsequent installation of the Revolution in power. It is, 
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therefore, interesting that those who helped to usher in the era of the Cuban 
Revolution in power in 1959 still find themselves in distinguished roles within the 
revolutionary leadership (with the exception, now, of Casas Regueiro), particularly 
given the various transformations and crises experienced by the Revolution 
throughout its trajectory. What is more, the 'militarisation' perspective fails to 
address the fact that the FAR has its origins in, and developed out of, the Ejcrcito 
Rebelde, the very guerrilla force which sprang up in the isolated mountain regions of 
Cuba, and in which the above names participated.4 These historical roots of the FAR 
render it distinct from other more traditional militaries, and particularly those in the 
rest of Latin America, which have been created and developed for the service of a 
state power (Klepak 2005, 2010). Cuba's armed forces, in contrast, were founded 
upon a struggle waged by, and for, the people. The military historian Hal Klepak has 
written of this distinction, stating that the FAR 'are in their own minds different from 
other Latin American armed forces because of their revolutionary past and their 
revolutionary tradition. They see themselves truly as the "people's army" of a 
revolutionary people' (Klepak 2005,56). 
Moreover, to talk of the 'militarisation' of the Cuban Revolution is to suggest that 
the FAR exist as a monolithic entity completely removed from the civilian sphere, 
though exercising authority over it. Such a suggestion indicates a lack of 
understanding as to how the armed forces operate in Cuba, and how they relate to the 
rest of the population. Since the creation of the Milicias Nacionales Revolucionarias 
(MNR) in 1959, a volunteer force under the control ofthe FAR (though not part of it 
4 Ejercito Rebelde was the name adopted by the guerrilla forces which fought in the sierras of Cuba 
during the struggle against the dictatorship of Fulgencio Batista between July) 956 and January) 959. 
After the fall of Batista, the Ejercito Rebelde was gradually transformed into the FAR, a 
transformation set in motion by the creation of the Ministerio de las Fuer7.as Armadas Revolucionarias 
(MINF AR) in October) 960 (Perez, Jr. ) 976, 26) 
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as such), the Revolution has cultivated a force of reservists who occupy roles in both 
the civilian and military spheres, thereby blurring the lines between the two. By the 
same token, many military personnel have assumed responsibilities in the civilian 
sphere, as will become clear in the ensuing literature review. In addition, it should 
be noted that the labelling by non-Cuban observers of certain figures within the 
political sphere as 'military' does not necessarily indicate that such men currently 
serve, or have ever served, in the FAR. Many of those who possess military titles 
were awarded them solely on the back of their participation in the guerrilla struggle 
of the 1950s, and may not have been actively involved in any 'military' activity 
thereafter (aside from their roles as reservists). 
Furthermore, unlike the influence of military officials which, as will be discussed 
later, only really came to the fore in the late 1960s, it should be acknowledged that 
the guerrilla element within the leadership has, of course, been in place since the 
very inception of the Cuban Revolution. The sustained presence of the guerrilla 
cohort within the leadership is telling in that it is indicative of a continuity within the 
Revolution from the insurrectionary phase onwards. This continuity, in turn, leads 
one to question how the longevity of the political careers of these ex-guerrilleros. 
and not, therefore, military men, has been legitimised in the eyes of the Cuban 
public. 
Clues which might explain this legitimacy are plentiful in contemporary 
revolutionary Cuba, particularly in the images and slogans promulgated by the 
leadership. In Havana's Plaza de la Revoluci6n, for example, the outline of the 
image of Ernesto 'Che' Guevara has for many years adorned the Ministerio del 
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Interior building, while, in 2009, a similar outline of Guevara's comrade-in-arms, 
Camilo Cienfuegos, was erected on the wall of the adjacent Ministerio de la 
Infonmitica y las Comunicaciones. Elsewhere in the city, and across the entire 
island, can be found similar visual representations of both Guevara and Cienfuegos, 
along with other images of the Ejercito Rebelde, accompanied by revolutionary 
slogans such as 'Hasta la Victoria, Siempre!'. In addition, there is a clear 
encouragement of citizens to emulate the attitude and behaviour of the figure of the 
guerrillero, and particularly that of Che Guevara. The slogan of the Revolution's 
principal organisation for children of primary school age, the Organizaci6n de 
Pioneros Jose Marti, for example, illustrates how citizens, from an early age, are 
incited to model their behaviour on the archetypal Cuban guerrillero: 'Pioneros por 
el Comunismo, seremos como el Che'. Similarly, ubiquitous billboards carrying 
messages such as 'Che: Tu ejemplo vive, tus ideas perduran' and 'Queremos que 
sean como el Che' confirm this promotion of the guerrillero as the model 
revolutionary. 
All these images, slogans and symbols point to a consistent veneration of the 
Revolution's guerrilleros throughout the Revolution's trajectory, and an active 
cultivation on the part of the leadership of the legacy of the guerrilla warfare enacted 
in the insurrectionary phase. This apparent reverence reserved for the Revolution's 
guerrilleros has been highlighted by Tzvi Medin, who observed that 'images of the 
fallen heroes of the revolution are constantly projected in the press, the arts, radio, 
television, and so on: as exemplary figures symbolizing both heroic existence and 
total revolutionary sacrifice' (Medin 1990, 34). The perpetuation of the guerrilla 
legacy in this way may partly account for the durability of the political careers of 
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those who participated in the guerrilla stage, insofar as it affords them historical 
legitimacy, a legitimacy of which Cuban citizens are continually reminded. The 
guerrilla legacy, as presented by the leadership, attributes the victory of the 
Revolution in 1959 almost entirely to the guerrilla rebels and, in this light, the former 
guerrilleros have earned the right to preside over the Revolution which they brought 
to power. The pervasiveness of the image of the guerrillero, and the promotion of 
the guerrilla ethos more broadly, cast further doubt on the applicability of the term 
'militarism' to the Cuban revolutionary context. The concept of 'militarism' is, 
therefore, somewhat reductive in its failure to acknowledge the on-going legacy of 
the insurrectionary phase. Moreover, the very fact that there is a general tendency 
among ex-guerrilleros to self-identify as guerrilleros, rather than military men per 
se, further undermines the notion of a 'militaristic' Revolution. Indeed, the title of 
Fidel Castro's 2012 two-part memoir, Fidel: Guerrillero del Tiempo, suggests that 
his participation in the guerrilla struggle against Batista was a character-defining 
experience in his revolutionary career. 
While this thesis challenges the assumptions posed by the notion of 'militarism', 
much of the literature that presents and characterises the Cuban Revolution as 
'militarised' has, nonetheless, made a significant contribution to scholarly study of 
the Revolution, and has produced a conceptualisation which has become widely 
accepted within the field of Cuban studies. It is, therefore, necessary in the first 
instance to offer an overview of this literature in order to understand more precisely 
how it has attempted to explain both the presence of military figures within the 
leadership, and the longevity of their careers. The following review thus summarises 
the key texts and arguments in support of 'militarism', and serves as a point of 
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departure for explaining how this thesis will develop the ideas therein, and thereby 
offer an original contribution to the existing work in this area. 
A 'militaristic' Revolution? 
The trend for characterising the Cuban Revolution as 'militaristic' can be said to 
have commenced in the early 1970s when scholars of Cuba began to reflect on the 
preceding few years of the Revolution's trajectory. It was generally understood that 
the Revolution had changed profoundly during this period, and no longer resembled 
the radical, and somewhat experimental, force for change that it had done in the early 
and mid-1960s. A pivotal moment for these scholars was the year 1968, when Fidel 
Castro announced the launch of the Revolutionary Offensive, a nation-wide project 
which was to see almost the entire population mobilised for agricultural work. This 
mobilisation was organised largely along military lines, with objectives framed in 
military terms. Julie Bunck, writing in the 1990s, highlighted the military element to 
the Offensive: 
a range of officials exalted work and used military terms, even war dispatches, to 
describe their goals. Speeches adopted militaristic phrases, equating the labour force 
with a 'heroic battalion' and described labour efforts as 'struggles' or 'wars' (Bunck 
1994, 144). 
The desired culmination of the Offensive was to produce a ten million tonne sugar 
harvest in the zaJra of 1970. The nationwide contribution to the zaJra continued to 
be structured and controlled in a military style. 
During this period, the Cuban government was also beginning to make concerted 
efforts towards a rapprochement with the Soviet Union, efforts which prefigured the 
almost wholesale adoption of the Soviet model during the period of 
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'institutionalisation ' (or 'Sovietisation', the term preferred by many Western 
academics).5 This so-called 'institutionalisation', commencing in 1970, involved 
widespread bureaucratisation, the professionalisation of the FAR in line with the 
Soviet military model, and the restructuring of the political system, to the extent that 
'Cuban politics increasingly took on the central features of Soviet political life' 
(Binns and Gonzalez, 1980). In short, 'The second decade of the Cuban Revolution 
brought Cuba fully within the Soviet ambit' (Binns and Gonzalez, 1980). 
Such profound changes to the revolutionary system in Cuba did not, of course, go 
unnoticed. Cuba commentators began to write, most with a negative slant, of the 
increased role of the military in both politics and the economy. In 1978, Jorge 
Dominguez highlighted this trend, stating that 'It has become fashionable to write 
about the militarization of the Cuban Revolution, a concept that suggests that the late 
1960s were drastically different from other years' (Dominguez 1978,377). 
One of the first to comment on this apparent 'militarisation' was Rene Dumont, a 
French agronomist who visited Cuba in the 1960s in his role as European economic 
adviser to Fidel Castro. Dumont published two works, Cuba: Socialism and 
Development in 1964, followed by Is Cuba Socialist? in 1970.6 Dumont was an 
early admirer of Castro and was keen to gain an understanding of the economic 
structures that underpinned the Revolution in its formative years. 
5 The term ; institutionalisation' became standardised following the publication of Carmelo Mesa-
Lago's 1974 text, Cuba in the 1970s: Pragmatism and Institutionalization (Mesa-Lago, 1974). 
6 The original editions of these texts were published in French. The English translations referenced 
here were not published until 1970 and 1974, respectively. 
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In the earlier work, Cuba: Socialism and Development, Dumont commented on 
developments in the Revolution that, judging by his later writings, seemed to pave 
the way for a more entrenched militarisation of Cuban society by the end of the 
decade. Dumont wrote that: 
Battalions of civilians have been fonned on this military model, for instance, the 
women's brigades of tractor drivers of the green belt around Havana or the province of 
Oriente. Government offices, nationalised companies, and so forth, furnish workers 
for the harvesting of cane and coffee beans and caring for the crops; they are 
organized on the same principles. Civil defence, finally, is working along the same 
lines to organize production in case of war. Cuba is already on a war footing (Dumont 
1970, 232). 
Dumont's observations in this instance also bring to mind another term which has 
frequently been employed to describe, and account for, the general sense of fear of 
an enemy attack in Cuba, and the accompanying preparedness of its citizens: that is, 
the state of a 'siege mentality'. Dumont's comment that 'Cuba is already on a war 
footing' suggests that, in the early years of the Revolution, the country felt itself, 
with good reason, to be vulnerable to enemy attack. As we shall see in the course of 
this chapter, the depictions of a supposedly 'militarised' Cuban Revolution are often 
linked to the existence of a 'siege mentality' on the island. 
Dumont's second work constituted a report on his return visit to Cuba later in the 
decade in which he examined the economic and political structure of the Cuban 
Revolution. Dumont commented that, in 1967, the Soviet Union advised the Cuban 
leadership to be stricter on its population in terms of achieving revolutionary 
objectives; he argued that, from that year onwards, Cuba followed this advice insofar 
as military involvement in the economy became prevalent, and there was a marked 
increase in the military organisation of Cuban citizens. Moreover, he suggested that 
the Soviets' advice to instil a greater sense of discipline was not, in fact, at odds with 
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the way in which certain members of the elite, notably Raul Castro, felt Cuba should 
be governed. Dumont asserted: 
Raul Castro had always recommended stricter discipline, discipline like the anny's, 
the only administration that gets itself obeyed and makes things move. It was the only 
way to close ranks, to continue a hard, bitter, uncertain struggle. This theory 
interestingly illuminates the development of both the 1968 Revolutionary Offensive 
and the third agrarian reform. They were to lead to a general militarization of Cuba's 
economy (Dumont 1974, 72). 
Dumont did not hold back in his criticism of the transformation which he considered 
to have occurred in Cuba since his previous visit; indeed, he characterised this 
transformation as a 'neo-Stalinist militarization' of the Cuban Revolution (Dumont 
1974, 123). Dumont argued that the increased involvement of the military in 
governmental matters (and in the Cuban economy in particular) had made it difficult 
to distinguish between the Party and Army. He contended: 
Agriculture thus became more than just an urgent problem to be solved; it became a 
magnificent training ground for the anny. Militarization was urged not only to 
eliminate inefficiency and disorganization, but to cope with the passive resistance of a 
growing number of unwilling workers. The Cuban population was more and more 
under the control of the Party and the anny, and it became increasingly difficult to 
distinguish between the two groups since they both wore uniforms and carried 
revolvers (Dumont 1974, 100). 
In tum, Dumont saw the 'militarisation' of the Party as having engendered a 
militarisation of society more generally. Dumont lamented this latter transformation 
as, in his eyes, it had reduced the possibilities for political participation for the 
average citizen: 
This military society ( ... ) follows a path leading away from participation; it leads to a 
hierarchized society with an authoritarian leadership, headed by a personal power that 
decides all problems, political, economic, and technical (Dumont 1974, 113). 
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Dumont's criticisms of this so-called 'militarisation' of Cuban society were widely 
read and absorbed by foreign observers of the Cuban Revolution, not least because 
Dumont considered himself a socialist and had previously been a sympathiser of 
Fidel Castro. Numerous academics writing on Cuba, and on the supposed 
'militarisation' of the Revolution, would later make reference to Dumont's work 
(Aguilar, 2003; Bonachea and San Martin, 2003; Horowitz, 2008). In this way, 
Dumont might be considered to have set the ball rolling in terms of classifying the 
Revolution as 'militaristic'. 
Another text, contemporaneous to Dumont's work, which contained references to the 
'm ilitarisation , of Cuban society was a collection of articles edited by Carmelo 
Mesa-Lago, published in 1971. In the preface, Mesa-Lago informed the reader that 
the volume's intention was to 'present a comprehensive, well-documented, up-to-
date, and relatively objective study of the revolutionary changes that have taken 
place in Cuba from 1959 to 1970' (Mesa-Lago 1971, xi). He went on to add that: 
the period from 1964 to 1970 is crucial to the understanding of the Revolution because 
it is a period in which dramatic decisions were made - decisions to change economic 
policy, reorganize planning, establish the Communist Party, support moral incentives, 
launch the Revolutionary Offensive, endorse the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, 
and harvest ten million tons of sugar (Mesa-Lago 1971, xiii). 
A notable chapter in this volume, insofar as it dealt with the 'militarisation' of Cuban 
society, was James Malloy's contribution. Malloy's paper aimed to analyse the 
process of the creation of a new economic order in Cuba, and how the creation of 
such an order required a 'new political and economic framework with the avowed 
aim of national development' (Malloy 1971, 23). Of particular interest to this study 
is a section of the chapter entitled 'Moral Incentives and Militarization of Society 
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(1966-)' (Malloy 1971,37). In it, Malloy discussed the dual process of establishing a 
moral economy in Cuba and the gradual militarisation of the Cuban people; Malloy 
contended that this process unfolded following Castro's announcement of the 
'Revolution's commitment to the path of moral incentives' in August 1966, and soon 
thereafter the proclamation of the Revolutionary Offensive in 1968. Malloy wrote 
that: 
At the same time that there is an increasing attempt to moralise the society, it is also 
being increasingly militarised. As stated, the proclamation of the Revolutionary 
Offensive was also a declaration of quasi-moral war. In a real sense, all Cubans are 
now considered to be soldiers in a vast producing army. As such, they are expected to 
adhere to the traditional military values of discipline and devotion to duty. Each is a 
soldier on permanent alert ready to join his brigade and fight with muscle and tool to 
win the economic war. The image of the army has become the image of society 
(Malloy 1971, 40). 
He later continued: 
All indications are that the army is the real locus of political power. The party is 
ostensibly the chief organ of political coordination, but its command structure is 
permeated at all levels by military men. Cuba's top military men hold key positions in 
both the army and the party, thereby guaranteeing not only the interests of the military 
institution, but a preponderance of military styles and values (Malloy 1971, 41). 
In the latter citation, Malloy appeared to draw similar conclusions to Dumont 
regarding the apparent fusion of the Party and the armed forces, albeit in a distinctly 
less critical tone. 
Elsewhere in Mesa-Lago's volume, Horowitz also commented on what he described 
as the 'general militarization of the Cuban society' (Horowitz 1971, 138). As will 
become evident below, Horowitz remains a leading proponent of the notion of a 
'militarised' Cuba. In this particular work, Horowitz discussed the 'theory of the 
Stalinization of the Cuban Revolution'; however, unlike Dumont, he underlined that 
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his use of 'Stalinization' eschewed the 'emotive use of the term, employing it instead 
to refer to 'specific forms of social and political behaviour and institutions' 
(Horowitz 1971, 127). In line with this definition, one of the key characteristics of 
'Stalinization' was 'the emergence of a leader and his small coterie as exclusive 
spokesmen for the Communist Party' (Horowitz 1971, 127). In the case of Cuba, 
Horowitz argued that this characteristic was evident in Castro's decision to surround 
himself with military men in the upper echelons of the Cuban leadership. He 
affirmed that: 
The general militarization of the Cuban society is manifested by the fact that ten out of 
the twenty ministries are headed by military men of Castro's inner circle, who contra) 
the most strategic sectors, that is, agriculture, the sugar industry, mining, 
transportation, communications, labour, the anned forces, and internal order. All 
members of the Politburo, except two, and 66 per cent of the Central Committee 
members are also military men (Horowitz 1971, 138). 
Once again, we see that the presence of high-ranking military figures in ministerial 
positions is cited as evidence of an increasingly militarised Cuban Revolution. 
Staying with Horowitz for the moment, we might consider his edited collection 
Cuban Communism, first published in 1970, which contained various references to 
the notion which is of interest to us here: the 'militarisation' of Cuban society. 
Horowitz himself opened the collection with his appropriately entitled essay 'Cuban 
Communism', in which he again alluded to the growing number of military men in 
positions of power: 'Castro's appointment of a guerrilla cohort - Major Raul 
Curbelo, Chief of the air force - as vice president of IN RA is only one instance of 
the continued militarization of Cuban society' (Horowitz 1972, 17). What is also 
interesting in Horowitz's article is his interpretation of Regis Debray's lRevo/ution 
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dans la Revolution? (Debray, 1967).7 Unlike the majority of observers who would 
likely consider this text a call to arms to Latin American revolutionaries, not to 
mention an unreserved defence of the guerrilla path to revolution, Horowitz 
purported that a key deduction to be drawn from Debray concerned the overriding 
'primacy of the military' (Horowitz 1972, 22). He conceived of the text as a 
discussion on the: 
progression from the military loco to the political movement. Thus at the ideological 
level the revolution in the revolution represents the transformation of guerrilla" into 
gorilas, into advocates of the total militarization of Latin America. This seems to 
incorporate rightist doctrine into a leftist framework. The revolution in the revolution 
is not so much a call for sheer militancy or a reflection of new class alignments as it is 
a call for the primacy of the military (Horowitz 1972,21/22). 
Horowitz thus seemed to be arguing here that Debray's thinking echoed Castro's 
supposed line of thought: that the military should assume authority over other forms 
of leadership. Horowitz even went so far as to place the Cuba of the early 1970s in 
the same vein as the tide of military governments/dictatorships which was sweeping 
Latin America at the time. He wrote that 'the general militarization of the 
hemisphere has had its left-wing reflex in Cuba' (Horowitz 1972, 18). 
Moving on to another chapter in the Cuban Communism collection from 1972, 
Ram6n Bonachea and Marta San Martin's article, 'The Military Dimension of the 
Cuban Revolution', was a notable contribution to the literature on the militarisation 
of the Cuban Revolution. In this work, the authors contended that the shift towards 
'militarism' in Cuba was inextricably linked to the leadership's decision to adopt a 
socialist ideology in 1961. They wrote: 
Ever since the Cuban Revolution proclaimed its allegiance to socialism there has been 
a marked emphasis on preparing responsible personnel to occupy decision-making 
7 Debray's text will be discussed in detail in Chapter One. 
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positions in agriculture, industry, the military or education. This qualified manpower 
has been termed cadres or, more specifically yet, 'command cadres', a managerial 
development within the revolution (Bonachea and San Martin 1972,247). 
Bonachea and San Martin placed particular emphasis on the large scale involvement 
of youth in military-style education as a principal characteristic of Cuba's process of 
'militarisation'. Specific mention was made of the role of the Escuelas de Instrucci6n 
Revolucionaria (EIR) in this process, in addition to the introduction of a draft for 
students to attend military schools as part of their Servicio Mililar Obligalorio 
(SMO). The latter programme in particular was cited as being 'instrumental in 
extending military authority over youth' (Bonachea and San Martin 1972,238). 
The authors went on to argue that the manifestation of 'militarism' became ever 
more marked following the proclamation of the aforementioned Revolutionary 
Offensive which anticipated the zaJra of 1970. The 'militaristic' element, the 
authors affinned, could be found in the organisation ofthe Offensive around pueslos 
de mando: 
People were mobilised into squadrons, platoons, companies and battalions at the level 
of provinces, regions and municipalities under the supervision of the party from civil 
defense command posts (Bonachea and San Martin 1972, 253). 
Later, following the zaJra, they argued that 'militarism' seemed only to have 
increased: 
The military organisation of the zaJra, together with the number of cabinet positions 
already filled by FAR majors, could only confirm a vision of militarism throughout 
Cuban society (Bonachea and San Martin 1972, 255). 
Endorsing the idea of a 'siege mentality' suggested by Dumont's work, Bonachea 
and San Martin's article proposed a link between the 'militarisation' of the 
20 
Revolution and the sense that there was an on-going threat of attack from an external 
enemy, namely the United States. In the opening lines, they stated that: 
The militarism of Cuban society is now undeniable. On the surface, the militarization 
of Cuba seems to be the result of a policy geared toward establishing a strong defense 
on the home front as well as in respect to the United States (Bonachea and San Martin 
1972,229). 
They continued with this line of thought later on in the chapter with the following 
depiction: 
Military exercises are conducted every month in various parts of the island. The 
strategy is to crush the invaders before they approach the coast, or to annihilate them 
entirely if they land. Large quantities of human and material resources are mobilised 
to this end since any hesitation would be costly in terms of lives and time (Bonachea 
and San Martin (1972, 250). 
The citations imply that the apparent increased 'militarisation' of the Revolution was 
not solely a means to improve the organisation of revolutionary tasks and 
programmes, nor simply was it only a means of disciplining citizens in order that 
they fully participate in their revolutionary duties. Rather, the 'mi litarisation' also 
had the concrete aim of ensuring that Cuba was adequately defended from an enemy 
invasion on all fronts. 
Later in the decade, Dominguez offered a further contribution to the discussion ofthe 
military dimension, notably through his concept of the 'civic soldier'. According to 
Dominguez, the 'civic soldier' referred to the way in which many Cubans occupied 
important roles in both the civilian and military spheres, without any tension between 
the two, effectively 'fusing civilian and military life year round' (Dominguez 1978, 
378). He argued that this trend became apparent from the mid-J960s at a point 
when: 
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the armed forces adopted social, economic, and political missions as well as purely 
military functions. From one point of view, civilians were militarised; from another, 
the military were civilianised. The result was the flourishing of the civic soldier at 
least through the mid-1970s (Dominguez 1978, 353). 
Dominguez purported that the increased number of leaders who occupied civilian 
and military positions had 'intentionally made the civic soldier the norm for all, even 
in purely civilian organisations' (Dominguez 1978, 376). His observations here 
echoed the aforementioned works of Malloy and Dumont, which both pointed to 
increasingly blurred lines between the Party and the military. 
Additionally, Dominguez found evidence of an enlarged military role in the Cuban 
Revolution in the establishment of Unidades Militares de Ayuda a la Producci6n 
(UMAP) in November 1965, and the Ejercito Juvenil del Trabajo (EJT). The UMAP 
were put to use in the zaJras between 1965 and 1967, but were eventually dissolved 
in 1967 following a protest by the Uni6n de Escritores y Artistas de Cuba (UNEAC). 
For Dominguez, the UMAP embodied the supposedly 'rehabilitative' role of the 
armed forces and their 'repressive mission' (Dominguez 1978, 357). The Ejercito 
Juvenil del Trabajo, on the other hand, was a paramilitary arm of MINFAR dedicated 
to industrial and agricultural efforts (Perez, Jr. 1976, 269). Dominguez saw the 
establishment of this 'Army' as 'an example of military role expansion, because it 
absorbed the productive activities of the Communist Youth Union' (Dominguez 
1978, 378). Moreover, he considered it, along with the 'militarisation of the 
reserves', to have contributed to the expansion of the civic soldier role among the 
masses (Dominguez 1978, 378). 
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However, while Dominguez's work underscored the military dimension of the Cuban 
Revolution, and constituted a significant addition to the literature on the topic, he 
was careful to avoid the use of the term 'militarisation'. He contended: 
I believe the concept of militarization is inappropriate to the Cuban situation because 
it fails to account for the special political quality of civic soldiers, who are important 
in many areas, from running the government to running farm equipment. These 
soldiers went to military school after they had fought and won the war against Batista, 
during which they acquired their extramilitary concerns for the first time. The Cuban 
civic soldiers have been different from the armed forces both in other Communist and 
in non-Communist countries because of their eagerness and conviction that military 
and political personnel and methods cannot be separate but must overlap if 
revolutionary goals are to be achieved (Dominguez 1978, 377). 
Dominguez, then, though recognising that the military played a decisive role, did not 
view the armed forces as imposing order on Cuban citizens (an aspect one might 
consider characteristic of a militarised society). Rather, he considered the fusion of 
civilian and military roles as key to the preclusion of an outright 'militarisation'. 
What Dominguez proposed instead were two mutually influential spheres, as 
embodied in the 'civic soldier'. 
The literature considered thus far has focused on the increased 'militarisation' in 
Cuba during the late 1960s and the 1970s and, in particular, how this 'militarisation' 
changed the shape of the Revolution and, in turn, acted upon its citizens. Yet, from 
the mid-1970s onwards, many scholars writing on Cuba found a new focus, albeit 
one that still centred on the Cuban military: Cuba's participation in Angola, 
beginning in 1975. The Cuban involvement in Africa contributed to the image of a 
'militarised' Revolution, insofar as the FAR came to represent the Cuban Revolution 
on the world stage; it became the outward face of Cuban revolutionary foreign 
policy. Moreover, many concluded that the Angolan mission was the outcome of a 
successful 'militarisation' process in Cuba. 
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One scholar to draw such a conclusion was Edward Gonzalez who proposed that the 
concentration of power in the hands of military figures in Cuba engendered the 
decision to enhance the role of the FAR in overseas matters. He pointed out that: 
The post-l 970 process of institutionalization led both to the diversification of political 
elites within Cuba's ruling coalition and to the reconcentration of political power in 
the hands of the two Castro brothers and their followers. The Cuban leadership circle 
was broadened as veteranjidelislas from the July 26 Movement now shared party or 
government posts ( ... ) raulislas ( ... ) emerged as a pivotal elite element, comprising 
principally those military officers with long-standing personal ties to Raul who either 
remained or had been reassigned to high-level posts in the party and government after 
1970 (Gonzalez 1977, 6). 
He continued: 
If fonner military officers assigned to civilian ministries and agencies in the post-1970 
period are treated as still identified with the military, the share of civilian ministerial 
figures on the PCC declines to 29 per cent, and FARIMINFAR representation runs to 
37 per cent, once more underscoring the importance of the military - among them 
many raulislas - in the new power constellation (Gonzalez 1977,6).8 
Gonzalez contended that the high proportion of military men in ministerial positions 
after 1970 led to the emergence of one of three strands of thought regarding foreign 
policy: 'the military mission tendency'. This tendency, he proposed: 
derives from the outlook of Raul Castro and other politically influential 
F ARlMINF AR officers. They stress the external role or mission of the Cuban armed 
forces. Their impact on Cuba's foreign activities stems not only from their enhanced 
political influence within the Cuban regime but also from the strengthened military 
capabilities of the FAR (Gonzalez 1970, 6). 
With this notion in mind, the Cuban involvement in Angola could be partly 
explained by the desire of certain military-minded ministers to test Cuba's increased 
military capabilities in a foreign setting. Angola was seen as a means of receiving 
materiel for Cuba's armed forces from the Soviet Union, and of providing the FAR 
with valuable first-hand experience of warfare. 
B Partido Comunista de Cuba (PCC) 
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The presence of a huge number of Cuban troops in Angola stood in stark contrast to 
the smaller-scale covert support the Revolution had provided to burgeoning 
revolutionary guerrilla movements in Latin America, Africa and the Middle East in 
the 1960s. For many observers, this increased involvement was evidence enough of 
the 'militarisation' ofthe Cuban Revolution. Jiri Valenta, writing in 1981, described 
the increased weaponry of the FAR as a direct consequence of Soviet assistance: 
Thanks to the Soviet-supplied MiG-23s, Cuba has the best-equipped air force in Latin 
America Moreover, the Russians have helped to build a small but very modern and 
efficient Cuban coastal navy ( ... ) The Cuban army meanwhile has been equipped with 
T-62 tanks of Soviet origin. The Soviet arms transfer to Cuba is relatively advanced 
in the overall context of the Soviet arms aid programme (Valenta 1981,47). 
The enhanced military capability of the FAR enabled Cuba not only to support the 
People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), but also liberation 
movements in other parts of the continent. Having witnessed the failure of Latin 
American guerrilla movements to foment revolution, Fidel Castro now viewed Africa 
as a continent 'ripe for revolutionary change' (Valenta 1978, 23). Thus, Valenta 
pointed out in 1978 that: 
As of 1977, Cuba had extended its military presence from military technicians to 
combat units in nine African countries: Angola, Mozambique, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, 
Tanzania, Equatorial Guinea, Sierra Leone, the Congo-Brazzaville, and Ethiopia ( ... ) 
it is Cuba and not the U .S.S.R which directly demonstrates the 'internationalism' of its 
armed forces (Valenta 1978,32). 
It is important to mention here that, while the large-scale participation of Cuban 
forces in Africa may have contributed to the perception of the Revolution as a 
'militarised' system of governance, Cuba's decision to dedicate much of its military 
resources to an overseas conflict may also indicate a temporary shift away from the 
so called 'siege mentality'. Cuba seemed to move from a defensive to an offensive 
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position, perhaps demonstrating that the Revolution, for the time being, no longer felt 
vulnerable, or isolated. The confidence of the Cuban leadership in committing a 
large number of its troops to foreign soil partly stemmed from the fact that, in the 
wake of its humiliating defeat in Vietnam, its neighbour to the north was not looking 
to become involved in any other Third World conflicts. Cuba thus appeared to seize 
the opportunity to act without the threat of US interference. Valenta reinforced this 
argument in his affirmation that 'the intervention can be characterised as a reactive 
and opportunistic move on the part of the U.S.S.R and Cuba' (Valenta 1978,30). 
Yet Cuba's apparent sense of security at this stage in the Revolution was to be short 
lived. As the Revolution entered its third decade, the leadership placed a renewed 
emphasis on the defence of the patria. largely as a response to the intensification of 
us hostility towards the island under the newly elected Ronald Reagan. 1980 saw 
the launch of a new defence strategy, the Guerra de Todo el Pueblo, which was 
aimed at producing large-scale mobilisation around the task of defending the island. 
As an integral component of this strategy, the aforementioned MNR were restored 
under the modified title Milicias de Tropas Territoriales (MIT) with the aim of 
providing the FAR with a strong back-up force in the event of an invasion (Klepak 
2005,60). 
The increase in defence-orientated mobilisation, and the stress placed by the 
leadership on the potential for an attack, did not, of course, go unnoticed by Western 
observers of the Cuban Revolution, many of whom viewed the strategies of the 
Guerra de Todo el Pueblo as further confirmation of the 'militarisation' of the 
Revolution, and, specifically, of a 'siege mentality'. Petras and Morley declared, for 
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example, that one of Cuba's defining characteristics was its 'perpetual state of siege' 
(Petras and Morley 1985, 429). They reasoned that this 'state of siege' could be 
explained by 'the sustained hostility exhibited by the United States imperial state 
through seven administrations, Republican and Democratic, liberal and conservative 
- the longest blockade ever maintained by a dominant imperialist country' (Petras 
and Morley 1985, 429). In turn, this hostility and the resulting state of siege, they 
contended, had profoundly shaped the Revolution's development. The authors also 
referred to a 'socialist fortress mentality' which had 'forced Cubans to give priority 
to national security issues - the political system has been organised around creating 
the most effective military-preparedness system' and had led to 'overdeveloped 
institutions of national defence and underdeveloped institutions of democratic 
representation' (Petras and Morley 1985,433/435). It is interesting to note here that, 
while perhaps critical of the outcome of the 'state of siege' in Cuba, Petras and 
Morley perceived of it as a 'necessary concern' and did not attempt to explain it 
away as simply 'paranoia' on the part of the Cuban leadership (Petras and Morley 
1985,435). 
Let us now consider another key text which examined the role of the armed forces in 
the Cuban Revolution: Jaime Suchlicki's edited collection of essays on the Cuban 
military, published in 1989. The volume's aim was to 'review, examine, and explore 
the FAR's history, its evolution, and current status within the Cuban political 
context' (Morris 1989, iii). From the opening paragraph of James Morris' 
introduction, the significance of the role of the FAR in the trajectory of the 
Revolution was heavily underlined: 
Over the past three decades, the FAR has dramatically evolved from its pre-1959 
revolutionary origins into a professional military institution. The military has 
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contributed to Cuba's economic production and the country's infrastructure; it has lent 
its expertise to the state bureaucracy; and it has been Cuba's first line of national 
defence. Since the mid-1970s, the FAR has been one of the most important 
instruments of Cuba's global foreign policy. Throughout the course of the Cuban 
Revolution the military has maintained a central position in the polity, and generally 
the FAR has been held in high esteem by the Cuban people. This has been the case 
whether due to its early revolutionary legitimacy, its performance in the helping to 
consolidate the Revolution, or its battlefield successes at home or abroad. In sum, 
when stripped of its surface complexities, the Cuban armed forces have served as the 
principal base of political power for Fidel Castro and the leadership closest to him 
(Morris 1989, xiii). 
To evidence these factors in Cuba, Damian Fernandez's chapter made reference to 
various transfonnations within the Revolution, most of which he believed came into 
fruition in 1963 and 1968, the key period relating to the FAR's pre-eminence. 
Notably, he underlined the importance of the 'building of the Party within the armed 
forces' which contributed to blurring 'the distinction between civil and military 
boundaries' (Fernandez 1989, 9). As we have already seen in the other titles 
discussed, this fusion of the civil and military in Cuba has been cited as one of the 
principal characteristics of the 'militarisation' of the Revolution by authors such as 
Malloy and Dumont. The involvement of the FAR in the organisation and 
undertaking of agricultural work was also considered a key factor in the 
'militarisation' process. A significant example of this involvement was the 
deployment of 100,000 soldiers to participate in the infamous zaJra of 1970; the 
FAR's role was referred to as Operacion Mambi (Fernandez 1989, to). 
Responsibility for clamping down on 'absenteeism, lack of discipline, and 
inefficiency' was conferred upon the FAR, while 'the economic rhetoric and 
command structure of the time was clearly militarist' (Fernandez 1989, 10). With 
regard to the latter point, we have seen that Dumont, in particular, found the military 
element of the Revolution's economic projects to be highly inefficient. Moreover, 
according to Fernandez, the FAR's influence seemed to know no bounds, as 'military 
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methodology was applied to all spheres of society such as education, treatment of 
'social deviants', and the arts' (Fernandez 1989, 10). 
Interestingly, Fernandez also argued that, though the military maintained a majority 
position in the revolutionary leadership in the 1970s, not to mention becoming more 
professionalised, the 1970s could be considered as a decade of 'social 
demilitarization' in Cuba (Fernandez 1989, 17). He contended that, as 'the pee and 
other civilian institutions upgraded their organisational capability and became more 
adept in dealing with economic problems, the role of the armed forces was limited to 
national defence' (Fernandez 1989, 13). In contrast, Fernandez viewed the 1980s as 
a decade marked by the resurgence of 'popular militarisation', owing mainly to the 
pronouncement of the Guerra de Todo el Pueblo, and the organisation of the M1T 
(Fernandez 1989, 17). He asserted: 
Militarization in the 1980s differed from previous experiences in that the War of All 
the People has been better organized, better staffed and, increasingly professionalized. 
In this way, the two military options debated during the early 1960s, i.e. a 
professional, modem FAR and a popular militia may have been reconciled during the 
1980s (Fernandez 1989, 17). 
Also of note in Fernandez's text was that he perceived the 1980s as a time of a 
renewed sense of a 'siege mentality' in Cuba. He proposed that the 'events in 
Grenada in 1983 ( ... ) reconfirmed the longstanding perception of the need to 
militarize the revolution, and it accentuated the pre-existent garrison state mentality' 
(Fernandez 1989, 18).9 Fernandez also suggested that increased hostility in general 
9 In October 1983, the United States led an invasion of Grenada in response to the coup which had 
ousted Maurice Bishop's Marxist-Leninist movement which had been supported by the Cuban 
Revolution. Around seven hundred Cuban personnel who were based on the island (only forty-three of 
whom were military personnel) surrendered to the invading troops, while twenty four were killed in 
action (O'Shaughnessy 1984, IS; Mazarr 1990,278). Approximately six thousand US troops were 
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from the United States under Reagan could be considered a contributing factor in the 
rekindled sense ofthreat of an enemy attack. Indeed, the attitude of the United States 
was cited as one of the central components of this so-called 'garrison state 
mentality' : 
U.s. aggression and Castro's ideology helps us to understand the garrison state 
mentality that has existed on the island since 1959 and the recent military doctrine of 
'War of All the People' (fa guerra de todo e/ pueblo). Threats from the U.s. and the 
Dominican Republic and from within ( ... ) in the initial hours led to militarization and 
the perception of Cuba as a besieged island. Thereafter, the regime has exploited this 
image to rally support and exert control through popular defense mobilization. Social 
militarization is also evident in the pedagogical emphasis on patriotic-military 
education from pre-school to university (Fernandez 1989,3). 
Thus, in Fernandez's writing, we see that 'militarisation' in Cuba, and mobilisation 
in general, were once again partly explained through the existence of a 'siege 
mentality' which had been manipulated by the leadership in order to encourage 
widespread participation amongst Cuban citizens. Fernandez's ideas on the 'garrison 
state mentality' echoed those of Dumont and Bonachea and San Martin, whose work 
was discussed earlier. 
Like Fernandez, Aguila also cited the role of the FAR in the zaJra as evidence of 
'militarisation' through an 'extension of a military mentality, and the use of military 
methods in education, labor, agriculture and even commerce' (Aguila 1989, 35). 
AdditionalIy, he viewed the MTT as 'another striking example of the regime's 
mobilisational capabilities, and of its penchant for inducing social militarization as a 
means of strengthening popular discipline' (Aguila 1989, 53). These factors, he 
purported, had contributed to the fact that the Cuban leadership had the ability to 
'mobilize nearly 2 million citizens for national defence, almost 20% of its 
involved in the invasion which resulted in the capture of the island in just a few days (Meemik 2004, 
176). 
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population. That is the highest proportion of potential military mobilization in any 
Latin American country, as well as the highest index of social militarization' (Aguila 
1989,33). 
Similarly, Leon Goure's chapter in this volume reinforced the arguments set forth by 
Aguila and Fernandez, particularly those regarding the supposed 'garrison state 
mentality' described by the latter. Goure wrote: 
Castro takes to heart Lenin's dictum that "a revolution is only worth something if it is 
able to defend itself'. According to the garrison state mentality presumably shared 
and deliberately fostered in Cuba by Fidel Castro as an important factor in 
legitimizing his regime and in maintaining the Cuban society in a perpetual state of 
mobilization, one would expect him to believe that "the proof of independence, the 
supreme proof, is that a country is able to defend itself and its independence in the 
face of an adversary as powerful as the US" (Goure 1989,63). 
Here, it was again evident that the 'garrison state mentality' was considered 
fundamental to the ability of the Revolution's leaders to mobilise its citizens into 
defending the nation by military means. Goure returned to this argument in the final 
chapter ofthe volume, in which he stated that: 
The alleged US threat to Cuba and the image of the island as a fortress forever ready 
to repel Yankee aggression has been and continues to be an important tool of the 
regime's ability to mobilise the Cuban people and ensure its support. This lends the 
FAR added prestige and importance and also makes it imperative to continually 
improve its capabilities (Goure 1989, 176). 
Elsewhere in Suchlicki's text, Andres Suarez offered additional evidence of the 
central role played by the FAR in Cuban politics in his chapter on 'Civil-Military 
Relations in Cuba'. Suarez made reference to Gonzalez's aforementioned concept of 
the 'civic soldier', and argued that the Cubans themselves had discussed openly the 
merits of a political-military leadership: 
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In several international conferences sponsored by the Soviets. the Cubans have 
suggested a new type of revolutionary leadership. a "political-military" leadership to 
replace the traditional communist leader; an expert in clandestine operations eternally 
waiting for the "maturation of objective conditions". We prefer to call them 
"revolutionary soldiers". These are men and women who profess a revolutionary 
ideology. who have discovered an aptitude for the military, and who perfect it in 
action (Suarez 1989. 132). 
Once more, it is evident that the fusion of the civil and military in Cuban society has 
often been seen as tantamount to the 'militarisation' of the Revolution. 
In the 1990s, authors taking a retrospective look at the history of the Cuban 
Revolution continued to examine the military aspects of the Revolution in power. 
One such author was Bunek, whose work, as stated at the beginning of this section, 
explored the active efforts of the Revolution's leaders to engender cultural change; 
specifically, Bunek analysed their attempts to 'create the proper conciencia ( ... ) to 
mold a "new man'" (Bunek ] 994, xi). Different, then, to many of the authors that 
have been discussed here, Bunck's work explored the 'militarism' of the Cuban 
Revolution through its manifestation in, and influence on, cultural practices and 
organisations in Cuban society. That said, Bunek did not ignore the significant role 
of the military in agriculture and industry, and the way in which its presence shaped 
the Revolution beyond these areas. 
As with Bonachea and San Martin, Bunck identified 1961 as the beginning of the 
'militarisation' process, although she associated it with the declaration of the 'Year 
of Education' and the subsequent literacy campaign, rather than with the declaration 
of the socialist nature of the Revolution, as such. In the campaign, Bunck found 
parallels with the way in which a nation might prepare itself for an impending 
conflict. She maintained: 
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The literacy campaign, involving more than one and a quarter million Cubans, also 
mobilized the masses in impressive fashion. As the campaign progressed, it reached a 
scope, duration, and intensity that states usually attain only on a war footing. The 
leadership's rhetoric charged the movement with the dramatic imagery of national 
emergency, revolutionary battle, and heroic victory. The literacy campaign thus 
revealed the militaristic style of the revolutionary leaders. It set a precedent of 
militarism that would steadily intensify over the next thirty years. Castro and his 
assistants conceptualised the literacy campaign, as they did nearly all national efforts, 
as a military exercise: as a "war", a "battle", or a "struggle". Over time this 
militaristic mentality came to dominate policy making concerned with cultural change 
(Bunck 1994, 26). 
It is possible to identify in Bunck's words echoes of Dumont's aforementioned 
comment from 1964 that 'Cuba is already on a war footing' (Dumont 1970, 232). 
Both authors thus seemed to view the mass mobilisation of Cuban citizens along 
military lines as akin to that of a nation at war, with each citizen being called upon to 
act in the nation's interests. Based on these perspectives, the idea of a 'siege 
mentality', therefore, permeates areas of the Revolution not directly associated with 
the defence of the nation. At other points in the text, Bunck referred to the military 
element of the organisation of agricultural work as part of the Revolutionary 
Offensive in much the same terms: 
Once the leaders launched the Offensive, a broad range of officials exalted work and 
used military terms, even war dispatches, to describe their goals. Speeches adopted 
dramatic militaristic phrases, equating the labour force with a "heroic battalion" and 
routinely describing labour efforts as "struggles" or "wars" (Bunck 1994, 144). 
Tied in with the early manifestation of 'militarism' in the literacy campaign, Bunck 
devoted much time to discussing the 'militarisation' of youth in Cuba. She argued 
that the military were largely employed to bring into line those young people who 
did not conform to the leadership's ideas regarding the ideal revolutionary citizen. In 
the I 970s, for example, 'rural work-study programs were expanded to include 
primary as well as secondary schools' (Bunck 1994, 50). These programmes sought 
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to instil military discipline and 'communist civic-mindedness' among the students, in 
addition to agricultural expertise. The guiding motto of the programme was 'estudio, 
trabajo y fusil', which, Bunck argued, clearly illustrated the equal importance given 
to military training. Later, during the Rectification period, the leadership hoped to 
reintegrate Cuban youth into the Revolution; the Uni6n de J6venes Comunistas 
(UJC) in particular was charged with resurrecting the concept of "military discipline" 
among young people (Bunck 1994, 64).10 Moreover, earlier in the decade, the 
government implemented an initiative entitled the Sociedad de Educaci6n Patri6tico-
Militar (SEPMI). Bunck explained that this programme functioned as a "military 
outreach program" for Cuban youths (Bunck 1994, 67). Through the programme, 
young people 'met with people who took part in famous revolutionary events, 
participated in seminars to study the legacy of Jose Marti, and promoted military 
sports ( ... ) At the same time, SEPMI encouraged Cuban patriotism and imparted 
useful military skills' (Bunck 1994, 67). Such programmes and organisations, Bunck 
affirmed, ensured that the 'militarisation' process permeated all areas of society. 
Some more recent academic texts have maintained the focus on the 'militarisation' of 
the Cuban Revolution. One notable example is Horowitz's voluminous monograph 
published in 2008. Horowitz, a known critic of the Revolution, perceives the 
generous authority awarded to the military in Cuba as central to the failings of the 
Revolution. Indeed, in his introduction, he declares that the 26th of July Movement 
10 The 'Rectification' campaign (the 'rectification of errors and negative tendencies', to give it its full 
title) was formally initiated at the Third Communist Party Congress in 1986. The campaign signalled 
a shift away from the Soviet model of economic management which was thought to have cultivated 
'inefficiency, corruption, and profit-minded selfishness' (LeoGrande 2008, 52). In its place. 
'Rectification' aimed to recentralise economic planning. and to eradicate material incentives 
(LeoGrande 2008, 52). Voluntary labour would also playa central role in the restructuring of Cuba's 
economy, much as it had done in the 1960s (LeoGrande 2008,52). 
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'quickly morphed into the January 1 st Movement of the Military'; it is this military 
style of governance that, under the 'family dictatorship' of the Castro brothers, has 
led to what he considers to have been a 'collective national disaster' (Horowitz 2008, 
ix). Horowitz stresses that, soon after Batista's overthrow, • All power rapidly moved 
from civil to military instruments and to a party that performed all essential roles of 
civil society without the encumbrance of democratic exchange' (Horowitz 2008, I). 
Much of Horowitz's argument for what he often terms Cuba's 'military sociology' 
finds its basis in the fact that he sees 'militarisation' as a natural step for guerrilla 
movements once they gain power. He contended in the mid-1970s that: 
Guerrilla movements are, first and foremost, military movements in the making. They 
require organisation, leadership, discipline. obedience and a command structure that is 
understood by the rank and file ( ... ) As in any regime that is a consequence of military 
engagements ( ... ) a sense of the necessary ingredients of military victory is carried 
over and perpetuated in the post-revolutionary epoch of reconstruction and 
consolidation. Hence, to speak of the military sociology of Cuban communism is to 
deal with a characteristic that defines revolutionary forces from the outset, not those 
which are simply grafted onto the revolution after its assumption of political power 
(Horowitz 2008, 104/5). 
In the following chapter, Horowitz continues with this line of thought when he 
asserts that 'the very origins of the Cuban military, steeped in guerrilla folklore and 
in Communist party indifference to spontaneous mass action, made the transition 
from civilianism to militarism not so much a matter of national upheaval as an 
expected stage of national development' (Horowitz 2008, 136). In this way, by 
placing the origins of 'militarisation' in the guerrilla insurrection, Horowitz is able to 
declare that he does not consider the process to have begun in 1968; rather, he 
affirms that he 'would probably date it somewhat earlier' (Horowitz 2008, 179). He 
states: 'It is my position that the military factor is endemic to the structure of the 
Cuban Revolution, spurred first, in response to US pressures culminating in the Bay 
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of Pigs' (Horowitz 2008,179). Situating the beginning of the 'militarisation' process 
in the early 1960s is consistent with San Martin and Bonachea' s aforementioned 
position: that 'militarisation' began at around the same time as the declaration of the 
Revolution as 'socialist' (Le. 1961). It also coincides with Bunck's observations 
regarding the 'militaristic' dimension of the literacy campaign of 1961. 
Horowitz then goes on to outline the different stages in Cuba's 'militarisation' 
which, he proposes, have corresponded to the changing needs of the Revolution. 
Firstly, he contends that the leadership looked to the military 'in classic Latin 
American tradition, for internal police functions, through the CDRs' (Horowitz 2008, 
136). Secondly, the military was employed to mobilise the masses following the 
failed attempt to improve economic development through moral incentives. Thirdly, 
professionalism was encouraged within the armed forces in order that they could 
perform competently in conflicts overseas. 
Of all these phases, Horowitz perceives of 1973 as a pivotal moment in the 
militarisation process, partly owing to the aforementioned role it acquired in the 
efforts to tum the economy around, but largely as a result of the ascendancy of Raul 
Castro within the leadership: 
Not only did 1973 represent a new stage in the militarization of Cuban communism, 
but it also witnessed the thoroughgoing displacement of Guevara as the number-two 
figure (even in death) by the orthodox military figure of Raul Castro ( ... ) Raul's rise 
to a place second only to Fidel's, and increasingly paralleling Fidel's role in crucial 
state and diplomatic functions, can hardly be exaggerated. Raul has become the 
spokesman for all things military and the heir apparent to the revolution itself. His 
orthodoxy extends to the cut of his uniform ( ... ) and his insistence on creating ranks 
within the Cuban military that are isomorphic with military ranks elsewhere in the 
world (Horowitz 2008, ]37). 
36 
Here, it is evident that Horowitz's argument is contrary to Fernandez's comment 
discussed earlier, regarding the 1970s in Cuba as a period of 'social demilitarization'. 
Rather, Horowitz purports that it 'would take an ostrich-like self-deception to assume 
that since 1970 Cuba has been in a process of demilitarization ( ... ) If anything, 
Cuban leadership has become more bellicose over the last several years in claiming 
the righteousness of the decision to resort to the military as the underpinning of the 
state' (Horowitz 2008, 175). He continues: 'To speak of some magic 
demilitarization having begun in the 1970s is, to put it mildly, idiosyncratic. 
Militarization is not easily turned on and off at will. Even Cuban authorities have 
not asserted such an extreme voluntarist position concerning demilitarization' 
(Horowitz 2008, 179). 
Horowitz does, however, support the position of the majority of academics in stating 
that Cuban agriculture has been 'entirely militarized. Workers have been organised 
mobilized and organized into brigades' (Horowitz 2008, 177). He posits that 
militarisation in this area has been inevitable, owing to the Revolution's 'single-crop 
export "socialism'" (Horowitz 2008, 177). Horowitz cites this involvement of the 
military in the agricultural sector as a contributing factor in the institutionalisation of 
the fusion of the party and the military (Horowitz 2008, 422). Moreover, he 
reiterates the comments he made in 1971 when he asserts: 
My own deepest impulse is to see the Castro regime as increasingly similar in function 
and structure to classical go/pisla regimes elsewhere in the hemisphere. In that sense, 
Cuba is the backwater of Latin American tendencies toward democratization 
(Horowitz 2008, 423). 
In sum, the review of the above literature confirms the statement made earlier in the 
Introduction regarding the existence of a broad consensus in Western academia on 
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the subject of 'militarism' in the Cuban Revolution. Additionally, it allows for the 
conclusion that much of the literature on the 'militarisation' of the Cuban Revolution 
has been critical of such a process, with many arguing that the military dimension of 
revolutionary change has served only as an obstacle to genuine political participation 
in Cuba, largely as a result of the oft-cited fusion of the Party and the military. 
Several prominent academics have also pointed to the creation of a hierarchy along 
military lines within the Party, and some argue that this has inevitably produced 
authoritarianism within the Revolution. The general argument seems to revolve 
around the idea that the role of the military in economic matters, and, specifically, in 
the organisation of agricultural programmes, has not only been inefficient, but that 
Cuban citizens needed to be coerced into performing their so-called revolutionary 
'duties' and would not have done so without enforcement by the armed forces. 
What is more, the majority of the authors just reviewed are of the opinion that the 
long-standing presence of military figures in governmental positions has reflected an 
overriding concern with national defence which, at times, has meant that the 
immediate needs of Cuban citizens have been ignored. Aguila, for instance, referred 
to an 'unmitigated paranoia' within the leadership which 'adversely affects 
development efforts and reinforces a siege mentality that is unnecessary' (Aguila 
1989, 33). This so-called 'siege mentality' has, on the whole, been presented as both 
a cause and an effect of the 'militarisation' process. On the one hand, some authors 
have viewed the development of a 'siege mentality' as the strategy which has 
legitimised the Revolution's shift to 'militarism'; the leadership'S consistent 
emphasis on the Revolution's vulnerability to counter-revolutionary attacks has 
justified the need for the military organisation of the population in order to create a 
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fully prepared defence force. On the other hand, others have argued that 'siege 
mentality' is a consequence of the militarisation process, insofar as the pervasive role 
of the military in Cuban society and politics has produced an environment in which 
the nation constantly appears to be, to use Dumont's term, on a 'war footing' 
(Dumont 1970, 232). 
A New Approach: The Guerrilla Legacy, Political Culture, and Discourse 
Analysis 
The body of literature just discussed has made a significant contribution to Cuban 
studies in its analysis of the changing face of the Revolution from the late 1960s 
onwards. It has offered useful insights into the workings of the Revolution and the 
way in which the FAR has made decisive contributions to the Revolution's economy, 
infrastructure, foreign policy, and, perhaps most significantly, its defensive 
capabilities (Morris 1989, xiii). It is not the purpose of this thesis to contest the idea 
of the pervasive role of the Cuban military in either the leadership, or in Cuban 
society as a whole, from the first decade of the Revolution in power. This 
characteristic of the Revolution is indisputable. The physical presence of the FAR 
and its members has loomed large, and still does, within many areas of the 
Revolution, such as political governance and the management of mass agricultural 
work, which one would normally consider to be beyond the remit of most armed 
forces. Moreover, the FAR itself has undoubtedly been transformed from a 
relatively disorganised guerrilla army into a professionalised military institution, a 
transformation which has brought with it an increased hierarchical structure, and a 
greater emphasis on military discipline and order, both within the institution itself, 
and within the Revolution more broadly. 
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Rather, the aim of this thesis is to question the very term 'militarism' and its use as a 
means of accounting for the Revolution's survival and that of its leaders. One of the 
problems with the term 'militarism' is that, when applied to the Cuban context after 
1959, it is done so in a loose and impressionistic fashion, really referring to a steady 
process whereby supposedly: 
a) The FAR, as a more professional and hierarchical structure after 1972, began 
to move into areas of labour mobilisation (for example, the EJT) and to 
influence foreign policy, as evidenced by Cuba's involvement in Angola and 
Ethiopia. 
b) Cubans were marshalled in military-like structures (and language) into 
various mobilisations, such as in the Literacy Campaign and the 
Revolutionary Offensive. 
However, in reality, 'militarism' as a concept is very specific in time (and often 
place), according to political science and history (Chickering 2008, 196). From these 
disciplinary standpoints, 'militarism' refers, on the whole, to the late nineteenth 
century growth of a belief (within newly professionalised militaries) in the military'S 
corporate identity (thinking and acting as a unified 'one'), and corporate superiority 
over civilians. This belief resulted in a general propensity to engage, and intervene, 
if necessary, in political life in cases where the nation's unity and stability were 
'threatened', whether by external forces or from below. 
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Integral to that sense of militarism was, therefore, the idea of a 'mission' to which 
the military had to be loyal (to 'save' country X or 'defend' country V's 
sovereignty), and which justified intervention. Since that concept of militarism also 
became characteristic of the Latin American militaries from the 1880s, being 
reinforced from the 1920s (with the rise of corporatism as an elite-based idea) and 
then again in the 1960s (with the US-driven 'doctrine of national security'), the 
assumption grew that Cuba's supposed domination by 'the military' was simply a 
Cuban version of a wider problem. Hence, the use of the term 'militarism' to 
describe something perceived in Cuba was loose at one level (in that it meant 
different things and was often simply impressionistic rather than analytical) but also 
deliberate, relating a supposedly FAR-dominated Cuban system to the military 
dictatorships which emerged in Latin America in the 1960s. This latter comparative 
application has largely been propounded by critics of the Revolution, and is 
exemplified by Horowitz's aforementioned contention that 'the general militarization 
of the hemisphere has had its left-wing reflex in Cuba' (Horowitz 1972, 18). 
Yet, as previously discussed, negative interpretations such as Horowitz's overlook 
the inescapable truth that Cuba's military, unlike others in Latin America, is heir to a 
revolutionary heritage which has permeated it with the belief that the armed forces 
operate on behalf of a revolutionary people; it does not, therefore, possess a 
corporate superiority over the civilian population in its role as defender of the state 
(Klepak 2005, 56). Instead, and as noted in the opening pages of the Introduction, in 
revolutionary Cuba the distinction between what constitutes the civilian and military 
sphere is quite often difficult to discern. Put simply, then, applying 'militarism' to 
the very specific context of the Cuban Revolution does not tell the whole story of 
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Cuba's military (or, for that matter, guerrilla) experience, both prior and subsequent 
to 1959, and its complex relationship with the leadership and general society. 
Moreover, seen through the lens of 'militarism', the longevity of the Revolution and 
the political careers of those who participated in the insurrectionary phase can be 
explained by an increased authoritarian style of leadership and the concentration of 
power in the hands of a small elite (a direct result of a supposed military 
'intervention' in government), both of which reduce citizen political participation, 
and the perpetuation of a 'siege mentality'. All these factors, as we saw in the 
preceding section, have been highlighted as defining characteristics of' mil itarism' in 
the Cuban context. This focus on authoritarianism, discipline, and the so-called 
'siege', or 'garrison state mentality', is somewhat myopic in its understanding of 
how the Revolution functions, how the leadership interacts with the rest of the 
population, and how it garners consent for a revolutionary project first envisioned in 
1953 with the attack on the Moncada army barracks in Santiago de Cuba. 
Specifically, it neglects to consider the political culture which has underpinned the 
Revolution in power. This thesis rectifies this glaring omission by demonstrating 
how the guerrilla experience has shaped the political culture of the Cuban 
Revolution. 
The notion of 'political culture' employed in the thesis is consistent with Richard 
Fagen's conceptualisation of the term in his insightful work, The Transformation of 
Political Culture in Cuba (Fagen, 1969). Fagen perceived of 'political culture' as 
"'the system of empirical beliefs, expressive symbols, and values which defines the 
situation in which political action takes place. It provides the subjective orientation 
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to politics'" (Fagen 1969, 5). To elucidate further, a political culture, which Fagen 
alternately terms 'political socialization', refers to the beliefs, symbols and values 
which are created by a political elite to determine how citizens relate to the political 
institution of said elite, but also to each other in a given political context (Fagen 
1969,2). The creation of a new political culture aims to institute a new 'way of life' 
in which the incumbent political power is afforded legitimacy (Fagen 1969, 5). It is 
important to add that, for Fagen, the notion of political culture does not encapsulate 
'recurring patterns of manifest political behaviour' (Fagen 1969, 5). Instead, it sees 
such patterns (for example, a high level of citizen participation in the task of defence 
in revolutionary Cuba) as the outcome of the socialisation which accompanies a 
given political culture. It is such an outcome which is one of the objectives of 
creating a new political culture. With respect to the Cuban context, Fagen contends 
that 'The primary aim of political socialization in Cuba is to produce a participating 
citizen, not just one who can recite the revolutionary catechism perfectly (oo.) The 
regime seeks to forge the new political culture in the crucible of action' (Fagen 1969, 
7). 
Fagen's concept is useful for an understanding of how the guerrilla generation has 
assumed a central role within the Cuban leadership throughout the course of the 
Revolution, insofar as it assists, in Fagen's own words, in explaining 'how and why 
certain political institutions function or fail to function in specific national settings' 
(Fagen 1969 5). Moreover, the images, symbols and slogans which point to a 
veneration of the guerrillero in Cuba can be considered significant components of 
the political culture implemented and fostered by the leadership, in that they 
represent certain beliefs and values which have shaped the way in which Cuban 
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citizens have responded to the revolutionary project. In other words, the cultivation 
of the guerrilla legacy has assisted in establishing a context in which the idea of a 
leadership largely composed of ex-guerrilla fighters has been gradually normalised 
since 1959 and has become, to a certain degree, unquestioned. As Fagen has written, 
'the Cuban elite has not in the main been interested in socializing citizens to pre-
existing values and ways of behaving. Rather, the socialization process has been 
directed toward an attempt to create new values and behaviours in the context of new 
political settings' (Fagen 1969, 6). 
It is this new political setting, and not, therefore, 'militarism', which has enabled the 
Revolution to endure crises where other less socially and culturally embedded 
political powers might have failed. The Revolution did not, for example, collapse 
with the resignation of Fidel Castro as head of the Council of State and the Council 
of Ministers of Cuba in 2008, an outcome which contradicts one version of the 
'militarism' perspective. Cited earlier, Dumont stated that the 'militarism' of the 
Revolution was partly characterised by 'an authoritarian leadership headed by a 
personal power that decides all problems, political, economic, and technical' 
(Dumont 1974, 113). The smooth handover of power to Raul Castro offered 
sufficient demonstration that the Revolution could not be reduced to the political 
power of one individual, but was instead buttressed by a political culture which 
legitimised the Revolution as a whole. Furthermore, the involvement of a significant 
proportion of the population in the aforementioned Bastion defence training exercise 
in 2004 revealed that the Cuban leadership, as Klepak has asserted, 'still has a 
striking ability to mobilize the nation in times of crisis' (Klepak 2008, 72). This 
level of citizen participation in the Revolution undermines Dumont's other claim that 
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'This military society ( ... ) follows a path leading away from participation' (Dumont 
1974, 113). Again, it is the political culture that has accompanied the Revolution in 
power since its formative years which has presented the task of defending it as a duty 
that all Cubans must fulfil. 
A principal contention of this thesis is that a central component of the political 
culture developed by the Revolution has been the guerrilla legacy. This aspect has 
profoundly shaped the political culture insofar as many of the values, beliefs and 
symbols of which it is comprised amount to a promotion of the guerrilla ethos and 
the image of the guerrillero. Briefly mentioned in the opening paragraphs, evidence 
for this promulgation of the guerrilla ethos is ubiquitous in Cuba. The elevation of 
the heroes and events of the insurrectionary phase of the Revolution encourages 
Cuban citizens to emulate the values and attributes of the guerrillero, for instance the 
value of duty, or deber, mentioned above. What is more, the guerrilla legacy imbues 
the political culture, and, therefore, the Cuban people, with a profound sense of 
history, and, specifically, Cuba's history of struggle for its independence. This 
history has been presented by the leadership as an on-going guerrilla struggle - that 
of the underdog fighting against much greater and more powerful enemies - of 
which the Revolution in power is the concluding chapter. In this portrayal of an 
unfinished guerrilla struggle, the Cuban people as a nation are designated the true 
leaders of the Revolution, and are thus afforded agency in determining the fate of the 
Revolution. Hence, they are not necessarily discouraged by the leadership from 
participating in revolutionary activity, nor simply subject to a military discipline 
which forces their involvement or consent. On the contrary, there has been a 
conscious attempt by the leadership to encourage participation, but, more 
45 
importantly, to create an environment in which the revolutionary project can be 
accepted by Cuban citizens as an inevitable stage of Cuba's long-standing quest for 
independence. In this way, where 'militarism' is overwhelmingly negative in its talk 
of authoritarian control and Cuba's perpetual state of being on a 'war footing', the 
guerrilla aspect of the Revolution's political culture is, on the whole, positive. For 
this reason, it is too reductive to say that authoritarianism and 'siege mentality' are 
central to understanding the durability of the leadership's political power. Instead, 
by taking into account the legacy of guerrilla warfare and its effect on the 
Revolution's political culture, one can begin to understand that the relationship 
between the leadership and the general population is far more complex, and involves 
a certain degree of complicity and consent which has contributed to the Revolution's 
survival. 
It should be made clear here, however, that this study does not look to assess the 
reception of the beliefs and values relating to the guerrilla experience by Cuban 
citizens, nor does it measure the extent to which the acceptance of these values has 
manifested itself in increased participation and support for the Revolution. Aside 
from the obvious obstacles to undertaking such an assessment in revolutionary Cuba 
(both politically and methodologically speaking), the decision to overlook these 
aspects of the Revolution is also consistent with Fagen's assertion, cited earlier, that 
the notion of 'political culture' does not refer to 'recurring patterns of manifest 
political behaviour' (Fagen 1969, 5). Instead, under investigation here is the way in 
which the guerrilla experience has shaped the 'way of life' and the 'new interlocking 
system of political values and behaviours' which has been developed by the 
revolutionary leadership (Fagen 1969, 5). 
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This influence of the guerrilla experience on the shaping of values and beliefs is most 
evident in the language employed by the leadership in its communication with the 
rest of the population. It is language, after all, which acts as the primary medium 
through which those in power are able to express certain beliefs, and therefore create 
a new political culture. Accordingly, then, this study applies discourse analysis to 
texts issued at specific points in the history of the Revolution in power, in order to 
reveal the extent to which the guerrilla ethos has been actively perpetuated. The 
particular methodology of discourse analysis applied follows the approach which has 
been outlined by Norman Fairclough (1989, 1992). Fairclough's methodology, 
described in greater detail in Chapter Two, combines 'linguistically-oriented 
discourse analysis and social and political thought relevant to discourse and 
language' as a means of examining how discourse contributes to social change 
(Fairclough 1992, 64). Taking into account the influential work of Ferdinand de 
Saussure, Michel Pecheux and Michel Foucault in the field of discourse analysis, 
Fairclough views discursive practice as having the capacity to 'naturalise' certain 
ideologies in its contribution to 'the construction of systems of knowledge and 
belief (Fairclough 1992, 65/66). In tum, he argues that this ability of discourse to 
construct and naturalise ideologies contributes to 'transforming society and 
reproducing it' (Fair1cough 1992, 65). It is necessary to underline here Fairclough's 
definition of what is meant by 'discourse' in his work. He states that his 'focus is 
upon language' and thus he employs the term 'more narrowly than social scientists to 
refer to spoken or written language use' as a form of 'social practice', as a way in 
which 'people may act upon the world' and each other' (Fairclough 1992. 62/63). 
With regard to his classification of what constitutes a 'text', Fairclough considers this 
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term to refer to 'any discursive event', whether spoken or written (Fairclough 1992, 
4). 
Consistent, then, with Fairclough's interpretation, the discourse analysis employed in 
this thesis is applied to a range of texts, including books, newspapers, magazines and 
speeches. The analysis itself involves, among other aspects, an examination of how 
phrases are structured, and the meanings and 'ideological investment' attached to 
specific words, with a view to uncovering clues as to the belief system such wordings 
help to construct (Fairclough 1992, 77). This notion of discourse as a contributor to 
the 'construction of systems of knowledge and belief and the naturalisation of a 
given ideology has important connotations for the study of the role of the guerrilla 
legacy in the Cuban Revolution. If we are to accept that the leadership's discourse 
reflects its ideological outlook, then it follows that the marked presence of a 
'guerrilla rhetoric' within that discourse is evidence that the guerrilla ethos 
constitutes one of the defining components of the ideology which underpins the 
Cuban Revolution. 
Fairclough's mention of ideology, however, requires further clarification here. The 
notion of ideology employed in this thesis is consistent with the Gramscian 
explanation of the term, and is thus defined in relation to the concept of hegemony, a 
more precise definition of which is also provided in Chapter Two. Antonio Gramsci 
argued that the pursuit of political power, or hegemonic control, involved the 
creation of 'a new and integral conception of the world' which was central to the task 
of 'conquering' the 'subordinated masses of civil society' (Gramsci 1971, 9). He 
wrote: 
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What matters is that a new way of conceiving the world and man is born and that this 
conception is no longer reserved to the great intellectuals, to professional 
philosophers, but tends rather to become a popular, mass phenomenon, with a 
concretely world-wide character, capable of modifying C ••• ) popular thought (Gramsci 
1971,417). 
Following Gramsci, then, the present work considers the ideology, or the 'way of 
conceiving the world', of the Cuban Revolution to be that of cubania. The concept 
of cubania is firmly embedded in Cuban literature and historiography, and can be 
briefly summarised as a combination of pride in the Cuban nation and an inherent 
sense of history. Antoni Kapcia, who has written extensively on the concept, offers a 
more precise definition of cubania, describing it as 'the political belief in 
cubanidad'; cubanidad, in turn, can be considered a 'belief in the existence of an 
inherent 'cuban-ness', a desire to re-capture an imagined nation or community which 
has somehow been obscured by the involvement of exogenous factors, such as 
Spanish colonialism and, later, US imperialism' (Kapcia 2000, 22/23). Put 
differently, cubania can be summed up as an innate belief in an independent Cuba 
and a Cuban national identity, fused with anti-imperialism. Kapcia asserts that this 
conceptualisation of cubania is not about ideas, 'but rather of beliefs and values, that 
is the substance of which a genuinely consensual ideology consists' (Kapcia 2008, 
92). 
The present work argues that many of the 'beliefs and values' of which clihania is 
comprised are those which represent the guerrilla ethos. To assist in outlining this 
argument, Kapcia's concept of ideological 'codes' is employed as a means of 
defining more precisely how these guerrilla beliefs and values relate to the wider 
'world-view' of the Revolution. Kapcia identifies such 'codes' as 'building blocks 
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of the ideology, defining separately the values, as beliefs, that will collectively form 
the whole belief-system that constitutes an ideology' (Kapcia 2000, 13). In other 
words, codes can be understood as the pillars of an ideology, as specific sets of 
beliefs and principles. As will become clear in the subsequent chapters, the values 
which constitute the guerrilla ethos, and which have been promoted by the 
leadership, together form an ideological code, a mini belief system within the wider 
belief-system of cubania, which has underpinned the Revolution since its inception. 
Chapter One of the thesis provides a discussion of how we might conceptualise the 
perpetuation of the guerrilla ethos in the Cuban Revolution, and thereby produce an 
alternative to the term 'militarism'. It first considers the term joquismo, given that, 
for the majority of Western scholars, this term immediately calls to mind the Cuban 
theory, and experience, of guerrilla warfare. A detailed outline of what is meant by 
joquismo is offered, based on a reading of Che Guevara's La Guerra de Guerrillas 
(1960), and Regis Debray's Revolution dans la Revolution? (1967). This outline 
contributes to our understanding of what is meant by guerrilla warfare in the context 
of the Cuban Revolution, while also providing a reference point for the discourse 
analysis in subsequent chapters, which supports the hypothesis that the guerrilla 
ethos constitutes an ideological code within the leadership's discourse. There then 
follows an overview of the work of a comparatively small number of scholars who 
have argued against the categorisation of the Revolution as 'militarised' by 
highlighting the pervasive guerrilla element in the Cuban Revolution. The terms 
proposed by these scholars to define this guerrilla element are evaluated in terms of 
their pertinence to this study's examination of the code ofthe guerrilla ethos. 
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Chapters Two and Three are comprised of an in-depth analysis of the revolutionary 
leadership's discourse in the 1960s and 1970s, respectively. The discourse analysis 
will identify whether the language of the leadership during the first two decades 
reflected the on-going influence of the guerrilla experience through a promotion of 
the guerrilla ethos. The 1960s and 1970s have been selected as periods for 
examination, given the centrality of this period to those who have emphasised the 
Revolution's 'militarism'. Here, the dominant trend has been to pinpoint the mid- to 
late- 1960s as heralding the gradual shift to a 'militarised' Revolution, while the 
1970s is generally perceived as the decade in which the process of 'militarisation' 
became complete, in line with the 'Sovietisation'/ 'institutionalisation' that the 
Revolution supposedly experienced from the late 1960s onwards. By contrast, based 
on an analysis of a cross-section of texts, Chapters Two and Three challenge the 
assumption that, by the late I 960s, the Revolution had undergone a complete 
transformation from an inchoate guerrilla-led system into one which was organised 
primarily along military lines, and which bore little resemblance to the Revolution 
which had assumed power in 1959. What the evidence in these chapters reveals is 
that, though the Revolution underwent profound structural change in the late 1960s 
and early 1970s, the beliefs and values which underpinned the revolutionary project 
remained unchanged. In demonstrating this ideological continuity, Chapter Three 
also undermines the widely accepted premise that the second decade of the 
Revolution can be characterised as a period of' Sovietisation' / 'institutionalisation' . 
Chapter Four continues the analysis of the leadership's discourse by examining the 
so-called 'Special Period' of the 1990s. This decade offers an interesting case-study, 
insofar as it was a time of heightened instability and profound crisis which resulted 
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from the collapse of Cuba's principal political and economic ally, the Soviet Union, 
in 1991. Having already established that a 'guerrilla rhetoric' is evident in texts 
issued by the leadership in the 1960s and 1970s in the preceding chapters, Chapter 
Four demonstrates that the values related to the guerrilla ethos have constituted an 
ideological code at other points in the course of the Revolution in power, and have 
thus continued to shape the political culture of the Revolution long after the physical 
guerrilla struggle of the insurrectionary phase ended. Moreover, by presenting 
evidence of a resurgence of the guerrilla ethos during the 'Special Period', the 
chapter argues that the guerrilla code is a recourse to which the leadership turns 
when trying to steel the popUlation to face a series of unprecedented challenges. 
Finally, the concluding chapter ties together the evidence presented in Chapters Two 
to Four to demonstrate how the perpetuation ofthe guerrilla ethos has contributed to 
the survival of the Revolution over six decades, and how it has enabled the leaders of 
the Ejercito Rebelde to maintain their political control over the revolutionary project. 
It also affirms the contribution of the thesis to the broader field of Cuban studies, and 
the avenues for further research which it opens up. 
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Chapter One 
Conceptualising the Perpetuation of the Guerrilla Ethos in the 
Cuban Revolution 
It has already been established in the Introduction that this thesis considers the term 
'militarism' to be unhelpful when referring to the Cuban context, given that it does 
not account for the guerrilla origins of the Cuban Revolution, nor the evidence which 
points to an on-going legacy of the guerrilla experience under the Revolution in 
power. One of the first tasks which this study must necessarily undertake, therefore, 
is to decide upon an alternative conceptualisation which does consider the above 
aspects, and which will serve to classify the 'guerrilla code' throughout the thesis. In 
order to do so, this chapter evaluates the existing literature which has called attention 
to the legacy of guerrilla warfare, and which has attempted to categorise such a 
legacy in a specifically Cuban context. 
The principal, and perhaps most obvious, term to be considered is that of foquismo. 
for three reasons. First, it is probable that, for non-Cuban scholars, this term is 
instantly recognisable given its inextricable association with the writings of Che 
Guevara concerning guerrilla warfare methodology, and its subsequent appropriation 
by left-wing armed revolutionary movements in Latin America during the I 960s and 
1970s. That foquismo is a readily identifiable concept which immediately evokes 
images of guerrilla warfare (specifically, the Cuban experience of this form of 
insurrection) suggests that it is a suitable opposition to 'militarism'. Secondly, an 
examination of the term is useful in that the precepts of the methodology to which it 
refers are based on the events of the guerrilla insurrection of the 1950s. Given that 
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this thesis demonstrates that the lived experience of guerrilla warfare during that 
period has continued to shape the political culture of the Revolution in power, an 
examination of what is meant by foquismo will shed light upon what is meant by 
guerrilla warfare in the Cuban context, and, in tum, facilitate an understanding of 
how exactly its influence has manifested itself in the leadership's discourse. Finally, 
as will become clear in the following three chapters, echoes of Guevara's precepts of 
guerrilla warfare featured heavily in the hegemonic discourse of the 1960s, 70s and 
90s, and thus constitute one of the key indicators of a promulgation of 
guerrillerismo. An understanding of these precepts at the outset is therefore essential 
if we are to appreciate fully the extent to which they were employed in the active 
perpetuation of the guerrilla ethos. The following section will thus present a detailed 
outline of the concept of foquismo, followed by a discussion of the applicability of 
foquismo as a characterisation of the 'guerrilla code'. 
What is Foquismo? 
At its most basic level, the term foquismo refers to the Cuban theory of revolution 
based upon guerrilla warfare. The principal architect of the theory was Guevara 
who, having acted as one of the chief protagonists in the Cuban Revolution's 
insurrectionary phase, believed that important lessons could be drawn from the hard-
won campaign. These lessons, he argued, would contribute to the development of 
armed struggle in Latin America, and would be universally applicable to all countries 
across the region. Guevara articulated his conclusions in his 1960 publication, La 
Guerra de Guerrillas, a text which would lay the basis for the conceptualisation of 
guerrilla warfare known as the foco theory. This work had an explicitly didactic 
function, intended as it was to provide would-be Latin American guerrilleros with a 
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methodology for fomenting revolution through guerrilla warfare. Harry Villegas, 
himselfa celebrated hero of the Cuban Revolution, writes in the prologue to the 2006 
edition that La Guerra de Guerrillas outlined 'un metodo, una gufa y una forma para 
la toma del poder polftico en America Latina, por medio de la lucha armada', and 
aimed to equip armed struggle with 'una metodologia y didactica especificas' 
(Villegas 2006, 3). Guevara had intended for his friend and fellow guerrillero, 
Camilo Cienfuegos, to edit and amend the text prior to publication, but Cienfuegos 
was killed in a plane crash in October 1959. The work has thus formed part of 
Guevara's legacy alone. 
In 1963, Guevara published two other works, both of which were also based on his 
experience in the sierras of Cuba. The most well-known of these works was Pasajes 
de fa Guerra Revofucionaria (Guevara, 1963). Through its incorporation of excerpts 
from Guevara's diary, the text comprehensively chronicled the events of the 
Revolution's guerrilla war, and served to corroborate the conclusions summarised in 
La Guerra de Guerrillas by providing a detailed account of the strategies employed 
by the Ejercito Rebelde. The other text to be published that year was an article 
entitled 'Guerra de Guerrillas: un metodo', which first appeared in the magazine 
Cuba Socialista (Guevara, 1963). In the article, Guevara reiterated the conclusions 
of La Guerra de Guerrillas, and reconfirmed his belief that armed struggle was the 
only viable path to revolution in the Americas. II This text, along with La Guerra de 
Guerrillas, will serve as the basis for the following outline ofthe!oco theory. 
II Matt D. Childs argues that the article differed, however, from La Guerra de Guerrillas in its 
distinctly Marxist tone (reflecting the Revolution's entry into the socialist sphere), and in the absence 
of the 'democratic corolIary' (Childs 1995, 616). This latter point, articulated in La Guerra de 
Guerrillas, proposed that guerrilIa warfare could not be successful in countries in which democracy 
was, even superficially, in existence (Guevara 2006, 14). 
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It is important to note here that, while Guevara became indelibly linked to the 
concept of Joquismo in Latin America, he never once used the term in his own 
writing; rather, Guevara spoke only of the guerrillafoco, and thus his methodology 
has become known as the loco theory. It wasn't until the pUblication of Regis 
Debray's Revolution dans la Revolution? in 1967 that the term was first used to 
conceptualise the methodology outlined by Guevara. More will be said of Debray's 
writings on Joquismo later in this section, but it is from Guevara's work that the 
following tenets of the Joco theory are drawn. 
In the opening lines of La Guerra de Guerrillas, in a chapter entitled 'Esencia de la 
Lucha Guerrillera', Guevara outlined three unavoidable conclusions, or, as he 
referred to them, 'aportaciones', which could be drawn from the Cuban Revolution's 
insurrectionary phase, and applied to armed struggle in Latin America. He proposed: 
Consideramos que tres aportaciones fundamentales hizo la Revoluci6n cubana a la 
mecanica de los movimientos revolucionarios en America. Son ellas: 
1. Las fuerzas populares pueden ganar una guerra contra el ejercito. 
2. No siempre hay que esperar a que se den todas las condiciones para la revoluci6n; 
el foeo insurreccional puede desarrollar condiciones subjetivas sobre la base de las 
condiciones objetivas dadas. 
3. En la America subdesarrollada, el terreno de la lucha armada debe ser 
fundamental mente el campo (Guevara 2006, 13). 
Guevara's hypotheses (most significantly the second deduction) were to prove highly 
influential for countless guerrilla movements that emerged across Latin America in 
the wake of the Cuban Revolution's coming to power in the 1960s and early 1970s. 
Indeed, these three central tenets can be viewed as the motivating force behind the 
articulation ofthe loco strategy. In other words, having established that the victory of 
a small guerrilla army over a far superior force was entirely possible in Latin 
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America ifthe conflict was carried out in a rural area and could rely on the subjective 
will of the revolutionaries involved, Guevara sought to create a concrete 
methodology of revolutionary guerrilla warfare which used these three tenets as its 
point of departure. 
At the root of this theory, the very starting point of a revolution, was the belief that a 
small group of guerrilla fighters could penetrate into an isolated, rural area and 
establish a base. Both Guevara and Castro referred to such a base as afoeo. It was 
proposed that, from this centre of operations, the micro-army would be able to launch 
a guerrilla war and gradually disseminate over a wider area through the 
establishment of additional jocos, eventually forming a network. The principal 
objective of the formation of a network was to gain control of the countryside, thus 
isolating urban centres. Cut off from the rest of the country, the city-based state 
mechanisms would be weakened to the point of destruction. At such a point, the 
guerrilla army, in collaboration with mass civilian support, would be in a position to 
descend from the mountains, or jungle, and assume control of the metropolitan areas. 
It should be noted here that the foco base did not refer to a fixed geographical 
location. Rather, the idea of the foeo denoted a clandestine body of highly-trained 
armed combatants which must remain constantly mobile. Guevara maintained that 
the loco should be comprised of just a small number of guerrilleros: approximately 
twenty-five men should the terrain be favourable (Guevara 2006, 36). In contrast, 
when operating in unfavourable terrain, Guevara was of the opinion that the joco 
should not consist of more than ten to fifteen men. He stated: 'cuando el numero 
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pasa de diez las posibilidades de que el enemigo los localice ( ... ) son mucho 
mayores' (Guevara 2006,41). 
Guevara considered the mobility of the guerrilla joco, and also, therefore, its 
diminutive size, to be critical features of an embryonic campaign, insofar as both 
characteristics would aid in diminishing the possibility of the joco's detection by the 
state security apparatus. As such, it was stated that a guerrilla cell should maintain 
the flexibility to relocate should enemy forces be active within its vicinity. Guevara 
insisted: 
Caracteristica fundamental de una guerrilla es la movilidad, 10 que Ie permite estar en 
pocos minutos lejos del teatro especifico de la acci6n y en pocas horas lejos de la 
regi6n de la misma, si fuera necesario; que Ie pennite cambiar constantemente de 
frente y evitar cualquier tipo de cerco (Guevara 2006, 26). 
This primacy of flexibility was also underlined in relation to the attitude and actions 
of the guerrillero; the individual fighter had to be prepared to confront and adapt to 
disparate circumstances in the course of the guerrilla struggle. Guevara contended: 
'Otra caracteristica fundamental del soldado guerrillero es su flexibilidad para 
adaptarse a todas las circunstancias y convertir en favorables todos los accidentes de 
la acci6n' (Guevara 2006, 28). In tum, such adaptability at an individual level would 
allow for the guerrilla army, as a collective, to perpetuate its state of mobility. 
Guevara advised that 'nunca conviene habituar al enemigo a una forma determinada 
de Guerra; hay que variar constantemente los lugares y las horas de operaci6n y las 
formas de hacerlo tambien' (Guevara 2006,39). 
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The mobility and flexibility of the guerrilla army were also fundamental tenets of the 
methodology, in that they allowed for the movement to tum its inferior size to its 
advantage. Constant mobility, and the capacity to move around undetected, would 
enable the guerrilla army to apply one of its most effective weapons: the element of 
surprise. Surprise attacks were central to a successful guerrilla campaign given that 
the small number of rebels impeded the possibility of participating in conventional, 
military battles. Instead, it was vital that the guerrilleros attack the enemy when 
least expected, and flee the scene before its target had time to regroup and retaliate. 
Such attacks could inflict not only physical damage, but could also dent the morale 
of the opposing forces, which would then be forced into the defensive position. 
Guevara wrote of this tactic: 
Naturalmente, su inferioridad numerica hace muy necesario que los ataques sean 
siempre por sorpresa, esa es la gran ventaja, es 10 que permite al guerrillero hacer 
bajas al enemigo sin sufrir perdidas (Guevara 2006, 27). 
Elsewhere in La Guerra de Guerrillas, he referred to this tactic as that of 'muerde y 
huye' (Guevara 2006, 20). He purported that the repetition of this strategy 'sin 
descanso al enemigo' would thoroughly demoralise the opponent, leaving it to 
believe that it was surrounded by the rebel forces (Guevara 2006, 20). Surprise 
attacks could also lead to the acquisition of additional weaponry by the rebels which 
would only serve to strengthen the campaign. Another means of undermining the 
enemy, according to Guevara, was to employ 'otra de las terribles armas de la 
guerrilla': the act of sabotage (Guevara 2006, 25). Sabotage, he argued, was capable 
of paralysing entire armies, and would demoralise the enemy to the point where the 
guerrilla army could attack with little fear of repercussion. 
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In order to achieve the required constant mobility, and, therefore, enact the 
aforementioned strategies, Guevara's methodology posited that the setting of a 
revolutionary guerrilla warfare campaign should be rural. As mentioned, this rule 
formed part of the three conclusions drawn from the Cuban Revolution's 
insurrectionary phase: 'En la America subdesarrollada, el terreno de la lucha armada 
debe ser fundamental mente el campo' (Guevara 2006, 13). Guevara argued that 
rural environments offered the necessary space and isolation in which a guerrilla 
micro-army could manoeuvre undetected for an extended period of time. In contrast, 
guerrilla operations carried out in urban centres were strongly discouraged owing to 
the proximity of such activity to state security forces. Should urban operations 
become necessary during the course of a campaign, the city-based activity would 
need to be under the direction of guerrilla leaders based in the countryside. Guevara 
wrote that: 
Es fundamental precisar que nunca puede surgir por sl misma una guerrilla suburbana. 
Tendra nacimiento despues de que se creen ciertas condiciones necesarias para que 
pueda subsistir, y esto mismo indica que la guerrilla suburbana estan\ directamente a 
las 6rdenes de jefes situados en otras zonas (Guevara 2006, 46). 
He continued: 
Su integraci6n numerica no debe pasar de cuatro 0 cinco hombres. Es importante la 
Iimitaci6n del numero, porque la guerrilla suburbana debe ser considerada como 
situada en terrenos excepcionalmente desfavorables, donde la vigilancia del enemigo 
sera mucho mayor y las posihilidades de represalia aumentan enormemente asi como 
las de una delaci6n. Hay que contar como circunstancias agravantes el hecho de que 
la guerrilla suburbana no puede alejarse mucho de los lugares donde vaya a operar 
(Guevara 2006, 46). 
The primacy of the rural campaign expressed in Guevara's methodology for 
fomenting revolution marked a theoretical deviation from more traditional, Marxist-
Leninist theories of revolution. Marx predicted that revolution would occur 
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predominantly in urban, industrial areas, while, similarly, it can be said that Lenin's 
theory was also metropolitan-minded, given the role it afforded to the industrial 
working class and intellectuals. 12 It was not Guevara's aim to discredit such theories, 
particularly in light of the Revolution's adoption of the Marxist-Leninist ideology 
soon after the publication of La Guerra de Guerrillas. Instead, he aimed to 
demonstrate that, given the specificities of the Latin American context, theories 
developed elsewhere were inapplicable with respect to the means of producing 
revolution. Guevara believed that strict adherence to theories which emphasised the 
role of the urban, working class masses was entirely ineffective in Third World 
countries, insofar as it failed to take into account the continent's not insignificant 
rural population. He asserted: 
EI tercer aporte es fundamental mente de indole estrategica y debe ser una Hamada de 
atenci6n a quienes pretenden con criterios dogmaticos centrar la lucha de las masas en 
los movimientos de las ciudades, olvidando total mente la inmensa participaci6n de la 
gente del campo en la vida de todos los paises subdesarrolladas de America. No es 
que se desprecie las luchas de masas organizadas, simplemente se analiza con criterio 
realista las posibilidades, en las condiciones dificiles de la lucha armada, donde las 
garantias que suelen adomar nuestras constituciones estan suspendidas 0 ignoradas. 
En estas condiciones, los movimientos obreros deben hacerse clandestinos, sin armas, 
en la iJegaJidad y arrostrando peJigros enormes; no es tan dificil la situaci6n en el 
campo abierto, apoyados los habitantes por la guerrilla armada y en lugares donde las 
fuerzas represivas no pueden lIegar (Guevara 2006, 15). 
Though contradictory to the aforementioned more orthodox theories, Guevara's 
insistence on el campo as the scene of conflict was, however, consistent with Maoist 
revolutionary theory which also upheld the primacy of rural campaigns. That said, 
12 Lenin afforded little attention to the role of guerrilla warfare in revolutionary movements. I lis 1906 
article 'Guerrilla Warfare' was one of the few instances in which he offered a perspective on this form 
of revolutionary struggle. In it, he contended that 'as a general rule, guerrilla warfare is waged by the 
worker combatant, or simply by the unemployed worker' (Laqueur 1977, 172). Lenin also differed 
from Guevara in his assertion that guerrilla warfare would only be an inevitable part of a revolution 
'when the mass movement had actually reached the point of an uprising and when fairly large 
intervals occur between the big 'engagements' in the civil war'(Laqueur 1977, 172). Later, after) 917, 
Lenin spoke only disparagingly of this form of armed warfare (Laqueur 1977, 173). 
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the two theories differed with respect to the notion of liberated territories (Kohl and 
Litt 1974, 17).\3 Previously discussed, the success of Guevara's methodology was 
dependent upon the flexibility of the loco. The guerrilla loco was not, under any 
circumstance, to establish a fixed base, or an autonomous or liberated territory, at 
least in the nascent stages of the guerrilla campaign. Such a base would increase the 
chances of detection by the enemy, and force the guerrilleros into a defensive 
position, rather than one reliant upon the element of surprise. Only once a wider loco 
network covering a specific area was in place could a more permanent base be 
created. In the Cuban Revolution's insurrectionary phase, the Comandancia de la 
Plata in the Sierra Maestra, Cuba's first 'Primer Territorio Libre', was founded only 
after significant successes had been achieved, some seventeen months into the 
campaign. 
More significantly, perhaps, Guevara'sloeo theory diverged from previous theories 
of revolution in its insistence that the guerrilla micro-army should not serve as the 
vanguard front of a political party located elsewhere. Rather, the guerrilla loco 
served as the nucleus of revolutionary activity, fusing the armed and political wings 
of a movement into a single entity. This aspect of the theory was clearly expressed 
in La Guerra de Guerrillas, in which Guevara contended: 'la guerrilla, como nucleo 
armado, es la vanguardia combatiente del mismo, su gran fuerza radica en la masa de 
la poblaci6n' (Guevara 2006, 16). The principal objective of designating the grupo 
armado act as the 'base (mica' of the revolutionary struggle was to preclude 
13 Kohl and Litt have written of the discrepancies between the/oco and Maoist theories: 'Whereas the 
Yenan region could be militarily detached and defended, there is no comparable opportunity in Latin 
America. The army can occupy any particular patch of ground it chooses, and hence the guerrillas are 
forced into a war of mobility, clandestinity, and attrition. This introduces the problem of security on a 
greater scale than in China: neither the guerrillas nor their supporters can rely on impenetrability of 
terrain ( ... ) As embodied in the loco theory, these security-related problems led to a de-emphasis on 
mass-line work' (Kohl and Litt 1974, 17). 
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problems relating to factionalism, as might arise should the vanguard front be 
subordinate to the orders of a city-based headquarters (Guevara 2006, 18). 
Moreover, the purpose of such 'acci6n politico-militar' was partly to contribute to 
the political education of each member of the movement. From the initial stages of 
the insurrectionary phase, those fighting in the sierra understood that revolutionary 
consciousness: 
could not be developed by means of propaganda or indoctrination but must arise 
fundamentally from revolutionary praxis: armed struggle and the restructuring of the 
land tenure system; participation in militant action; change in living conditions of the 
peasantry (Medin 1990, 6). 
The idea behind the nucleus of the guerrilla loco, therefore, would be to ensure that 
every individual within a given movement would develop a revolutionary 
consciousness through the lived experience of physical struggle. The use of the term 
'revolutionary consciousness' here is consistent with C. Fred Judson's useful 
conceptualisation: 
Revolutionary consciousness can be defined on the cognitive level as the awareness of 
contradictions in a society which has reached a stage, that of crisis, where a 
revolutionary outcome is possible. ( ... ) Revolutionary consciousness implies faith and 
belief in victory, emotional identification with the cause of social revolution, and a 
belief that social regeneration will be made possible by revolution (Judson 1984,2). 
This form of consciousness-building in a revolution's formative stages would form 
the basis of the project of national, social consciousness-raising in the years 
following the rise to power of a revolutionary movement. Guevara would later 
elaborate on the decisive role of consciousness in the construction of a socialist 
society in his 1965 essay 'El socialismo y el hombre en Cuba'. In this well-known 
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work, Guevara argued that it was necessary to create an 'hombre nuevo', an ideal 
citizen with a highly developed conciencia, driven predominantly by moral 
incentives, and 'consumed with passion for the nation and for the revolution' (Blum 
2011, 22). This 'new man' and, in turn, a new society would be formed through 
active and daily participation in revolutionary activity. As Guevara succinctly put it: 
'Nos forjaremos en la accion cotidiana, creando un hombre nuevo' (Guevara 1979, 
15). 
What was evident, then, in La Guerra de Guerrillas was the desire to fuse theory and 
practice, an approach which he believed to be fundamental to revolutionary success, 
and one which motivated his articulation of the loco theory. For Guevara, no 
political education was necessary other than the direct, lived experience of 
revolution. He stated as such in 'Guerra de Guerrillas: un metodo': 'No hay oficio ni 
profesion que se pueda aprender solamente en libros de texto. La lucha, en este caso, 
es la gran maestra' (Guevara 1963, 168). In his emphasis on praxis and on the idea 
that, out of praxis, develops consciousness, Guevara's work corresponds with the 
centrality of action in shaping ideology in Gramscian thought. Gramsci argued that a 
socialist consciousness could not be imposed on the general population from above, 
but must develop organically from their everyday working lives. He propounded that 
all individuals possessed the capacity to acquire an awareness of the social and 
economic conditions of the world in which they lived and, importantly, the need to 
change it, through their actions alone, arguing that, 'Man is a process and more 
precisely the process of his actions' (in Femia 1981, 113). 
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Guevara's focus upon praxis, and the fact that his methodology was based upon the 
already lived Cuban experience of struggle, is crucial to understanding the relevance 
of the loco theory to the leadership in the 1960s, and why it was reflected in the 
hegemonic discourse of that time, evidence of which will be presented in the 
following chapter. A critical component of the lived experience, according to 
Guevara, and a contributor to the development of revolutionary consciousness, was 
the interaction with the population local to the region in which a guerrilla loco was 
active. Direct cooperation and communication between citizens and gllerrilleros, it 
was argued, would facilitate the shaping of a revolutionary consciousness of both 
parties. On the one hand, the combatants would come to understand the plight of the 
peasantry and, in tum, strengthen their belief in agrarian reform through revolution. 
After all, as Guevara posited, 'el guerrillero es, ante todo, un revolucionario agrario' 
and, as such, 'Interpreta los deseos de la gran masa campesina de ser duel\a de la 
tierra, duefta de sus medios de producci6n, de sus animales, de 10 que constituye su 
vida y constituira tambien su cementerio' (Guevara 2006, ) 7). On the other hand, 
the citizens themselves would learn from the guerri/leros with respect to the 
possibilities for change through revolution and would, therefore, come to support, 
and potentially form part of, the revolution (Guevara 2006, 53). To realise this 
mutual advancement of revolutionary consciousness, Guevara advised: 
Hay que establecer, al mismo tiempo que centros de estudio de las zonas de 
operaciones y centros de estudios de las zonas de operaciones futuras, trabajo popular 
intensivo, expJicando los motivos de la revoluci6n, los fines de esta misma revoluci6n 
y diseminando la verdad incontrovertible de que en definitiva contra el pueblo no se 
puede veneer. Quien no sienta esta verdad indubitable no puede ser guerrillero 
(Guevara 2006,24). 
Providing the local population with a political education through such activity would 
constitute one of the methods by which the initial loco would be able to increase its 
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membership and, consequently, establish additional focos. Other means of winning 
civilians over to the guerrilla cause advocated by Guevara included the transmission 
of propagandistic messages via radio and other media such as newspapers; he 
considered radio to be the most effective channel (Guevara 2006, 127). This type of 
propaganda would serve to explain to citizens both the reasons behind the 
insurrection, and the proposed plan of action that the revolutionaries intended to 
realise. It was hoped that such propaganda would elicit sympathy for the cause and, 
in turn, physical support on the ground. 
Guevara's strategies for acquiring new recruits, and hence widening the loco 
network, underlined the importance of popular support to his methodology. While 
the initial stages of a revolution would unfold in seemingly inauspicious conditions 
involving just a handful of men, ultimately, it would not succeed without the support 
of the general population. Denied such support, the locos would be condemned to 
perpetuate the condition of isolation which, though initially facilitating revolutionary 
activity, would, in the long run, preclude the possibility of defeating the enemy. It 
was only popular support which could enable the movement to make the leap from 
irregular force to an organised army capable of assuming power. Indeed, as his first 
hypothesis stated, it was 'las fuerzas populares', and not the guerrilla army, which 
would eventually win the war. Guevara was unequivocal in highlighting this aspect 
of guerrilla warfare-based revolution. He wrote: 
Es importante destacar que la lucha guerrillera es una lucha de masas, es una lucha de 
pueblos: la guerrilla, como micIeo armado, es la vanguardia combatiente del mismo, 
su gran fuerza radica en la masa de la poblaci6n. ( ... ) EI guerrillero cuenta, entonces 
can todo el apoyo de la poblaci6n del lugar. Es una cualidad sine qua non (Guevara 
2006, 16). 
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This principle regarding the necessity of mass support and the eventual creation of an 
'Ejercito Regular' was a component critical to the functionality of Guevara's 
methodology, and one which the majority of foco-oriented guerrilla movements in 
Latin America post-1959 failed to realise. Thefoco method was, after all, a means to 
initiating revolution, rather than an end. If the movement did not progress beyond 
the level of scattered rural focos, it could not expect to possess a strength which was 
sufficient to topple the state's security forces. Guevara made sure to highlight this 
message, that the guerrilla campaign was but one stage in the revolutionary process: 
Queda bien establecido que la guerra de guerrillas es una fase de la guerra que no tiene 
de por si oportunidades de lograr el triunfo, es ademas una de las fases primarias de la 
guerra y se ira desenvolviendo y desarrollando hasta que el Ejercito Guerrillero, en su 
crecimiento constante, adquiera las caracteristicas de un Ejercito Regular. En ese 
momento estara listo para aplicar golpes definitivos al enemigo y acreditarse la 
victoria. EI triunfo sera logrado por un Ejercito Regular, aunque sus origenes sean el 
de un Ejercito Guerrillero (Guevara 2006, 21). 
Furthermore, underscoring the role of the wider population in foco warfare, and the 
goal of the formation of a regular army, might also have had the intention of 
demonstrating that this type of revolutionary warfare offered real potential for 
success. The concept of initiating a revolution with such a minority of participants 
may have seemed unthinkable to some would-be revolutionaries, who would likely 
have questioned the plausibility of what appeared to be something of a suicidal 
mission. Thus, positioning the struggle as one of 'the people' added a sense of 
purpose to the initial phase of the isolated ioco, and offered hope to those who 
formed part ofit. Guevara was attempting to boost the morale of those who might be 
facing a situation in which all seemed to be lost, and to encourage belief in the cause 
and its method. In other words, he was contributing to the development of a 
revolutionary consciousness in the guerrillero; that is, encouraging 'faith and belief 
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in victory' (Judson 1984, 2). Guevara stressed that, 'No debe considerarse a la 
guerrilla numericamente inferior al ejercito contra el cual combate, aunque sea 
inferior su potencia de fuego' (Guevara 2006, 16). As will become clear in the 
ensuing chapters, this notion that the rebel side should not consider itself inferior to 
the enemy permeated the hegemonic discourse in Cuba from the onset of the 
Revolution in power. 
Yet, in spite of Guevara's insistence on the role of the masses in revolutionary 
warfare, it was his aportacion regarding 'subjective conditions' which, in many 
ways, had the greatest impact on ideas of revolution, both in Cuba and in the rest of 
Latin America. Indeed, coupled with his proposal that 'popular forces' could defeat 
a nation's army, Guevara himself acknowledged the deliberate potency of his tenet 
that 'el foco insurreccional puede desarrollar condiciones subjetivas sobre la base de 
las condiciones objetivas dadas' (Guevara 2006, 13). He contended: 
De estas tres aportaciones, las dos primeras luchan contra la actitud quietista de 
revolucionarios 0 seudorrevolucionarios que se refugian, y refugian su inactividad, en 
el pretexto de que contra el ejercito profesional nada se puede hacer y algunos otros 
que sientan a esperar a que, en una forma mecanica, se den todas las condiciones 
objetivas y subjetivas necesarias, sin preocuparse de acelerarlas (Guevara 2006, 13). 
The mention here of 'objective conditions' referred to the Leninist conceptualisation 
of revolution, which posited that the revolution could not be realised unless the 
'objective conditions' of a popular uprising were already in place. Richard Gott has 
offered a useful description of such conditions: 'A revolutionary situation, according 
to Lenin, presupposes certain objective conditions: a political crisis which makes it 
impossible for the old ruling classes to continue ruling in the old way; a substantial 
deterioration in the conditions of the masses; and the rise of a genuinely mass 
movement' (Gott 1970, 15). 
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In contrast, Guevara's defining contribution to debates in Latin America on the most 
effective path to revolution was to declare that waiting for the 'objective conditions' 
to arrive was utterly fruitless, and simply furnished so-called 'pseudo-
revolutionaries' with a useful excuse for their inaction (Guevara 2006, 13). As an 
alternative, he argued that revolution could be engendered through 'subjective 
conditions' alone, that it could be made by the revolutionary regardless of the 
'objective conditions' with which he/she was confronted. The creation of 'subjective 
conditions' required nothing more than the subjective will of the individual to act. In 
other words, the revolution could, and should, commence without delay if based on 
voluntarism alone. The role of the guerrilla fighter was therefore to precipitate the 
revolutionary struggle of a given nation. Villegas writes that: 
para el Che el papel de la guerrilla era de un catalizador, que aceleraria las condiciones 
de lucha en el pueblo, siendo consecuente con el principio de que el papel del 
revolucionario no es sentarse a esperar para ver pasar el cadaver del imperialismo, 
sino contribuir a acelerar las condiciones que propicien su colapso (Villegas 2006, 4). 
Similarly, Peter Binns and Mike Gonzalez have noted that, in La Guerra de 
Guerrillas, 'Che insists that it is the revolutionaries who make the revolution ( ... ) the 
assumption is drawn ( ... ) that will power, the subjective conditions, can overcome the 
objective conditions for revolution. The protagonists of the revolution are the 
guerrillas, not the workers' (Binns and Gonzalez, 1980). 
Given the immense task of catalysing the revolution, Guevara was careful to specify 
the necessary characteristics which a guerrillero should embody if a campaign were 
to be successful. Two chapters of La Guerra de Guerrillas were devoted to outlining 
these prerequisite qualities, 'EI guerrillero, reformador social' and 'EI guerrillero, 
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como combatiente', though other guidelines relating to the guerrillero could be 
found elsewhere in the text. One of Guevara's striking pronouncements in this 
respect appeared in the opening pages: 
la cualidad positiva de esta guerra de guerrillas es que cada uno de los guerrilleros este 
dispuesto a morir, no s610 por defender un ideal sino por convertirlo en reaJidad. Esa 
es la base, la esencia de la lucha de guerrillas (Guevara 2006, 21). 
Here, there is no mistaking that, for Guevara, if one was to be a true guerrillero, one 
had to be willing to make the ultimate sacrifice: to give one's life in the name of the 
revolution. Indeed, as he contended, the alacrity of the guerriJ/ero to die for the 
cause lay at the very heart of this type of guerrilla warfare. In this sense, the 
guerrillero could possess only the most heightened revolutionary consciousness. 
What is more, Guevara stipulated that the guerrilla fighter had to be a risk taker, he 
should show courage and, perhaps more importantly, optimism in the face of 
adversity. He contended that the guerriJ/ero: 
debe ser audaz, analizar correctamente los peJigros y las posibilidades de una acci6n y 
estar siempre presto a tomar una actitud optimista frente a las circunstancias y a 
encontrar una decisi6n favorable ailO en los momentos en que el amllisis de las 
condiciones adversas y favorable no arroje un saldo positivo apreciable (Guevara 
2006,56). 
Similarly, the text stated that/oeo-based guerrilla warfare required extreme tenacity, 
and an 'actitud de lucha' from its guerrilleros, who would inevitably experience 
suffering and grave danger, often on a daily basis: 
La actitud de lucha, esa actitud que no debe desmayar en ningun momento, esa 
inflexibilidad frente a los grandes problemas del objetivo final, es tambien la grandeza 
del guerrillero (Guevara 2006, 21). 
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In addition to these qualities demanded of a guerrillero if he was to excel as a 
combatant, this type of guerrilla warfare also necessitated that its participants 
possessed 'cualidades morales' (Guevara 2006, 57). In other words, the moral 
conduct of the guerrilla fighter should be nothing more than exemplary; the 
guerri//ero should offer a shining example to the rest of the population if new 
recruits to the revolution were to be acquired. Guevara asserted: 'el guerrillero 
debe tener una conducta moral que 10 acredite como verdadero sacerdote de la 
reforma que pretende' (Guevara 2006, 51). The religiosity of the metaphor 
employed here, whereby Guevara compared the guerrillero to a priest, was 
reinforced in Guevara's contention that: 
EI guerrillero sera una especie de angel tutelar caido sobre la zona para ayudar 
siempre a1 pobre y para molestar 10 menos posible al rico, en los primeros momentos 
del desarrollo de la guerra (Guevara 2005, 52). 
Guevara's employment of a religious lexicon in these examples underlined his 
conviction that the guerrilla/oeo was a force for positive social change which offered 
redemption to those willing to join its ranks. In effect, the realisation of 'trabajo 
popular intensivo' was akin to performing something of a religious conversion. The 
guerrillero should not, therefore, underestimate the magnitude of the role he/she was 
undertaking. Moreover, such language underscored the role of faith in catalysing 
revolution. Ultimately, it was unerring faith in the revolutionary cause which would 
bring about revolutionary change. The religious undertones in Guevara's work were 
later echoed in the hegemonic discourse of the Revolution, examples of which will 
be discussed in the textual analysis of the subsequent chapters. Similarly, although 
to a far greater extent, Guevara's tenet regarding the role of subjective conditions, 
and his prescriptive articulation regarding the attributes required of a guerrillero, 
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also permeated the leadership's discourse of the 1960s and 1970s. The revolutionary 
leadership can be seen to have drawn on, and actively promoted, Guevara's ideas as 
a means of inspiring and mobilising Cuban citizens. In this way, the guerrilla ethos 
lived on beyond the physical struggle for power. It is for this reason that a detailed 
examination of his writings has been included in this chapter. 
Yet Guevara's principal goal in promoting the primacy of 'subjective conditions', 
and in producing thefoco theory in the first instance, was to 'shake-up' existing ideas 
on revolution in the Americas, and thereby spark a new flame of revolutionary 
activity across the region. In line with the Leninist conception that the revolution 
should be international, Guevara advocated a pan-American revolution which would 
mutually strengthen revolutionary activity in neighbouring countries. Guevara 
perceived of the Cuban Revolution as the first step towards a continental rebellion. 
Indeed, in many ways, he conceived of Cuba as symbolic ofthe firstfoeo in the Latin 
American revolution. In 'Guerra de Guerrillas: un metodo', he argued in favour of 
such a regional struggle against imperialism: 
se hace dificil que la victoria se logre y consoli de en un pais aislado. A la uni6n de las 
fuerzas represivas debe contestarse con la uni6n de las fuerzas populares. En todos los 
paises en que la opresi6n llegue a niveles insostenibles, debe alzarse la bandera de la 
rebeli6n, y esta bandera tendra por necesidad hist6rica. caracteres continentales. La 
Cordillera de los Andes esta Hamada a ser la Sierra Maestra de America, como dijera 
Fidel, y todos los inmensos territorios que abarea este continente estan lIamados a ser 
escenarios de la lucha a muerte contra el poder imperialista (Guevara 1963. 173). 
Guevara's unreserved calls for revolution did not go unheard in Latin America. For 
would-be revolutionaries who found themselves to be on a vastly unequal footing 
with respect to a potential conflict with the enemy (the state), the foeo methodology 
(and, of course, the Cuban example more generally) illuminated the path towards 
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revolutionary victory. The Cuban success story generated a 'new faith in 
revolutionary action', demonstrating how an initially small band of militants could 
develop into a force strong enough to defeat a state's armed forces (Wright 1002, 
41). Furthermore, the Cuban Revolution provided a 'horne-grown' model of 
revolution that appeared to draw upon the specificities of the Latin American 
context; specifically, its (supposedly) largely rural composition. Guevara was keen 
to assert that, though Latin American countries may have differed in many 
fundamental aspects, foeo warfare's core tenets were universally applicable within 
the continent. He argued that: 
Es natural que las condiciones geograficas y sociales de cada pais determinen el modo 
y las formas peculiares que adoptara la Guerra de guerrillas, pero sus leyes esenciales 
tienen vigencia para cualquier lucha de este tipo (Guevara 2006, 16). 
In the early 1960s, numerous guerrilla movements sprang up across the region. The 
majority, operating in the countryside, sought to produce almost carbon-copies of the 
Cuban insurrection. Significant examples of rural guerrilla struggles of the early 
1960s occurred in Guatemala, Colombia, Peru and Venezuela: 4 Though the 
longevity of each campaign varied from country to country, ultimately, all of these 
movements failed to produce revolution in their respective nation-states. Much of 
the blame for the defeat of these movements can be attributed to improved counter-
insurgency methods which were developed around that time. In this way, not only 
did the Cuban Revolution inspire subsequent revolutionary campaigns but it also 
highlighted the 'necessity of versatile, resolute and informed counter-insurgency 
techniques' (Kohl and Litt 1974, 9). Thus the nascent movements of the 1960s faced 
14 Though guerrilla warfare had been in motion in Colombia for over a decade prior to the Cuban 
Revolution, it was only in 1964 that an organized guerrilla front emerged with the aim of producing 
revolution (Wright 2001. 88). 
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a far greater challenge than that posed by Batista's forces; the enemy had developed 
counter-insurgency methods specifically designed to combat foco warfare. As Regis 
Debray noted in 1965: 'Une revolution socialiste revolutionne aussi la contre-
revolution' (Debray 1967, 145).15 
The string of failures that characterized the Latin American attempt to reproduce the 
Cuban Revolution appeared to herald the end of the application offoquista warfare in 
the region. Furthermore, the Cuban revolutionary model lost much of its currency 
following Guevara's disastrous effort to launch a ruralfoquista campaign in Bolivia, 
and his subsequent death at the hands of the Bolivian Army (aided by the CIA) in 
October 1967. The defeat in Bolivia was considered by many to symbolise the 
ultimate failure of Guevara's theory of rural guerrilla warfare. That said, guerrilla 
movements continued to emerge and establish focos in Latin America, most 
significantly in the Southern Cone. While, on the one hand, Guevara's death 
highlighted the deficiency of the Cuban model, on the other hand it transformed his 
figure into the heroic martyr of the Latin American revolution, and ensured that the 
myth of the "heroic guerrilla" would live on. This martyrdom inspired many to 
continue to fight to realise Guevara's dream of a hemispheric revolution. Thus, as 
Jorge Castaneda has succinctly remarked, 'The death ofChe Guevara symbolized the 
end of an epoch, though it did not actually coincide with its conclusion' (Castaneda 
1993,80). 
Moreover, Cuba's continuing active encouragement of a continent-wide revolution 
did much to buck the waning trend. One of the enduring symbols of Cuban support 
15 'A socialist revolution also revolutionises the counter-revolution'. NB: This and all subsequent 
translations are my own. 
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for revolutionary movements in the late 1960s was the Tricontinental Conference 
held in Havana in January 1966. This conference was the first meeting of the 
Organizaci6n de Solidaridad con los Pueblos de Asia, Africa y America Latina 
(OSPAAAL), which had been created by Castro just a few months before. The 
purpose of the meeting was to gather revolutionary governments and organizations 
with the intent of accelerating revolution throughout the Third World (Wright 2001, 
34). Nelson Valdes has written that 'on this and other occasions Cuba put its 
commitment to international revolutionary solidarity on the record' (Valdes 1979, 
89). This commitment was made explicit in President Dortic6s' opening speech of 
the Tricontinental, in which he proclaimed: 'Es irrevocable nuestra voluntad de 
ejercer la solidaridad internacional' and, citing Castro, 'con Cuba, cualquier 
movimiento revolucionario, en cualquier parto del mundo, podra con tar con su ayuda 
incondicional y decidida' (Documentos Politicos 1966,2314). 
One of the outcomes of the Tricontinental was the establishment of the Organizaci6n 
Latinoamericana de Solidaridad (OLAS), which 'gave priority attention to the 
Dominican RepUblic, Venezuela, Colombia, Guatemala and Peru' (Dominguez 1978, 
270). The purpose of the organization was 'to serve as a mechanism for Havana to 
aid, coordinate, and provide leadership to pro-Castro guerrilla groups throughout the 
continent' (Erisman 1985, 31). The OLAS had a short life-span, eventually being 
absorbed by OPSAAAL in the late 1960s. However, it did stage a noteworthy 
conference in Havana in the summer of 1967 which was attended by delegates from 
numerous prominent Latin American left-wing movements. H. Michael Erisman has 
contended that the foundation ofthe OLAS was a means for Cuba 'to have a vehicle 
free of Soviet influence for implementing its radical line' and came to epitomise 'the 
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severity of Havana's disenchantment with the Soviets and their Latin cohorts' 
(Erisman 1985, 31). 
Another means by which Cuba re-confirmed its endorsement of a Latin American 
revolution, and of particular note here, was the Fidel Castro-endorsed publication of 
Debray's aforementioned text, Revolution dans la Revolution?, in early 1967. A 
young French professor of philosophy working at the University of Havana, and an 
acquaintance of both Castro and Guevara, Debray sought to defend the Cuban 
revolutionary warfare model in his writings. Rather than considering the repeated 
failure of Cuban-style guerrilla warfare in Latin America to be evidence of 
deficiencies in Guevara's methodology, Debray believed that defeat across the 
continent had simply served to strengthen armed struggle, insofar as it offered 
valuable lessons for future movements. He argued that defeat would not only permit 
revolutionaries to perfect the model, and thereby succeed, but it had also reinforced 
the ' I e ~ o n n de tenacite' evidenced by the Cuban insurrection. Debray contended that 
'Pour un revolutionnaire, I'echec est un tremplin: theoriquement plus enrichissant 
que Ie succes, it accumule une experience et un savoir' (Debray 1967, 20).16 
Moreover, he argued that setbacks elsewhere could not be attributed to shortcomings 
in the Cuban methodology, but instead resulted from the failure of would-be 
revolutionaries to identify the true contribution of the Cuban example: 'une nouvelle 
conception de la guerre de guerilla' (Debray 1967, 15). \7 
16 'For a revolutionary, failure is a springboard: theoretically more enriching than success, it builds 
experience and knowledge'. 
I? 'A new concept of guerrilla warfare'. 
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Debray's aim, therefore, in publishing Revolution dans la Revolution? was to 
elaborate on and to highlight certain of Guevara's conclusions, in addition to 
incorporating ideas generated through long discussions with Castro, in order to 
breathe new life into the Joco theory and, in turn, encourage a new wave of 
revolutionary guerrilla warfare throughout Latin America. An article published in 
the short-lived Cuban journal Pensamiento Critico in May 1967 by the Les Temps 
Modernes correspondent, Rachid, stated the following regarding Debray's text: 
A su vez, Debray intenta fijar ciertos tacticos y estrategicos enunciados a veces en 'La 
guerra de guerrillas' y extrae las profundas implicaciones polfticas de la guerrilla 
cubana, su aporte decisivo a la experiencia revolucionaria intemacional y al marxismo 
leninismo. Debray se hace interprete de la situaci6n. Nada mas (Rachid 1967, 20 I). 
As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, Debray's expounding of Guevara and 
Castro's ideas resulted in the fonnal conceptualisation of Cuban guerrilla warfare 
strategies asJoquismo. 
Two notable precepts of Guevara's which Debray wished to highlight were those of 
'subjective conditions', and the predominance of the countryside as the terrain of 
anned struggle. Debray underlined, at various stages throughout the text, the role of 
the individual in producing revolution, the importance of fomenting revolution 
without delay, and stated that 'Ie travail insurrectionnel est aujourd'hui Ie travail 
politique numero l' (Debray 1967, 125).18 With regard to the rural nature of Joco 
warfare, Debray was adamant that, though power was held and seized in the city, 'Ie 
chemin qui y mene les exploites passe par la campagne, ineluctablement' (Debray 
1967, 122).19 
18 'insurrectionary work is today the single most important form of political work'. 
19 'The path which leads the exploited there passes, unavoidably, through the countryside'. 
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Debray's work also expanded upon other aspects of Guevara's theory, whilst at the 
same time incorporating his own observations and conclusions concerning the 
correct path to a Latin American revolution. Specifically, Debray laid much 
emphasis on the primacy of mobility in a guerrilla campaign (and, inextricably linked 
to the latter, clandestinity), the fusion of the party and the army into a single nucleus 
(the/oeD), and the role of the masses in the revolutionary struggle. His conclusions 
were divided into four subchapters, each devoted to a different strategy: 
'L'autodefense armee', 'La propagande armee', 'La base guerillera' and 'Parti et 
guerilla'. The first topic, 'L'autodHense armee'. sought to reinforce Guevara's 
aforementioned assertion regarding the mobility of the guerrilla foco: 'Caracteristica 
fundamental de una guerrilla es la movilidad' (Guevara 2006, 26). Basing his 
analysis on the crushing defeat of subversive movements in southern Colombia in 
1964 and in Bolivia in 1965, Debray argued that the notion of defending a fixed base, 
or a liberated area, as a starting point of a campaign was tantamount to disaster in 
Latin America. Like Guevara, he contended that such a base would convert the 
embryonic guerrilla army into a 'sitting duck' for the enemy. When the time of 
confrontation inevitably arrived, the guerrilleros would simply be wiped out, not 
having the sufficient firepower or strength in numbers to defend the territory which 
they had claimed as their own. Debray asserted: 
La communaute en autodefense n'a pas d'initiative: elle ne peut elire Ie lieu du 
combat, elle ne beneficie ni de la mobilite. ni de I'effet de surprise, ni de la capacite de 
manreuvre. ( ... ) la zone d'autodCfense sera I 'objet d'un encerclement et d'une attaque 
minutieusement preparee par I'ennemi au moment choisi par ce dernier (Debray 1967, 
26)?O 
20 'The community in self-defence does not have the initiative: it cannot choose the place of 
combat, it benefits neither from mobility, nor the surprise effect, nor the ability to manreuvre ( ... ) 
the zone of self-defence will be the object of an encirclement and of a meticulously planned attack 
by the enemy, at a moment chosen by the latter'. 
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A similar argument was put forward in the third subchapter, 'La base guerillera'. 
Debray reiterated the necessity of maintaining a nomadic, isolated unit (the loco) in 
the initial stages of revolutionary activity for a movement to be successful. He 
contended that, during these stages: 
la base guerillera c'est, selon une expression de Fidel, Ie territoire a I'interieur duquel 
se deplace Ie guerillero et qui se deplace avec lui. La base d'appui, dans I'etape 
initiale, elle est dans Ie havresac du combattant (Debray 1967,66).21 
To support his argument, Debray referred to the armed struggle phase of the Cuban 
Revolution, in which a fixed base was not established until seventeen months into the 
campaIgn. 
For Debray, the notion that the loco was the centre of operations was also important 
in the sense that it would serve as an armed nucleus in which were fused the political 
and military wings of a given movement. Debray did not hold back in underlining 
this aspect which, of course, followed on from Guevara's emphasis on 'acci6n 
politico-militar' and the 'base unica'. He upheld that 'L'armee populaire sera Ie 
noyau du parti et non I'inverse. La guerilla est l'avant-garde politi que "in nuce'" 
(Debray 1967, 125).22 Furthermore, this idea of uniting the armed and the political 
contributed to the achievement of 'Ia reunion de la theorie et de la pratique'; the 
achievement of such a synthesis is key to understanding Debray's motives for 
producing a new model for revolutionary warfare (Debray 1967, 9). 
21 'the guerrilla base, according to one of Fidel's expressions, is the territory inside of which the 
guerrilla moves, and which moves with him. The support base, in the initial stage, is in the knapsack 
of the combatant'. 
22 'The popular army will be the nucleus of the party and not the reverse. The guerrilla army is the 
political vanguard in nuce'. 
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In the second subchapter, 'La propagande armee', Debray again looked directly to 
the insurrectionary phase of the Cuban Revolution for an example of how to win the 
masses over to the side of the revolutionaries; following Guevara's lead, he was 
adamant that the guerrilla army 'doit s'appuyer sur les masses ou disparaitre' 
(Debray 1967, 45).23 In addition to carrying out the 'trabajo popular intensivo' 
advocated by Guevara, Debray proposed that the most effective propaganda was 
'armed propaganda', particularly for a small, burgeoning movement. He defined the 
concept thus: 'La propaganda c'est une action militaire reussie' (Debray 1967, 56).24 
In other words, according to Debray, the best way to guarantee the cooperation of the 
masses was to carry out a successful operation against the enemy forces, much like 
Guevara had done with his promotion of the 'muerde y huye' tactic, mentioned 
earlier. Such operations would not only demonstrate the potential weaknesses of the 
enemy (dispelling the myth that the state could not be reckoned with), but would 
prove the capabilities of the guerrilla force, no matter how small in number. Debray 
stated: 
Mieux que deux cents discours, la liquidation d'un carnion de transport de troupes ou 
I'execution pubJique d'un poJicier tortionnaire font plus de propagande effective, 
hautement et profondement politique, sur la population avoisinante (Debray 1967, 
53).25 
Consistent with the actions of the Ejercito Rebelde, the tactic of armed propaganda 
denoted a move away from the orthodox method of gaining popular support through 
the staging of political rallies. Debray's joquismo deemed such rallies ineffective 
given that they could increase the vulnerability of attendees in the face of an enemy 
23 'must find support in the masses or disappear'. 
24 'Propaganda is a successful military action'. 
2S 'Far better than two hundred speeches, the elimination of a troop carrier, or the public execution of 
a police torturer make for more effective, and thoroughly and profoundly political, propaganda on the 
neighbouring population' . 
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attack. To illustrate his argument, Debray pointed out that, in Cuba, 'en deux ans de 
guerre Fidel n'a pas tenu un seul meeting dans son aire d'operations' (Debray 1967, 
As intended, Revolution dans la Revolution? had a huge impact on Latin American 
revolutionaries. Debray's analysis of failed movements, and his apparent solutions 
to the problems they had faced, provided something of a lifeline to burgeoning left-
wing revolutionary movements in Latin America, and legitimised the continued 
recourse to armed struggle. Debray's work was perhaps all the more influential 
given that it appeared at a time when much of the region, particularly the Southern 
Cone, found itself under the increasingly authoritarian rule of military dictatorships. 
Debray's conceptualisation of foquismo appealed to those challenging the might of 
such seemingly monolithic governments, outlining for them the path to victory 
regardless of the vastly unequal footing on which they were placed. The famed 
Salvadoran writer, Roque Dalton, wrote in his evaluation of Debray's text, entitled 
I,Revolucion en la Revolucion? y la critica de derecha, that the French writer's work 
'cay6 precisamente como una bomba ideol6gica' in Latin America (Dalton 1970, 
108). Yet, while Debray's renewed call to arms did much to instigate a new wave of 
revolutionary activity, his protestations regarding the rural setting of foco warfare 
were largely ignored. The face of guerrilla warfare after 1967 was markedly 
different to its previous incarnation: the arena of armed struggle had moved to the 
city.27 
26 'in two years of war Fidel did not hold a single meeting in his sphere of operations'. 
27 Walter Laqueur has discussed the shift to urban guerrilla warfare in his work A History of 
Terrorism: 'Latin American urban terrorists developed a doctrine, but more by instinct than on the 
basis of socio-political analysis. Latin America had the fastest rate of urbanization of anywhere in the 
world; to talk about the encirclement of the city by the village in Uruguay or Argentina was to invite 
ridicule. The political as well as the military and economic centres of power were in the big 
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Ultimately, however, the majority of Latin America's urban guerrillas of the late 
1960s and early 1970s would fail to meet their objectives.28 In the Southern Cone, 
where urban guerrilla warfare experienced its most prominent expression in the 
Americas, the right-wing military dictatorships, with the support of the United States, 
did not hesitate in applying highly-developed counter-insurgency measures and 
unleashing violent waves of repression in response to leftist agitation. Though 
Argentina's Montoneros remained active until 1979, the majority of the Southern 
Cone's urban guerrillas had been wiped out by 1974. Thus the second wave of 
Cuban-inspired guerrilla warfare came to an end. 
With this second wave of crushing defeat came also a wave of criticism of Debray's 
theorisation. Much of this criticism hailed from members of the Latin American 
Communist Parties who remained committed to pursuing revolutionary change via a 
camino pacifico, thereby toeing the Moscow line of reform through electoral 
struggle. Brazil's Partido Comunista Brasileiro (PCB), for example, criticised 
foquismo from the outset, describing the theory in 1967 as 'a conception of 
revolution based on insurrectionary hotheads stirred up by adventures totally isolated 
from the mass movement' (Chilcote 1974, 84). Vehement criticism was also 
articulated by 'progressive', left-wing intellectuals, both within and external to Latin 
America (Dalton 1970, 9). Articles written by such intellectuals, and published in 
journals such as Monthly Review, fuelled the debate regarding the efficacy of 
conurbations; hence the decision to attack the enemy there and not on the periphery' (Laqueur 2002, 
184). The most prominent of the urban-centred groups were the Tupamaros in Uruguay, the 
Montoneros in Argentina and the Movimento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR) in Chile. In Brazil, 
there was no single movement at the forefront of armed struggle but numerous groups which waged 
individual battles. 
28 A noteworthy exception to this trend was the Nicaraguan movement, Frente Sandinista de 
Liberaci6n Nacional (FSLN). Emerging in 1961, the movement first attempted to foment rural foco-
style warfare, but later adopted an urban guerrilla approach in the mid-1970s, thus transforming into a 
powerful armed opponent to the dictatorial regime of Anastasio Somoza Debayle. The Sandinista 
Revolution came to power in July 1979 (Wright 2001, 165). 
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joquismo as a means to revolution.29 Many questioned whether Oebray was best 
positioned to pontificate on the process of revolutionary change in the continent, 
given his status as a European bourgeois intellectual, whose lived reality was far 
removed from that of the underdeveloped nations of Latin America. Contradictions 
in Oebray's work were frequently highlighted by his detractors. Notably, his 
articulation of the ciudad-campo relationship was held in disregard, given that the 
city was now the focus of revolutionary activity. 
The widespread negative reaction to i,Revolution dans la Revolution? signalled the 
almost complete devaluation of the joco theory. Indeed, many aspiring Latin 
American revolutionaries, who had, at first, found great inspiration in Oebray's 
work, concluded that the joquista theory did not constitute a viable guerrilla warfare 
methodology, and was by no means universally applicable in Latin America.3o Even 
Debray himself would later concede that his theory was not entirely feasible, perhaps 
a consequence of having witnessed the devastating failure of joqu;sla warfare in the 
Southern Cone. In a 1969 letter to the editors of Monthly Review, Oebray stated: 
The so-called/oco theory in its simplest, most skeletal form of an isolated military 
detonator organized by itself, independent of any national organization or urban 
political work, is certainly an utopian notion. It is not a coherent revolutionary line 
capable of assuming the complex tasks of political leadership and organization in a 
concrete situation (Debray 1969,237). 
Those who sought to offer a more balanced, objective evaluation of Oebray's work 
perceived of the vehement attacks against him as, in reality, an indirect criticism of 
29 Leo Huberman and Paul M. Sweezy's edited collection, Regis Debray and the Latin American 
Revolution: a collection of essays. provides a solid overview of the criticism directed at Debray, much 
of which was published in Monthly Review (Huberman and Sweezy, 1969). See also: Alberto Methol 
Ferre (1967), 'La Revoluci6n Verde Oliva, Debray y la OLAS', Vispera, 1 (3): 17 y ss. 
30 In their 1969 self-criticism, for example, the Brazilian guerrilla movement PCdoB-Ala Vermelha 
stated: '0 foeo eonstitui mesmo 0 maior entrave DO desenvolvimento de acaes armadas eapazes de 
levar ao estabelecimento concreto da luta armada no pais' (Partido Comunista do Brasil-Ala Vermelha 
(XIV) 1969,351). 
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the Cuban Revolution and its promotion of armed struggle. In Dalton's 
aforementioned text, for example, he asserted that, 'es politicamente menos 
complicado atacar a Debray que atacar a quienes esUin en el origen de las ideas que 
expone el notable escritor frances, es decir, principalmente, el comandante Ernesto 
Guevara. el comandante Fidel Castro, etc.' (Dalton 1970, 108). Elsewhere in the 
text, he continued: 
La obra de Debray habra representado para esa critica la oportunidad de atacar al Che 
sin decir su nombre, de atacar las posiciones revolucionarias sin nombrar sus 
encarnaciones concretas ( ... ) no s610 se substitufa la figura del Che y las posiciones de 
la linea revoluci6n latinoamericana por la figura de Regis y su obra sino que se 
reducian aquelJas, exclusiva y excluyentemente a estas (Debray ] 970, ] 70). 
Similarly, the Cuban intellectual, Fernando Martinez Heredia, has written 
retrospectively that 'la expresi6n "foquismo" fue la clave de una critica al 
pensamiento politico de Guevara que en ciertos casos lleg6 hasta descalificarlos a el 
y ala experiencia cubana' (Martinez Heredia 2010, 289).31 
The polemic surroundingfoquismo, and the implicit criticism it implied with respect 
to Cuba's stance on the most effective path to revolutionary change, appears to have 
resulted in the removal of the term from the Cuban vernacular, at least when it comes 
to describing the country's own revolutionary history. The analysis of texts from the 
1960s and 1970s, which forms the basis of the following chapters, reveals no 
mention of the term during that period, whether in relation to the Revolution's 
insurrectionary phase, or to the wave of armed struggle which swept Latin America 
in the 1960s. The reason for this absence of the term in the discourse is clear: since 
31 Laqueur confinned this incidence of veiled criticism of the Cuban Revolution: 'The Latin American 
Communists C .. ) were reluctant to engage in a dispute with the Cubans because of their tremendous 
prestige in radical circles all over the continent. In the circumstances, Debray became the main butt 
for their attacks; he was merely an unofficial spokesman of the regime and could be criticized with 
greater impunity' (Laqueur 1977,338). 
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the 1970s, but even at the peak ofthefoco idea's popularity in the mid- to late 1960s, 
Cuban discourse, 'official' and at other levels, has tended to distinguish between a) 
the foco (referring specifically to Che's ideas from 1960 onwards, and even, 
retrospectively, to the lessons ofthe Sierra struggle, b)foquismo, increasingly seen to 
be associated exclusively with Debray's (somewhat discredited) further theorising of 
those ideas, and thus to the whole question of mistaken concepts, and even examples, 
of guerrilla warfare in Latin America, and c) the idea of guerrilla warfare and its 
practice (the latter much broader than either term). Taking these distinctions into 
account, it is thus apparent that the term foquismo is unhelpful as a means of 
representing the undercurrent of the guerrilla legacy within the context of the Cuban 
Revolution, given its inescapable connotations of armed struggles elsewhere in Latin 
America. Instead, what is needed is a more comprehensive term which, while 
encompassing all of the aspects differentiated above, will allow for wider reference 
to the historical experience of guerrilla warfare in Cuba. 
However, it should be noted here that the term foquismo is not entirely redundant to 
this study. Where the notion of a 'guerrilla code' is applied to the existence of a 
guerrilla ethos which was actively promoted as a tool for mobilisation within Cuba, it 
is still possible to identify examples of foquismo at times when the leadership was 
attempting to incite revolution in Latin America. As will become clear in the 
subsequent chapters, during the 1960s and 1970s, and later in the 1990s, the 
leadership has often espoused an incendiary discourse, and has concomitantly 
projected an image of Cuba as the first foco of a hemispheric revolution. Such 
rhetoric can be deemed foquista insofar as it forms part of the Cuban leadership's 
intermittent endeavour to promote armed struggle abroad. This endeavour at one 
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time involved the work of both Guevara and Debray in the dissemination of the 
message to foment revolution. Moreover, Joquismo can be deemed an apposite 
description of this language, insofar as the enactment of this particular form of 
warfare only ever occurred outside of Cuba. The guerrilla struggle which took place 
prior to 1959 in the Revolution was simply a spontaneous reaction to the conditions 
with which those who arrived on the Granma were confronted. Guevara's 
conclusions were thus formed in hindsight, and his theory was 'an ex post facto 
rationalization of an improvised response to events beyond Castro's control' (Draper 
1965, 25). The term, therefore, should not be applied to the Cuban experience but 
only to guerrilla campaigns which came after it, following its example, in locations 
external to the island's shores. 
What is more, it is difficult to discard completely the notion of Joquismo in this 
thesis, despite the reception of the term in Cuba, largely owing to the unavoidable 
fact that the Cuban leadership agreed to the publication of Debray's text in the first 
instance in 1967. That decision suggests that, at least at the time, the ideas which 
constituted Debray's conceptualisation ofJoquismo were consistent with those of the 
leadership. In other words, Debray's principles of armed struggle, and particularly 
his emphasis on subjective conditions, matched the perspective on revolutionary 
activity of those in power. It is, therefore, logical to suggest that this perspective was 
reflected, and can be readily identified, in the leadership's discourse around that 
time. There is, then, a case to argue that the notion of a Joquista rhetoric is still valid 
and should not be overlooked simply because of the controversy which the term 
Joquismo would later provoke. On the whole, however, the absence of Joquismo in 
the Cuban vocabulary, and its association with armed struggles external to Cuba, 
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render it unsuitable as an over-arching tenn to describe the uniquely Cuban 
experience of guerrilla warfare, and the on-going legacy of this experience under the 
Revolution in power. Accordingly, then, we will now consider alternative terms 
which may categorise more pertinently this experience in the Cuban context. 
'Sierra Maestra Complex', 'Guerrilla Mentality', or Guerrillerismo? 
In determining the appropriate terminology for what we are temporarily referring to 
as the 'guerrilla code', the necessary starting point is to consider the literature which 
has previously highlighted the guerrilla element which runs through the Revolution, 
and the tenns used to describe this element therein. Such literature first emerged in 
the early to mid-1960s when a handful of academics working on Cuba started to 
question the concept of 'militarism' which was becoming commonplace in scholarly 
studies of the Revolution at that time, as demonstrated in the review presented in the 
Introduction. These academics, though far smaller in number, steered clear of 
categorising the Revolution in such potentially reductive tenns, and instead opted to 
underline its peculiarities which they saw as stemming from its guerrilla roots, and 
which rendered its military distinct from other anned forces. 
One of the most significant contributions to the discussion regarding the 
idiosyncrasies of the revolutionary style of governance in its early years came from 
the guerrillero heroico himself, Che Guevara. In 1963, Guevara published an article 
entitled 'Contra el burocratismo', in which, as the title suggests, he railed against the 
shift to bureaucratic organisation within the revolutionary government and its various 
ministries. The inefficiency and absence of initiative which this bureaucracy 
engendered were the result, Guevara argued, of the leadership having moved too 
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quickly to shed the influence of its guerrilla past on the shaping of the nascent 
government. It is in this way that Guevara drew attention to the fact that the 
construction of the Revolution in power, at least initially, owed much to the lived 
experience of guerrilla warfare. To this effect, Guevara asserted: 
Nuestra Revoluci6n fue, en esencia, el producto de un movimiento que inici6 la lucha 
armada contra la tirania y la cristaliz6 en la toma del poder. Los primeros pasos como 
Estado Revolucionario, asi como toda la primitiva epoca de nuestra gesti6n en el 
gobierno, estaban fuertemente tei'lidos de los elementos fundamentales de la tlictica 
guerrillera como forma de administraci6n estatal. El "guerrillerismo" repetfa la 
experiencia de la lucha armada de las sierras y los campos de Cuba en las distintas 
organizaciones administrativas y de masas, y se traducia en que solamente las grandes 
consignas revolucionarias eran seguidas (y muchas veces interpretadas en distintas 
maneras) par los organismos de la administraci6n y de la sociedad en general. La 
forma de resolver los problemas concretos estaba sujeta allibre arbitrio de cada uno de 
los dirigentes (Guevara 1963, 176). 
Of note here is Guevara's mention of the concept of 'guerrillerismo' as the act of 
continuing to play out the armed struggle of the sierra in the realm of government 
administration and mass organisations. He also went on to talk of 'guerrillas 
administrativas' in reference to the disagreements that occurred between former 
members of the Ejercito Rebelde over how best to interpret and implement new laws. 
Rather than adhering to the rules of the 'aparato central de direcci6n', the former 
guerrilleros were prone to arguing amongst themselves and to issuing their own 
decrees. Such descriptions, from a perspective internal to the Revolution, do much 
to contradict the notion that the Revolution was 'militarised', and convey a more 
complicated picture of the process of revolution-building following a guerrilla 
struggle. However, it should be noted that Guevara declared the period of 
'guerrillerismo' to have ended one year into the Revolution in power with the onset 
of bureaucracy. He contended: 
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Despues de un afio de dolorosas experiencias Ilegamos a la concJusi6n de que era 
imprescindible modificar total mente nuestro estilo de trabajo y volver a organizar el 
aparato estatal de un modo racional, utilizando las tecnicas de la planiticaci6n 
conocidas en los hermanos paises socialistas (Guevara 1963, 176). 
It is clear, then, that Guevara's idea of 'guerrillerismo' cannot be invoked to argue 
against the application of the term 'militarisation' to the Revolution in later years, 
particularly during the 1970s. Nonetheless, one might be led to question whether the 
lived experience of the armed insurrection, so ingrained in the minds of its 
participants, could be so easily pushed aside as a source of inspiration for the 
revolutionary leadership. 
Other works support this idea that the guerrilla insurrection continued to be a model 
of revolutionary action after 1959, and, contrary to Guevara, after 1960. Theodore 
Draper, for instance, commented in 1965 on the interference of the past in Cuba's 
revolutionary project, and of the leadership's apparent inability to shake off its 
guerrilla roots. Draper remarked that: 
Castroism has tended to return to its origins. It has been obsessed by what might be 
called a "Sierra Maestra complex" - the legend of the twelve who with the help of a 
few hundred or a few thousand "illiterate, uneducated, and technically untrained" 
peasants allegedly overthrew a "regular, disciplined army" ( ... ) In effect. Castro has 
oscillated between two extremes: to make a Cuba out of all Latin America or to make 
a Sierra Maestra out of all Cuba. ( ... ) His past differs from that of all other 
Communist leaders and repeatedly insists on injecting itself into the present (Draper 
1965, 219/220). 
Draper was highly critical of what he saw as the leadership's propensity to 
perpetuate the guerrilla condition, seeing it as contributing to 'an immanent violence 
which turns inward as readily as outward' (Draper 1965, 221). He argued that such 
a predisposition to view violence as part and parcel of revolution could lead to ruin 
in the Cuban case (Draper 1965, 221). 
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Another academic to comment on the complexities of the Revolution with respect to 
the guerrilla influence was K.S. Karol, whose seminal work, Guerrillas in Power: 
The Course of the Cuban Revolution, was published in 1970. Indeed, the very title of 
his monograph makes reference to the guerrilla past, and present, of the Revolution's 
leaders. Karol was keen to stress that, in its first decade, Cuba's revolutionary 
government was formed of men who had been swiftly transplanted from the sierra to 
the upper echelons of the leadership, with little time for a political education other 
than what they had learned through the enactment of warfare. Accordingly, Karol 
argued that the way in which the Revolution in power was constructed was heavily 
influenced by the experience of these former guerrilleros. He commented that 'the 
sierra had not been simply a military test for the Castroists; it was also a social 
experiment, and had a decisive effect on the future of the Revolution' (Karol 1970, 
42). This 'decisive effect' was apparent in the sense that the majority of the initial 
revolutionary initiatives, particularly those intended to revive the economy, were 
unstructured and insufficiently planned in such a way as one might expect of a 
guerrilla army. In other words, the revolutionary government lacked the order of an 
established political institution, and the military precision of an armed force in the 
traditional mould. Writing about his experiences in Cuba in the early 1960s, Karol 
observed: 
I learned that INRA was still far too 'guerrillero' - to use Che Guevara's famous 
expression - i.e. neither coordinated enough nor properly planned. The Castroists 
themselves were the first to admit this and half amused, half shocked, they told 
entertaining stories about certain granja leaders who had come forward with all sorts 
of hare-brained schemes ( ... ) their mistakes were inevitable, given their lack of 
experience and the scope of the task they had taken on (Karol 1970, 34). 
However, while Karol made constant reference to the 'guerrilla-ness' of the 
Revolution in power, at one point describing socialist Cuba as Castro's 'new Sierra 
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Maestra', he did, at times, employ the term 'militaristic', particularly with reference 
to the closing years of the first decade (Karol 1970, 186). For instance, he wrote of 
the Revolutionary Offensive period that, 'Though the word 'militarisation' was never 
used officially, the whole country was, in fact, reorganised on the model of its army' 
(Karol 1970, 444). That said, though not shying away from the term, Karol did not 
seem to believe that the Revolution and, therefore, Cuba had been completely 
'm ilitari sed' ; rather, he pointed to aspects of 'militarism', such as the creation of the 
UMAP and the forms of 'repression' carried out during the Offensive (Karol 1970, 
448). Moreover, if one considers the Cuban armed forces to have been shaped by the 
lessons of guerrilla warfare. Karol's assertion that Cuba was 'reorganised on the 
model of its army' does not necessarily contradict the notion that the lived 
experience of guerrilla warfare informed the development of the Revolution in 
power. 
Similar observations concerning the apparent legacy of the guerrilla struggle in Cuba 
post-1959 were put forward by Gonzalez in 1974. Gonzalez proposed the existence 
of a 'guerri11a mentality', which, following Draper. he alternately labelled the 'Sierra 
Maestra complex'. According to Gonzalez, this 'mentality', or 'complex', led the 
Cuban leadership to view revolutionary rule as a continuation of guerrilla struggle; 
the leaders' style of governance thus seemed to be born out of their experience in the 
sierra, and did not, therefore, conform to what might be expected of a 'militarised' 
Revolution. Gonzalez wrote that the 'guerrilla mentality'/ 'Sierra Maestra complex' 
could be: 
distinguished by (Fidel's) disposition to posit maximum revolutionary objectives, to 
take bold risks on behalf of these goals, to push defiantly in the face of adversity, to 
demand supreme sacrifice from his followers, and to rely heavily on improvisation 
and subjective factors for the accomplishment of his revolutionary undertaking. In the 
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end, this type of guerrilla-derived radicalism came to dominate not only politics but 
also the jidelista regime's economic policies (Gonzalez 1974, 109). 
Much like Draper, Gonzalez's references to the 'Sierra Maestra complex' seem to be 
directed principally at Fidel Castro, and not at the revolutionary leadership as a 
whole. Though the conflation of Castro with the Revolution can lead to an 
oversimplification of the process of decision-making and of government in the 
Cuban context (ignoring, as it does, the role of other political actors) Gonzalez's and 
Draper's reflections are nevertheless useful. Castro's actions were not necessarily 
representative of the entire Cuban leadership, but he did, as Gonzalez pointed out, 
exert an influence over the thinking of those forming part of the 'fidelista regime'. 
Castro's own 'Sierra Maestra complex' would likely have cultivated and perpetuated 
similar sentiments amongst other former guerrilleros. 
This latter idea was put forward by Louis Perez, Jr. in 1976. Perez, Jr. argued that 
the Ejercito Rebelde which transformed into the official state military in the 1960s 
was permeated with the memory of the sierra which, in tum, underpinned wider 
government initiatives in the early years of the Revolution in power. He noted that: 
The theme of struggle as a continuum with the Sierra Maestra dominated government 
programs as efforts were made to fasten the sierra consciousness on to the military. 
( ... ) Rebel Army projects were designed to instil a commitment to the Revolution as 
defined by the sierra leadership. The Sierra Maestra provided the inspiration for all 
revolutionaries who were to partake of its ethos and emerge spiritually connected to 
the heroic struggle and politically committed to its leaders (Perez, Jr. 1976,263). 
Perez, Jr. thus described a clear, linear prolongation of the pre-1959 guerrilla 
insurrection which seemed to be actively encouraged by those who had been 
amongst its chief protagonists. Much like the other authors discussed here, he 
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proposed that this furtherance of the guerrilla struggle was characteristic only of the 
very first years of the Revolution; events such as the Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961, he 
contended, persuaded the leadership of the necessity of organising 'a professionally 
prepared armed institution' (Perez, Jr. 1976, 265). 
In contrast, Kapcia has argued more recently that the guerrilla ethos instilled by the 
insurrection has continued to underscore the Revolution throughout its trajectory. 
Kapcia contends that the supposed 'militarism' of the Revolution could be more 
aptly conceptualised as "guerrilla-ization", a characteristic born out of the '1960s 
"guerrilla mentality" which extolled the guerrilla ( ... ) as the model for all 
commitment to the tasks of the Revolution' (Kapcia 2008, 152). He proposes that 
such a "guerrilla-ization", contrary to engendering 'a coercive militarist atmosphere'. 
has, in fact, 'created a sense of collective struggle that gave ordinary Cubans a sense 
of empowerment and even quietly 'heroic' participation in the defence of their 
Revolution' which is 'less coercion than mobilization' (Kapcia 2008, 152). 
Elsewhere, Kapcia has applied the term 'guerrillerismo' to the Revolution's 
omnipresent guerrilla ethos. He has written that 'guerrillerismo' denotes an 
'instinctive preference for voluntarism, for insurrection, for the subjective over the 
objective', as well as the attempt to 'universalise the ethos of the guerrilla into all 
aspects of life' (Kapcia 2000, 184/185). 
Taking into account the various terms discussed here, it may be that the concept of 
guerrillerismo as a type of code which has underpinned the Revolution in power is 
the most appropriate alternative to the notion of an embedded 'militarism', for a 
number of reasons. Firstly, unlike the terms 'guerrilla mentality' and 'Sierra Maestra 
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complex', guerrillerismo is relatively neutral in its characterisation of the 
perpetuation of the guerrilla ethos. In other words, it does not imply a judgement of 
this aspect of the Revolution in power, but instead simply acts as a descriptor. In 
contrast, the concepts of 'guerrilla mentality' and 'Sierra Maestra complex' possess 
potentially negative connotations, particularly the former in the comparison it invites 
with another supposed 'complex', that of 'siege mentality'. In the coming chapters, 
it will become clear that the evidence which supports the existence of the 'guerrilla 
code' often concomitantly challenges the notion of a 'siege mentality' which, as we 
have seen, has been presented as a fundamental component of 'militarism'. In 
addition, the term 'mentality' can also be said to refer only to a 'way of thinking', 
and not a way of acting in, and shaping, the world. As stated in the Introduction, this 
thesis demonstrates that the continued influence of the guerrilla experience was 
outwardly expressed by the leadership at different points in the Revolution's 
trajectory, and contributed to the shaping of the political culture that underpinned the 
Revolution in power. The perpetuation of the guerrilla legacy should not, therefore, 
be reduced to the level of a 'mindset' possessed by former guerrilleros in the 
leadership. Moreover, the notion of a 'complex' suggests, in the psychoanalytical 
sense of the word, a repressed experience, or impulses, which continue to influence 
behaviour. While this concept might, to an extent, account for the expression of the 
guerrilla experience by the leadership, the ubiquitous presence of symbols and 
images related to the insurrectionary phase, not to mention the conscious veneration 
of its heroes, reveal that, far from being repressed, the guerrilla experience has been 
actively kept alive by the leadership. Furthermore, Draper and Gonzalez seem to 
have defined the 'Sierra Maestra complex' largely in relation to Fidel Castro. To 
reiterate, Gonzalez proposed that the 'complex' could be 'distinguished by (Fidel's) 
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disposition to posit maximum revolutionary objectives', while Draper argued that it 
was most evident in Castro's indecision over whether to 'make a Cuba out of all 
Latin America or to make a Sierra Maestra out of all Cuba', and the way in which his 
past 'repeatedly insists on injecting itself into the present' (Draper 1965, 219/220; 
Gonzalez 1974, 109). What this thesis shows is that the 'guerrilla code' is a set of 
values and beliefs which have been promoted by a leadership comprised of former 
guerrilleros in such a way that it has shaped the political culture of the Revolution in 
power, and has, in turn, helped to legitimise the revolutionary project. It cannot, 
therefore, be reduced to the actions, beliefs or, indeed, 'complex' of one individual. 
In contrast to 'guerrilla mentality' and the 'Sierra Maestra complex', guerrillerismo 
offers a far more impartial definition of the perpetuation ofthe guerrilla ethos and all 
that it entails, and thus is perhaps a more suitable characterisation of the 'guerrilla 
code'. This impartiality results, in part, from the '-ismo' element of the term; this 
suffix tends to denote a given set of principles or beliefs, without conferring 
judgement on the root word to which it is attached. In this particular case, the ,-
ism' refers simply to the beliefs and principles which are associated with the word 
guerrillero. Deconstructed in this way, guerrillerismo seems to offer a particularly 
apposite definition of the propagation of the beliefs and values associated with the 
guerrilla insurrection, and the accompanying veneration of the figure of the 
guerrillero. Additionally, it should be acknowledged that guerrillerismo also 
provides something of a fitting alternative for the concept of 'militarism', in that it 
essentially allows for the replacement of one 'ism' - the set of principles associated 
with the military, in a general sense - with another. that is those related to guerrilla 
warfare. 
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Guerrillerismo is also a more useful term insofar as it enables one to circumvent the 
controversy connoted by foquismo, and the latter's obvious allusion to the 
insurrection of the 1950s, while at the same time encompassing the precepts of 
foquismo. Unlikefoquismo, which is indelibly tied to a precise historical context and 
geographical location (Latin America, not including Cuba), guerrillerismo allows for 
a broader reference to Cuba's tradition of guerrilla struggle that precedes the 
articulation of both Debray and Guevara's guerrilla warfare methodologies and 
which, according to the official historical narrative of the Revolution, commenced 
with the independence struggles of the late 1800s. As will become clear in the 
following chapters, the guerrilla ethos promoted by the leadership does not derive its 
values from the experience of the Revolution's insurrectionary phase alone, but from 
Cuba's long-standing tradition of guerrilla warfare more broadly. Thus 
guerrillerismo does not simply replace foquismo as a concept; rather it includes it in 
its definition, allowingfoquismo to be considered as fundamental to the development 
of the notion of guerrilla struggle in the Cuban context, only alongside other 
historical events and ideas. 
By the same token, guerrillerismo is not applied in this thesis as a straightforward 
substitute for 'militarism', nor are the two terms proposed as binary opposites. 
Instead, what is intended by the use of guerrillerismo is a more nuanced 
understanding of how Cuba's armed forces differ from other military institutions, 
most notably in Latin America, as a result of the revolutionary tradition out of which 
they emerged, and from which their underpinning values are derived. 
Guerrillerismo, like 'militarism', allows for consideration of the pronounced military 
presence in Cuban politics and society, yet it seeks to explain this presence not by 
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resorting to obvious comparisons with other countries' military experiences, but by 
taking into account the legacy of guerrilla struggle in Cuba, a legacy which cannot be 
separated from the development of revolutionary institutions, military or otherwise, 
after 1959. In this way, 'militarism', a term rooted in nineteenth-century Europe, as 
discussed earlier, is unable to address adequately Cuba's historical specificities, or 
explain the complex relationship between the military and the leadership. Reference 
to Klepak's perspective on this issue is once again instructive here: 
it is important to note that the FAR are rarely seen, and certainly do not see 
themselves as a repressive instrument of the government. They have not fired on the 
people to date and it is clear that doing so would be the most unacceptable thing they 
had ever been asked to do. They are in their own minds different from other Latin 
American armed forces because of their revolutionary past and their revolutionary 
tradition. They see themselves truly as the "people's army" of a revolutionary people 
(Klepak 2005, 56). 
Guerrillerismo, in contrast to 'militarism', applies to a uniquely Cuban revolutionary 
context. In place of analysing the FAR (and the Revolution more generally) in terms 
of foreign models, the concept of guerrillerismo contends that there is a set of beliefs 
and values engendered and fostered by a tradition of armed revolutionary struggle 
that have come to form a central component, a constituent code, of the ideology 
which drives forward the revolutionary project: cubania. To remind ourselves of 
what is signified by cubania, the term can be understood as connoting an unyielding 
belief in Cuban sovereignty and national identity, combined with the principle of 
anti-imperialism and the sense that the answer to Cuba's problems can only be found 
'inside, in a recourse to Cuba, to the Cuban people and in Cuban history' (Kapcia 
2008, 90). Kapcia, among others, has argued that it is cubania which, ideologically-
speaking, has characterised the Revolution since its inception: 'With the victory of 
the Rebel Army in 1959, these beliefs and values were to transform from a counter-
97 
hegemonic 'ideology of dissent' into a hegemonic one, henceforth 'guiding the 
whole revolutionary process and contributing to its radicalization' (Kapcia 2000, 
175). This thesis argues that guerrillerismo represents one of the defining codes of 
cubania, insofar as 'It is a set of related and cognate beliefs and principles that can be 
grouped together to make a coherent belief in a single, given value' (Kapcia 2000. 
13). To elucidate further, codes can be thought of as the pillars of an ideology/belief-
system, as representing the ideal values or qualities of a given group, or as 'a 
statement of what is desirable as a quality for all those who belong to that 
community, which should be put into effect and which is basic to the whole 
ideology' (Kapcia 2000, 13/14). The ensuing chapters will demonstrate that, as a 
code of cubania, guerrillerismo signifies a number of 'desirable' values relating to 
the guerrilla ethos but also revolutionary struggle in a wider sense. Of note is the 
value of voluntad, or subjective will, the idea that the fate of a revolution is 
detennined by the actions (or rather the will to act) of the individual revolutionary. 
As we saw earlier in Chapter One, this value was propounded by Guevara in his 
writings on guerrilla warfare methodology. 
In its focus on subjective will and revolutionary action, guerrillerismo contributes to 
the development of the revolutionary consciousness of Cuban citizens, previously 
defined in this chapter as implying 'faith and belief in victory, emotional 
identification with the cause of social revolution, and a beliefthat social regeneration 
will be made possible by revolution' (Judson 1984, 2). According to Guevara (and 
Gramsci), revolutionary consciousness can only be obtained through direct 
participation and lived experience of physical struggle. By acquiring faith in the 
cause of the Revolution and a belief in the transformative potential of the 
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revolutionary project, the individual will also come to identify with the Revolution's 
ideology of cubania. In this way, guerrillerismo not only promotes numerous 
'desirable qualities' which the ideal Cuban citizen must possess, but, in so doing, it 
also shapes his or her world-view to the extent that it becomes at least partly 
consistent with the ideology which underpins the Revolution. In other words, 
citizens will come to accept as given, or 'normal', the beliefs and values housed 
under cubania and espoused by the revolutionary leadership so that they remain 
unchallenged. This 'normalisation' of values has played an inherent part in the 
creation of the Cuban Revolution's political culture (its 'political socialisation' 
process), the main objective of which, as Fagen states, is 'to produce a participating 
citizen' (Fagen 1969, 7). It is the Revolution's deep-seated political culture which 
has contributed to its longevity and not, as implied by the 'militarism' perspective. an 
increased authoritarianism and the absence of political participation. 
Guerrillerismo, Discourse and Power 
The promotion and acceptance of the values contained within the code of 
guerrillerismo can only occur if these values are communicated effectively by the 
revolutionary leadership to the wider Cuban population. As stated in the 
Introduction, this communication occurs largely, and most successfully, through 
language, although it is further buttressed by the proliferation of accompanying 
images. It is for this reason that discourse analysis is applied to the language of the 
Cuban leadership as a means of determining whether the values pertaining to the 
guerrilla ethos can be identified therein and, if so, the periods during which their 
presence is most palpable. The form of discourse analysis adopted follows the 
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methodology outlined by Fairclough (the specific aspects of which will be detailed in 
Chapter Two), which involves picking apart the composition of a given text and 
finding meaning in its vocabulary, ordering of phrases and overall cohesion. 
However, while this approach provides an extremely useful toolkit for performing a 
close reading of a text, a discussion on the wider implications of discourse is 
necessary here if we are to gain a more holistic understanding of its role in the 
acquisition and preservation of power. Foucault's substantial body of work 
regarding the relationship between discourse and power is particularly illuminating 
in this respect. Indeed, much of Fairclough's methodology draws on Foucault's 
writings on the 'discursive nature of power' and the potential of changing discursive 
practices to effect social change (Fairclough 1992, 55/56). 
Foucault's definition of discourse is, at best, ambiguous, yet an important point to 
remember is that it is not to be taken as synonymous with language, but rather, as he 
wrote in his seminal work The Archaeology of Knowledge, as denoting a set of 
'regulated practices that account for a number of statements' (Foucault 1972, 80). 
Put differently, Foucault is not so much concerned with texts in and of themselves, 
but with the unspoken rules and structures which determine what can be said in a 
given social context (Mills 2003, 53). He argues that these rules and practices allow 
certain statements to remain in constant circulation while others are simply excluded, 
writing: 
in every society the production of discourse is at once controlled, selected, organised 
and redistributed by a certain number of procedures whose role it is to ward off its 
powers and dangers, to gain mastery over its chance events, to evade its ponderous, 
formidable materiality (Foucault 1981,52). 
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This control over discourse, he proposes, in tum affects our perception of reality and 
the world around us, although we are not always cognisant that this 'structuring' of 
our reality is taking place (Mills 2003, 55). 
In determining what statements can be circulated and what must be excluded, 
Foucault contends that the distinction between what is true and what is false plays a 
key part. This distinction is itself determined by the specific social, historical and 
political conditions in which they occur (McHoul and Grace 1993, 29). It should be 
noted that the idea of 'truth' in the Foucauldian sense does not refer to 'self-evident' 
statements, but to what is spoken or written by those in positions of authority or 
within established institutions (thus, conversely, anyone not in a position of power 
does not speak the truth) (Mills 2003, 58). As Foucault puts it: 'by the production of 
truth I mean not the production of true utterances, but the establishment of domains 
in which the practice of true and false can be made at once ordered and pertinent' 
(Foucault 1991 a, 79). 
The statements made by people in power become further authorised and supported 
by 'a range of practices and institutions: universities, government departments, 
publishing houses, scientific bodies, and so on. All these institutions work to 
exclude statements which they characterise as false and they keep in circulation those 
statements they characterise as true' (Mills 2003, 58). This circulation occurs in all 
areas of a given society, being replicated in books and educational curricula and, 
ultimately, transforming into 'common-sense-knowledge' (Mills 2003, 74). With 
regard to education in particular, Foucault asserts that, 'Every educational system is a 
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political means of maintaining or of modifying the appropriation of discourse, with 
the knowledge and the powers it carries with it' (Foucault 1971, 156). 
For Foucault, then, discourse analysis is not about what is being said, it is about 
identifying the processes behind why a statement is being uttered and the practices 
which lead to it becoming 'true' and therefore reproduced time and again: 'At all 
events, one thing at least must be emphasised here: that the analysis of discourse thus 
understood, does not reveal the universality of a meaning, but brings to light the 
action of imposed rarity, with a fundamental power of affirmation' (Foucault 1971, 
162). Foucault is interested in uncovering the 'historical specificity' of what is taken 
to be true in certain contexts, that is how truth is contingent upon its historical and 
political circumstances (McHoul and Grace 1993, 33). 
It is important to remember, however, that, though Foucault's approach might appear 
intrinsically negative (insofar as it aims to uncover the seemingly manipulative use 
of discourse by those in power), Foucault is adamant that his analysis is concerned 
more with describing rather than criticising. To this effect, he writes in Discipline 
and Punish: The Birth of the Prison that, 'We must cease once and for all to describe 
the effects of power in negative terms: it "excludes", it "represses", it "censors", it 
"abstracts", it "masks", it "conceals". In fact, power produces; it produces reality; it 
produces domains and objects and rituals of truth ' (Foucault 1991 b, 194). 
Such an objective approach to the study of language use by a political power 
provides a helpful means of thinking about and understanding how certain statements 
(namely those relating to guerrillerismo) are used, circulated and perpetuated in 
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revolutionary Cuba, and by whom. Complementary to Fairclough's approach, 
which allows for a thorough analysis of specific words and phrases in order to better 
understand the tenets that comprise the ideology behind the Revolution, applying 
Foucault's ideas enables a consideration of the bigger picture; it offers an 
explanation as to how these words and phrases come to be repeated and reproduced 
over time in different ways and in different types of text in the Cuban context. More 
importantly for the purposes of this study, Foucault's work shows how the 
reproduction of 'true' statements plays a crucial part in maintaining political power 
by contributing to the construction and preservation of a new reality (or, indeed, a 
new political culture) in which certain ideas and values, such as those encompassed 
by guerrillerismo, become normalised and unquestioned. In Cuba, these values and 
ideas are those that make up cubania, the ideological glue that continues to hold 
together the revolutionary project. Thus, for Foucault, power is not about an 'all-
encompassing opposition between ruler and ruled' nor a 'duality extending from the 
top down and reacting on more and more limited groups to the very depths of the 
social body' but about the perpetuation of ideas and values throughout a given 
society over time, and the creation of the conditions in which these ideas and values 
represent the 'truth' (Foucault 1979, 93/4). This conceptualisation of power is 
helpful when considering the Cuban context, in which the separation between state 
and civil society is not readily discernible. and in which power is mediated through 
ministries, institutions and mass organisations. 
In the next three chapters, Foucault's notion of discourse will provide the broader 
conceptual framework for a detailed textual analysis that. following Fairclough. 
highlights the mUltiple linguistic techniques through which cuban;sla values and 
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ideas have been communicated effectively to the Cuban population at various stages 
in the Revolution's history. Consistent with Foucault's understanding of how 
discourse functions, the analysis will consider a range of texts produced by a variety 
of publishers and ministries in revolutionary Cuba to demonstrate how different 
'practices and institutions' contribute to the reproduction and dissemination of 'true' 
statements issued by those in power (Mills 2003, 58). These texts include official 
speeches, military training manuals, newspapers, magazines and history books, more 
detail on the selection of which is offered in Chapter Two. Specifically, the analysis 
will show that the 'true' statements kept in circulation frequently promote the values 
and ideas that, together, define guerrillerismo, thereby confirming the applicability 
of the term to the Cuban context. 
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Chapter Two 
Guerrillerismo in the 1960s 
In the preceding chapter, we concluded that the term guerrillerismo offers the most 
apposite characterisation of the revolutionary leadership's sustained promotion of the 
image and ethos of the guerrillero. In order to substantiate this concept, the 
following two chapters comprise a discussion of evidence which supports its validity; 
this evidence is grounded in discourse analysis. This chapter first expands on the 
brief description offered in the Introduction of what is meant by discourse analysis 
for the purposes of this thesis. There will then follow an extended examination of 
selected citations from a number of texts which were published in Cuba during the 
first decade of the Revolution in power, that is between 1959 and 1969. This 
examination will demonstrate that the beliefs and values which constitute 
guerrillerismo were most evident in the language emanating 'from above', the 
official hegemonic discourse of the Cuban Revolution. The following chapter will 
then see a shift in the focus of the analysis to the period 1969-1981. 
It is necessary first, however, to provide a definition of what is proposed by the 
reference to 'hegemonic discourse' in this context. As mentioned briefly in the 
Introduction, the concept of hegemony as employed in the thesis is consistent with 
Gramsci's conceptualisation, in spite of the ambiguity surrounding the term which 
arises largely out of the plethora of academic exegeses produced on Gramsci's work. 
Gramsci's concept of hegemony developed out of his conviction that Marxism 
placed too great an emphasis on the economic base as the root of political 
transformation (Kurtz 1996, 107). He thus aimed to produce a theory which 
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analysed in greater detail the acquisition and maintenance of political power, the way 
in which social classes interact, and 'the cultural and ideological forms in which 
social antagonisms are fought out or regulated and dissipated' (Forgacs 2000, 189). 
This theory was that of hegemony. Gramsci argued that political power, or 
hegemonic control, cannot be based on coercion alone, but rather' is characterised by 
the combination of force and consent, which balance each other reciprocally, without 
force predominating excessively over consent' (Gramsci 1971, 80). For Gramsci, a 
fundamental factor in achieving the necessary consent was the creation of a new 
ideology, or world-view, which could be accepted by the mass majority in civil 
society. To reiterate partly his words cited in the Introduction, Gramsci asserted that 
'what matters is that a new way of conceiving the world and man is born ( ... ) with a 
concretely world-wide character, capable of modifying ( ... ) popular thought' 
(Gramsci 1971,417). 
If we apply Gramsci's notion of hegemony to the context of Cuba in the J 960s, the 
position of 'hegemonic control' can, of course, be ascribed to those leading the 
embryonic Revolution. In spite of the fact that, upon arriving in Havana in ) 959, the 
rebel leaders did not have a fixed ideology or world-view per se, the revolutionary 
campaign was underpinned by a set of values and beliefs which formed part of the 
pre-existing tradition of cubania (Kapcia 2000, 100). The adherence to cubania 
legitimised the revolutionary project in the eyes of the population, thus garnering for 
the leadership the required consent for achieving hegemony. Cubania remained the 
driving belief system behind the revolutionary project throughout the 1960s (and, 
arguably, until the present day), developing new and old constituent beliefs, and 
securing the hegemonic control by the revolutionary leadership. Returning to the 
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idea of 'hegemonic discourse', then, the analysis considers this term to apply to the 
discursive expression, or articulation, of the ideology of the Cuban Rcvolution, in 
both written and spokcn form. While this thesis accepts that cubania has 
consistently underpinned the Revolution, it also proposes that the values and beliefs 
of which cubania is comprised may be modified, or feature more or less prominently 
in the hegemonic discourse, at difTerentjunctures (Kapcia 2000, 18). With this latter 
idea in mind, the analysis will establish whether, in the 1960s and 70s, gllerrillerismo 
was a pre-eminent aspect of the leadership's discourse. 
The ensuing analysis incorporates numerous texts published and distributed during 
the first two decades of the Revolution in power. The choice of texts under 
inspection is informed by Foucault's notion that statements issued by those in power 
are further reinforced and legitimised by a number of practices and institutions, such 
as government ministries, universities and publishing houses. As Sara Mills has put 
it: 'All these institutions work to exclude statements which they characterise as false 
and they keep in circulation those statements they characterise as true' (Mills 2003, 
58). In order to establish which statements, or 'truths', are being perpetuated in the 
first instance by the revolutionary leadership, a significant part of the analysis is 
devoted to analysing speeches delivered by the former leader, Fidel Castro. If the 
guerrillerista language in the speeches of the leadership's highest authority is 
subsequently repeated in other forms of text, then it can be assumed that these 
statements constitute 'truths' in the Cuban context. After all, it is only those in 
positions of authority, according to Foucault, who are able to speak the 'truth'. In 
revolutionary Cuba, we can consider those who form part of the revolutionary 
leadership or, more specifically, the political stalwarts of the Revolution who fought 
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in the guerrilla struggle of the 1950s, to be in possession of the utmost authority. As 
we will see in the forthcoming chapters, these figures use the promotion of 
guerrillerismo, and an accompanying teleological historical narrative, to legitimise 
their hold on power. 
The analysis takes into account, however, that, unlike the written texts discussed 
here, the medium of a premeditated speech constitutes a very specific 'speech act', 
one that is designed to serve as a vehicle for conveying a given message (Fairclough 
1992, 84). In other words, its purpose is to project the ideology of the revolutionary 
leadership at a given moment, in such a way that the ideological message is 
communicated clearly and directly. The increased clarity in speeches, as opposed to 
written forms of text, might be seen to make the listener further aware of how their 
reality is being 'structured', and therefore less susceptible to ideological 
'manipulation' (Mills 2003,55). 
Yet, for the purposes of this study, speeches still constitute an important source of 
determining how the leadership laid the foundations of its evolving ideology during 
its first decade in power and, crucially, whether guerrillerismo formed an identifiable 
component of this ideology. In the formative years of the Revolution in power, the 
leadership was obliged to express its ideology more explicitly in order to inform its 
people, not to mention foreign observers, of the nature of the Revolution and its 
underlying motivation. Speeches thus offer a clear indication of the general mood of 
the Revolution, and the message, or 'truths', that the leadership was trying to instil in 
the population at certain junctures. From a Foucauldian perspective, official 
speeches are of particular interest for discourse analysis because they are 'verbal 
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acts' whose statements, in contrast to every day conversations and other forms of 
spoken text, are designed to be repeated and circulated and, ultimately, remain in the 
public imagination. Referring to this distinction, Foucault argues that there is 
something of a hierarchy of texts that exists in a society, in the upper echelons of 
which can be found official speeches: 
I suspect one could find a kind of gradation between different types of discourse 
within most societies: discourse "uttered" in the course of the day and in casual 
meetings, and which disappears with the very act which gave rise to it; and those 
forms of discourse that lie at the origins of a certain number of new verbal acts, which 
are reiterated, transformed or discussed; in short, discourse which is spoken and 
remains spoken, indefinitely, beyond its formulation, and which remains to be spoken 
(Foucault 1971, 162). 
It is these 'verbal acts' that are 'reiterated, transformed or discussed' and that 
'remain spoken' beyond their initial utterance that are of interest to this study. That 
said, there is a lesser focus on speeches in the analysis of the discourse in the 1970s 
outlined in the next chapter. What the analysis in Chapter Three will demonstrate are 
traces of guerrillerismo in the early years of the second decade of the Revolution in 
power. These traces are not so frequently identifiable in the leadership's speeches in 
the 1970s given that, at that time, the process of institutionalisation. or 
'Sovietisation', was in full swing. The rapprochement with the Soviet Union saw the 
leadership attempt to shake off the remnants of its guerrilla past, at least outwardly, 
thereby appearing to adhere to Soviet orthodoxy. The 'truths' established in the 
discourse of the 1960s, however, continued to be reproduced in other, less 'obvious', 
forms. 
An analysis of texts in which ideological messages are conveyed more subtly will 
form the core of the analysis. Two of the key texts in this respect are the 1960 
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Manual de Capacitacion Civica and the 1973 edition of Instruccion Polilica FAR, 
both published by MINF AR. These texts have been selected as the focus of the 
analysis owing to their shared function as instruction manuals for enacting 
revolutionary duties, although their intended readerships differ: the former was 
directed at members of the voluntary MNR, while the latter was aimed at 
professional members of the FAR. The evidence of guerrillerismo in the language 
employed in both these texts is particularly telling, since it demonstrates that the 
leadership aimed to guide the actions of Cuban citizens and soldiers by promoting 
the values and beliefs associated with the guerrilla ethos, and not, therefore, 
'militarism'. Moreover, as mentioned earlier, it is government institutions and 
ministries that, according to Foucault, aid in keeping certain statements in circulation 
while excluding others. The replication of guerrillerista statements in texts produced 
by one of the largest and most pervasive institutions in Cuba, MINFAR, will reveal 
that the values associated with guerrillerismo are those which the leadership aims to 
transfonn into 'common-sense-knowledge' (Mills 2003, 74). For this reason, the 
official magazine of the FAR, Verde Olivo, is also under review in the following 
chapters. Verde Olivo, founded in 1959 under the initiative of Raul Castro, Camilo 
Cienfuegos and Che Guevara, features articles relating to general military matters 
and current events, yet it has a strong historical element, placing the spotlight on key 
historical events and figures. Though intended principally for members of the armed 
forces, it has a wider readership among members' families and friends. 
In addition to texts published by government institutions, the analysis also examines 
texts with an explicitly educational purpose, such as history books. This type of text 
also contributes to the circulation and preservation of particular statements, insofar as 
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it is designed to be reiterated and discussed beyond the initial reading by the text 
recipient (Foucault 1971, 152). History books in particular allow for the presentation 
of a specific version of events that supports the 'truth' constructed and 
communicated by the revolutionary leadership; as will become clear in the next 
chapters, this version of events often plays up the role of guerrilla struggle in the 
Cuban historical narrative (to the exclusion of other events) to aid in granting 
historical legitimacy to former guerril/eros in power. 
A similar function can be ascribed to newspapers and magazines. In revolutionary 
Cuba, where the media is state-controlled and censored, official newspapers and 
magazines on the whole comply with the practices of government institutions, in the 
sense that they repeat and reproduce statements that support or affirm the 'truth' or 
reality constructed by the leadership. Indeed, many academics have written of the 
central role played by the media in safeguarding the revolutionary government's hold 
on power, largely by affirming the historical narrative that portrays the country's 
leaders as the rightful heirs to this authority (Guerra, 2012; Pettavino, 1990). 
Publications under scrutiny in the ensuing analysis include Cuba's only national 
daily newspaper, Granma, the self-proclaimed '6rgano Oficial del Comite Central 
del Partido Comunista de Cuba'. Granma, established in 1965, is Cuba's most 
widely-read newspaper, carrying news and current events stories, alongside official 
announcements and speeches. The country's oldest general-interest magazine, 
Bohemia, will also be examined. Bohemia, founded in 1908, was a vocal supporter 
ofthe Revolution during its first months in power, publishing an anthology of events 
that played up the role of the guerrilleros in the insurrectionary phase, and thereby 
helping to secure public trust for the new government (Guerra 2012, 42). Overall, 
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the purpose of this detailed analysis of a cross-section of texts is to provide an 
overview of the leadership's discourse at different points in the first two decades of 
the Revolution in power, with the aim of highlighting the presence of guerrillerismo 
therein. 
As indicated, the specific historical period under scrutiny in this study runs first from 
1959 to 1969; Chapter Three will consider separately the subsequent decade, from 
1969 to 1979. Concerning the first decade of the Revolution in power, this period is 
an obvious choice for close examination given the topic of this study. In 1959, the 
Revolution was transplanted directly from the mountains to the city, from irregular 
guerrilla warfare to the seat of power. Those leading the Revolution had received 
their political education in the Sierra Maestra, arriving in Havana still wearing their 
verde olivo guerrilla uniforms, and with little idea of how the new revolutionary 
government should be constructed. With these historical circumstances in mind, it is 
reasonable to conclude that the formative years of the Revolution in power would 
otTer the most fertile ground for unearthing evidence of guerrillerismo, given that it 
is somewhat improbable that the revolutionary leadership would have discarded its 
guerrilla past immediately after seizing power. Indeed, as has already been discussed 
in Chapter One, Guevara himself wrote of the phenomenon of guerrillerismo in his 
1965 article 'Contra el burocratismo', in which he described how the guerrilla 
struggle of the sierra continued to play out in the realm of government 
administration. The evidence presented here thus highlights the extent to which the 
experience of guerrilla warfare continued to influence those holding the reins of 
power in the 1960s, and how, in tum, this influence shaped the way in which the 
leadership attempted to mould its citizens into 'ideal' revolutionaries. The evidence 
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further demonstrates that the guerrilla influence was reflected in the language 
employed by those in power as a means of including the rest of the population in an 
on-going guerrilla struggle, albeit one that was now about maintaining. rather than 
producing, a revolution. In addition to substantiating the notion of guerrillerismo. 
the evidence also concomitantly enables a refutation of the 'militarism' label which, 
as underlined thus far in the thesis, has been ascribed to the Cuban Revolution in 
power. 
Briefly discussed in the Introduction, the form of discourse analysis which has been 
carried out for the purpose of this thesis is consistent with the methodology put 
forward in Fairclough's work, Discourse and Social Change (Fairclough, 1992). 
Fairclough's text offers a useful model for discourse analysis, one which aims to 
'bring together linguistically-oriented discourse analysis and social and political 
thought relevant to discourse and language, in the form ofa framework which will be 
suitable for use in social scientific research, and specifically in the study of social 
change' (Fairclough 1992, 62). Fairclough views discourse, or 'language use', as a 
'form of social practice, rather than a purely individual activity or a reflex of 
situational variables'; this perspective, he argues, 'implies that discourse is a mode of 
action, one form in which people may act upon the world ( ... ) as well as a mode of 
representation' (Fairclough 1992, 62). Furthermore, Fairclough contends that 
discourse plays a part in the construction of "social identities' and 'subject positions' 
for social 'subjects' and types of 'self', but also in 'the construction of systems of 
knowledge and belief (Fairclough 1992, 64). This latter point is particularly 
relevant to this research given that it aims to investigate how, through language, the 
Cuban leadership attempted to mould citizens into the ideal revolutionary subjects; 
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that is, individuals committed to defending the Revolution by following the precepts 
of which guerrillerismo is comprised. 
In order to analyse how discourse engenders these identities and systems, Fairclough 
advocates using a framework which is comprised of four key areas: 'vocabulary" 
'grammar', 'cohesion' and 'text structure' (Fairclough 1992, 75). He adds to these a 
further three categories which are more concerned with analysing discursive practice 
rather than a text in itself. These categories are as follows: 'the 'force' of utterances, 
i.e. what sort of speech acts ( ... ) they constitute; the 'coherence' of texts; and the 
'intertextuality' of texts' (Fairclough 1992, 75). 
Fairclough then offers a brief explanation of what the four main categories imply in 
terms of a practical application, before providing a more in-depth guide later in the 
book. With regard to 'vocabulary', he proposes a focus upon 'alternative wordings 
and their political and ideological significance', in addition to 'word meaning'; he 
contends that 'particular structurings of the relationships between words and the 
relationships between the meanings of words are forms of hegemony' (Fairclough 
1992, 77). A third suggested focus within this category is 'metaphor'. insofar as 
attention should be given to 'the ideological and political import of particular 
metaphors, and conflict between alternative metaphors' (Fairclough 1992, 77). For 
grammar, Fairclough stresses the importance of clauses and their specific structure; 
he asserts that 'every clause is a combination of ideational, interpersonal ( ... ) and 
textual meanings' (Fairclough 1992, 76). He recommends a consideration of the 
'ideological investment' which can be inferred from the different ways in which 
certain events or statements are signified, and this includes taking into account the 
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use of agency in a given clause (Fairclough 1992, 77). Clauses are also an important 
factor to consider when examining the 'cohesion' of a text; Fairclough advocates an 
examination of 'how clauses are linked together, and how sentences are, in turn, 
linked together to form larger units in texts' (Fairclough 1992, 77). The linkages 
between clauses and sentences can be formed through the use of various techniques 
such as employing vocabulary from common semantic fields, referring and 
substituting devices, and conjunctions (Fairclough 1992, 77). Finally, concerning 
'text structure', Fairclough states that this category also deals with the 'architecture' 
of texts, and 'specifically higher-level design features of different types of text to 
discern 'what elements or episodes are combined in what ways and what order to 
constitute, for example, a crime report in a newspaper, or a job interview' 
(Fairclough 1992, 77). Fairclough argues that different 'structuring conventions' can 
provide 'a lot of insight into the systems of knowledge and belief and the 
assumptions about social relationships and social identities that are built into the 
conventions of text types' (Fairclough 1992, 78). These four categories will be 
applied and explored in further detail in the following analysis. 
Textual Analysis (1959-1969) 
From the opening weeks of the Cuban Revolution in power in 1959, the overriding 
message that the Cuban leadership wished to convey was clear: the Revolution had 
been won by the people, and for the people. This message was perhaps most 
obviously expressed in the triumphant speeches made by Fidel Castro during that 
first year. Castro wasted no time in voicing his gratitude to the Cuban people for 
making the Revolution possible, and in demonstrating his unbreakable faith in the 
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pueblo's ability to withstand the pressures, both internal and external, which the 
Revolution faced. 
In his speech of I January 1959, delivered in Santiago de Cuba's Parque Cespedes, 
Fidel Castro made sure to remind his audience frequently of the origins of the 
Revolution, and to instil a sense of ownership in the people of both the challenges 
already overcome and those which were to follow. Castro asserted: 
Yo no voy a decir que la Revoluci6n tiene el pueblo, eso ni se dice, eso 10 sabe todo el 
mundo. Yo decia que el pueblo, que antes tenia escopeticas, ya tiene artilleria, 
tanques y fragatas; y tiene muchos ttknicos capacitados del Ejercito que nos van a 
ayudar a manejarlas, si fuese necesario. jAhora sf que el pueblo esta annado! Yo les 
aseguro que si cuando eramos 12 hombres solamente no perdimos la fe, ahora que 
tenemos ahi 12 tanques c6mo vamos a perder la fe (Castro, 1959a). 
Castro declared that the support of the people for the Revolution was simply a given 
fact and thus was scarcely worth highlighting. Yet his very contention that 'Ia 
Revoluci6n tiene el pueblo', although encased in negatives, effectively underscored 
the statement. Castro was also careful here to underline the foundations of the 
movement which had brought the Revolution to power, stating: 'Yo decfa que el 
pueblo, que antes tenIa escopeticas'. By pointing out that the Cuban people fighting 
to overthrow Batista were once only armed with small shotguns, Castro effectively 
laid emphasis on the historical feat of the initial group of revolutionaries; that is, that 
they were able to produce revolution despite the paucity of their resources. The 
inclusion of the diminutive suffix, '-icas', in 'escopeticas', served to stress further the 
rather feeble capacity of these particular firearms which, in tum, added to the 
imagery of poorly equipped rebel fighters. What is more, Castro's use of this type of 
diminutive, a feature typical of spoken Cuban Spanish, is perhaps indicative of an 
attempt on his part to demonstrate that he himself was one of the pueblo to which he 
116 
made reference. In other words, Castro was making a deliberate attempt to use the 
language of 'the people' and did not want to distance himself from his audience 
through the employment of a more formal rhetoric. This gesture of inclusivity is 
reinforced in the final sentence of the citation where Castro contended that, 'cuando 
eramos 12 hombres solamente no perdimos la fe, ahora que tenemos ah i 12 tanques 
c6mo vamos a perder la fe'. The use of the first person plural in 'eramos' implied 
that, though there were only a small number of revolutionaries who participated in 
the embryonic campaign of 1956, the struggle of these few was representative of the 
struggle of the Cuban people as a whole. Similarly, the first person plural 'tenemos' 
seems intended to convey the message that the recently acquired military apparatus 
was not at the service of the state but of the newly-crowned leaders of the Cuban 
Revolution: e/ pueblo. 
The very notion that the Cuban people were in charge of the Revolution, and that it 
was they who had ensured its victory, pre-empted one of the precepts which Guevara 
would include in La Guerra de Guerrillas, published the following year: 'Las fuerzas 
populares pueden ganar una Guerra contra el ejercito' (Guevara 2006, 13). 
Informing the Cuban people that they would continue to lead the Revolution implied 
that the irregular approach of guerrilla struggle which had carried the Revolution to 
power was to continue. Put differently, the Revolution would not be fought in the 
first instance by soldiers trained to protect the state but, as in the sierra, by citizens 
fighting on behalf of their own people. It is thus possible to detect a promotion of 
the guerrilla ethos in the very first weeks of the Revolution in power which, in turn, 
compounds the idea that guerrillerismo grew organically out of the insurrection and 
was carried forward into the era of revolutionary government. 
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The reference in this citation to the' 12 hombres' who survived the Granma landing 
further reinforced Castro's point regarding the inferiority of the original group of 
rebels who took on the state security forces in 1956, thereby conveying the message 
once again that initiating a campaign on an unequal footing did not necessarily 
preclude success. Castro's words are an early example of the promotion of the myth 
of the los doce which recurs frequently in the leadership's rhetoric throughout the 
Revolution's trajectory. This myth refers to the belief that there were twelve 
survivors of the Granma landing who went on to launch the insurrection, although 
the exact number of rebels in the early stages of the campaign remains unknown. 
The myth became firmly inscribed in the Cuban imaginary following the publication 
of Carlos Franqui's EI libro de los doce in 1967 (but written shortly after the 
Revolution came to power). The book featured testimonial accounts of the 
insurrection from twelve of its central participants, although some, such as Haydee 
Santamaria, were certainly not present in the most nascent stages of the struggle in 
the sierra. Since the 1960s, this myth has transformed into something of a shorthand 
for those in power who have wished to underline not only the enormity of the 
challenge faced by the embryonic Ejercito Rebelde, but also the tenacity of those 
involved who chose to engage in combat in spite of the unfavourable outlook. The 
idea of los doce also has clear biblical connotations, insofar as it invites comparison 
with the twelve apostles, although the resemblance is never explicitly alluded to 
(Judson 1985, 233). In the quotation in question, the seemingly deliberate parallels 
drawn between the '12 hombres' and the '12 tanques' provided a neat contrast which 
highlighted how far the Ejercito Rebelde had come; that is, it had transformed from a 
vulnerable movement comprised of a handful of men to one which wielded 
considerable military might. The repetition here of 'fe' also added a further tone of 
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religiosity. Castro was suggesting that continuing to support the Revolution, even 
when victory seemed elusive, required a level of faith akin to that required by 
religion. Such language was reinforced by Guevara's later employment of a 
religious lexicon in La Guerra de Guerrillas, discussed briefly in Chapter One, and 
has been a consistent feature of the revolutionary discourse ever since. Fernandez 
has argued that the leadership's religious rhetoric is evidence of a 'political religion' 
in Cuba, or a 'popular religiosity' (Fernandez 2000, 63). He stated that, 'The 
religious feelings the barbudos (the bearded ones, as the rebels were commonly 
called) inspired were reflected in the media and in the discourse of the revolutionary 
leaders ( ... ) The discourse is better understood as the language of passion that gave 
form to a political religion' (Fernandez 2000,65). 
A similar message was conveyed elsewhere in the speech where Castro discussed the 
power of the voluntad of the Cuban pueblo. Comparable to the idea of 'fe' as a 
necessary component of revolutionary transformation, Castro declared in this citation 
that a lack of resources was irrelevant to the Revolution's odds of survival; what 
mattered most was the will of the people. Castro proclaimed: 'si no hay dinero, ino 
importa!, 10 que hayes voluntad, y hacemos 10 que sea necesario' (Castro, 1959a). 
This proclamation that the voluntad of the pueblo was more important than the 
financial wealth, or lack of, the Revolution again pre-empted one of the principal 
lessons of La Guerra de Guerrillas: that revolution could be produced through a 
reliance upon subjective conditions alone. It would thus appear that, from the outset, 
Castro intended to promote a voluntaristic approach to supporting and defending the 
Revolution, an approach which lay at the very core of the Cuban theory of 
revolutionary guerrilla warfare. 
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The stress upon the importance of voluntad was also in evidence in another of 
Castro's significant speeches from 1959, his 26 July address. Referring to the 
reasons behind the victory of the Revolution, Castro affirmed: 'No se ha cumplido 
pues la voluntad de un hombre 0 de un grupo de hombres; jse ha cumplido la 
voluntad de un pueblo!' (Castro, 1959b). Again, Castro was drawing attention to the 
potential of collective subjective will by attributing to it the defeat of Batista. 
Furthermore, Castro's assertion that 'no se ha cumplido pues la voluntad de un 
hombre' could suggest that his aim was to undermine the belief that the victory of the 
Revolution could, in an insignificant way, be attributed to his own tenacity and skill 
as a leader. Instead, he chose to affirm the decisive role of the Cuban people. In 
doing so, Castro's intention was to remind the Cuban people of what they could 
achieve through collective action, thus encouraging a continuation of participation of 
this kind. 
Castro persisted in highlighting the pivotal role of the pueblo as the driving force 
behind the Revolution elsewhere in the speech. He stated that: 
NingUn hombre es ni sera indispensable. Lo unico indispensable aquf - 10 digo 
porque 10 siento - es el pueblo. Si la Revoluci6n no tuviera el pueblo, estarla 
perdida. jEI pueblo es 10 que importa, y el pueblo 10 tiene la Revoluci6n! Ademas, es 
consolodar pensar, es consolador pensar que a un hombre 10 pueden matar, pero a un 
pueblo no 10 pueden matar, igual que un hombre puede ser traidor, pero un pueblo no 
puede ser traidor (Castro, 1959b). 
Castro communicated a powerful message in characterising the Cuban people as 
'indispensable': the Cuban Revolution would not survive without the support of 
citizens. This statement was compounded by the unambiguous proclamation, 'Si la 
Revoluci6n no tuviera el pueblo, estaria perdida', and further reinforced by the 
emphatic exclamation of 'EI pueblo es 10 que importa, y el pueblo 10 tiene la 
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Revoluci6n!'. It would also appear that Castro intended to inspire confidence in the 
Cuban people with regard to the survival of the Revolution. The statement 'a un 
pueblo no 10 pueden matar' implied that, as the people were the Revolution, the 
Revolution was therefore indestructible. The objective of the preceding phrase 'es 
consolodar pensar', and its subsequent repetition, was to encourage the Cuban 
population to take comfort from their 'invincibility', and thus to recognise their 
potential strength in numbers, as a collective. Again, such statements pertaining to 
the power of the pueblo could be considered precursors to Guevara's conviction that 
'las fuerzas populares' could conquer more powerful, institutionalised annies. 
Castro's efforts to inspire confidence in the Cuban people, particularly through 
underscoring the potential for the underdog to succeed, continued throughout the 
Revolution's first year in power. Significantly, these efforts were equally manifest in 
speeches given on dates which did not form part of the official calendar of 
commemoration, thus suggesting that guerrillerismo fonned a consistently integral 
part of the official discourse at that time. Noteworthy examples of this guerrillerista 
rhetoric can be found in Castro's opening and closing addresses to the X Congreso 
Nacional Obrero held in November 1959. In these speeches, Castro's message was 
still one which focussed on the primacy of the power of the Cuban pueblo, yet there 
appears to have been a heightened emphasis on the obligation to defend the 
Revolution, and at all costs. In the opening address, Castro was unequivocal in his 
belief that all Cubans had a defensive role to play. He infonned his audience that 
'por encima de todo tenemos un deber indiscutible: 'el deber de defender la 
Revoluci6n ( ... ) ninguno puede olvidar la responsabilidad que les corresponde para 
que la Revoluci6n pueda contar con ustedes' (Castro 1959c, 25). In this example, 
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Castro referred to the collective responsibility for defence as a 'deber', a duty; this 
point was accentuated through the repetition of'deber' within the first line. The first 
person plural of 'tenemos' compounds the collective obligation to the duty of 
defence, while the inclusion of the modifying adjective 'indiscutible', in addition to 
the noun 'responsabilidad', underlined the point that defence was a commitment to 
which all Cubans were tied without question. It should be remarked that Castro's 
employment of the word deber here was no accident; rather, it can be argued that he 
consciously chose to include it given its historical significance. It is likely that, even 
at this early stage of the Revolution, the word deber constituted what Fairclough 
might term a 'lexical item'. Fairclough recommends the use of this technical term 
over 'words' given that it 'captures the idea of expressions which have achieved a 
degree of stability and fixity' (Fairclough 1992, 191). By the time of the Revolution, 
deber was already linked to Cuba's previous struggles for independence and, more 
specifically, with the writings of the island's most famous independentista, Jose 
Marti. Marti frequently wrote of the centrality of deber as both an inherent feature of 
patria and a motivational force for revolutionary activity, as illustrated in the 
citations, lei deber de un hombre esta alH donde es mas utii' (Marti 1895, 403) and 
'el verdadero hombre no mira de que lado se vive mejor, sino de que lado esta el 
deber' (MartI 1890, 103). This latter citation was incorporated into Fidel Castro's 
seminal 1953 speech, 'La historia me absolvera', thereby laying the foundations for 
the import of deber in the ideology of the Revolution.32 
32 The full citation of Fidel Castro's intertextual reference to Marti in 'La historia me absol verll' read 
as follows: 'A los que me lIaman por esto soi'lador, les digo como Marti: "EI verdadcro homhre no 
mira de que lado se vive mejor, sino de que lado esta el deber; y ese es [ ... ] el unico homhre pn\ctico 
cuyo suef\o de hoy sera la ley de maf\ana, porque el que haya puesto los ojos en las entranas 
universales y visto hervir los pueblos, lIameantes y ensangrentados, en la artesa de los siglos, sabc que 
el porvenir, sin una sola excepci6n, esta dellado del deber.'''(Castro 2008, 54). 
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By 1959, therefore, deber had something of a fixed and given meaning, one that was 
indelibly associated with the Independence cause and with revolutionary activity 
more generally. It can be argued that Castro intended to perpetuate and tap into this 
tradition which was recognisable to the Cuban people, and with which, therefore, 
they could become aligned, while also attributing some much-needed historical 
legitimacy to the current revolutionary cause, insofar as it was presented as a 
continuation of an on-going struggle which was rooted in Cuba's history. As will 
become evident through the course of the analysis oftexts from the 1960s, the notion 
of deber was a common feature of the leadership's discourse throughout the first 
decade in power. It should also be noted here that the historical significance of 
deber, and its association with rebel struggle, serves to contradict Malloy's statement 
regarding the 'militarisation' of the Revolution, as discussed in the Introduction. 
Malloy proposed that Cubans citizens were viewed by the leadership as 'soldiers in a 
vast producing army' and were, therefore, 'expected to adhere to the traditional 
military values of discipline and devotion to duty' (Malloy 1971, 40). The 
unavoidable association of the term with Marti and Cuban history more generally 
demonstrates that the sense of duty required of the Cuban pueblo was not simply part 
and parcel of the Revolution's supposed transformation into a militarised system of 
governance, but rather was a pre-existing tradition which was re-articulated by the 
revolutionary leadership from the outset. Moreover, rather than being emblematic of 
'militarism', this tradition overlapped with the concept of guerrillerismo; a sense of 
duty to the task of revolutionary struggle must be an inherent value of the 
guerrillero. It is the recognition of deber which engenders the subjective will to 
foment revolution. 
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In addition to the attention directed at the moral obligation of Cuban citizens to 
defend the Revolution, Castro also declared in this speech that the nation's workers, 
whom he was addressing directly, would be responsible for a continuation of the 
struggle undertaken by the Ejercito Rebelde. Castro proclaimed: 
Ustedes son el Ejercito Rebelde en esta etapa de la Revoluci6n; ustedes son la parte 
mas importante del pueblo y del Ejercito Rebelde en cualquier lucha futura que 
tengamos que sostener para defender la Revoluci6n (Castro 1959c, 26). 
These words are a clear example of guerrillerismo. Castro was stating in no 
uncertain terms that the struggle of the Ejercito Rebelde had not finished, but rather 
would continue in other forms; in other words, the Cuban obreros would constitute 
the new guerrilla army. The phrase 'esta etapa' further compounded the suggestion 
of an on-going struggle, insofar as the Revolution in power was but the next step in 
the guerrilla struggle begun in the sierra. 
In Castro's closing speech at the conference, the guerrilla foundations of the 
Revolution were highlighted once again, similar to his remarks in his January I 
speech 1959. He asserted: 'Es preciso recordar que eramos pocos, eramos muy 
pocos' (Castro 1959d, 46). The repetition of 'eramos pocos' served, of course, to 
underline the small number of participants in the initial campaign against Batista and, 
in turn, the enormity of the challenge which they were able to overcome. Later in the 
same speech, Castro continued with the same theme: 
frente a la contrarrevoluci6n vamos a luchar aunque sean muchos los de la 
contrarrevoluci6n 0 sean pocos y aunque nosotros seamos muchos 0 seamos pocos, 
compafieros. Y, ademas, compafieros, porque sabemos 10 que es luchar cuando somos 
pocos, porque estan frescos todavia aquellos tiempos en que eramos pocos, pero 
buenos (oo.) Es preferible pocos buenos, que muchos mal os, preferibles pocos pero 
seguros (oo.) (Castro 1959d, 54). 
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In this extract, Castro was again referring to the inauspicious beginnings to the 
Revolution in order to inspire his audience, informing them that, though the obstacles 
with which the Revolution was confronted might have seemed overwhelming. it was 
possible to overcome them, much as the Ejercito Rebelde had done during the 
insurrectionary phase. Collective participation in the events of the insurrection was 
implied by the first person plural of 'sabemos 10 que es luchar cuando somos poe os, 
compafteros'; the use of the plural subject as an agent in his speeches is a recurrent 
feature of Castro's rhetoric, further examples of which will be discussed in the 
course of the analysis. The inclusive nature of Castro's references to the history of 
the insurrection was further reinforced by the informal address, 'companeros'. This 
term created a tone of familiarity to his discourse, and was another attempt at 
implying an equality between himself and his audience, and between those who had 
participated in the first nucleus of the guerrilla struggle and the rest of the population. 
The continued influence of the early days of the struggle was also evident in the line 
'porque estan frescos todavfa aqueJlos tiempos en que eramos pocos' whereby Castro 
clearly stated that the guerrilla struggle lived on in the memory of its participants. 
Castro further attempted to convince his audience that being inferior in size to one's 
enemy did not herald defeat but, rather, could be conceived of as an advantage: 'Es 
preferible pocos buenos, que muchos malos, preferibles pocos pero seguros ( ... )' 
(Castro 1959d, 54). Traces of guerrillerismo are evident here in Castro's stress that 
the participation of a few good men was preferable to that of a large number of 
morally questionable combatants. This approach to revolutionary activity is 
essentially that of guerrilla warfare and, specifically, the guerrilla warfare enacted in 
the insurrectionary stage of the Revolution. 
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Thus far the analysis has established that, in the first year ofthe Revolution in power, 
Castro was keen to promote the example of the embryonic guerrilla campaign as a 
model for citizen participation in supporting and defending the Revolution. As 
discussed, Castro frequently underlined the lesson of triumph over adversity which 
could be drawn from the Revolution's insurrectionary roots. Moreover, Castro quite 
clearly intended to convey the message that the struggle for revolutionary change had 
not ended but had to be continued by the Cuban pueblo; indeed, they had a moral 
obligation, a deber, to do so. 
The focus on the Cuban pueblo as the driving force in producing revolutionary 
change was sustained in one of the major texts to be published by the revolutionary 
leadership in the early years of the Revolution in power, the 1960 Manual de 
Capacitacion Civica. Briefly mentioned earlier, the 1960 Manual constitutes the 
core text to be analysed in this chapter. The Manual was produced by the 
Departamento de Instrucci6n within the Ministerio de las FAR as the leading 
educational text in the civic training ofthe members of the MNR, already referred to 
briefly in the Introduction. The Milicias were created on 26 October, 1959 as an 
additional force of 'civic soldiers' to protect Cuba against impending invasion; 
though under the control of the Armed Forces, they did not form part them as such 
(Kapcia 2000, 113). In addition to their defensive function, the Milicias also 
'provided a way of resocializing a considerable sector of the population and 
maintaining it in a state of mobilization' (Medin 1990, 156). Shortly after their 
creation, thousands of Cubans, mostly young people, had voluntarily signed up. Most 
frequently, members were assigned non-combative tasks, such as guarding buildings 
against the acts of sabotage that were still occurring at this point (Aguila 1989, 29). 
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However, the Milicias later proved to be an indispensable force, acting as the first 
line of defence during the Bay of Pigs invasion, and playing a major role in defeating 
the counterrevolutionary guerrilla movements that emerged in the Escambray 
mountains. 
The intention ofthe Milicia's training manual was to inform volunteers regarding the 
nature and objectives of the Revolution, its historical antecedents, the tasks the 
Revolution needed to address, and the morals and discipline required of the ideal 
revolutionary. The opening section indicated that the text had been produced as an 
updated version of the text 'Curso de Orientaci6n Revolucionaria', published in 
March 1959 by the Direcci6n de Cultura del Ejercito Rebelde. This precursor to the 
1960 version aimed to enlighten members of the Ejercito Rebelde with respect to the 
concepts necessary to understanding 'la realidad revolucionaria' at the time of its 
publication (Manual 1960, 1). The 1960 Manual informed the reader that, while 
many problems had been resolved in the year that had passed since the previous 
edition, new challenges had emerged; additionally, concepts which in 1959 were 
relevant to revolutionary progress had inevitably become outdated. Consequently, 
the Departamento de Instrucci6n within the Ministerio de las FAR had deemed it 
essential to produce a revised edition. Regarding this issue, the Manual read: 
De ahi la necesidad de otro libro, como este Manual de Capacitaci6n Civica, mas 
completo, mas actual, que no vaya a prestar servicio de aleccionamiento 
revolucionario y estimulo patri6tico s610 a los miembros de las Fuerzas Armadas, sino 
que litH a los Milicias Nacionales, a todas las organizaciones y personas que apoyan a 
la revoluci6n, es decir, a todo nuestro pueblo (Manual 1960, 2). 
The Manual was divided into several 'Lecciones', thus providing a clear indication 
of its intended didactic function. The iecciones were housed under the following 
127 
headings: Revolucion, Reforma Agraria, Industrializacion, Geografia Economica, 
Historia de Cuba, Doctrina Martiana and Moral y Disciplina. A final section was 
composed of four significant speeches, three of which were given by Fidel Castro, 
including the 'First Declaration of Havana'. Though the month of publication was 
not indicated in the text, the inclusion of Castro's First Declaration, made in 
September 1960, suggests that the text was issued in the closing months of that year. 
Within the first few lines of the Manual, there is a clear allusion to one of the key 
precepts of Guevara's theory of guerrilla warfare, as outlined in his text La Guerra 
de Guerrillas, published in the same year. The second paragraph of the first Ieee ion 
opens with the following sentence: 
EI factor fundamental en esta lucha victoriosa fue el Ejercito Rebelde, cuyo nucleo 
inicial se form6 en tomo de Fidel Castro y de sus compafieros sobrevivientes del 
desembarco del Granma, en 1956, con la incorporaci6n de campesinos, obreros y 
estudiantes a sus filas (Manual 1960, 5). 
The reference to the 'nueleo inicial' in this citation can be directly associated with 
Guevara's work, which proposed that a revolution could he set in motion through the 
creation of an initial isolated nucleus, or Joco, in which were fused the political and 
armed wings of a given movement. As Guevara stated in La Guerra de Guerrillas, 
'la guerrilla, como nueleo armado, es la vanguardia combatiente del mismo' 
(Guevara 2000, 16). Here, the inclusion of the subordinate, non-defining relative 
clause accentuated the significance of the role of the primary nucleus within the 
'lucha victoriosa' of the Ejercito Rebelde, and served to highlight the fact that it was 
Castro and the other survivors of the Granma landing who were responsible for 
fomenting the Revolution in the first instance. The incorporation of this clause 
directly before the detail regarding the involvement of 'campesinos, obreros y 
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estudiantes' ensured that the role of these additional participants was undermined 
through its relegation to the end of the sentence. Moreover, the almost uninterrupted 
juxtaposition of 'Ejercito Rebelde' with 'nucleo inicial' might have effectively 
conflated the two in the mind of the reader; in other words, this crucial aspect of the 
guerrilla struggle had the potential to become inherently linked to the Ejercito 
Rebelde's victorious struggle. The marked separation here of those who constituted 
the guerrilla nucleus and the rest of the population was at odds with Castro's 
portrayal of the initial struggle as one which was carried out by the people, as 
evidenced in the previously discussed speeches from 1959. In those speeches, 
Castro's message was one of a collective victory of the Cuban pueblo; here, in 
contrast, the text underscored the fundamental role of the original guerrilleros, in 
particular Fidel Castro, whose name was foregrounded. This shift in message was 
indicative of the turbulent internal politics of that period, a time in which the former 
guerrilleros of the sierra, with Castro at the helm, were attempting to gain 
ascendancy within the Cuban government. Attributing the victory of the Revolution 
to their initial nucleus could be viewed as an effort to grant themselves historical 
legitimacy which, in turn, would have contributed to the justification of their rise to 
power. 
What is more, designating the Ejercito Rebelde and, therefore, its initial nucleus, as a 
'factor fundamental' in the 'Iucha victoriosa', created the effect of inserting the 
Revolution, and its guerrilla strategies, into the pre-existing Cuban tradition of lucha. 
The term itself would likely have resonated with a contemporary reader given that it 
had, and still has, something of a fixed meaning within Cuba, which pre-dates the 
appearance of the Ejercito Rebelde in the Sierra Maestra. Lucha can be said to 
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embody the idea of a national struggle, and is heavily associated with the heroes of 
the Cuban historical narrative, such as the anticolonialist struggle of Jose Marti and 
the mambises.33 Moreover, lucha might be considered to be one of the principal 
codes which constitute the concept of cubania; this concept can be said to have 
underpinned the Cuban Revolution since its inception; one might define clibania, on 
a basic level, as a fusion of pride in the Cuban nation with an inherent sense of 
history, combined with anti-imperialist undertones. These connotations and 
associations housed under the term lucha within Cuba allow for its classification as a 
'lexical item', much like the term deber, as previously discussed. As with deber, a 
cultural or ideological significance can certainly be applied to lucha, affording it 
something of a fixed, contextually grounded meaning. 
The overall effect of the juxtaposition of this 'lexical item' and the concept of the 
nucleus was to direct the reader to confer historical (and cultural) legitimacy upon 
guerrilla warfare as a new form of struggle, insofar as its methods were presented as 
another means of continuing the on-going lucha of the Cuban people against tyranny 
and domination. The overarching message here would seem to be that guerrilla 
strategies, particularly the notion of the 'nucleo inicial', were what would 
characterise and direct the lucha henceforth within the Revolution. The alliteration 
of the fricative 'f in 'factor fundamental' aided in reinforcing the centrality of the 
Ejercito Rebelde and, therefore, its nucleus in the Revolution's victory. 
The idea that the embryonic phase of a revolution was fundamental to its success was 
echoed elsewhere in the Manual, although the focus was less overtly connected to 
33 Mambises is the name given to the guerrilla fighters who participated in Cuba's struggles Illf 
independence, first in the Ten Years' War of 1868-1878, and later in the War of Independence of 
1895-1898. 
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Guevara's tenet regarding the isolated nucleus; rather. an emphasis on the 
significance of the beginning of revolutions in a more general sense, and, 
specifically, the right of the individual to produce these beginnings, was evident. 
This focus was clearly illustrated in the following citation: 
Algunas personas piensan que la revoluci6n termina con la toma del gobierno, pero en 
realidad, entonces, ha acabado de empezar. Fidel Castro se referia a esto diciendo que 
en estas condiciones 'adquirimos el derecho a empezar ( ... ) muchos creyeron que la 
Revoluci6n era ya el primero del enero la soluci6n de todos los males del pais ( ... ) y 
que no era ( ... ) sino tan s610 el derecho a empezar. EI triunfo del primero de enero 
fue tan s610 e1 derecho a empezar' (Manual 1960, 16/1 7). 
In this example, the intentional stress upon 'el derecho a empezar' was made 
apparent through its repetition. One can assert that this emphasis on 'the right to 
begin' was an implicit allusion to the loco theory and its principle of creating the 
'subjective conditions' necessary for fomenting revolution, and of the capacity of the 
pueblo to produce a revolution. Furthermore, Guevara proposed that a revolution 
should be begun without delay. To reiterate the discussion in Chapter One, 
Guevara's two most fundamental precepts of the loco theory, as outlined in La 
Guerra de Guerrillas, were as follows: 
1. Las fuerzas populares pueden ganar una guerra contra e1 ejercito. 
2. No siempre hay que esperar a que se den todas las condiciones para la revoluci6n; 
eJ foeo insurreccional puede desarrollar condiciones subjetivas sobre la base de 
condiciones objetivas dadas (Guevara 2006, 13). 
These tenets unambiguously placed the onus of producing a revolution upon the 
pueblo who, in their potential capacity as las Juerzas populares, were able to create 
the necessary subjective conditions. 
Returning to the citation in question, one can posit that that it was consistent with 
these guerrilla precepts, insofar as its purpose was to inform the reader that he or she 
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had the right to commence a revolution at once, and perhaps had a responsibility to 
do so, given that the need for revolutionary activity was at its peak in these early 
years of the Revolution in power. Employing the word 'derecho' might have had the 
effect of instilling a sense of entitlement in the reader with regard to revolutionary 
action; its intention seems to have been to suggest that the Cuban people, through the 
ousting of Batista and the subsequent establishment of a revolutionary government, 
had been granted the freedom to enact revolution and should, therefore, act upon this 
legitimate privilege. What is more, the use of the first person plural in 'adquirimos' 
added a sense of inclusivity and collective ownership to this idea of the 'right to 
begin', implying that the responsibility and freedom to commence the revolution was 
shared amongst all Cuban citizens. 
Further weight was added to the focus on 'el derecho a empezar' through the 
assimilation of a section of an unspecified speech by Fidel Castro. The inclusion of 
speech in such a way is an example of a type of intertextuality referred to by 
Fairclough as 'discourse representation'; Fairclough favours this term over 'speech 
reportage': 
because (i) it better captures the idea that when one 'reports' discourse one necessarily 
chooses to represent it in one way rather than another; and (ii) what is represented is 
not just speech, but also writing, and not just their grammatical features but also their 
discursive organisation, as well as various other aspects of the discursive event - its 
circumstances, the tone in which things were said, etc. (Fairclough 1992, lIS). 
In this instance, the text producer incorporated 'direct discourse representation', 
whereby the speech was introduced (though not contextualised) and thus manifestly 
demarcated from the rest of the narrative. The specification of the speaker would 
appear to be intentional; by introducing Castro as the producer of this discourse, it 
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served to legitimise the text to an extent, given his position at the time of Prime 
Minister of Cuba, but also, and perhaps more importantly, as a key figure in the 
launch of the Revolution in 1956. To elucidate further, the attribution of these words 
to a revolutionary leader who, as the text claimed earlier, was at the heart of the 
'nucleo inicial' served in some ways to authorise them. Having been a significant 
player in the embryonic period of the insurrectionary phase, Castro was able to utter 
these words with conviction, thereby adding weight to their meaning. 
The overarching message of this section of Castro's speech was summarised in the 
final declarative sentence 'EI triunfo del primero de enero fue tan s610 el derecho a 
empezar'. This sentence contained no subordinate clauses which, through providing 
additional detail, might have obscured the key point being communicated. Ending 
the discussion of a particular point or topic with a punchy declarative statement was 
an effective means of encapsulating the argument; this technique might have aided in 
rendering the text more digestible for the reader while adding to the overall textual 
comprehension. This rhetorical device was characteristic of Castro's discourse, 
additional examples of which will be discussed later in the text. 
In the second leccion of the Manual, entitled 'Concepto de Revoluci6n. La 
experiencia cubana y de America" one can find an additional example of direct 
discourse representation of another of Castro's speeches in which he again laid 
emphasis on 'el derecho de empezar'. However, as in the above case, the speech 
represented was not contextualised, thus it was unclear whether both examples were 
borrowed from the same speech. In the second citation, Castro asserted: 
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Hace falta que la conciencia revolucionaria se apodere del pais y que en el haber de 
esa conciencia C ... ) haya mucho mas que 10 que esa conciencia revolucionaria pueda 
perder, en el cambio de circunstancias de un pals oprimido a un pals que ... al menos ha 
adquirido el derecho a empezar (Manual 1960, 26). 
Again, the message here remained the same; that is, that the Revolution had not yet 
begun and thus required the revolutionary actions of all Cubans in order for it to 
commence. In addition to reinforcing the above message, the repetition of an 
intertextual phrase also served to produce greater textual cohesion. This repetition 
could be viewed as an illustration of a type of 'surface cohesive marking' referred to 
by Fairclough as 'lexical cohesion'; this mode of cohesion is created through the 
repetition of words (Fairclough 1992, 176). Alternatively, or additionally, it could 
constitute another form of surface cohesive marking known as 'reference', defined in 
one respect as 'a matter of referring back to an earlier part of the text' (Fairclough 
1992, 176). Whatever its precise type, the repetition established a connection 
between these two lecciones. Such a connection would have facilitated the reader's 
understanding of the Manual as a whole by highlighting its principal messages at 
different stages within it. The use of direct discourse representation such as is 
exemplified in these citations can be frequently identified elsewhere, not only in this 
particular text but also in the 1973 Instruccion Politica FAR, as shall be seen in the 
following chapter. 
As discussed, the repetition of 'el derecho a empezar' seems to have had at its basis 
the notion of collective action; Castro's words suggested that the right to instigate a 
revolution was a shared one, and a responsibility which had been acquired by the 
Cuban population as a whole. The primacy of collective action was unambiguous 
elsewhere in the text. In another example of direct discourse representation of one of 
Castro's speeches, he stated: 
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Ese espiritu de sacrificio del pueblo, ese despertar de la conciencia de nuestro pueblo, 
esa disposicion en que esta de hacer los sacrificios que sean necesarios, esa seguridad 
de que solo de sus fuerzas depende el triunfo, y que solo los pueblos heroicos tienen 
derecho a ser pueblos Iibres y pueblos feJices y pueblos independientes ( ... ) eso es 10 
que nos alienta (Manual 1960, 25). 
The repetition of pueblo was a clear indication that part of this speech's aim was to 
highlight how crucial the actions of the Cuban people were, as a collective, in driving 
forward the Revolution. Once again, there was reference to the notion of 'derechos' 
as being acquired through action; in this particular case, rights were the privilege of 
those who, as a people, had been heroic. The parallel structure and syndetic listing in 
'pueblos libres y pueblos felices y pueblos independientes' accentuate the 
multiplicity of the rights that were afforded to the heroic, again, as a pueblo and not 
as individuals. These words also suggested that the people were in control of their 
own destinies; as Castro contended, 'esa seguridad de que s610 de sus fuerzas 
depende el triunfo'. This phrase hinted at Guevara's precept regarding the creation 
of the subjective conditions necessary for inciting revolution, insofar as it stated that 
the pueblo, through using their combined might and will, had control of the outcome 
of the Revolution. This sentiment regarding the power of the people was mirrored 
later in the text within the leccion dedicated to 'Industrializaci6n'. The Cuban 
population was referred to as 'el gran soberano, que es el pueblo', while the success 
of the industrialization project would be not be attributed to the government but 
designated as a 'victoria revolucionaria del pueblo' (Manual 1960, 10 I). The aim of 
these statements was thus to confer a sense of power upon the Cuban people, and to 
inculcate the notion that the actions of citizens were valuable, not to mention crucial, 
to the potential achievements ofthe Revolution. 
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This attempt to bestow merit upon the collective action of the pueblo was reinforced 
towards the end of the text. In the leccion 'Moral y Disciplina', the victory of the 
Revolution's insurrection itself was attributed to the Cuban pueblo: 'esta guerra la 
gan6 el pueblo por la acci6n de su vanguardia armada combatiente' (Manual 1960, 
298). According the pueblo the responsibility for the defeat of Batista transmitted an 
effective message: the Cuban people were capable of achieving the seemingly 
impossible, such as winning a battle against an enemy whose forces were 
numerically superior to its own. What is more, these words declared that it was the 
armed vanguard of the people which enabled the final victory. The reference to the 
vanguard here was a clear allusion to the loco theory, if one is to recall Guevara's 
aforementioned assertion: 'la guerrilla, como nucleo arm ado, es la vanguardia 
combatiente del mismo' (Guevara 2006, 16). 
Yet, perhaps contradictorily, there were instances elsewhere in the text in which the 
actions and attitudes of the individual within the Revolution, and not the collective, 
were brought to the fore. The following words taken from a section entitled • La 
Revoluci6n de las ideas' constitute one such example: 'la revoluci6n ( ... ) pone en 
primer termino la voluntad consciente del ciudadano en el logro de sus objetivos 
individuales y sociales (Manual 1960, 25). Here, the necessity of sUbjective will, of 
voluntad, was expressed in terms of the individual citizen, with a focus on achieving 
goals at a personal level. 
Later in the Manual, an additional example of the notion of 'voluntaristic' action at 
an individual level can be identified within another of Castro's speeches, the August 
1960 'Acta de la segunda independencia'. As before, the inclusion of this speech 
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constituted a form of intertextuality, although this time the direct discourse was 
represented in its entirety and was fully contextualised. Castro declared: 'La 
democracia cuban a Ie da a cada cubano algo mas; la democracia cubana Ie da a cada 
cubano un fusil para defender sus derechos y para defender a su Patria' (Castro 
1960a, 342). It is evident in this instance that there was an intentional stress upon 
every Cuban citizen as an agent capable of defending both his or her rights and 
homeland. The parallel structure of the two sentences underscored this emphasis, 
particularly through the repetition of 'cada cubano' within these sentences. The 
inclusion of the determiner 'cada' to qualify the noun 'cubano' was significant in 
that, unlike the alternative of using the plural noun 'los cubanos', for example, it 
further highlighted the message that every Cuban was granted the agency to defend 
himself or herself. The alliteration of the fricative 'c' in 'cada cubano' reinforced the 
weight already placed upon this phrase through repetition. What is more, the use of 
possessive pronouns in 'sus derechos' and 'su Patria' conferred an ownership upon 
'cada cubano', and perhaps, therefore, was employed with the intention of instilling a 
sense of obligation upon Cuban citizens to defend these rights and the homeland. 
One might also note that the metaphor comparing democracy to a weapon was 
consistent with the leadership's tendency to express events or actions, in this case a 
democratic vote, in terms of an armed struggle, as part of an on-going lucha. 
While the above citations demonstrate that, at times, the Manual shifted its focus 
from the collective to the individual with regard to creating the subjective conditions 
for revolution, in general, the emphasis of the text as a whole was on the necessity of 
collective action as a means of producing or sustaining the Revolution. Moreover, 
there is evidence to suggest that, when there was a focus upon the value of individual 
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action, that value was acquired only if the action was beneficial to the collective, 
whether it be a specific collective, or the Revolution more broadly. This latter point 
was illustrated in the segment named' lQue son las cooperativas?' which formed part 
of the leccion concerning 'Las Cooperativas de la Reforma Agraria'. The segment 
read: 
EI movimiento cooperativo tiene mas de cien aflos de existencia. No subestima al 
individuo, sino por el contrario 10 tiene como fin primordial, procurando que 
desarrolle sus sentimientos y calidades humanas, dentro del marco de la sociedad en 
que convive. EI cooperativismo propende al cuidado y atenci6n del individuo, desde 
que nace hasta que muere, con todos los derechos inherentes a su condici6n humana. 
Pretende sustituir caracteristicas de una sociedad basada en e1 lucro y la explotaci6n. 
por las de una sociedad de economia cooperativista, basada en principios de 
compenetraci6n y solidaridad humanas (Manual 1960, 89). 
The simple declarative sentence which opened this paragraph established that its 
main focus was the cooperative movement, a form of collective action which played 
a significant role in the early years of the Revolution. The historicity of this practice 
was made clear from the outset in 'tiene cien anos de existencia'. The foregrounding 
of this information seems intended to legitimise the practice of cooperativismo, 
insofar as it portrayed the formation of cooperatives as an inherent part of Cuban 
tradition, as a practice rooted in Cuban society. Yet, while cooperativismo is, by 
definition, a collective activity, the role of the individual within this collective was 
very much played up in this paragraph. Indeed, it claimed that the cooperative 
movement 'propende al cuidado y atenci6n del individuo', and, significantly, had the 
individual as a 'fin primordial'. There was also a focus here on the 'derechos 
inherentes' of the individual as a human being. This reference echoed the weight 
placed upon the notion of 'derechos' in the earlier citation regarding the 'derecho a 
empezar'. Unlike the previous citation, however, in this instance the attention was 
on the rights of the individual, rather than the acquisition of collective rights. 
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That said, one can posit that the overall message in this example remained one that 
extolled the need for a collective approach to agrarian reform. The development of 
each citizen as described in the paragraph only appears to be necessary insofar as this 
formation will be beneficial to the cooperative as a whole, and to the wider goal of 
creating 'una sociedad de econom(a cooperativista, basada en principios de 
compenetracion y solidaridad humanas' (Manual 1960, 89). The placing of this 
dependent clause at the end of the paragraph was effective in highlighting this notion 
of solidarity, and ensured that it was, perhaps, the lasting message of this segment. 
The analysis of the Manual will now focus on the final section of the text: a 
transcription of Fidel Castro's 'First Declaration of Havana'. Similar to the 
aforementioned, 'Acta de la segunda independencia', the inclusion of the Declaration 
was a form of intertextuality and, again, the complete direct discourse was fully 
contextualised. The insertion of the speech now seems significant, if unsurprising; 
the Declaration constituted one of Castro's most noteworthy and incendiary speeches 
up to that point in the Revolution's trajectory. Occurring at a time when US-Cuban 
relations were rapidly deteriorating, the Declaration partly served as a very explicit 
projection onto the world stage of Cuba's anti-imperialist standpoint. Moreover, the 
Declaration was a rallying cry for Latin American solidarity; Castro stressed that the 
Cuban leadership supported the notion of a pan-Latin American struggle against 
oppression. 
For the purposes of this study, the Declaration provides an interesting, if implicit, 
illustration of the leadership's guerrillerista discourse in the early years of the 
Revolution. What is more, given that this address was directed both at the Cuban 
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population and an external audience, the Declaration is also illustrative of afoquisla 
rhetoric. As discussed in Chapter One, the idea that foquismo was invoked as a 
means of mobilisation becomes relevant when one refers to the leadership's efforts to 
incite revolution abroad, particularly in Latin America. This was one such effort. 
described by Dominguez as 'the first formal call for Revolution in the hemisphere' 
(Dominguez 1978, 27). 
In the opening line of the 'First Declaration of Havana' there was an indirect allusion 
to Guevara'sfoeo theory, or at least the very process of guerrilla warfare carried out 
by the Ejercito Rebelde. Castro stated: 
Junto a la imagen y el recuerdo de Jose Marti, en Cuba, Territorio Libre de America, 
el pueblo, en uso de las potestades inalienables que dimanan del efectivo ejercicio de 
la soberania, expresada en el sufragio directo, universal y publico, se ha constituido en 
Asamblea General Nacional (Castro 1960b, 346). 
In this statement, it was the reference to Cuba as the 'Territorio Libre de America' 
which contained apparent connotations of guerrillerismo. The idea of the 'Territorio 
Libre' can be traced back to the insurrectionary phase of the Cuban Revolution 
during which Castro's headquarters, La Comandancia de La Plata in the Sierra 
Maestra, was designated as the first 'free territory' of Cuba. Thus, by referring to 
Cuba as the free territory of the Americas, one might argue that Castro's intention, 
conscious or not, was to forge a direct correlation between the guerrilla struggle and 
the situation in which Cuba found itself at the time of this speech. In other words, 
Castro aimed to present Cuba's new-found sovereignty as being the first step in the 
continent-wide revolution for which the Declaration called; to elucidate further, one 
could say that Castro here was in some ways implying that Cuba was the first foco of 
the Latin American revolution. 
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When considered in terms of discourse analysis, Castro achieved the effect of placing 
the Latin American struggle within a guerrillerista framework through the use of 
presupposition. Presuppositions, according to Fairclough, are 'propositions which 
are taken by the producer of the text as already established or 'given" (Fairclough 
1992, 120). This rhetorical device can have a manipulative effect on the receiver of 
the text; Fairclough asserts that presupposition can provide text producers with: 
a rather effective means of manipulating audiences through attributing to their 
experience things which they want to get them to accept. Because the propositions 
concerned are not made explicit, it is sometimes difficult for people to identify them 
and, if they wish to, reject them. So presuppositions can be ( ... ) sincere or 
manipUlative. But presuppositions can also have ideological functions, when what 
they assume has the character of 'common sense in the service of power' (Fairclough 
1989, 154). 
In the statement in question, Castro assumed that his audience would have sufficient 
knowledge of the events of the Cuban Revolution to immediately recognise the 
parallels drawn between Cuba's position in the continent at that time and the 
declaration of the first free territory within the island's shores; this recognition would 
therefore have likely led to an awareness of the underlying metaphor of Cuba as the 
first foco of the Latin American revolution. It could be argued that this 'general 
appeal to "background knowledge'" (Fairclough 1989, 154) had an ideological 
function in that it sought, through its indirect historical reference, to promote armed 
struggle in the Cuban mould that would produce further free territories in the 
Americas, or, infoquista terms, additionalfocos. It conveyed an image of Cuba as 
being at the vanguard of the continent's struggle against imperialism/despotism; this 
idea of vanguard ism was central to Guevara's guerrilla warfare methodology. For 
the Cuban audience, the idea that Cuba was at the helm of revolutionary struggle 
might have been empowering; it implied a strength to the Revolution, and was likely 
intended to inspire pride in the Cuban people, thereby encouraging mobilisation. 
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That said, one must take into account the reception of the speech by an audience 
external to Cuba. While the victory of the Cuban Revolution was a seminal event in 
Latin American history, foreign observers may not have been as knowledgeable as 
the average Cuban with regard to the specific events of the insurrectionary phase 
(Cuban citizens, in contrast, would likely have known of the Comandancia de La 
Plata at the time of its designation as the country's first free territory). With this in 
mind, a non-Cuban may not have understood the intertextual reference, and therefore 
the foquista implications. However, the statement may still have contributed to the 
representation of Cuba as synonymous with the notion ofa 'free territory', one that is 
not dominated nor constrained by an exogenous hegemonic power. The potential 
synonymity of Cuba and 'free territory' is partly created through what Fairclough 
terms 'rewording' (Fairclough 1989, 113). Castro made it clear that Cuba should 
henceforth be equated with this concept of a 'free territory', and that the two terms 
were interchangeable. 
This idea of a 'free territory' might have also suggested defiance in the face of 
increasing hostility from the United States; it conveyed the message that it did not 
need to maintain economic or diplomatic relations with its North American 
neighbour provided it had its freedom/sovereignty. In this way, the Cuban leadership 
did not seem to be projecting an image of a nation besieged, but rather one that 
revelled in its independence and increasing isolation. The leaders appeared to be 
asserting that, in standing apart from its neighbours, the country was in prime 
position to assume the role of the vanguard of the Latin American revolution. 
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Castro's assertion of a 'Territorio Libre de America' fits the pattern of the way in 
which presuppositions are cued in text. One feature of the inclusion of 
presuppositions is the subordinate clause, which was employed in this example 
(Fairclough 1989, 154). Similarly, the very first clause (also subordinate) of the 
Declaration, 'Junto a la imagen y el recuerdo de Jose Marti', contained a 
presupposition, albeit of a more explicit nature; we can place this technique of using 
presuppositions under the more general heading of intertextuality (Fairclough 1989, 
155). In this instance, Castro made a direct intertextual reference to an historical 
Cuban figure, Jose Marti, and, as with the previous example, presupposed that the 
audience was aware of his historical significance. Once again, the average Cuban 
citizen would have been fully cognisant of Marti's role in Cuban history and his on-
going legacy, both prior to and following the events of the Revolution. Marti was, 
and continues to be, considered the 'Ap6stol' of Cuban independence and is one of 
the key, ifnot principal, symbols of the tradition of national struggle, or Illcha. Thus, 
by referencing Marti here, and therefore suggesting a link between Marti's struggle 
and that of the Revolution, Castro attempted to confer historical legitimacy upon this 
speech, and upon the actions of the revolutionary leadership in general. The fact that 
the intertextual reference was made without introduction presupposed a shared 
national history with the audience, that history itself being a fundamental component 
of clIbania. The effect of this reference might therefore have been to conflate the 
Illcha carried out in the Cuban Revolution with that of Marti and the country's pre-
existing tradition of Illcha. Moreover, if we accept that the rewording of Cuba as 
'Territorio Libre' connoted a guerrillerista struggle, then the juxtaposition of these 
two intertextual references had the effect of portraying guerrillerismo as a new form 
of lucha which could be placed in the same tradition as that of Marti. Castro's 
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attempt to evoke parallels between Marti's mission and that of the Revolution was 
aided by the manipulation of syntax in the opening statement. While the clauses 
regarding Marti and 'Territorio Libre' were subordinate, the main clause being 'en 
Cuba C ••• ) el pueblo C ..• ) se ha constituido en Asamblea General Nacional', they 
were foregrounded, thereby increasing their impact upon the audience. 
In addition to serving as an early illustration of guerrillerismo in Castro's discourse, 
the 'First Declaration of Havana' also contains evidence which both supports and 
refutes the notion that a 'siege mentality' was encouraged by the leadership. Castro 
seemed to alternate between attempting to create an atmosphere of siege and 
promoting a sense of confident defiance. In some respects, it would appear that 
Castro intended to create the impression that Cuba, and, indeed, the rest of Latin 
America, was in danger of being attacked by the United States. Castro spoke of the 
'conducta guerrerista y agresiva del Gobiemo norteamericano' which 'ponen en 
peligro la paz y la seguridad del hemisferio del mundo' (Castro 1960b, 346). He also 
repeated the word 'intervenci6n' in relation to the United States and Latin American 
nations; in one example, Castro purported that 'Esa intervenci6n, afianzada en la 
superioridad militar ( ... ) ha convertido ( ... ) a nuestro America ( ... ) en zona de 
explotaci6n' (Castro 1960b, 346). Castro outlined previous 'interventions' by the 
United States in various Latin American countries and listed, at length. the 'crimes' 
committed by its government and other imperialist tyrannical nations whose 
'oligarquias militares y politicas que mantienen a nuestros pueblos en la miseria. 
impiden su desarrollo democratico y el pleno ejercicio de su soberania' (Castro 
1960b, 348). These statements seem intended to promote the idea that there was a 
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very real threat posed not only by the United States but by imperialistic governments 
and despotism in general, and that this 'unlawful' involvement had a long history. 
That said, despite this apparent threat, it does not appear that Castro wished to imply 
that Cuba was isolated, nor that it was in danger of being 'besieged'. Rather, there is 
a definite tone of defiance in this speech, and a sense that Cuba was standing in 
solidarity with the rest of Latin America, in addition to the Soviet Union and China. 
Castro contended: 
La Asamblea General Nacional del Pueblo declara, que la ayuda espontaneamente 
ofrecida por la Union Sovietica a Cuba en caso de que nuestro pais fuera atacado por 
fuerzas militares imperialistas ( ... ) constituye un evidente acto de solidaridad ( ... ) 
brindada a Cuba ante un iminente ataque del Pentagono yanqui (Castro 1960b, 347). 
The use of derogatory rewording of the United States government such as 
'Pentagono yanqui', and the incorporation of lexical sets relating to criminality and 
despotism, had the ideological effect of casting the island's North American 
neighbours as the enemy and of attaching overtly negative connotations to the United 
States administration. The Cuban Revolution, conversely, was described in terms of 
'dignidad', 'libertad', 'derechos' and 'soberanfa', in addition to the repeated phrase 
we saw earlier, 'Territorio Libre de America'. Castro's use of language reinforced 
the impression that Cuba had agency in the on-going hostilities with the United 
States. Castro made it clear that Cuba was not a passive 'sitting duck' which would 
allow itself to be overcome by aggression directed at it from the North. Each point in 
the Declaration begins with an active, declarative sentence in which Cuba is the 
agent; Castro vehemently pronounced that 'La Asamblea General Nacional del 
Pueblo de Cuba condenaldeclaralrechazalratifica' and so on. Conferring linguistic 
agency on the Cuban people could be read as an intentionally symbolic means of 
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conveying the message that the Cuban people had reclaimed ownership of their 
island from the hands of the United States and would not relinquish this power 
without a fight. 
Much like the texts included in the rest of the Manual, the 'First Declaration of 
Havana' also appeared to place emphasis on collective action. In the extract selected 
for analysis, it was again the Cuban people as a whole who were said to have formed 
the General Assembly: 'el pueblo ( ... ) se ha constituido en Asamblea General 
Nacional'. Elsewhere in the speech he stated: 'Desde el primero hasta el ultimo 
disparo ( ... ) desde el primero hasta el ultimo acto de la Revoluci6n el pueblo de Cuba 
ha actuado por libre y absoluta determinaci6n propia' (Castro 1960b, 347). Again, 
the emphasis here was upon the actions of the Cuban people as a whole, rather than 
selected individuals. 
This idea of individual action possessing value only within a collective was perhaps 
illustrative of the principles that underpinned the/oco theory. The theory posited that 
the subjective conditions for revolution could be engendered through the creation of 
the initial isolated nucleus, thefoco. While this first/oco had to be isolated, its wider 
aim was to produce additional locos with which it could form a network and, 
eventually, combine into a large force powerful enough to overthrow the enemy. 
Thus, a key characteristic ofthe theory was the notion that the isolated nucleus could 
only be effective once it formed part of a collective of locos. In the 1960 Manual, it 
would seem that this notion was applied to the individual Cuban citizen who was 
projected as something of a microcosm of the foco warfare process. The underlying 
message appears to be that there was a necessity for the SUbjective will to act on an 
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individual level, but that this action would only be effective ifit was realised within a 
collective. 
A comparable message was conveyed in another of Fidel Castro's seminal speeches 
from the early years of the Revolution in power, his 'Second Declaration of Havana' 
delivered in Havana's Plaza de la Revoluci6n on February 4 1962. Unlike the 
relatively more constrained rhetoric of the' First Declaration', in this speech Castro 
did not hold back in illustrating his unbridled hatred of North American imperialism; 
additionally, the tone was one of undoubted militancy, an unambiguous provocation 
to the people of Latin America to take up arms in the name of liberty. The 
overarching message of the Declaration was one of subjective will, of creating one's 
own SUbjective conditions in which to produce revolution, as had been outlined in 
Guevara's La Guerra de Guerrillas, published two years earlier. Moreover, Castro 
was adamant that, not only should action be taken immediately, but it should follow 
the armed path. In other words, the speech endorsed a !oquista mode of action for 
burgeoning revolutionary movements across the continent. 
Similar to the 'First Declaration', Jose Marti was mentioned in the very first line of 
the 'Second Declaration'; in this instance, however, Castro employed a more 
'manifest intertextuality', whereby he quoted directly from a letter written by Martr 
shortly before his death in 1895 (Fairclough 1992, 117). Once again, presupposition 
was at work in the way Castro took it for granted that his audience would need little 
introduction to this letter, nor to Marti as an historical figure. With respect to 
guerrillerismo, the following lines from Marti's letter are of interest: 
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ya estoy todos los dias en peligro de dar mi vida por mi pais, y par mi deber ... de 
impedir a tiempo con la independencia de Cuba que se extendian por las Antillas de 
los Estados Unidos y caigan, con esa fuerza mas, sabre nuestras tierras de America 
(Castro 1962, 127). 
The reference to deber mentioned here echoed its inclusion in the 'First Declaration'. 
As already discussed, in the previous declaration it would seem that Castro intended 
to draw parallels between Cuba's history of lucha and the struggle to defend the 
Revolution at the time of his speaking; that link he attempted to forge through the 
seamless juxtaposition of 'Marti' and 'Territorio Libre'. By opening the second 
declaration with an allusion to deber, Castro was proposing that this notion of 'duty', 
and lucha more generally, to defend Cuba's independence was still relevant for the 
situation in which Cuba found itself in 1962; that is, increasingly isolated in world 
politics and facing direct attacks from US-sponsored operations, such as the Bay of 
Pigs invasion the previous year. Furthermore, by introducing the idea of deber from 
the outset, Castro was promoting the idea that it was a 'duty' and, therefore, not a 
choice, for Cubans to defend the Revolution; it was a necessary act if Cubans wanted 
to continue in the tradition of Marti, the national hero. 
Later in the speech, Castro uttered one of his most famous lines: 'El deber de todo 
revolucionario es hacer la revoluci6n' (Castro 1962, 169). Here, he again returned to 
the notion of deber, yet this time he explicitly stated that it was the duty of each 
revolutionary to produce the revolution; put differently, this statement placed weight 
upon subjective will, on a 'voluntaristic' approach to Revolution, on the importance 
of the actions of each individual in sustaining, or, with regard to the rest of Latin 
America, producing the Revolution. With this stress on voluntarism in mind, one 
can argue that there is an unambiguously guerrillerisla element to this statement. As 
148 
outlined in Chapter One, one of Guevara's principal tenets of the ioeo theory 
concerned the individual's application of hislher will-power to create the subjective 
conditions in which revolution could be produced. To reiterate, Guevara concluded 
that: 'No siempre hay que esperar a que se den todas las condiciones para la 
revoluci6n; el foco insurreccional puede desarrollar condiciones subjetivas sobre la 
base de las condiciones objetivas dadas' (Guevara 2006, 13). 
Castro's point was made all the more clear by the use of a declarative sentence which 
contained no subordinate clauses which might have obscured the message he wished 
to convey. Additionally, the use of the determiner 'todo' further underlined the 
individual subjectivity of revolutionary action. Parallels can be drawn here between 
another of Castro's statements, included in his 1960 'Acta de la segunda 
independencia', considered earlier: 'La democracia cubana Ie da a cada cubano algo 
mas; la democracia cubana Ie da a cada cubano un fusH para defender sus derechos y 
para defender a su Patria' (1960, 342). What is more, the implicit intertextuality, 
whereby Castro referred back to the earlier use of deber in the quote from Marti, 
without signposting its use as such, could be read as an attempt to create a conceptual 
link between the lucha of Marti and that of the revolutionary in the early 1960s; he 
could be seen to have been inculcating the idea that the 'duty' of the Cuban citizen 
was to continue with the lucha begun by Marti, only it would be a new kind of lucha, 
one that involved the 'subjective conditions' specific to the ioeo theory. This 
endeavour to place the past in the present was compounded by the way in which the 
text jumped back and forth in time; Castro seamlessly juxtaposed historical events, 
issues contemporaneous to his speech and a redemptive future created by mass 
revolution. This confusion of temporalities blurred the lines between past, present 
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and future, thus creating the effect that the events of each era belonged to the same 
tradition of lucha. However, in spite of the frequent shift in tenses, cohesion was 
produced through techniques such as the intertextual reference to words or phrases 
used at an earlier point within the text. 
There are other numerous instances in the speech in which a guerrillerisla element to 
Castro's rhetoric was readily discernible. As an illustration, Castro referred directly 
to the subjective conditions necessary for fomenting a successful revolution: 'Las 
condiciones subjetivas de cada pais - es decir, el factor conciencia, organizaci6n, 
direcci6n - pueden acelerar 0 retrasar la revoluci6n segun su mayor 0 menor grado 
de desarrollo' (Castro 1962, 140). Similarly, there were several examples where 
emphasis was placed upon the importance of subjective will, on the idea that 
revolutionaries could 'make' the revolution. For instance, in response to foreign 
critics who had accused Cuba of exporting its revolution overseas, Castro retorted: 
'las revoluciones no se exportan, las hacen los pueblos' ( ... ) l Y que ensena la 
Revoluci6n Cubana? Que la revoluci6n es posible, que los pueblos pueden hacerla' 
(Castro 1962, 163). Later in the speech he attested: 'Pero esta lucha, mas que 
aquella, la haran las masas, la har!n los pueblos' (Castro 1962, 170). As in the' First 
Declaration of Havana', however, these latter statements reveal that, while there was 
a marked stress upon subjective will in this speech, the necessity of producing action 
as part of a collective was the overriding message. Castro was clearly stating that it 
was the Cuban pueblo as a united whole, and not the individual, who would bring 
about revolutionary change, as demonstrated in the phrase 'la haran las masas, la 
haran los pueblos'. 
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There were also references to the isolated nucleus and the vanguard, both key tenets 
of the foco theory. Castro alluded to 'Ia lucha inicial de reducidos nucleos 
combatientes', before uttering the following statement: 'l.Que es 10 que desde el 
comienzo mismo de la lucha de esos prim eros nucleos los hace invencibles, 
independientemente del numero, el poder y los recursos de sus enemigos? EI apoyo 
del pueblo' (Castro 1962, 166). Concerning the vanguard, Castro contended: 
La actual correlaci6n mundial de fuerzas, y el movimiento universal de liberaci6n de 
los pueblos coloniales y dependientes, senalan a la clase obrera y a los intelectuales 
revolucionarios de America Latina su verdadero papel, que es el de situarse 
resueltamente a la vanguardia de la lucha contra el imperialismo y el feudalismo 
(Castro 1962, 167). 
Similar to the' First Declaration of Havana', the' Second Declaration' also brought to 
the fore the question of 'siege mentality'. As might be expected from the more 
militant 'Second Declaration of Havana', the tone of defiance was more explicit than 
in the previous Declaration, and was evident from the outset. Indeed, the final line of 
Marti's letter, which was quoted at the beginning ofthe speech, read 'mi honda es la 
de David' (Castro 1962, 128). The biblical metaphor invoked was an undoubtedly 
defiant statement which suggested that, though smaller in size, Cuba had the strength 
and courage to triumph in a confrontation with the United States. Castro uttered 
similar proclamations of fearlessness at other stages in the speech: 
En aquel c6nc1ave inmoral, la voz titanica de Cuba se elev6 sin debilidad ni miedo 
para acusar ante todos los pueblos de America y del mundo el monstruoso atentado, y 
defender virilmente, y con dignidad que constara en los anales de la historia, no solo el 
derecho de Cuba, sino el derecho desamparado de todas las naciones hermanas del 
continente Americano (Castro 1962, 147). 
He also declared that, rather than Latin America, it was the imperialists who were 
living in fear: 'No el miedo a la Revoluci6n Cubana; el miedo a la revoluci6n 
lSI 
latinoamericana ( ... ) el miedo a que los pueblos saqueados del continente arrebaten 
las armas a sus opresoras y se declaren, como Cuba, pueblos libres de America' 
(Castr 1962, 137). Castro attempted to create the impression that there was great 
solidarity between the revolutionary people of Latin America and that their combined 
strength would be powerful enough to overcome imperialist aggression. Cuba was 
presented as being far from isolated, instead assum ing its role at the vanguard of a 
larger continent-wide movement. In this way, a 'siege mentality' was far from being 
promoted at this stage, despite the physical invasion of Cuba during the Bay of Pigs 
operation the previous year. 
That is not to say, however, that Castro did not acknowledge the threat posed by the 
United States. In contrast, he actively sought to build a climate of fear. For instance, 
he listed the numerous 'crimes' committed by the US against Cuba since the 
Revolution had come to power: 
Cuba ha vivido tres aflos de Revoluci6n bajo incesante hostigamiento de intervenci6n 
yanki en nuestros asuntos internos. A viones piratas, procedentes de Estados Unidos, 
lanzando materias inflamables, han quemado millones de arrobas de cafla; actos de 
sabotaje internacional perpetrados por agentes yankis, como la explosion del vapor La 
Coubre, han costado decenas de vidas cubanas; miles de armas norteamericanas de 
todo tipo han side lanzadas en paracardas por los servicios militares de Estados 
Unidos sobre nuestro territorio para promover la subversi6n (Castro 1962, 149/150). 
The asyndetic listing employed here, which continued for some time, accentuated the 
multiplicity of the 'crimes' committed by the US against Cuba and therefore 
highlighted the very real danger that Cuba was facing. Moreover, Castro spoke of 
the 'terrorist' attacks carried out against Latin America as a whole: 
Las misiones militares norteamericanas en America Latina constituyen un aparato de 
espionaje permanente en cada naci6n ( ... ) Es notorio que las embajadas yanquis en 
distintos parses de America Latina estan organizando, instruyendo y equipando bandas 
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fascistas para sembrar el terror y agredir las organizaciones obreras, estudiantiles e 
intelectuales (Castro 1962, 1421143). 
Castro seemed to be equating Cuba with the rest of Latin America in terms of the 
threat posed by US aggression; in this way, Cuba was not projected as being isolated 
but as part of an entire continent that lived in peril. Castro proclaimed that: 
Ningun pueblo de America Latina es debil, porque forma parte de una familia de 200 
millones de hermanos que padecen las mismas miserias ( ... ) tienen el mismo enemigo 
( ... ) y cuentan con la solidaridad de todos los hombres y mujeres honrados del mundo 
entero (Castro 1962, 169/170). 
With regard to taking a stand against this threat, however, Cuba asserted its role as 
the defiant vanguard of all Latin America. 
Castro's Declarations of Havana were deliberately incendiary and, as briefly 
discussed in the opening pages of this chapter, constituted a specific type of 'speech 
act', one that was necessarily ideologically charged. In contrast, written texts, such 
as the Manual de Capacitacion Civica, though also reflecting and communicating the 
ideology of the leadership, tend to be less explicit in their intent to shape the 
consciousness of the reader. In such texts, the indications of guerrillerista discourse 
are perhaps less conspicuous and are thus reliant on the inference of the text 
recipient. 
This characteristic is true of another written text published in the 1960s by the 
revolutionary government: Historia de Cuba: Curso de Superacion para Maestros 
(Tomo 1) (1964). This text was produced by the Ministerio de Educaci6n for 
'Maestros Populares y de Vanguardia' to furnish them with a solid understanding of 
Cuban history. As stated in the Introduction to the text, it aimed to provide 'una 
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visi6n panonimica de la evoluci6n de la sociedad cubana desde su etapa inicial de 
comunidad primitiva, hasta el momento actual de trans ito al socialismo' (His/oria 
1964, 7). The short history 'course' is divided into sections that outline different 
stages in Cuba's history, from the Spanish 'conquest' up until the War of 
Independence of 1895. These outlines offer somewhat basic overviews of their 
respective periods, with central figures and events singled out for additional 
explanation. At the end of each chapter, key questions are posed to the reader (i.e. the 
trainee teacher) to aid them in identifying these figures and events. 
This text has been selected for closer inspection in light of Foucault's contention that 
government institutions support the circulation of statements which are taken to be 
'true' in a given society. The publication of the book by the Ministerio de Educaci6n 
suggests that the statements contained within were consistent with the ideas and 
'truths' put forward by the leadership, such as the guerrillerista statements uttered by 
Fidel Castro in the speeches already discussed. Moreover, it takes into account 
Foucault's belief that, 'Every educational system is a political means of maintaining 
or of modifying the appropriation of discourse, with the knowledge and the powers it 
carries with it' (Foucault 1971, 156). In other words, education is one of the ways by 
which certain statements can 'transform' into 'common-sense-knowledge' (Mills 
2003, 74). This is particularly true of history books which can present a version of 
events that corresponds with and supports the values and beliefs promoted by the 
leadership; the re-telling of history is an effective means by which certain statements 
or ideas can be perpetuated, while other ('false') statements or versions of events are 
excluded. That this text was aimed at primary school teachers renders it more 
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interesting still as a source for analysis, in that its version of history was also 
indirectly aimed at educating young people via their teachers. 
Although this edition presented a version of Cuba's historical narrative up to 1895 
only, there are numerous instances in which it is possible to detect elements of 
guerrillerismo. Indeed, what becomes immediately clear from an analysis of the text 
is that there seems to have been a conscious attempt to convey an image of a 
tradition of rebellion through the writing of this particular historical narrative. This 
tradition, as created in the text, stretched back not just to the wars of independence of 
the 1800s, which are often cited as precursors to the insurrection of the Revolution, 
but to the seventeenth century. The text stated that, while Spain enjoyed great 
financial gain from the exploitation of its colonies in the 1600s: 
Cuba, aislada, va gestando una tradici6n de rebeldia, se van acentuando sus 
contradicciones. El siglo XVIII ofreceni un panorama distinto pero en estas oscuras 
epocas de los primeros sig10s coloniales se ira creando silenciosamente, a traves de las 
sangres distintas que fluyen por la misma vena, una tradici6n de rebeldia, de 
independencia, de coraje y un impulso hacia la cultura y la superaci6n de los marcos 
limitados de la colonia (Hisloria 1964, 83). 
This assertion that the seeds of a 'tradici6n de rebeldfa' were being sown some three-
hundred years prior to the guerrilla struggle of the Sierra Maestra served to 
strengthen the already established notion of a tradition of lucha. While 
guerrillerismo was not necessarily connoted by this citation, it most certainly 
overlaps, in the same way as lucha, with the concept of 'rebeldfa'. 
A more obvious illustration of guerrillerista discourse was apparent in the section of 
the book which briefly profiled the well-known Cuban intelIectual of the colonial 
period, Felix Varela. Varela was described in the text as 'EI mas notable exponente 
155 
de la lucha revolucionaria del Siglo XIX antes de 1868' and, in quoting the historian 
Roig de Leuchsenring, 'el primer intelectual revolucionario cubano' (His1oria 1964, 
139). In summing up his political thought, it was stated that one ofVareJa's essential 
principles was: 
Que no era recomendable que se esperase en la Isla ala fructificaci6n de los proyectos 
revolucionarios en favor nuestro de otros pueblos recientemente emancipados, sino 
que la revoluci6n debia fomentarse y desenvolverse dentro de Cuba y por el propio y 
unico esfuerzo de los cubanos (Historia 1964, 141). 
The contention that Varela did not believe Cuba should wait until a more propitious 
time to launch a revolution is quite obviously consistent with one of Guevara's key 
precepts: that one should not wait until the 'objective conditions' for revolution were 
in place, but should instead rely on 'subjective conditions', or the subjective will of 
revolutionaries. This latter point in particular was reflected in the final phrase of the 
citation, 'Ia revoluci6n debfa fomentarse y desenvolverse dentro de Cuba y por el 
propio y unico esfuerzo de los cubanos' (His/oria 1964, 141). Again, Varela's 
political thought was portrayed as having been compatible with that of Guevara, but 
it also conformed to the overarching message being transmitted in the hegemonic 
discourse of the time; as has already been discussed in the analysis, in the first 
decade in power, the revolutionary leadership seemed intent on emphasising that it 
was the Cuban pueblo who had defeated Batista, and whose actions would determine 
the fate of the Revolution in power. This message was further reinforced in this text 
through the incorporation of such phrases as 'por el propio y unico esfuerzo de los 
cubanos', where the inclusion of the adjective 'propio' further highlighted the notion 
that only the Cubans themselves had the power to create a revolution in Cuba. 
156 
There are other instances in the text in which heroic figures from Cuba's history are 
portrayed as having held views on revolutionary action which were aligned with 
Guevara's, and with guerrillerismo more generally. When describing the 
independence campaign led by Carlos Manuel de Cespedes in 1868, the text read: 
8610 doce hombres quedaron con Cespedes. "A un quedan doce hombres, bastan para 
hacer la independencia de Cuba", afirm6 el jefe de la revoluci6n. No serla la ultima 
vez ~ u e e con doce hombres se iniciara la lucha de todo un pueblo (Hisloria 1964, 
180). 4 
It is the phrase attributed to Cespedes which is of interest here; it proposed that 
Cespedes claimed that a force of just twelve men was sufficient to win the war of 
independence. This idea that a numerically inferior side could win a war against a 
much larger enemy was, of course, consistent with Guevara's aporlacion that 'Las 
fuerzas populares pueden ganar una guerra contra el ejercito', and with his notion 
that an initial loco of just a handful of men could foment revolution. Moreover, the 
allusion to 'doce hombres' was linked to the myth of the twelve survivors of the 
Granma landing, mentioned earlier, as suggested in 'No serla la ultima vez que con 
doce hombres se iniciara la lucha de todo un pueblo'. The text producer assumed 
that the contemporary Cuban reader would have been aware of the significance 
associated with los doce, and therefore chose not to spell it out as such; one can 
therefore argue that this mention of 'doce hombres' constitutes another example of 
presupposition. 
The intended function of attaching this myth to Cespedes was clearly to draw 
parallels between the struggle of the Ten Years' War and that of the Cuban 
34 Carlos Manuel de Cespedes was one of the leading figures in Cuba's Ten Years' War of 1868-1878. 
A plantation owner from Eastern Cuba, Cespedes heralded the start of the War with his Grito de Yara 
in October 1868, before freeing his slaves and co-ordinating the rebellion against the colonial Spanish 
government (Thomas 1998, 245-247). He was later killed by Spanish forces in 1874. 
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Revolution in its insurrectionary phase. The use of quotation marks guided the 
reader to believe that Cespedes himself uttered such a guerrillerisla statement, 
thereby legitimising it to a certain extent. Such punctuation was intended to suggest 
manifest intertextuality, yet there is no certainty that he uttered these exact words as 
the source is not provided. Still, the overall effect was to imply that Cespedes' 
strategies for fomenting revolution in 1868 were not far removed from those 
employed by the Granma survivors, and therefore formed part of, or laid the 
foundations for, the tradition of guerrilla struggle in Cuba. 
As stated earlier in the analysis of Castro's I January 1959 speech, the allusion to the 
myth of los dace recurred in the Revolution's hegemonic discourse throughout the 
1960s and, as the evidence presented in the next chapter wiIl confirm, in the early 
1970s. These periodic references to the myth of los dace can be considered 
'cohesive markers', if one is to view the various texts produced on (or simply 
referring to) Cuban history in the Revolution's first decade as a single historical 
narrative (Fairclough 1992, 177). In other words, repeatedly returning to the same 
myth added cohesion to the historical narrative (and the hegemonic discourse), 
insofar as an image was created of an unchanged, and eventually effective, approach 
to revolution which had been tried and tested over the previous hundred years of 
struggle for independence. This approach was that of having the courage to continue 
with a revolutionary programme despite a lack of resources and a vastly superior 
enemy in terms of the number of combatants, which is, in essence, the ethos of 
guerrillerismo. 
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As a result of the repeated references, 'doce hombres' could also be identified as a 
presupposition, in the sense that its meaning was viewed by the text producer as a 
'given', something readily identifiable and understood by a Cuban text recipient. 
Presuppositions might also be considered a form of intertextuality, whereby they 
constitute a means of incorporating other texts. As Fairclough has pointed out, from 
the intertextual perspective of presupposition, these other texts are not specific texts 
but rather 'a more nebulous 'text' corresponding to public opinion (what people tend 
to say, accumulated textual experience)' (Fairclough 1992. 121). This 'accumulated 
textual experience' is tantamount to the historical narrative articulated by the 
hegemonic discourse of the Revolution in power. 
Continuing with the idea of the myth of the 'doce hombres' as a presupposition, its 
accompanying message would thus have constituted 'background knowledge' or 
'common sense' to the average Cuban (Fairclough 1989, 154). The use of 
presuppositions in this way can be said to have a manipulative effect: if the text 
recipient cannot identify them as such, they cannot, therefore, be rejected (Fairclough 
1989, 154). What is more, and to employ Fairclough's words, such examples of 
subtle manipulation suppose 'interpreting subjects with particular prior textual 
experiences and assumptions, and in so doing they contribute to the ideological 
constitution of subjects' (Fairclough 1992, 121). This latter point rings particularly 
true in the case of the myth of the 'doce hombres'; this presupposition aimed to 
inculcate guerrillerismo onto its 'interpreting subjects', the Cuban people, whereby 
they were repeatedly reminded of the potential of the underdog to emerge 
triumphant, without the message being spelled out as such. This lesson had the 
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potential to be internalised by the average Cuban, thus forming part of his or her 
'ideological constitution'. 
The concept that revolution could be won through a reliance on subjective factors is 
evident elsewhere in the text. Concerning Ignacio Agramonte's role in the Tcn 
Years' War, the text stated:35 
Pronto se hizo sentir en CamagUey la presencia de Agramonte y aunque escaseaban 
los recursos, la moral era firme. Un oficial de Agramonte que no podia comprender su 
fe Ie pregunt6: 
-Pero, General, "Con que recursos cuenta Ud. para continuar la guerra? - "Con la 
vergUenza de los cubanos", fue la respuesta del Mayor (Histaria 1964, 195). 
As before with the citation attributed to Cespedes, the quotation marks in this extract 
were intended to imply that manifest intertextuality had been employed; that is, that 
these were Agramonte's own words. Again, as the source of the citation is not given, 
it is impossible to confirm whether this is true. The reader was told that, while 
'escaseaban los recursos', Agramonte felt he could depend on the outrage of the 
Cuban people. Thus, once more, the message was relayed that material resources 
were not as important as the will of the people to continue in the struggle. 
A similar message was expressed in the following citation which referred to the 
perspective of the Spanish forces in the independence struggle of 1868-1878: • Los 
espaftoles no se atreverian en 10 adelante a salir al campo en pequeftas columnas. 
Sabian que los cubanos, apenas sin armas, contaban con dos [actores poderosos: la 
sorpresa en el ataque y el valor en la lucha' (Historia 1964, 197). Once again. the 
paucity of weaponry on the side of the revolutionaries was underlined, as 
H Ignacio Agramonte was a central protagonist and military strategist in the Cuban rebel forces in the 
Ten Years' War. 
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demonstrated in 'los cubanos, apenas sin armas'. What is more. the tactics of the 
revolutionaries of the Ten Years' War were described in such a way as to highlight 
their conformity to Guevara's strategies for guerrilla warfare. The proposal that the 
independentistas had 'sorpresa' as a tactical advantage paralleled one of Guevara's 
propositions regarding guerrilla warfare: 'Naturalmente, su inferioridad numerica 
hace muy necesario que los ataques sean siempre por sorpresa, esa es la gran ventaja. 
es 10 que permite al guerrillero hacer bajas al enemigo sin sufrir perdidas' (Guevara 
2006, 27). As with the earlier citation attributed to Cespedes, the correlation 
between the style of warfare employed in the Ten Years' War and that advocated by 
Guevara was intentionally highlighted in order to further reinforce the impression 
that Cuba had a long-standing tradition of a specifically guerrillerista struggle. 
The citations examined from this edition of Hisloria de Cuba seem to substantiate 
the aforementioned proposal that, where speeches are perhaps more explicit vehicles 
for transmitting an ideology, the messages contained within texts that do not, at least 
ostensibly, have a political function are more implicit and must be inferred by the 
reader. Moreover, and as has been made clear in the discussion on presupposition, 
there is the potential for the reader to understand and possibly internalise a message 
without realising they are doing so. In this way, the inculcation of an ideology, or of 
certain values, might be more effective than direct appeals to the consciousness of 
the text recipient. Furthermore, while texts such as Hisloria de Cuba have a didactic 
function, they are also inherently ideological; the telling, or re-telling, of history as 
guided by any political power is always necessarily ideological, insofar as the 
historical narrative is shaped in such a way as to be consistent with the ideology of 
the leadership. This assertion certainly appears to ring true with regard to this edition 
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of Historia de Cuba, in which the presentation of history allowed for the creation of 
a tradition of guerrillerismo. This tradition afforded historical legitimacy to the 
revolutionary leadership's continued promotion of the guerrilla ethos in the 1960s: 
guerrilla struggle was presented as something inherently Cuban which the Cuban 
people had a duty to perpetuate. The representation of history under the Revolution 
in power can be considered a form of 'discursive rearticulation', in that the existing 
historical narrative was rewritten to meet the needs of those in charge (Fairclough 
1992, 93). In other words, this rearticulation formed part of the struggle for 
hegemony of the revolutionary leadership, and, specifically, those within the 
leadership who had lived the guerrilla experience. 
As the first decade in power progressed, more tangibly gllerrillerisla concepts 
continued to be dispersed in the speeches given on behalf ofthe leadership. As a case 
in point, the concept of 'subjective conditions' remained a recognisable feature of the 
hegemonic discourse. An illustration of the recurrent referral to Guevara's idea can 
be found in Fidel Castro's 2 January speech 1965, the sixth anniversary of the 
Revolution. Castro was keen to underline the increase in the revolutionary 
consciousness of the Cuban people that had occurred since 1959. He declared that, 
since the onset of the Revolution in power, 'los factores subjetivos han aumentado 
considerablemente, el pueblo que hoy es un pueblo mucho mas organizado, mucho 
mas revolucionario, mucho mas preparado, no hay la menor duda' (Castro 1965, 
183). 
Here, Castro was attempting to convince his audience that, in spite of imperialist 
aggression and a lack of resources, the voluntarism of the pueblo was what counted 
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in terms of the Revolution's survival. Interestingly, Castro, as with his mention of 
'condiciones subjetivas' in the 'Second Declaration of Havana', did not deem it 
necessary to pinpoint what he meant by subjective conditions. Rather, he assumed 
that his audience would be able to identify readily this concept; that is. one of 
producing Revolution based on the subjective will of the participating 
revolutionaries. This citation therefore constituted another instance of Castro's use 
of presupposition, ofa 'general appeal to "background knowledge"'. Once again, the 
employment of the technique appears to have been a tacit but effective means of 
communicating guerrillerismo to the audience; Castro was able to promote the ideas 
and precepts of the 'heroic guerrilla', without referencing Guevara directly, nor his 
loco theory. Furthermore, it is an intertextual presupposition yet, unlike the earlier 
example of the 'doce hombres', the notion of 'subjective conditions' does not 
constitute a reference to a 'nebulous text', but a specific and well-known work 
authored by the heroic guerrilla himself, the very embodiment of guerrilleri.'imo. 
The 1965 Anniversary speech also highlighted the idiosyncratic nature of the 
leadership's methods of governance. Castro stated: 
Nuestro pais no se ha apresurado en crear instituciones formales. Realmente somos 
alergicos al formalismo. Estarnos apegados a instituciones esenciales, preferimos no 
crear algo, a crear algo con un caracter exclusivamente formal, 0 formalista (Castro 
]965, 187). 
Castro's statements in this extract revealed the somewhat unsystematic approach to 
the organisation of the revolutionary government in the first decade of power, insofar 
as he admitted that there had been no rush to establish formal institutions up to that 
point. This somewhat arbitrary approach to the organisation of the Revolution 
contradicts the picture of a system highly militarised from the outset, as painted by 
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academics such as Dumont and Bunck, whose work in this area was outlined in the 
Introduction, Castro's words implied a more guerrillerista approach to revolutionary 
governance, one which did not intend to maintain the institutions established before 
the Revolution, or to copy models put in place outside of Cuba. As was 
characteristic of his speeches at the time, Castro referred to the tasks of the 
Revolution as being the responsibility of the collective. Government was not the job 
of the chosen few, but of those that had won the Revolution and were now in power: 
the Cuban people. This stance was presented in the personification of Cuba; the 
country was the subject of the opening sentence and was therefore granted agency in 
creation ofinstitutions. The inclusion ofthe possessive pronoun 'nuestro' in 'Nuestro 
pais no se ha apresurado en crear instituciones formales', effectively conflated the 
actions of the country and the Cuban people, or at least afforded the pueblo 
ownership of the Revolution's actions up to that point. The subsequent use of the 
first person plural in 'somos', 'estamos', and 'preferimos' further compounded this 
idea of collective decision-making. 
However, despite claiming a metaphorical allergy to formalijmo, Castro went on to 
stress that it was time for a change in attitude, arguing in favour of a more practical 
approach. He purported: 
En los afios pr6ximos debemos crear nuestras instituciones estatales, y debemos crear 
nuestras instituciones locales ( ... ) Es necesario que empecemos a preocuparnos por 
estas cuestiones. Es necesario que nos preocupemos por resolver estos problemas. Es 
necesario que avancemos en el terreno pn\ctico y avancemos tambien en el desarrollo 
de las ideas (Castro 1965, 187). 
This appeal for a more pragmatic, structured approach to revolutionary governance is 
consistent with the views of the majority of the authors who have written on the 
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militarisation of the Revolution. As outlined in the Introduction, many scholars have 
argued that the Cuban Revolution underwent a transformation in the late 1960s, 
whereby there was a noticeable shift towards greater organisation based on a military 
model. Yet an examination of Castro's well known closing speech of the 1967 
OLAS conference, delivered on 10 August in Havana, reveals that, far from moving 
towards 'militarism', the Cuban revolutionary leadership remained committed to a 
promotion of both guerillerismo and !oquismo.36 Much like the First and Second 
Declarations of Havana, the promotion of revolutionary action was still very much a 
principal theme of the OLAS discourse. Castro continued to criticise imperialism 
while underlining the supposed inevitability of a Latin American revolution. This 
latter point had the added intention of reaffirming that Havana would not adhere to 
Moscow's policy of 'peaceful coexistence', despite its ideological and economic 
links with the Soviet Union. 
Given the speech's projected message, it is perhaps unsurprising that it included 
frequent, direct references to the guerrilla struggle and the importance of the guerrilla 
vanguard, the armed nucleus, subjective conditions/will and, above all, lucha. Castro 
talked of 'La importancia de la guerrilla, el papel de vanguardia de la guerrilla ( ... ) 
La guerrilla esta Hamada a ser el nucleo fundamental del movimiento revolucionario' 
(Castro, 1967). There are several instances in which Castro outlined a guerrilla 
process of revolutionary warfare, although he did not refer to it as such. As an 
illustration, when describing the civil rights movements in the United States, Castro 
attested: 'Eso demuestra que muchas veces el movimiento puede comenzar primero 
que el programa'. Later, he stressed the necessity of action over ideas: 
36 Briefly mentioned in Chapter One, the OLAS was a short-lived initiative of the Cuban Revolution 
designed to co-ordinate the guerrilla struggle in Latin America. The 1967 meeting constituted its first 
and only conference. 
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Esto no quiere decir que la acci6n deba esperar el triunfo de las ideas. Este es uno de 
los puntos esenciales de la cuesti6n: los que creen que es necesario primero que las 
ideas triunfen en las masas antes de iniciar la acci6n, y los que comprenden que 
precisamente la acci6n es uno de los mas eficaces instrumentos de hacer triunfar las 
ideas en las masas. Quienquiera que se detenga a esperar que las ideas triunfen 
primero en las masas, de manera mayoritaria, para iniciar la acci6n revolucionaria, no 
sera jamas revolucionario (Castro, 1967). 
Castro's message in this extract was deliberately clear: aspiring revolutionaries 
should act immediately, and ideally by following the path of the heroic guerrilla. 
Moreover, there was a distinct emphasis on struggle at numerous points in the 
speech; the speech was permeated with the word' luchar'. A signi ficant case in point 
is the following statement: 'Hay que luchar. Tenemos que luchar' (Castro, 1967). 
The recurrent mentions of both the guerrilla path to revolution and lucha might have 
served to conflate the two concepts in the minds of the listener; it would seem that, 
for Castro, the two terms were interchangeable. In this way, it is possible that 
Castro's intention was to promote the idea that guerrilla struggle, and the struggle of 
the sierra more specifically, was tantamount to a new form of lucha. It is interesting 
to note that, unlike in the Declarations of Havana, in this speech, there were no 
intertextual references to MartI or other pre-Revolution heroes from Cuban history. 
Rather, Castro included presuppositions relating only to the insurrectionary phase of 
the Revolution. This selection of historical references implies that Castro was trying 
to convey the message that, rather than looking to Marti as an inspiration for lucha 
and heroism, the Revolution had produced its own heroes and could serve 
sufficiently as the only necessary example for revolutionary struggle; by this stage, 
the Revolution had already created its own myths and inscribed itself in Cuban 
history. Castro underlined the historicity of the Revolution in the following 
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quotation: 'Porque nuestra Revoluci6n tiene su historia; nuestra Revoluci6n tiene su 
historia' (Castro, 1967). Here, the direct repetition accentuated his point. 
In addition to projecting a message of revolutionary armed struggle, the OLAS 
speech remained consistent with the First and Second Declarations of Havana in its 
overall tone of defiance. In this way, it too sheds light on the issue of whether a 
siege mentality was promoted by the revolutionary leadership during the 1960s. At 
this point in the Revolution's trajectory, Cuba was looking ever-more isolated; even 
the relationship with its closest ally, the Soviet Union, was under strain owing to 
Cuba's continued support for armed revolutionary movements in Latin America. Yet 
Castro did not tone down his vehement verbal attacks against imperialism, or also the 
Latin American Communist Parties, particularly the Venezuelan contingent. and 
anyone else who did not agree that armed action was the decisive path to revolution. 
Early in the speech, Castro began to incorporate intertextual references to recent 
news reports on CIA activity on Cuban soil. His tone was undoubtedly mocking of 
the inability of the Agency to cause any significant damage to the Revolution. He 
frequently employed rhetorical questions to highlight the issue of covert but 
incompetent CIA activity against Cuba. The following extract is illustrative of such 
questions: 
l.Es que aeaso tenemos que probar que el imperialismo realiza actividades subversivas 
contra nuestra patria? (".) l,No es acaso una enorme ingenuidad creer que la CIA es 
un organismo perfecto, maravilloso, inteligentfsimo, incapaz de cometer la menor 
pifia? t,Pero es que acaso no hem os lefdo en un libro escrito precisarnente por 
periodistas norteamericanos historias tenebrosas acerca de las decenas y decenas de 
estupideces y de crfmenes cometidos por la CIA? (Castro, 1967). 
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The ironic tone in this citation aimed to undermine any threat posed by the United 
States in its attempts to attack the Revolution. Castro deliberately mocked the 
frequent failures of the CIA, thus creating the overall impression that Cuba was not 
in any real danger, and was far from being 'besieged'. 
That said, Castro's comments later in the speech revealed that he was not trying to 
suggest that Cuba faced no danger from external actors. In fact, he explicitly 
remarked that the threat posed to Cuba was ever-present and not insignificant: 
Nadie considerara que los problemas de este pais son problemas faciles; que los 
peligros que se ciemen sobre este pais son peJigros insignificantes y 
minusculos. Nadie podra disminuir las circunstancias con que este pequefto pais se 
enfrenta resueltamente, sin vacitaci6n de ninguna indole, en las propias puertas del 
mas poderoso pais imperialista del mundo; y no s610 el mas poderoso. sino el mas 
agresivo; y no s610 el mas poderoso y agresivo, sino el mas sanguinario. el mas cinico. 
el mas engreido de los poderes imperialistas del mundo (Castro, 1967). 
It is notable here that Castro referred to Cuba as 'este pequeno pars'; this description 
served to underline Cuba's geographical inferiority in comparison with the 
imperialist powers, and thereby its vulnerability in the face of enemy attacks. This 
vulnerability was further reinforced by the repetition of similar phrases such as 'un 
pais tan pequeftito como el nuestro' (Castro, ] 967). What is more, certain comments 
of Castro's could be read as being intentionally paranoid. He spoke of 'una 
verdadera conspiraci6n internacional en contra de la Revoluci6n Cubana'. 'una 
verdadera conjura contra nuestra Revoluci6n', and, later, 'una repugnante 
conspiraci6n para crear un conflicto entre la Revoluci6n Cubana y los Estados del 
campo socialista' (Castro, 1967). It appears that Castro's purpose was to produce 
fear through his talk of 'conspiracy' and covert, subversive plots taking place behind 
the scenes between world leaders. 
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Yet, as with the majority of his other speeches, Castro finished this discourse with a 
final proclamation of defiance. He professed: 
Pero una cosa podemos decirles: que nos sentimos tranquilos, que nos sentimos 
seguros, y que esta pequefta isla sera siempre como un peft6n revolucionario de 
gran ito contra cuyas rocas se estrellaran todas las conjuras, todas las intrigas, todas las 
agresiones. Y que sobre ese peft6n revolucionario siempre ondeara una bandera que 
diga: jPatriaoMuerte! jVenceremos! (Castro,1967). 
Although Castro once again underscored the island's diminutive size through his 
reference to 'esta pequefta isla sera siempre como un peMn revolucionario', his final 
flourish made it clear that the Revolution would triumph and would not lose its 
resolve to fight back. 
Overall, Castro's OlAS speech supports the hypothesis that, in the late I 960s, rather 
than gradually becoming 'militarised', the revolutionary leadership continued to 
espouse the values of guerrillerismo. This notion is further reinforced by an analysis 
of another text from this period, Jorge Ibarra's 1968 article, 'Un siglo de lucha 
armada: una herencia bien aprendida'. The article featured in a collection of Ibarra's 
work, published under the title Aproximaciones a Clio in 1979 (Ibarra, 1979). Ibarra, 
an historian, has published extensively in Cuba, one of his most significant titles 
being MINF AR's 1965 text Historia de Cuba. This text was later incorporated into 
the 1973 edition of lnslruccion Polilica FAR, which will be discussed in the next 
chapter. Though he has never considered himself an 'official' historian, Ibarra has 
always been a vocal supporter of the Revolution, having participated in the 26th of 
July Movement in Santiago de Cuba, and later occupying posts in the Consejo 
Nacional de Cultura, the Direcci6n Politica de las FAR, the Instituto de Historia and 
the Instituto de Ciencias Sociales. Ibarra, then, writes from a position very much 
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within the Revolution and it can thus be assumed that his views are reflective of 
those of the revolutionary leadership. It is for this reason that his text has been 
selected for analysis here. Furthermore, given that this study considers government 
ministries and publishing houses to playa key role in the circulation of 'true' 
statements, the publication of Ibarra's work by MINFAR and Editorial de Ciencias 
Sociales, among others, suggests that his work is supported by and, ultimately, 
supports, the Revolution in power. 
Much like the Ministerio de Educaci6n's His/oria de Cuba considered earlier, it is 
immediately evident upon reading the article in question that the 'siglo de lucha 
armada' it discussed could have been alternatively titled 'siglo de lucha guerrillera'. 
In other words, those who fought in the independence wars of the 1800s were 
portrayed. once again, as having adopted guerrilla warfare as their means to fight the 
Spanish colonial power. This representation was made clear in the opening lines of 
the article: 'Las gestas independentistas del pueblo cubano en el siglo XIX, 
asumieron la forma de guerra irregular, de guerrillas, pasando por las etapas de 
desarrollo que han sido estudiadas por los chisicos militares marxistas de nuestra 
epoca' (Ibarra 1968, 183). 
Similarly unambiguous references to the supposed guerrilla struggle of the 
independentistas were inserted throughout the text. As in Historia de Cuba, 
Cespedes's approach to his campaign in particular was presented as being one which 
adhered entirely to the precepts of guerrilla warfare, such as is evidenced in the 
following citation: 'Cespedes estaba consciente de que la relativa debilidad inicial 
del movimiento revolucionario determinaba la necesidad de la guerra de guerrillas, 
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como soluci6n militar en una contienda dura y prolongada' (Ibarra 1968, 185). The 
mention of the 'relativa debilidad inicial del movimiento' established an obvious 
parallel between Cespedes' campaign and the embryonic stages of the Revolution's 
insurrectionary phase. As discussed elsewhere in this chapter, the leadership's 
discourse in the 1960s frequently underlined the inauspicious beginnings to the 
struggle that eventually ousted Batista; this tendency is perhaps best exemplified in 
the continued allusions to 'doce hombres'. These allusions were intended to inculcate 
the message that, though the prospect of victory might at times seem thoroughly 
distant, it was still possible to confront, and to overcome, a more ostensibly powerful 
enemy. This particular reference to the weakness of Cespedes' initial movement 
communicated that, in situations in which the rebel force was far inferior to that of 
the state security apparatus, guerrilla warfare was the only option. This latter idea 
not only justified the employment of guerrilla tactics but also demonstrated that, 
when obstacles seemed insurmountable, the guerrilla methodology could ofler a 
means of continuing with one's struggle and, therefore, precluded the possibility of 
simply giving up. Such an idea might have been underlined here to a contemporary 
reader as a way of legitimising, and explaining, the recurrent promotion of the 
guerrilla ethos; if guerrilla struggle allowed a weak armed movement to continue 
fighting, then guerrillerismo would be the approach which prevented a vulnerable 
Revolution in power, with a world superpower as its principal enemy, from giving in 
and which, in turn, enabled it to survive. Indeed, as the title suggests, the armed 
struggles that had been carried out prior to 1956 constituted 'una herencia bien 
aprendida'; that is, those who fought in the sierra for the Revolution had taken on 
board the approach to rebellion which had been adopted by their forerunners. As 
many of the central figures of the sierra struggle went on to form part of the 
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revolutionary government, it could thus be deduced that this notion of guerrilla 
struggle as the solution to the problem of inferiority had been inherited by the 
Revolution in power which, in tum, might explain the perpetuation of guerrillerismo. 
Another excerpt from the text illustrates Ibarra's intention not only to show that the 
conditions faced by the independentistas were similar to those which confronted the 
Granma survivors in 1956 (not to mention the entire nation under the Revolution in 
power), but that some of their tactics matched precisely the strategies which would 
later be advocated by Guevara. The text stated, for example, that 'en la provincia de 
Las Villas, debido a una serie de circunstancias desfavorables, las partidas 
insurrectas tuvieron que atenerse a la tactica de 'morder y huir' a las fuerzas 
espanolas' (Ibarra 1968, 186). This mention of 'la tactica "morder y huir'" was a 
form of intertextuality, though not manifest, in that it echoed directly Guevara's 
discussion on the primacy of the element of 'surprise' in guerrilla warfare. Guevara 
wrote in La Guerra de Guerrillas: '''Muerde y huye" Ie lIaman algunos 
despectivamente, yes exacto. Muerde y huye, espera, acecha, vuelve a morder y a 
huir y asi sucesivamente, sin dar descanso al enemigo' (Guevara 2006, 20). The 
deliberate correlation established here between Guevara's theory and the Ten Years' 
War reinforced the notion of a Cuban tradition of guerrilla struggle which the 
leadership consciously attempted to cultivate. It was this tradition which would 
confer historical legitimacy upon the continued recourse to guerrillerismo in the 
hegemonic discourse of the Revolution in power. 
What is more, it is interesting to note that this article was published in 1968, the year 
of the so-called Revolutionary Offensive. As pointed out in the Introduction, it was 
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the launch of the Offensive, and the style in which it was organised, which initially 
prompted several academics to comment on the supposed 'militarism' of the 
Revolution. Notable examples include Bonachea and San Martin, who described the 
'militarisation' of Cuba as 'undeniable' following the Offensive and the subsequent 
zafra, and the previously mentioned article by Malloy (Bonachea and San Martin, 
1971; Malloy, 1971). To refer once again to an excerpt from Malloy's work, he 
stated that 'all Cubans are now considered to be soldiers in a vast producing army. 
As such, they are expected to adhere to the traditional military values of discipline 
and devotion to duty' (Malloy 1971,40). 
What Ibarra's text demonstrates is that, though outwardly the Revolution appeared to 
have favoured a military style of organisation, the revolutionary government was still 
endorsing the publication of work which promulgated the guerrillerista message. 
Such evidence of the continued promotion of guerrillerismo contradicts Malloy's 
statement that Cuban citizens were expected to 'adhere to the traditional military 
values of discipline and devotion to duty', insofar as these values were not derived 
from the development of a 'militaristic mentality' but were instead rooted in the 
historic tradition, and lived experience, of guerrilla struggle (Malloy 1971, 40). This 
inconsistency between the leadership's methods of governance and the ideology 
espoused in texts which were not explicitly political set a precedent for the way in 
which guerrillerismo was communicated to the pueblo in the early half of the 1970s, 
as will become evident in Chapter Three. 
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Conclusion 
Based on the evidence presented in this chapter, we can conclude that, at least in the 
first decade ofthe Revolution in power, guerrillerismo was actively promoted by the 
revolutionary leadership. From the outset, the hegemonic discourse underlined the 
role of the Cuban pueblo in producing the Revolution, and stressed the deber of the 
population to maintain the Revolution in power. As stated, this idea that the pueblo 
had played, and would continue to play, a pivotal role in realising revolutionary 
change is one which conforms entirely to a general notion of guerrilla struggle. That 
is, of a non-institutionalised force which does not fight a state-sponsored war but 
which, in contrast, enters into combat at the grassroots level on behalf of the people 
and against the state. Indeed, this defining element of guerrilla warfare formed part 
of Guevara's three-point classification of guerrilla struggle based on the Cuban 
experience of insurrection: 'Las fuerzas populares pueden ganar una guerra contra el 
ejercito' (Guevara 2006, 13). 
In designating the pueblo as the torchbearers of the on-going struggle for revolution, 
the leadership's discourse necessarily advocated a collective approach to 
revolutionary activity. The task of supporting and defending the revolutionary 
project was one which Cuba, as a nation, was obliged to undertake. This message 
was often reflected in Fidel Castro's persistent employment of the first person plural 
to underline the inclusivity of revolutionary participation. This grammatical feature 
was evident in statements such as 'tenemos un deber indiscutible: el deber de 
defender la Revoluci6n' in which the message of collective responsibility was 
unmistakeable (Castro 1959c, 25). 
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That said, at times, the leadership's discourse expressed a marked endorsement of 
revolutionary participation on an individual level. Perhaps the most significant 
illustration of this promotion was the following statement from Fidel Castro's 
'Second Declaration of Havana': 'El deber de todo revolucionario es hacer la 
revoluci6n' (Castro 1962, 169). In this example, analysed previously in the chapter, 
the singular noun 'revolucionario', in addition to the determiner 'todo', highlighted 
the obligation of the individual to enact his or her revolutionary duties. The shift in 
focus between collective and individual action is reflective of the intrinsic 
contradiction contained within Guevara's loco theory. Where the individual is 
encouraged to the take immediate action to foment revolution ('no siempre hay que 
esperar a que se den todas las condiciones para la revoluci6n' (Guevara 2006. 13)), it 
is only as part of a loco comprising a handful of men in which such individual 
activity has the capacity to be effective ('el foco insurreccional puede desarrollar 
condiciones subjetivas sobre la base de condiciones objetivas dadas' (Guevara 2006, 
13». In tum, the loco itself can only produce the desired revolutionary change 
through the establishment of additional locos, and the eventual formation of a 
network which is sufficiently powerful to topple the state security apparatus. It is 
possible that the publication of Guevara's theory in 1960 contributed to this 
pendulum of collective/individual action. Prior to the articulation of Guevara's 
methodology, the evidence suggests that hegemonic discourse largely placed 
emphasis on the role of the pueblo as a collective in sustaining the Revolution; 
subsequent to 1960, the shifting between the primacy of the collective or the 
individual becomes more marked. 
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Regardless of this possible conflict, guerrillerismo remained a constant in the 
leadership's discourse throughout the decade. The potential of guerrilleri,'I/11O to 
steel the masses by shaping the consciousness of social subjects through the 
inculcation of its constituent values was reinforced by the employment of certain 
discursive techniques. Of particular note was the frequent incorporation of 
presupposition, a rhetorical device discussed at length in this chapter. Presupposition 
afforded an ideological significance, or, indeed, hegemony, to particular words or 
concepts, setting them up as features of 'common sense'; in other words, certain 
terms, following Fairclough, are 'implicit, backgrounded, taken for granted, not 
things that people are consciously aware of, rarely explicitly formulated or examined 
or questioned' (Fairclough 1989, 77). Therein lies the manipulative quality of such 
presuppositions. In the case of guerrillerismo, its promotion did not always require 
explicit demands of the Cuban people to emulate Che Guevara or Camilo 
Cienfuegos, for example, thereby calling attention to the ideological project of the 
leadership and thus rendering it less effective, but rather involved more subtle 
appeals to 'background knowledge' (Fairclough 1989, 154). Such was the case with 
the recurrent allusions to the myth of los doce. Rather than spelling it out as such, 
this presupposition transmitted the message that it was possible to achieve victory 
despite apparently insuperable obstacles; additionally, it implied that being on the 
inferior side in an unequal confrontation was, in fact, potentially advantageous. This 
manipulative effect of presuppositions partly confirms Foucault's idea that discourse 
'produces reality' in a given context, yet we are not always aware that such a 
'structuring' of our reality is taking place (Foucault 1991 b, 194; Mills 2003, 55). In 
this way, Fairclough's notion of presuppositions can be linked to Foucault's 
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discussion of how 'true' statements, through their continued reproduction in texts 
over time, transform into unchallenged 'common-sense-knowledge' (Mills 2003, 74). 
Finally, another means by which guerrillerismo was promoted in the hegemonic 
discourse of the 1960s was through the attempt to establish guerrilla struggle as a 
tradition rooted in Cuban history. The re-presentation of previous rebellions, most 
notably the independence wars, as adhering to the same principles of guerrilla 
warfare as those who formed the Ejercito Rebelde, conferred historical legitimacy 
upon the values encompassed by guerrillerismo, and the guerrilla approach to 
struggle more broadly. Moreover, this teleological portrayal of Cuban history, in 
which the Revolution becomes the concluding chapter in the quest for independence 
begun in 1868, implied a moral obligation on the part of all Cubans to participate in 
closing this chapter. In other words, Cubans had a duty to continue the guerrilla 
struggle, and emulating the guerri/lero was projected as natural or inherent to the 
condition of 'being Cuban'. The frequent incorporation of 'lexical items' in the 
discourse, specifically lucha and deber, themselves traditions carried over into the 
post-1959 era, reinforced the historicity of guerrilla struggle and, in so doing, 
strengthened the promotion of guerrillerismo. The re-articulation of Cuban history 
evidenced here was one of the principal means through which the leadership 
sustained its promotion of guerrillerismo well into the second decade of the 
Revolution in power, as will become clear in the analysis of the discourse of the 
1970s presented in the following chapter. 
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Chapter Three 
Guerrillerismo in the 1970s 
Noted in the Introduction, a significant number of scholars working on Cuba, writing 
at different stages of the Revolution's trajectory, consider that a shift to 'militarism' 
occurred or, at least, became more marked, during the late I 960s, and became more 
apparent still in the 1970s. Moreover, many of these scholars pinpoint the year 1968 
and the launch of the Revolutionary Offensive as heralding the onset of a more 
militarised system of revolutionary government (Bonachea and San Martfn, 1972; 
Fernandez, 2000; Malloy, 1971). The Offensive signified the leadership's attempt to 
ameliorate the country's economic position through eradicating the remnants of 
private enterprise and material incentives, and through mass mobilisation drives 
intended to improve agricultural production (Mesa-Lago 1971, 301). It was the 
involvement of the FAR in the organisation of these mass mobilisations which 
appears to have prompted academics to conclude that the Revolution was becoming 
ever more 'militaristic'. As cited in the Introduction. Julie Bunck, for instance, wrote 
of the Offensive that, 'a range of officials exalted work and used military terms, even 
war dispatches, to describe their goals. Speeches adopted militaristic phrases, 
equating the labour force with a 'heroic battalion' and described labour efforts as 
'struggles' or 'wars" (Bunck 1994, 144). 
The culmination of the Offensive was the drive to yield ten million tonnes in the 
zafra (sugar harvest) of 1970. Fidel Castro announced this objective in a speech 
given on 27 October 1969. Shortly after, he ordered the FAR to assume greater 
control of the administration of the harvest, and by the summer of 1970, 100,000 
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military personnel had been mobilised (Bonachea and San Martin 2003, 54). The 
FAR thus played an integral role in the zaJra, and it was the degree of their 
involvement, at both the managerial and ground level, in addition to the role played 
by military figures in the revolutionary government more broadly, which contributed 
to the perception held by numerous foreign observers that the Revolution was 
moving towards 'militarism'. Indeed, Bonachea and San Martin have asserted that 
the military-led organisation of the 1970 zaJra, 'could only confirm a vision of 
militarism throughout Cuban society' (Bonachea and San Martin 2003,54). 
This notion of increasing 'militarism' was in some ways reflected in the language 
employed in the aforementioned speech given by Fidel Castro on 27 October 1969. 
This speech constituted a rallying cry to the Cuban people to mobilise around the 
goal of cutting ten millions tonnes of sugar cane in the forthcoming zaJra. Citizens 
of all backgrounds and occupations were expected to participate in what was being 
touted as an event of great significance in the history of the nation and, just as 
importantly, the Revolution. In the preceding chapter, we saw how a promotion of 
guerrillerismo, and, therefore, the historical image of the guerrilla fighter, was one of 
the means by which the leadership attempted to steel the Cuban pueblo in the task of 
defending the Revolution during its first decade in power. In this prominent speech 
from 1969, however, it is possible to discern a slight shift in language, whereby, 
rather than endorsing the guerrillero as a model for revolutionary action, Castro 
instead referred to the individual Cuban citizen as a soldado. An illustration of this 
shift is found in the following citation: 
Y cada obrero, como un soldado, como 10 haria en una trinchera defendiendo el pais, 
como 10 haria frente a un ataque enemigo, como 10 hicieron los combatientes 
revolucionarios en los momentos decisivos, debe sentirse como un soldado en una 
trinchera con el fusil en la mano cumpliendo su deber (Castro, 1969). 
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In this extract, Castro explicitly informed his audience that, in participating in the 
zaJra, they should behave in a manner similar to that of a soldier fighting in a trench. 
The employment of such vocabulary as 'soldado' and 'trinchera', which undoubtedly 
comprise a lexical set related to a generalised notion of the military, or of military 
combat, implied that the leadership was beginning to shake off its guerrilla past. It is 
possible that, with the increasingly pervasive role of the FAR in the Revolutionary 
Offensive, and particularly in the zaJra, the leadership aimed to consciously endorse 
the image of the so/dado, and not, therefore, the guerrillero, in order to nurture 
support for its armed forces in the tasks that lay ahead. Furthermore, given that, by 
this stage in the Revolution, the FAR had developed, and continued to evolve, into a 
more professionalised institution, the image of the guerrillero might have seemed 
outdated, both to the leadership and to the Cuban people (Klepak, 2005; Morris, 
1989). In other words, the FAR was perhaps able to offer a more relevant, and 
highly visible, model for revolutionary participation in the shape of its own 
members. The repetition of , sold ado' here, and in the following extract, reinforces 
the notion that there was an attempt to 'militarise' citizens in some way: 'Pero cad a 
machetero ahf, cada soldado en esa batalla tiene que hacer todos los dias un poco 
mas de esfuerzo' (Castro, 1969). The incorporation of the word 'batalla' in this 
example also unambiguously connoted military conflict. 
While the selected citations partially substantiate the proposal that the Revolution 
became progressively 'militarised' from the time of the Revolutionary Offensive, 
traces of guerrillerismo can still be identified within this speech. As a case in point, 
when discussing the importance of'vergUenza' as a motivating factor in carrying out 
one's revolutionary duties, Castro stated that: 
180 
Y precisamente ese sentimiento es el que haee a los eombatientes, a los buenos 
soldados en la guerra, a los buenos guerri1leros en la lueha. Ese factor que haee que el 
hombre sepa apreciar mueho mas su honor que su propia vida (Castro, 1969). 
In this extract, while the inclusion of 'soldados' was foregrounded, the juxtaposition 
of the two phrases in, 'a los buenos soldados en la guerra, a los buenos guerri Ileros 
en la lucha', effectively placed equal emphasis on both types of 'combatientes', that 
is, 'soldados' and 'guerrilleros'. What can be inferred from such juxtaposition is 
that, while citizens were more explicitly encouraged to emulate the soldado in this 
particular speech, the figure of the guerrillero still resonated as the embodiment of 
the ideal revolutionary. The incorporation of the tradition of lucha here, and of 
deber in the previous citation, further strengthened the notion that guerrillerismo was 
not entirely redundant at this point, given that both 'lexical items' drew much of their 
meaning from the island's history of revolutionary guerrilla struggle. 
It could be argued that this juxtaposition of images, the so/dado and the guerrillero, 
mirrored what was occurring in the Revolution more broadly at this point in its 
trajectory. With the launch of the Offensive, the leadership sought to overhaul the 
Revolution, both socially and economically. through mobilising the Cuban people 
towards maximising the country's resources. The wider objective of this overhaul 
was to precipitate the country's progress towards communism (Kapcia 2000, III). 
The measures taken during the Offensive were concomitant with the leadership's 
gradual rapprochement with the Soviet Union. During the 1960s, the relationship 
between Cuba and the Soviet Union had often been fraught, with the Cuban 
leadership standing firm in its support for armed revolutionary struggle across the 
world. This support demonstrated a blatant disregard for the USSR's stance of 
'peaceful co-existence' with the West. Cuba thus resisted falling under the control of 
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another hegemonic power (the other being the United States), and instead pursued its 
own path to revolution, grounded in its own home-grown principles. Erisman has 
referred to this period (1962-1968) as one of 'Fidelista radicalism'. which he 
describes as 'a time of intense growing pains in the Cuban-Soviet relationship. Both 
governments fluctuated between attraction and aversion, the Fidelistas becoming 
more erratic' (Erisman 1985, 25). 
However, a delay in a shipment of Soviet oil to Cuba in 1968, in addition to the 
generally precarious economic conditions with which the Revolution was confronted, 
highlighted for the revolutionary government the extent to which it was dependent on 
its foreign partner. From then on, the Cuban leadership made concerted efforts 
towards a reconciliation with the USSR, most publicly through its backing of the 
Soviet Union's invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 (Aguilar 2003, 79). In April 
1970, Castro declared Cuba's 'unshakeable alliance' with the Soviet Union, and over 
the course of the ensuing decade, the Revolution was gradually transformed into a 
system which more closely resembled the Soviet model of socialist government 
(Aguilar 2003, 79). As discussed previously, this period of 'institutionalisation' was 
characterised by widespread bureaucratisation, a professionalisation of the armed 
forces, and a restructuring of the political system which conformed to the Soviet 
template. These profound changes within the Revolution signalled a move away 
from the more unsystematic and arbitrary approach to revolutionary governance 
adopted by the leadership during its first decade in power. In other words, the 
leadership seemed to be distancing itself from its guerrilla past through its increasing 
adherence to Soviet orthodoxy. 
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Yet certain events which took place in Cuba during this very period suggest that 
characterising the 1970s as the decade of' Sovietisation' does not quite tell the whole 
story. Perhaps the most obvious of these events was Cuba's decision to become 
involved in the Angolan Civil War in 1975. Far from toeing the Soviet line, Cuba's 
long-term participation in Angola signalled an outright defiance of the USSR's 
'peaceful co-existence' understanding with the West, and is evidence of a 
revolutionary leadership intent on adhering to its own revolutionary principles. In 
other words, it had not fallen prey to Soviet hegemony entirely. Other, less obvious, 
examples of Cuba asserting its ideological independence also contradict the 
'institutionalisation' /' Sovietisation' definition. Of particular note is the inauguration 
of the Centro de Estudios Martianos in 1976; the opening of such an institute raises 
questions as to why a resurgence in the elevation of Jose Marti as a national hero 
occurred at this time when, according to Soviet orthodoxy, his status should have 
been relegated simply to that of a bourgeois intellectual. More tellingly still, it 
should not be ignored that the Cuban Communist Party did not convene its first Party 
Congress until 1975, more than five years after the supposed wholesale adoption of 
the Soviet Communist model. This delay might suggest that, rather than there being 
a consensus within the Cuban leadership at the start of the decade to fall in line with 
Soviet orthodoxy, the years 1971-1975 were a period of internal debate in the 
revolutionary leadership regarding the direction of the Revolution thereafter. One 
might tentatively suggest that the reason behind the postponement lay in the presence 
of individuals, or a faction, within the upper echelons of power, who favoured a 
commitment to an endogenous approach to revolutionary government and not, 
therefore, the adoption of a foreign model. 
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Taking these seemingly anomalous events into account, the purpose of examining 
texts from the 1970s is to question the so-called 'Sovietisation' of the Revolution 
through an analysis ofthe language contained therein. The analysis will demonstrate 
that it is possible to find a continuation of the ideology expressed in the official 
hegemonic discourse of the 1960s. In Castro's aforementioned 1969 speech, for 
example, though the image of so/dado was more prominent than that of the 
guerrillero, the guerrillero was, nonetheless, still present. This continued use of 
guerrillerista rhetoric contributes to undermining the notion of a 'Sovietised' 
Revolution; it shows that the leadership had not so entirely bought into Soviet 
orthodoxy as previously thought, but instead continued to follow its own path, much 
as it had done since 1959, a path which was guided by the beliefs and values of 
guerrillerismo. Moreover, if one can support the claim that guerrillerismo continued 
to underpin the Revolution in the 1970s, one can also, therefore, counter the idea that 
a shift to 'militarism' was simultaneous to the process of 'institutionalisation'. 
Textual Analysis (1969-1981) 
In the previous chapter. it was established that one of the means by which the 
leadership attempted to steel and to reassure the Cuban pueblo during the I 960s was 
to present the Revolution in power as a continuation, or the conclusion-in-process, of 
the struggles for Cuban independence which emerged in the late 1800s. This 
presentation of a tradition of revolutionary struggle afforded historical legitimacy to 
the Revolution in power, and seemed designed to instil in the minds of Cuban 
citizens the message that they had a duty, a deber, to honour the legacy of their 
heroic forefathers. Furthermore, it was continually underlined that this tradition was 
characterised by guerrilla struggle, which, in tum, communicated the idea that it was 
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the preferred approach to revolutionary action for the Cuban people. This re-telling 
of history constituted one of the ways by which guerrillerismo was promoted in the 
first decade in power. 
The following analysis of key texts from the 1970s, will make clear that this method 
of promoting guerrillerismo continued into the second decade. A clear illustration of 
this pattern can be identified in a speech made by Fidel Castro on 31 December, 
1969. The speech was reproduced in its entirety in an edition of Verde Olivo 
published on the 11 January 1970. Speaking about the ten-mill ion-tonne zaJra. the 
efforts for which were still underway at that time, Castro purported: 
Esta lucha que esum Iibrando los cubanos en este momento con el machete cortando 
cana, no tiene menos importancia que la que libraran en 1868 y 1895 los mambises; no 
tiene menos importancia para nuestro pais, para la plena conquista de la felicidad, del 
bienestar, de la independencia del pais. Y la lucha que se libre en este momento con 
el machete se puede equiparar perfectamente con la lucha en la Sierra de los 
guerrilleros (Verde Olivo 1970, 18). 
The reference to the 'lexical item' lucha in the opening line of this extract 
immediately indicates that Castro's aim here was to insert the zaJra into Cuba's long-
standing tradition of struggle. This objective became all the more clear in Castro's 
declaration that the harvest 'no tiene menos importancia que la que Iibraran en 1868 
y 1895 los mambises', in which he unequivocally equated the significance of the 
zaJra with the battles fought for independence. This latter point was further 
highlighted by the repetition of 'no tiene menos importancia' in the following phrase. 
Castro's assertion that the zaJra was an important factor in achieving the 
'independencia del pais' communicated a powerful message to his audience, and 
underscored the notion that the Revolution in power was undergoing a process of 
concluding the struggle initiated some hundred years previously. The valuable role 
185 
assigned to the zaJra, that of preserving the independence of Cuba, seems to have 
been aimed at bolstering the morale of those involved in the cane cutting, insofar as 
it outlined a distinct, not to mention highly significant, purpose to their activity. 
Moreover, the idea that the zaJra was necessary for the achievement of the 'plena 
conquista ( ... ) de la independencia del pais' suggested that independence was not 
something definite and permanent, but rather was a vulnerable condition which one 
had to fight to maintain. In this way, Castro was attempting to encourage 
participation in the zaJra by highlighting the message that, though the Revolution 
was in power, there was no room for complacency. 
What was also manifest in this citation was the promotion of guerrillerismo. The 
final line of the extract clearly stated that the drive for an unprecedented sugar 
harvest was comparable to the lucha enacted by the guerrillas in the insurrectionary 
phase of the Revolution. This statement was reinforced by the incorporation of the 
adverb 'perfectamente', which served to underline the similarities between the 
struggle in the sierra and that of the zaJra. This comparison of the two events 
transmitted the message that those who participated in the zaJra constituted a new 
wave of guerrilleros whose task was no less significant in Cuba's history than that of 
freeing the country from dictatorial control. The drawing of such parallels was, 
again, intended to encourage and to inspire citizens; Castro was informing them that 
their actions would serve to perpetuate previous struggles, while also conferring 
historical legitimacy on the continued calls for dedication to the cause of the 
Revolution. Using the guerrilleros as an example in this way also indicates that, 
while ostensibly the leadership was becoming more 'militaristic' in the organisation 
of the zaJra and its approach to government more generally. it continued to view 
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guerrilla struggle as a relevant model and inspiration for revolutionary action, in 
whatever form. This notion is substantiated not only by the explicit mention of the 
'lucha en la Sierra de los guerrilleros', but also by the reference to the mambises. To 
reiterate the point made earlier, the revolutionary leadership portrayed the 
independence wars of the 1800s as belonging to the country's tradition of guerrilla 
struggle. 
In addition to being used as an inspiration for Cuban citizens, the campaigns of the 
mambises were also employed as an example of revolutionary conduct for serving 
members of the armed forces. In the 3 January 1971 edition of Verde Olivo, for 
example, a six-page article entitled 'Las tareas de las FAR en 1971' drew heavily 
upon the combative style of the mambises to illustrate the fundamental elements of 
which a revolutionary army should be comprised. The article read: 
En realidad el Ejercito Mambi alcanz6 un elevado grado de disposici6n combat iva. EI 
fundamento esencial que esto se debia a la raz6n moral que animaba a las valerosas 
huestes. EI hecho de luchar por la Patria, por una causa justa, infundia fe en la victoria 
final y espiritu de sacrificio suficiente para lIevar a cabo la lucha con entusiasmo y 
decisi6n, pero no hay que olvidar que la lucha continua, la actividad guerrera 
constante que tenian que desarrollar los soldados mambises tambien fO/jaba Sll 
resistencia y desenvolvia habilidades que los convert ian cada vez mas en competentes 
soldados (Verde Olivo 1971a, 28). 
Once again, lucha was included in this extract based on its resonance as a 'lexical 
item' which, by this point in the Revolution's trajectory, encompassed Cuba's history 
of struggle. This citation also contained another example of religious lexicon in its 
reference to the word 'Fe'; the suggestion here was that no motivation other than faith 
in the future victory of the revolutionary campaign had been necessary for the 
mambises to continue their fight. This primacy of faith in a redemptive future, not to 
mention an 'espiritu de sacrificio', as central to revolutionary struggle can be 
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compared with the faith and sacrifice required by religion. These ideas of 'fe' and 
'sacrificio' were alluded to frequently in the hegemonic discourse of the 19605 and 
19705, and, as discussed in the previous chapter, seem to substantiate Fernandez's 
hypothesis regarding the existence of a 'political religion' in Cuba (Fernandez 2000, 
63).37 The obligation to possess an unfaltering belief in 'Ia victoria final' also 
corroborates Fernandez's concept that the Revolution is buttressed by a 'politics of 
passion' (Fernandez 2000,63). Fernandez's characterises the 'politics of passion' as , 
being 'deeply affective', as encompassing the emotional and informal aspects of 
political activity and, more specifically, leadership (Fernandez 2000, 21). 
Furthermore, he asserts that the 'politics of passion are grounded in the past but they 
chart a cause for a utopian future'; this latter point is illustrated in the citation by the 
reference to the mambises' faith in final victory (Fernandez 2000, 20). What is more, 
the line 'el fundamento esencial que esto se debia a la raz6n moral que animaba a las 
valerosas huestes' attests to Fernandez's notion that a political religion is also 
characterised by a 'moral imperative' (Fernandez 2000, 19). 
The elevation of the mambises as models of the ideal revolutionaries who possessed 
faith in the inevitability of victory, made sacrifices in the name of this victory, and 
had finely tuned moral compasses, is noteworthy in that it suggests a continuation of 
the promotion of guerrillerismo in the early 1970s, given that the hegemonic 
discourse of the 1960s had already painted a picture of the mambises as forming part 
of the tradition of guerrilla struggle in Cuba. Thus, while the mambises were 
described at the end of the citation as having transformed into 'competentes 
37 The example of the use of 'fe' in the hegemonic discourse discussed in Chapter Two was taken 
from Fidel Castro's 1 January speech, 1959. The citation read: 'Yo les aseguro que si cuando eramos 
12 hombres solamente no perdimos la fe, ahora que tenemos ahf 12 tanques c6mo vamos a perder la 
fe' (Castro, 1959a). 
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soldados' (and not, therefore, guerrilleros), the pre-established image of these 
combatants as guerrilla fighters would likely still have been inferred by the text 
recipient. In this way, this citation also illustrates the soldadolguerrillero dichotomy 
at work in the Revolution during the second decade. Though the term so/dado was 
often employed explicitly, the guerrilla foundations of the leadership's conception of 
revolutionary struggle were still evident, albeit implicitly. That said, in this 
particular example, the text was directed at members of the anned forces specifically, 
thus the use of 'soldados' to describe the mambises, rather than indicating an 
ideological shift, may have been employed simply to allow the readership to identify 
more readily the parallels between their own struggle and that of the heroes of the 
independence period. 
Guerrillerismo can also be identified in this citation in its echoes of Guevara's La 
Guerra de Guerrillas. Guevara proposed that the ideal guerri/lero should possess 
'cualidades morales', and stated that 'el guerrillero debe tener una conducta moral 
que 10 acredite como verdadero sacerdote de la refonna que pretende' (Guevara 
2006, 57/51). The citation from Verde Olivo reflected Guevara's emphasis on 
morality as a key factor in struggle through highlighting the fact that the reason 
behind the mambises' attainment of 'un elevado grado de disposici6n combativa' 
was 'la raz6n moral'. Similarly, there were also parallels with Guevara's work in the 
stress upon carrying out the struggle with 'entusiasmo y decisi6n'. In his work, 
Guevara contended that the guerrillero: 
debe ser audaz, analizar correctamente los peligros y las posihilidades de una acci6n y 
estar siempre presto a tomar una actitud optimista frente a las circunstancias y a 
encontrar una decisi6n favorable aUn en los momentos en que el analisis de las 
condiciones adversas y favorable no arroje un saldo positivo apreciahle (Guevara 
2006,56). 
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The fact that the positive attributes of the mambises highlighted in an article from 
1971 were similar to those put forward by Guevara in his definition of the ideal 
guerrillero in ] 960 implies that the values and characteristics required of 
revolutionaries had not changed since the early years of the Revolution, despite the 
supposed onset of , Soviet is at ion' and 'militarism'. In other words, the leadership 
had the same specifications and requirements of Cuban citizens as Guevara had once 
had of would-be guerrilleros. 
Similar ideas regarding the importance of the attitude of the mambises in carrying out 
their campaign were manifest elsewhere in the article: 
En nuestras guerras de independencia el valor y el patriotismo indiscutiblemente 
jugaron el papel principal en el mantenimiento del espiritu de lucha y de sacrificio 
necesarios para lograr la victoria final (Verde Olivo 197] a, 3]). 
As in the previous citation, reference was made in this extract to 'Ia victoria final', 
which again reinforced the idea of a redemptive future which was attainable only 
through struggle. Moreover, there was a repetition of the term 'espiritu de sacrificio' 
as a vital quality of the combatant if slbe was ever to accomplish the 'victoria final'. 
This repetition sustained the article's tone of religiosity, and reinforced the message 
that sacrifice played a fundamental role in driving forward revolutionary struggle. 
The idea of sacrifice also recalled one of Guevara's precepts; as stated in Chapter 
One, Guevara posited that, if one were to be a 'true' guerrillero, one had to be 
willing to make the ultimate sacrifice: to give one's life in the name of the 
revolution.38 
38 Regarding sacrifice. Guevara wrote: 'Ia cualidad positiva de esta guerra de guerrillas es que cada 
uno de los guerrilleros e s t ~ ~ dispuesto a morir, no s610 por defender un ideal sino por convertirlo en 
realidad. Esa es la base. la esencia de la lucha de guerrillas' (Guevara 2006, 21). 
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What was also evident in the article was a sustained focus on the notion of deber in 
the hegemonic discourse. In Chapter Two of the present work, it was argued that, in 
the 1960s, the leadership frequently employed the 'lexical item' deber in its rhetoric 
as a means of instilling in Cuban citizens the message that they had a moral 
obligation, a duty, to support and defend the Revolution. An illustration of the 
continued prevalence of deber is apparent in the following citation, in which the term 
was repeated twice: 
Esta bien claro que la defensa de la Patria es el deber y derecho de todos, como es 
tambien deber y derecho de todos prepararse adecuadamente para ello (Verde Olivo 
1971a, 28). 
Also manifest in this extract was the inclusion of the term 'derecho'. Again, this 
term featured heavily in the leadership's discourse during its first decade in power. 
In this example, participating in the defence of the Revolution was not only an 
obligation but a right of all the Cuban people. It would seem that the intention of 
positioning 'Ia defensa de la Patria' as a 'derecho' here was to confer a sense of 
entitlement upon the reader with regard to revolutionary action, similar to the 
examples discussed in the previous chapter. In other words, informing Cuban 
citizens that they had a right to defend the Revolution suggested that the Revolution 
itself had afforded them the freedom to fight for whichever cause they believed in. 
The employment of derecho reinforced the moral obligation implied by deber. The 
inclusion of the pronoun 'todos' denoted that the duty and right to defend the 
Revolution were a collective responsibility and a collective privilege, respectively. 
No one was exempt from the task of ensuring the Revolution's survival. 
191 
In contrast, at other points in the text, the deber of defence was conferred upon the 
individual within the FAR, rather than the collective. This shift in focus regarding 
the agent of revolutionary activity was evident in the section of the article which 
discussed the role of the FAR, as exemplified below: 
Las FAR como ejercito popular hacen descansar fundamental mente en el factor moral, 
en la conciencia revolucionaria de cada combatiente, el interes por su preparaci6n, que, 
ademas, es una ohligaci6n personal de cada uno y como tal esta prevista en los 
reglamentos (Verde Olivo 1971a. 29). 
In this citation, the message communicated was that being prepared for an enemy 
attack was not only the responsibility of the members of the armed forces but also of 
every Cuban citizen. Indeed, the subtitle to the section from which this citation is 
taken was 'La Defensa de la Patria es deber de todos'(Verde Olivo 1971a, 28). This 
latter point was articulated in the phrase, 'es una obligaci6n personal de cada uno', in 
which the employment of the determiner 'cada' underlined the inclusivity of the duty 
of preparation. Similarly, the phrase 'cada combatiente' highlighted the fact that 
what was important was the revolutionary consciousness of every member of the 
armed forces at an individual level. This message was further strengthened by the 
alliteration of the fricative 'c' in 'cada combatiente'. The idea that defending the 
Revolution was the obligation of the individual citizen was repeated on the same 
page. It was stated that 'el paso por las FAR para prepararse para la defensa de la 
Patria es deber de cada cubano y en especial de cada joven' (Verde Olivo 1971 a, 29). 
The reference here to 'cadajoven' was telling, insofar as the text producer deemed it 
necessary to underline specifically the responsibility of the individual Cuban youth. 
This direct appeal to youth implies that, at that point in time, the leadership felt that 
young people needed to be reminded that they had a role to play in maintaining the 
Revolution. 
192 
The use of detenniners as exemplified here appears to have been a recurrent 
rhetorical device in the hegemonic discourse. Indeed, in the analysis of texts from 
the 1960s, two significant examples of this technique were discussed. These were 
the citations, 'la democracia cuban a Ie da a cada cubano un fusH para defender sus 
derechos y para defender a su Patria' (Castro 1960a, 342), and, 'EI deber de to do 
revolucionario es hacer la revolucion' (Castro 1962, 169). In both cases, and similar 
to the citations in question, the inclusion of the determiners, 'cada' and 'todo', 
underscored the individual subjectivity of revolutionary action. 
There are additional instances in the article in which one can identify a stress upon 
the centrality of individual revolutionary action within the FAR. For example, it was 
also stated that: 
la base de preparacion de una unidad es la instruccion individual. Esto qui ere decir 
que si el soldado personal mente no esta bien preparado no hay unidad que funcione 
bien, ni hay posibilidad tampoco para las acciones coordinadas (Verde Olivo 1971a, 
32). 
These particular words explicitly infonned the reader that the training and 
preparation of the individual was vital to the successful functioning of the unit of 
which they formed a part. Though this message was directed at members of the 
armed forces specifically, it did reflect the message being communicated to the rest 
of the population. That is, for the nation to be able to defend itself adequately, the 
individual citizen was obliged to undertake sufficient preparatory training. Such a 
lesson was imparted upon the reader in the previous citation, in which it was clearly 
stated that defence was not only the role of the collective anned forces but of every 
Cuban. The role of the individual soldier within the collectivity of the nation was 
also reinforced in the subsequent edition of Verde Olivo, the aforementioned official 
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weekly magazine of the FAR, which appeared on 10 January 1971. In another of the 
weekly articles entitled 'Las tareas de las FAR en 1971', it was written: 
Cada soldado esta en el deber de pensar y canalizar la trascendencia que tiene su 
conducta personal en el enorrne esfuerzo colectivo que tiene que hacer nuestra naci6n 
para salir del subdesarrollo y para asegurar una alta disposici6n combativa que haga 
fracasar los planes agresivos del imperiaJismo contra nuestro pais (Verde Olivo 1971 b, 
31). 
Here, the soldier was reminded of the wider implications of his 'conducta personal', 
it was stated that each soldier must consider and harness the 'transcendent' quality of 
his own individual actions with regard to the 'enorme esfuerzo colectivo'. As before, 
the agency of the individual was underlined by the determiner 'cada', yet the agency 
could only be asserted within the collective. 
The shift in focus from individual to collective action, and vice versa, was a 
persistent feature of the leadership's discourse. This feature was discussed in the 
previous chapter, particularly in reference to the 1960 Manual de Capacilacion 
Civica. Based on the analysis of the selected citations from that text, we concluded 
that, while individual action was promoted as an essential factor in driving forward 
the Revolution, it was also made clear that it could only be an effective means of 
revolutionary activity if it formed part of a collective endeavour for revolutionary 
change. The message contained within the previous citation implies that this idea 
remained intact in the early 1970s. This focus on collective action in general 
undermines the 'militarism' perspective, insofar as it reveals that participation on a 
large-scale was encouraged by the leadership. As we saw in the Introduction, several 
scholars argued that the supposed 'militarisation' of the Cuban Revolution 
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constituted an obstacle to genuine political participation (Dumont, 1974; Horowitz, 
2008). 
What can also be partly deduced from the last citation is that the so-called 'siege 
mentality' was, at times, still being expressed in the leadership's discourse. The final 
part of the extract, 'y para asegurar una alta disposici6n combativa que haga fracasar 
los planes agresivos del imperialismo contra nuestro paIs', demonstrates that the 
leadership felt it necessary to highlight that the threat of an attack on the Revolution 
remained a very real possibility in 1971. Accentuating the prospect of an enemy 
attack, particularly through the use of negative adjectives such as 'agresivos', was 
intended to motivate members of the armed forces into fulfilling their duty, both as 
soldiers and citizens, to defend the nation. That said, the mention of the 'enorme 
esfuerzo colectivo' and the assurance of an 'alta disposici6n combativa' served to 
counteract in some ways the sense of siege, or, at least, the vulnerability of the 
Revolution, produced through drawing attention to the spectre of an attack. 
Underscoring the capacity ofthe collective implied instead that the leadership wished 
to instil a sense of confident defiance in the reader (Le. a member of the armed 
forces). The combined will of the people could ensure the Revolution's survival 
against any form of enemy aggression. 
The notion that Cuba, as a small and vulnerable nation, could withstand an attack 
from a much larger enemy was echoed elsewhere in the same article in the form of 
another reference to the myth of los doce. In the previous chapter, we established 
that this myth was manipulated by the leadership during the 1960s as a means of 
promoting the message that fighting on the inferior side should not be a deterrent to 
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engaging in revolutionary activity, and nor did it preclude the possibility of victory. 
The myth of los dace was included in the article with reference to Carlos Manuel de 
Cespedes' campaign of 1868: 
Llenas estan las paginas de la historia combativa de nuestra Patria, de ejemplos que 
justifican nuestra concepci6n de lucha, desde la hist6rica primera derrota de las 
fuerzas cubanas dirigidas por Carlos Manuel de Cespedes el lOde octubre de 1868, 
que se qued6 con 12 hombres y con estos decidi6 continuar la guerra, hasta el 
desembarco del Comandante en Jefe por Playa Las Coloradas en que se repitio 
nuevamente la historia, pero esta vez para culminar despues de ai\os de lucha y 
sacrificio, con la victoria definitiva del pueblo (Verde Olivo 1971b, 30). 
This mention of Cespedes and his 'army' of twelve men echoed the citation from the 
1964 text Historia de Cuba discussed in Chapter Two.39 In this example, the 
reference to '12 hombres' was incorporated in the form of the subordinate clause: 
'que se qued6 con 12 hombres y con estos decidi6 continuar la guerra'. The 
inclusion of this clause implied that the underscoring of Cespedes' resolve to 
continue fighting with only a handful of men was deliberate, given that it was not 
essential to the overview of Cuba's history of lucha which this citation provided. 
Moreover, its inclusion suggests that the leadership considered the myth, and its 
accompanying lesson, to be of continued relevance to the Cuban people in the early 
1970s. That they did so is interesting, since, at that time, the Revolution was 
gradually becoming more stable, owing to its rapprochement with the Soviet Union, 
and the institutionalisation and material benefits that this rapprochement brought 
with it. These material benefits included an increase in the supply of modern 
armaments to the FAR, thus increasing its military capabilities, while the FAR itself 
became further professionalised as a result of the training it received from Soviet 
military personnel stationed in Cuba (Suchlicki 1997, 175/6). The increased 
39 The citation in question read: 'Solo dace hombres quedaron con Cespedes. "Atln quedan doce 
hombres, bastan para hacer la independencia de Cuba", afirmo eI jefe de la revoluci6n. No seria la 
ultima vez que con dace hombres se iniciara la lucha de todo un pueblo' (Hisloria 1964, 180). 
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defensive capacity ofthe FAR thus renders it significant that the leadership wished to 
reassure its members that being on the inferior side in a conflict did not necessarily 
reduce the potential for success. Highlighting the country's tradition of commencing 
lucha with a small number of combatants in this way is evidence that a guerrilla 
ethos continued to be promoted in the early part ofthe Revolution's second decade in 
power. In other words, it implied that, no matter the strength and size of the armed 
forces, the leadership did not want its soldiers to forget that the Revolution had been 
built on the back of the struggles of a few against many. 
This tradition of lucha stressed here paralleled the elevation of the mambises 
discussed earlier in the chapter, and the many instances in which Cuba's history of 
revolutionary struggle was used to inspire citizens in the 1960s. The foregrounding 
of the adjective 'llenas' in the opening phrase of the citation highlighted the 
multiplicity of examples of lucha in the Cuban historical narrative, while the 
leadership's attempt to derive historical legitimacy from the tradition was explicitly 
alluded to in the phrase, 'ejemplos que justifican nuestra concepci6n de lucha'. The 
importance afforded to Cuban history in this extract, and the message that the 
Revolution was simply a culmination of the preceding hundred years of struggle, 
reveal that the leadership aimed to cultivate a strong sense of history in the members 
of its armed forces. The purpose of instilling such a sense of history might have been 
to ensure that, though the FAR was transforming itself structurally and thus 
becoming increasingly removed from its Ejercito Rebelde origins, its guerrilla roots 
remained central to the ethos which underpinned the institution. In this way, the 
leadership, or, at least, certain figures within it, perhaps attempted to curb the Soviet 
influence on its armed forces by reminding its soldiers that Cuba had its own long-
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standing and unique approach to combat, as expressed in 'nuestra concepci6n de 
lucha'. 
Cuba's history of lucha was similarly illustrated in a book published in 1972 entitled 
La Invasion: eslralegia fundamental en nueslras guerras revolucionarias. This text 
was not, however, published for the armed forces, but for members of the Uni6n de 
J6venes Comunistas (UJC). The UJC represents the youth wing of the Cuban 
Communist Party and, unlike the many mass organisations in Cuba, is a voluntary 
and selective organisation for young people aged between fifteen and thirty. 
Members are selected based on exceptional conduct in school and in voluntary work 
and membership in the UJC is often considered a rite of passage for those seeking 
full Party membership after the age ofthirty (Henken 2008, 213). 
This text has been included in the analysis owing largely to the timing of its 
publication. In 1972 the UJC held its Second Congress, during which concerns were 
raised over weaknesses in the organisation's political work. Following the Congress, 
the UJC embarked on a campaign 'to recruit hundreds of thousands of young people, 
or at least exert political influence on them. ( ... ) The UJC proposed a reinvigoration 
of ideological work among the organization's cadres, and among youth at large' 
(Blum 2011, 78). The publication of this text by the UJC's Comisi6n Nacional de 
Historia in the same year as the launch of this campaign suggests that it formed part 
of the endeavour to improve the political and ideological education of Cuban youth. 
It is thus interesting to examine whether a key component of the campaign was a 
promotion of the beliefs and values associated with guerrillerismo. This being the 
case, one can conclude that the UJC, alongside government ministries and publishing 
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houses, constituted another important organisation that contributed to the circulation 
of the revolutionary discourse in the early 1970s. Furthermore, it reveals that Cuban 
youth were included in the attempts to inculcate guerrillerista values upon the 
population; that many of these young people would likely go on to serve in the Party 
in the years that followed offers a critical clue as to how ideas and values are 
perpetuated over time in revolutionary Cuba. 
La Invasion recounted three historical examples in which the strategy of invasion had 
been applied by Cuban rebels within their broader revolutionary campaigns. Its aim 
was to demonstrate how such a strategy had altered the course of revolutionary 
struggle in 1868, 1895 and 1958 and, in so doing, to reveal the similarities between 
these respective rebel campaigns. The wider purpose of the book was to aid Cuban 
youth in their understanding of the roots of the Revolution. On this subject, it was 
written in the book's introduction: 
Un tema como este que parecia agotado, abre sus amplias y aun oscuras puertas a los 
j6venes. interesados en ampliar sus conocimientos con otras lecturas que los ayuden a 
escarbar en las rafces hist6ricas que explican nuestra posici6n revolucionaria de hoy 
(La InvasiOn 1972, 11). 
As with a number of the texts already discussed in the analysis thus far, one 
particular theme emerged as a constant from a reading of La Invasion: the potential 
of an inferior force to defeat a much larger enemy. This theme was illustrated by an 
extract from the final chapter. 'Las invasiones de Camilo y el Che'. It was written 
that, during the insurrectionary phase of the Revolution, Batista's security forces: 
a pesar de contar con numerosos recursos helicos y gran cantidad de hombres, fueron 
derrotadas por el Ejercito Rebelde, con escasos recursos y una fuerza numericamente 
inferior. El triunfo de la invasi6n de 1895 origin6 el debilitamiento del regimen 
colonial, que tuvo como consecuencia la destituci6n del capitan general Arsenio 
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Martinez Campos. La invasion de 1958 ocasiono e1 derrocamiento del regimen 
dictatorial y la huida del tirano Fulgencio Batista (Nunez 1972, 30 I). 
The parallelism established by the repetition of ·con ... recursos', and the mirroring of 
the syntax in the two phrases, 'con numerosos recursos belicos y gran cantidad de 
hombres' and 'con escasos recursos y una fuerza numericamente inferior', 
accentuated the great disparity between Batista's forces and the Ejercito Rebelde in 
terms of their respective weaponry and manpower. Similarly, the foregrounding of 
the subordinate clause, 'a pesar de contar con numerosos recursos belicos', 
underlined the extent of Batista's military power and also, therefore, the tremendous 
feat achieved by the Ejercito Rebelde in defeating it. 
A comparable message regarding the capacity of an inferior force to succeed in 
combat despite beginning on an unequal footing was evident in a chapter entitled 'La 
Guerra de 1895: La invasi6n'. When discussing the movement of the rebels during 
the Cuban War oflndependence of 1895, the authors wrote: 
La columna invasora habia atravesado por cuatro provincias en 71 dias, enfrentandose 
en cada una de elias con el enemigo que trataba de impedirle el paso, sin que a pesar 
de la superioridad numerica y de armamento, pudieran impedirlo (Gonzalez and 
Revelo 1972, 193). 
Much as in the previous example, the inclusion of the clause, 'sin que a pesar de la 
superioridad numerica y de armamento', emphasised the overall supremacy of the 
enemy forces and, in doing so, again underscored the impressive accomplishment of 
the rebels in managing to outmanoeuvre them. 
As a final point on La Invasion, it should be noted that the publication of this text 
was very revealing with regard to the supposed existence of a 'siege mentality'. 
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Rather than present Cuba as a country permanently vulnerable to attack, this text 
informed Cuban youth that, in times of revolution, the Cuban people were 
themselves capable of attacking the enemy and achieving victories. Far from being a 
passive 'sitting duck', Cuba had the potential to be an agent of aggression against the 
imperialist enemy. However, the historical examples of invasion featured in the text 
suggested that this agency could only be acquired through the enactment of guerrilla 
warfare, and not, therefore, through the application of traditional military strategies 
involving the large-scale participation of the armed forces. In this way, the text 
serves to undermine both the notion of a 'siege mentality' and that of 'militarism' 
more broadly in its elevation of the guerrilla warfare approach. 
This challenge posed to the idea that the Revolution had become thoroughly 
'militarised' by the early 1970s is sustained by an analysis of the language featured 
in a text published the following year, the 1973 Instruccion Politica FAR: Libro 
Segundo. As pointed out in Chapter Two, the Instruccion Politica constitutes the 
central text around which this analysis is based, not least because it serves as a point 
of comparison for the analysis of the 1960 Manual de Capactacion Civica conducted 
in the previous chapter. Evidence of a similar guerrillerista rhetoric in both texts 
will reveal that, contrary to undergoing a process of absolute 'militarisation' and 
'Sovietisation' in the early 1970s, the Revolution continued to be guided by the same 
principles which had underpinned the revolutionary project in the early 1960s. These 
principles were those housed within the code of guerrillerismo. In contrast to the 
1960 Manual de Capacitacion Civica, however, the sole intended readership of the 
1973 Instruccion Politica were the members of the FAR, that is, military 
professionals and not, as in 1960, civilian volunteers who had signed up to join the 
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newly formed MNR. That the lnslruccion Politica FAR had an expressly military 
readership renders it particularly useful to this study. If it can be proven that 
guerrillerismo was promoted within the military itself, then the hypothesis that 
guerrillerismo was promoted by the leadership at a time when the Revolution had 
supposedly become 'militarised' is further corroborated. In other words, if leading 
figures in the military were advocating an emulation of the guerrilla ethos by their 
own soldiers, it follows that both former and serving military men within the 
revolutionary leadership were also endorsing the same values to the wider 
population. 
What is also interesting about the 1973 Instruccion Politica is that it constituted the 
fourth re-issue of the text, having first been published in 1968 (under the same title), 
and then again in 1969 and 1971. Although it has not been possible to locate the 
second and third issues, a side-by-side reading of the 1973 and 1968 texts revealed 
little difference between the two. The unmodified content in the 1973 edition 
indicates that this fourth re-issue was a re-printing, and not, therefore, a revised 
edition of the original text. That the text was simply re-printed is revealing, insofar 
as it implies that the leadership considered the ideological message communicated in 
1968 to be of continued relevance in 1973. Put differently, it suggests a continuity in 
the beliefs and values promoted by the leadership from the first into the second 
decade of the Revolution in power. As will become clear in the following analysis, 
these beliefs and values were those of guerrillerismo. 
The intended ideological function of the Instruccion Politica was made clear in its 
'Pr610go', in which it was stated that the text aimed to educate FAR members 
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concerning the key events that formed part of Cuba's 'cien ai'los de lucha', while also 
'educarlos en la linea politica de nuestro Partido Comunista, aSI como llevar a cada 
miembro de las FAR el conocimiento de la labor econ6mica que se desarrolla en el 
pais, en la cual participa directamente' (lnstruccion 1973, 5). The overall objective 
of the political education offered by the book seemed to be to heighten the 
revolutionary consciousness of each soldier. Again in the 'Pr6Iogo', it was claimed 
that the text would: 
contribuir en fonna concreta a la tarea educacional desplegada sistematicamente por la 
Revoluci6n sin que con el nos propongamos hacer de cada combatiente un especialista 
en esta materia, adentrarlo cada vez mas en la fonnaci6n revolucionaria del hombre 
nuevo, capaz de luchar y veneer tanto en el plano militar como ideo16gico frente al 
enemigo comun de todos los pueblos, el Imperialismo Yanqui, y de igual fonna 
desarrollar aun mas en nuestras tropas la conciencia y actitud intemacionalista que 
finnemente practica nuestro pueblo (lnstruccion 1973, 5). 
The text opened with a very concise preamble in which global, historical events of 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, such as the French Revolution and the US 
War of Independence, were cited as having influenced Cuban political thought in the 
1800s. There then followed a detailed description of the events leading up to and 
during the Ten Years' War of 1868-1878. Subsequently, a comprehensive overview 
of Cuban history was recounted, commencing with the Ten Years' War and 
concluding with the installation of the Revolutionary government in 1959. This 
retelling of Cuba's history constituted approximately two-thirds of the text, and was 
lifted from Ibarra's 1965 work, Historia de Cuba, which had been commissioned by 
MINF AR. Although not explicitly denoted as such, it would seem that the overview 
was intended to act as an illustration of the 'cien ai'ios de lucha' alluded to in the 
following citation from the 'Pr6Iogo': 
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La educaci6n politica en las Unidades de las Fuerzas Annadas Revolucionarias 
adquiere dimensiones extraordinarias ante la necesidad de pertrechar a nuestros 
j6venes soldados con el conocimiento de las tradiciones legadas por los gloriosos 
combatientes Marnbises y del Ejercito Rebelde. Los hombres y mujeres de nuestro 
pueblo, que a traves de cien afios de luchas emancipadoras han hecho posible erradicar 
en nuestra patria la explotaci6n del hombre por el hombre, la dominaci6n burguesa 
nacional y extranjera (lnstruccion 1973, 5). 
The narration of the 'cien afios de lucha' was followed by a summary of the 
achievements of the Revolution up to that point, such as agrarian and social reforms. 
The final chapters were entitled 'La Revoluci6n Latinoamericana' and 'La Defensa 
de la Patria' . 
What is evident from a reading of the first few pages of the book is that the mambi 
approach to revolutionary combat was presented in such a way as to appear to have 
been consistent with the guerrilla tactics employed by the Ejercito Rebelde in the 
Revolution's insurrectionary phase, and later recorded by Guevara in La Guerra de 
Guerrillas. An illustration of this representation of the mambises' strategic approach 
can be identified in Chapter One, entitled 'La Guerra de los 10 Alios': 
No satisfechos los ardorosos partidarios de Cespedes con la fecha fijada para iniciar el 
movimiento annado se reunieron eI 5 de octubre en el ingenio "Rosario" y acordaron 
lanzarse a la lucha el dfa 14 de octubre nombrando Jefe Superior de la Revoluci6n a 
Carlos Manuel de Cespedes, qui en entendia que "Ia hora era no solamente del 
patriotismo digno y desinteresado, sino de la acci6n, que ni la vacilaci6n, ni la 
serenidad de juicio, ni la precisa 16gica hist6rica 0 filos6fica, jarnas produjeron 
guerras, sino que forzosarnente en estas ha de imperar al apasionarniento que no 
advierte los obstAculos que va a derribar como alucinado"(lnstruccion 1973, 13/14). 
Within this paragraph, the quotation marks included before 'la hora .. .' and ending 
after 'alucinado' indicated manifest intertextuality, specifically direct discourse 
representation, although the text incorporated was unspecified. However, the 
foregrounding of the reporting clause 'Carlos Manuel de Cespedes, quien entendia 
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que ... ' directed the reader to believe that these were Cespedes' words retrospectively 
describing the events of that period. The guerrillerista elements in this example are 
manifest in the emphasis placed on 'Ia acci6n' and, in contrast, the negative 
connotations attached to 'Ia vacilaci6n' with regard to producing a war. These points 
were in accordance with the foeo theory's stress upon the primacy of action and its 
promotion of the idea that a revolution had to be begun without delay. If one is to 
accept that this citation can be attributed to Cespedes, then the aim of this discourse 
representation was to create the impression that this central figure in the Ten Years' 
War had a guerrillerista outlook concerning warfare. 
This impression had, in fact, been partly established in other texts previously 
published by the leadership. Discussed in Chapter Two, the 1964 text, Historia de 
Cuba, for example, revealed that Cespedes was shown to have held the belief that a 
revolution could be generated with just twelve men. As previously stated, this idea 
that a numerically inferior side could win a war against a much larger enemy was, of 
course, consistent with Guevara's conclusion that 'Las fuerzas populares pueden 
ganar una guerra contra el ejercito', and with his notion that an initial foeo of just a 
handful of men could foment revolution. The alignment of Cespedes with the myth 
of los doce was also mentioned earlier in this chapter in the analysis of a citation 
from Verde Olivo, in which his resolve to continue fighting, despite possessing a 
vastly inferior combative force, was underlined. To reiterate the citation, it was 
stated that Cespedes 'se qued6 con 12 hombres y con estos decidi6 continuar la 
guerra' (Verde Olivo 1971b, 30). The association of Cespedes with the myth, which 
was referred to in the previous chapter as a presupposition, was strengthened in the 
first chapter of Instruccion Politica, in which it was written: 
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Refiere el general Mestre uno de los acompafiantes de Cespedes que al expresar uno 
de sus hombres "que todo se habia perdido", Cespedes replic6 energicamente la frase 
que en nuestra patria se ha hecho doblemente hist6rica: 'Aun quedamos doce 
hombres: bastan para hacer la independencia de Cuba' (Instrucci6n 1973, 15). 
Also underscored in this particular citation was the correlation between Cespedes' 
struggle and that of the survivors of the Granma landing in 1956. This parallel was 
highlighted by the words, 'la frase que en nuestra patria se ha hecho doblemente 
hist6rica'. Similar to the example cited from Historia de Cuba, the text producer 
assumed that the contemporary Cuban reader would have recognised the 
connotations of los doce, and therefore elected not to clarify them explicitly. The 
purpose of the words, however, was clearly to invite a comparison between 
Cespedes' campaign and that of the guerrilleros in the Revolution's insurrectionary 
phase. The use of quotation marks implied direct discourse representation, which 
guided the text recipient into believing that Cespedes made this guerrillerista 
statement, thus adding to its legitimacy. Though the source of the text was not 
included, meaning that its legitimacy could not be verified, it achieved the objective 
of suggesting that the approach to warfare in the Ten Years' War was not entirely 
dissimilar to that enacted by the Granma survivors. Thus, according to the 
representation in the historical narrative articulated in the hegemonic discourse, the 
mambises set in motion Cuba's tradition of revolutionary guerrilla struggle, which 
would later culminate in the Revolution of the 1950s. 
Additional examples in which a gue"iIIerista language was used to describe 
Cespedes' actions reinforced the effect of seeing the Ten Years' War through the 
lens of gue"iIIerismo. The text claimed that Cespedes insisted upon a single point of 
command during war: 
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Cespedes pedia un poder centralizado que garantizara el man do unico, necesidad esta 
imprescindible en toda Guerra. Mientras Agramonte suena con la Republica 
democratica, Cespedes se pregunta: l.que Republica? jHay que hacer primero la 
guerra! La Republica vendra despues, la guerra exige unidad de mando, poder central 
que ordene y dirija (lnstrucci6n 1973, 25). 
This idea of a 'mando unico' was central to Guevara's foco methodology. In La 
Guerra de Guerrillas, Guevara posited that the armed and political wings of a 
movement should be fused into a single nucleus, the 'base unica', or foco (Guevara 
2006, 18). He wrote that 'Ia guerrilla, como nucleo armado, es la vanguardia 
combatiente del mismo, su gran fuerza radica en la masa de la poblaci6n' (Guevara 
2006, 16). This idea of the 'base unica' was also central to Debray's theorisation of 
foquismo. Indeed, as pointed out in Chapter One, Debray considered this precept to 
be one of Guevara's most significant contributions to guerrilla warfare strategy, and 
thus chose to highlight its importance in Revolution dans la Revolution? Debray 
asserted: 'L'armee populaire sera Ie noyau du parti et non I'inverse. La guerrilla est 
l'avant-garde politique "in nuce'" (Debray 1967, 125).40 
What is more, there was a clear allusion to the foco methodology's tenet in 'iHay que 
hacer primero la guerra!' that one had to produce the subjective conditions for 
revolution. The use of the agentless passive 'hay que' was effective in its 
implication that the necessity of 'making' war was a universal duty, and was not, 
therefore, exclusive to specific groups in society. The use of this grammatical 
construction also placed emphasis on individual, rather than collective, action. This 
point was fortified through the use of an exclamatory declarative sentence; the 
sentence contained no subordinate clauses which may have obscured its intended 
4Q'The popular army will be the nucleus of the party and not the reverse. The guerrilla anny is the 
political vanguard in nuce'. 
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message. Furthermore, the absence of quotation marks indicated that this section, 
beginning with 'l.que Republica?', was not an example of direct discourse 
representation. Yet the reader was directed to receive it as direct discourse, given 
that it was presented as though it were Cespedes' own speech, missing only the 
quotation marks to confirm it as such. This presentation was likely intentional, with 
the aim of adding authority to these words, and was an effective way of creating the 
impression that Cespedes' views on revolution were in accordance with those of the 
foco methodology. 
Later in the text, in a section which narrated the birth of the Cuban national anthem, 
other protagonists in the War were also credited with having had a revolutionary 
perspective which was consistent withfoco-style guerrilla warfare: 
Para ell os, esperar mas era de cobardes. No estar seguros del exito era tambien de 
cobardes. Acci6n era 10 que se necesitaba y alii estaban los tres - eran suficientes-
para levantar a Cuba sobre sus hombros. Del presente habian saltado al porvenir sin 
valladares que les contuviesen (Instrucci6n 1973, 107). 
This citation referred to the three conspirators, Perucho Figueredo, Francisco Vicente 
Aguilera and Francisco Maceo Osorio, whose actions set in motion the events that 
would lead up to the Ten Years' War. There was a definite sense here that the idea 
of subjective will, of a voluntaristic approach to revolution, as extolled by the foco 
theory, was being promoted. This idea was manifest in the manipulation of syntax in 
the third sentence, whereby 'acci6n' was foregrounded, thus placing emphasis on this 
noun. The repetition of 'cobardes' also aided in conferring a negative association 
upon procrastination and lack of faith with regard to commencing a revolution, 
suggesting that those who demonstrated these qualities were not brave. Moreover, 
the words clearly communicated that a negligible number of people was adequate to 
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start a revolution, in 'alii estaban los tres - eran suficientes - para levantar a Cuba 
sobre sus hombres'. The interpolation of 'eran suficientes' between two dashes was 
effective in highlighting this latter point, particularly as it was not a necessary 
component to the sentence, or the story, but was included as something of a 
parenthetical thought. Its inclusion thus seems to indicate that the text producer fully 
intended to stress the diminutive nature of the group which was able to launch a war, 
and, in so doing, promote the idea that the establishment of an initialfoeo, comprised 
of a handful of men, was integral to producing a successful revolution. 
Elsewhere in Instruccion Politica, one can identify a still more explicit illustration of 
how the Ten Years' War was partly portrayed as a struggle which adhered to the foco 
methodology. In a section entitled 'Necesidad de la Unidad revolucionaria', it was 
written that, as part of the armed struggle against Spanish rule, 'Existian tres focos 
insurrectos y tres gobiernos' (lnstruccion 1973, 24). The text then went on to say 
that 'ante el peligro existente del fracaso de los tres focos revolucionarios, surgi6 la 
necesidad de la unidad, iniciandose las primeras gestiones de acercamiento que 
culminaron en la Asamblea de Guaimaro en CamagUey' (lnstruccion 1973, 24). The 
implication that the rebels fighting the colonial power were divided into focos again 
seems designed to suggest that the Ten Years' War followed a similar trajectory to 
that of the campaign carried out in the sierra subsequent to the Granma landing. 
Yet perhaps the most obvious instances in which a language of the Joco methodology 
can be identified are those found in Chapter Two of the text which was devoted to 
the attack on the Moncada barracks in 1953. The section 'Antecedentes del asalto al 
Cuartel Moncada' was a partial reproduction of an article by Raul Castro written on 
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the seventh anniversary of the attack (1960). Again, manifest intertextual ity was 
employed, in that the text was fully contextualised and its author specified. In the 
article, Raul claimed: 'Por aquellos tiempos Fidel decia: "Hace falta echar a andar un 
motor pequeno que ayude a arran car el motor grande'" (lnstruccion 1973, 142). On 
the next page, he continued: 
Ya Fidel 10 tenia decidido: el motor pequeflo seria la toma de la fortaleza del Moncada 
( ... ) la que una vez en nuestras manos, echaria a andar e) motor grande, que seria el 
pueblo combatiendo, con las armas que capturariamos ( ... ) S610 habia una parte debil 
del plan: si falhlbamos en la toma del cuartel, toda se vendria abajo. Una cosa 
dependia de la otra, e) motor grande del pequeno; pero era una posibilidad y detras de 
ella nos lanzamos (Instruccion 1973, 143). 
The figurative language employed in these citations, whereby the metaphor of small 
and large motors was used to describe the stages of revolutionary action, invited an 
association with the loco theory. The metaphor connoted the sequence of events set 
out in the theory: the establishment of an initial loco as a means of setting in motion 
a revolution, followed by the creation of a network of locos which would eventually 
form an 'Ejercito Regular', able to defeat the state security apparatus (Guevara 2006, 
21). It is possible to equate the 'motor pequeflo' with the firstfoeo, and the 'motor 
grande' with the subsequent stage involving a greater number of combatants and, 
therefore, locos. While this citation did not refer to a foeo directly, it did, 
figuratively, focus on the importance of the initial stage of a revolution; in this case, 
it was the attack on the Moncada barracks which was the event that, through its very 
realisation, aimed to produce a revolution. This message was further underlined 
through the repetition of the 'motor' metaphor. Additionally, the representation 
(with questionable accuracy) of Fidel's direct discourse within the intertext was an 
attempt at conferring legitimacy on this notion through its attribution to the 
Revolution's leader. Parallels can be drawn here with the focus on the embryonic 
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stage of a revolution demonstrated in the 1960 Manual de Capacitaci()n Civica. 
analysed in the previous chapter. 
What was also highlighted in this extract was the notion that the success of a 
revolution was completely dependent on the success, or failure, of the first 
revolutionary action. Despite the failure of the Moncada assault, this issue was 
presented as something of a minor problem. The use of the adjective 's610' in the 
declarative sentence, 'S610 habia una parte debit del plan'. seemed intended to 
preclude the possibility of there having been any other weaknesses to this strategy for 
revolution. The metaphor was repeated for a final time in the text's referral to the 
Moncada defeat: 'EI ataque al Moncada fa1l6 y el motor pequeno en ese momento no 
pudo echar a andar al grande' (Instruccion 1973, 145). In that instance, the temporal 
adverb, 'en ese momento', indicated that, while this strategy failed at Moncada, there 
was another, later example in which the small motor would successfully ignite the 
'motor grande': that is, the landing of the Granma and the launching of the 
insurrectionary phase of the Cuban Revolution. 
However, while the Moncada attack was argued to have failed to start up the 'motor 
grande' of a widespread revolution, the following section, 'Significado hist6rico del 
asalto al Cuartel Moncada', suggested that it was, in fact, the nucleus that would later 
set in motion the Cuban Revolution. It stated: 
En la acci6n del Moncada, el 26 de julio, hacen su aparici6n los principales elementos 
dirigentes de nuestra Revoluci6n. Moncada es el nuc1eo del Ejercito Rebelde: el 
Ejercito Rebelde es e1 nucleo del Partido. Alrededor de ese nucleo, porque existia ya 
ese nucleo con su propia direcci6n potitico-militar, fue como pudieron reunirse a su 
alrededor otras fuerzas politicas que forman el actual Partido Comunista de Cuba 
(Instrucci6n 1973, 155). 
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What is more, it was claimed that the Ejercito Rebelde had been the nucleus of the 
Communist Party. It would appear that the intention of such statements was to 
establish a link between Moncada, the insurrectionary phase, and the Party, as it 
stood at the time of publication. The focus was on the significance of the 'nucleo" 
as was evident through the repetition of the word, and how, out of a nucleus, 
something greater could be produced. In this way, Moncada was presented not as a 
failed event, but as an event which sowed the seeds for the eventual birth of the 
Ejercito Rebelde, whose campaign would be successful. The purpose of the 
interlinking of events was to remind the reader of the origins of the Revolution, to 
reinforce the fact that all these events formed part of the same Cuban struggle. 
The use of a guerrillerista language to depict the Moncada strike continued 
throughout the section, and was particularly apparent in the following citation: 
Las revoluciones se realizan cuando hay condiciones objetivas para ello. Las 
condiciones sUbjetivas pueden irse creando en el transcurso de la lucha. Analizando 
las condiciones objetivas y subjetivas Fidel expresaba en su discurso del X III 
aniversario del ataque al cuartel Moncada, el 26 de julio de 1966: " ... esta cuesti6n de 
10 objetivo y 10 subjetivo se refiere, 10 primero a las condiciones sociales y materiales 
de las masas ( ... ) Y los factores subjetivos son los que se refieren al grado de 
conciencia que el pueblo tenga". 
Las condiciones objetivas existian en Cuba en aquella epoca y Fidel ide6 c6mo 
aprovecharlas. "A nosotros nos parecia que las condiciones revolucionarias habfa que 
crearlas y habia que crearlas luchando", dir{a mas tarde Fidel, "porque las masas 10 
que sentian era la opresi6n, 10 que sufrfan era las necesidades ( ... ) EI revolucionario 
tiene que actuar con ese sentimiento de las masas, con ese senti do que tiene de la 
explotaci6n que sufre, de las necesidades que padece. Y el verdadero revolucionario 
no espera que esos lIamados factores subjetivos se den de manera cabal". 
"La lucha tiene que venir primero, e inevitablemente detras de la lucha vendra con 
impetu creciente la conciencia revolucionaria" (Instrucci6n 1973, 149). 
In these paragraphs, the guerrillerista elements, and, more specifically, the echoes of 
the loco methodology, were unmistakable. For instance, in the line, 'A nosotros nos 
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parecia que las condiciones revolucionarias habia que crearlas y habia que crearlas 
luchando', there was a clear allusion to the foco tenet concerning the crucial role of 
subjective will in producing the subjective conditions for revolution. The repetition 
of 'crearlas' reinforced the message that subjective conditions had to be made 
through the actions of the revolutionary. In this instance, the emphasis would appear 
to have been on the role of the individual, rather than the collective, in producing the 
subjective conditions for revolution, as is evident in the use of the third person 
singular in the line 'el revolucionario tiene que actuar con ese sentimiento de las 
masas'. Similarly, the final declarative sentence, 'el verdadero revolucionario no 
espera que esos lIamados factores subjetivos se den de manera cabal', was aimed at 
mobilising revolutionary action on an individual level. This sentence in particular 
contained echoes of the opening of the second of Guevara's three key precepts: 'No 
siempre hay que esperar a que se den todas las condiciones para la revoluci6n' 
(Guevara 2006, 13). It should be pointed out that, while the central implication of 
these paragraphs was that the individual must produce the revolutionary subjective 
conditions, they also included the message that the subjective conditions were being 
produced on behalf of the masses. In other words, it was the collective whose 
suffering should inspire the individual, and who should benefit from revolutionary 
activity. This notion was comparable to that promoted in the 1960 Manual de 
Capacitacion Civica: that is, that the actions of the individual could only acquire 
meaning if they were carried out in the name of the collective. In the final line of the 
citation, 'La lucha tiene que venir primero', one can also identify parallels with the 
earlier statement attributed to Cespedes: 'iHay que hacer primero la guerra!' 
(Instrucci6n 1973, 25). Again, the point being made here was that an initial struggle, 
213 
created by the revolutionary, had to come before all other considerations, and that out 
of this struggle would arise the revolution. 
Further on in the text, reference was made once again to the idea of creating the 
subjective conditions for revolution through a discussion of the Moncada attack. A 
rhetorical device Ubiquitous in this text, direct discourse representation, was 
employed once more to promote this message in the section '''La Historia me 
Absolvera": programa de Iiberaci6n nacional'. The text read: 
En su intervenci6n en la Universidad Popular, el primero de diciembre de 1961. el 
comandante Fidel Castro dijo: 
" ... s610 sobre bases de condiciones objetivas es posible, en un momento hist6rico, 
hacer una revoluci6n ... ". "( ... ) no puede haber revoluci6n, en primer lugar, si no hay 
circunstancias objetivas que en un momento hist6rico dado, faciliten y hagan posible 
la revoluci6n. Es decir, que la revoluci6n no puede nacer en la mente de los 
hombres ... Los hombres pueden interpretar una ley de la historia, un momento 
determinado del desarrollo hist6rico. Hacer una interpretaci6n correcta es impulsar el 
movimiento revolucionario, y en Cuba, el papel nuestro, fue de impulsores de ese 
movimiento, sobre la apreciaci6n de una serie de condiciones objetivas. Nosotros 
simplemente ideamos c6mo aprovechar las condiciones objetivas existentes ..... 
(Instrucci6n 1973. 180). 
In this example, the emphasis was on building a revolution upon the pre-existing 
objective conditions. As before, this idea was undoubtedly guerrillerista. if it is 
compared to Guevara's second conclusion in La Guerra de Guerrillas: 'el foco 
insurreccional puede desarrollar condiciones subjetivas sobre la base de condiciones 
objetivas dadas' (Guevara 2006, 13). The text producer's decision to include this 
particular section of Castro's speech, beginning with "· ... s610 sobre bases de 
condiciones objetivas es posible, en un momento hist6rico, hacer una revoluci6n ...... , 
foregrounded the message that this direct discourse representation intended to impart 
on the reader. It also illustrated how direct discourse representation allowed for a 
certain amount of manipulation of the original discourse, insofar as it could be 
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selectively represented in order to convey the message of the text producer. 
Choosing to open the discourse with the adjective 'solo' underlined the notion that 
there was no alternative to producing revolution based on the objective conditions 
already in place. 
The final part of the text devoted to Cuban history concerned the guerrilla campaign 
carried out by the Ejercito Rebelde between 1956 and 1959, in a section titled, 
'Desarrollo de la Insurreccion Armada'. Equal to the other examples discussed, the 
strength of the guerrillerista language did not falter when it came to recounting the 
events in the sierra. The promotion of guerrillerismo in the chapter recounting the 
events of the insurrectionary phase of the Revolution is perhaps unsurprising, given 
that the guerrilla struggle of the sierra, according to the Cuban historical narrative, 
was the event which drew inspiration from, and, ultimately, concluded the previous 
struggles for independence. It also, of course, provided the basis for Guevara's 
methodology of guerrilla warfare, its successful outcome having legitimised its use 
as a model for revolutionary struggle. 
Similar to the rest of the text, much emphasis was placed on the role of the people in 
this section, for example, 'EI pueblo, actor principal de esta gloriosa epopeya 
revolucionaria' (Inslruccion 1973, 331) and 'jPero es definitiva es la acci6n del 
pueblo la que sera decisiva para aIcanzar el triunfo!' (lnstrucc;on 1973, 205). As 
before, these words granted agency to the Cuban people with regard to the task of 
producing revolution, and echoed Guevara's tenet that, 'Las fuerzas populares 
pueden ganar una guerra contra el ejercito' (Guevara 2006, 13). 
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Here we see also explicit references to the existence, and fundamental role. of 
guerrillafocos in the insurrectionary phase: 
EI desembarco del "Granma" y el levantamiento de Santiago fueron un nuevo llamado 
a toda la juventud al sacrificio y a la lucha. Sacudieron a las masas en forma 
definitiva. La existencia de un foco guerrillero, y despues de un territorio libre 
control ado por la Revoluci6n iban a constituir una fuente permanente de fe en la 
victoria (Instrucci6n 1973, 196). 
These words clearly stated that it was the establishment of a guerrilla foco, and later 
a 'territorio libre', which pushed forward the Revolution, and which was a source of 
inspiration for those participating in it. The text producer thus intended to underline 
that it was guerrilla struggle which had played the most significant role in the 
successful outcome of the Revolution, as opposed to the other forms of rebellion 
which occurred during that time, such as clandestine activity in urban locations. 
What was also manifest in the citation was a continued use of a religious lexicon, 
identifiable in the inclusion of the words 'sacrificio' and 'fe'. The attachment of the 
word 'fe' to the guerrilla struggle, this time in the sense that the foco was a 'fuente 
permanente' of faith in victory, reinforced the notion established in earlier texts that 
revolutionary struggle required an unfaltering belief in the attainment of the desired 
outcome. Moreover, it suggested that the guerrilla foco, and the territory that the 
guerrilleros would later liberate, were symbolic of the act of pursuing triumph over 
adversity. 
The idea that the guerrilla struggle had made the greatest contribution to the victory 
ofthe Revolution was echoed later on in the same chapter, when it was stated that: 
La lucha insurreccional en nuestro pais adopt6 diversas formas. La forma mas alta, 
incuestionablemente, fue la lucha guerrillera que forj6 el Ejercito Rebelde, brazo 
armado y micleo poHtico de la revoluci6n, primero en las Montaf\as de la Sierra 
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Maestra y luego en otros lugares hasta extenderse por todas las zonas rurales del pais 
donde combatio y logro derrotar al ejercito de la tirania (Inslruccion 1973, 269). 
In this citation, the primacy of guerrilla warfare as a method of revolutionary 
struggle was more explicitly expressed than in the previous example, given that it 
was designated the 'forma mas alta' of all the types of struggle waged during the 
insurrectionary stage. The idea of the guerrilla loco as an armed nucleus was also 
underscored here, with the words 'el Ejercito Rebelde, brazo arm ado y nuc1eo 
politico de la revolucion'. 
Thus far in the analysis of the 1973 Instrueeion Politica, we have established that 
there is much evidence to confirm the promotion of guerrillerismo in this particular 
text. The evidence for this promotion has largely been found in the text's historical 
narrative, particularly with respect to the presentation of the independence campaigns 
of the nineteenth century. These campaigns were conveyed as guerrilla struggles in 
the same vein as the Revolution's insurrection, while their perpetrators were shown 
to have held views consistent with Guevara'sloeo theory. 
In Chapter Four of the text, however, we see a shift in focus to the potential for 
revolution in contemporary Latin America. This chapter bore the title 'La 
Revoluci6n Latinoamericana' and was largely made up of the report provided by the 
Cuban delegation to the OLAS conference in 1967. The inclusion of the report was 
an example of manifest intertextuality, insofar as the context and title of the report 
were clearly stated: 'Informe de la Delegaci6n Cubana a la Primera Conferencia de la 
Organizaci6n Latinoamericana de Solidaridad'. The OLAS conference, staged in 
Havana, was referred to in the previous chapter in the thesis, in which Fidel Castro's 
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closing speech to the event was analysed. As previously stated, the speech was 
deliberately incendiary. Castro did not hold back in his criticisms of imperialist 
domination, while simultaneously declaring the inevitability of a Latin American 
revolution. The message contained in the delegation's report was of a similar tone. 
Indeed, one chapter of the report was titled 'La Revoluci6n es inevitable', and the 
report's purpose as a call to arms was unmistakeable. To illustrate this latter point, in 
the aforementioned chapter it was stated that: 
La violencia, en sus variadas manifestaciones, ha sido hasta hoy la (mica via conocida 
para alcanzar el triunfo revolucionario. La violencia es la partera de la historia. No 
puede seflalarse un solo caso, en el largo proceso hist6rico de la humanidad, en e\ eual 
la revoluci6n haya alcanzado la victoria sin utilizar los medios de la insurrecci6n 0 de 
la lucha armada. No existe experiencia en contra de esta afirmaei6n, porque, 
sencillamente, no la hay (lnstrucci6n 1973, 407). 
It was thus clear that, at the time of its distribution, the report, and, therefore, the 
leadership, aimed to encourage violent armed struggle across the Latin American 
continent. Other excerpts from the report implied that the leadership was not 
promoting just any method of violent struggle, but a specifically joquisla form of 
warfare. For instance, the report asserted that 'EI escenario fundamental donde 
puede desarrollarse la vanguardia de la lucha revolucionaria no es la ciudad, sino el 
campo, no son las regiones urbanas, sino las montaftosas' (lnstrucciOn 1973, 411). 
This statement recalled, of course, Guevara's third aportacion on armed struggle 
from La Guerra de Guerrillas: 'En la America subdesarrollada, el terreno de la lucha 
armada debe ser fundamental mente el campo' (Guevara 2006, 13). Similarly, given 
that this report was published in the same year as Debray's Revolution dans la 
Revolution?, the citation also echoed Debray's insistence that, while power was held 
and, therefore, seized in the city, 'Ie chemin qui y mene les exploites passe par la 
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campagne, ineluctablement' (Debray 1967, 122).41 Guevara and Debray's words 
were also reflected in the following citation: 'Si proclamamos ser revolucionarios, 
debemos atenemos a las consecuencias de esta actitud y debemos comprender la 
hondura y significado de esta posici6n. La vacilaci6n y la duda, s610 pueden 
beneficiar al enemigo' (lnstruccion 1973, 408). In this example, the negative 
outcome attributed to hesitation over revolutionary activity was consistent with 
Guevara's foco theory, and Debray's foquismo. Central to the foco theory, in its 
original and expanded form, was the idea that revolutionary action had to be 
undertaken without delay; one had to produce the 'subjective conditions' for 
revolution, instead of waiting for the appropriate 'objective conditions' to arise. 
Finally, an additional instance of the promotion of revolutionary activity in line with 
the foco methodology andfoquismo was identifiable in the report's emphasis on the 
establishment of a guerrilla vanguard: 
La vanguardia estani en la guerrilla, la vanguardia estara en los dirigentes de la guerra. 
Lo confirma la experiencia hist6riea, y es algo que resulta evidente. Es necesario, por 
10 tanto, que en los paises donde se desarrolle la lueha armada se comprenda con 
c1aridad que la direcci6n politica de la revoluci6n, la condueta polltica de la misma, 
debe estar a cargo de los dirigentes guerrilleros. Quienes no 10 comprendan. 
claramente, no han entendido algo tan importante como la experiencia historica de la 
Revoluci6n Cubana, y eI papel de la guerrilla dentro de la lucha de las clases. Si la 
guerrilla es la forma de lueha fundamental y se constituye en vanguardia, la direcci6n 
politica debe coincidir con la direcci6n de la guerrilla (lnstruccion 1973, 414). 
These words were undoubtedly consistent with Guevara's belief that 'Ia guerrilla, 
como nueleo arm ado, es la vanguardia combatiente del mismo, su gran fuerza radica 
en la masa de la pobJaci6n' (Guevara 2006, 16). However, given the timing of the 
report's distribution, it is perhaps more appropriate to compare these words with 
41 'The path which leads the exploited there passes, unavoidably, through the countryside'. 
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Debray's work, particularly as the idea of the guerrilla vanguard featured more 
prominently in the latter's text than in Guevara's. Debray expanded on Guevara's 
proposal regarding a 'base unica' by stressing the centrality of vanguardism to 
revolutionary struggle, and stating that the popular army would be the nucleus of the 
political party, as referred to earlier in this chapter (Debray 1967, 125). 
In the fifth and final chapter of the text, 'La Defensa de la Patria', the rhetoric ceased 
to be expressly foquista, instead adopting a similar guerrillerista tone to the rest of 
the text. This shift back to guerrillerismo was logical, given that this particular 
chapter was concerned with the defence of the Revolution and not the spread of 
armed struggle in other countries. In addition to unearthing evidence of 
guerrillerismo, an analysis of the final chapter also sheds some light on the issue of 
'siege mentality', and whether or not this mindset was encouraged by the leadership 
in the early 1970s. 
At first glance, one might conclude that a chapter entitled 'La Defensa de la Patria' 
would necessarily promote a 'siege mentality', in that it implied that the Revolution 
was in danger of being attacked. Indeed, there is much to support this assumption 
within the chapter. The text stated that Cuba was living 'bajo la directa amenaza del 
imperialismo yanqui', and that, 'EI imperialismo quiere destruir nuestra Revoluci6n, 
acabar con el ejemplo que nuestra Patria signifiea' (Instrucci6n 1973, 451/452). 
Such statements conveyed a clear message: the Revolution had an enemy to the north 
which plotted its annihilation. The focus on the necessity of preparation and 
'disciplina militar' in the chapter compounded this notion of a Revolution under 
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siege, while also implying that the responsibility to defend against an attack fell to 
the newly professionalised FAR and its recently acquired modern weaponry. 
Yet, as with the majority of the previous examples discussed in which the possibility 
of aggressive measures against the Revolution was underlined, the overarching tone 
of the chapter was one of confident defiance. The text implied that, rather than 
leading a besieged and isolated nation, the Cuban Revolution viewed itself as an 
example to other nations, and would thus refuse to allow itself to be isolated by 
North American imperialism. Through its example, the Revolution was bound to, 
and would continue to, establish relations with other nations fighting for a similar 
cause. The text read: 
El imperialismo norteamericano sabe 10 que significa nuestra Revoluci6n para los 
pueblos oprimidos del mundo, sabe que su ejemplo se arraiga cada vez mas en los 
corazones de los pueblos y quiere destruir 0 aislar ese ejemplo. Pero nuestro pueblo, 
fiel seguidor de Carnilo y el Che, no dejara ni destruir ni aislar su ejemplo y ante la 
estrategia de agresi6n y crimen del imperialismo, opondra su estrategia revolucionaria 
e intemacionalista hasta las ultimas consecuencias (lnstruccion ] 973,443). 
A sense of defiance was conveyed in this example through the words 'no dejara ni 
destruir ni aislar su ejemplo'. The reference to 'estrategia revolucionaria e 
internacionalista' was also interesting in its implication that, while the Revolution 
may have desisted to openly support armed revolutionary movements, it had not 
discarded its internationalist principles. This statement could be seen to have pre-
figured the Revolution's involvement in the Angolan Civil War just two years later 
and, in this way, was a means of warning soldiers of the potential for overseas 
missions. 
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Religious connotations can once again be inferred from this extract, in the words. 
'fiel seguidor de Camilo y el Che'. The projection of the Cuban people as faithful 
followers of the heroic guerrilleros implied a religious devotion to these two figures, 
while concomitantly setting them up as religious martyrs. This presentation 
evidences a promotion of guerrillerismo here, insofar as the guerrillero was elevated 
as a model for revolutionary action, or, in this case, for defending the palria, yet it 
also contributes to the substantiation of Fernandez's concept regarding the existence 
ofa 'political religion' in Cuba (Fernandez 2000,63). 
The image ofCamilo and 'el Che' as inspirational revolutionary heroes was manifest 
elsewhere in the chapter. An illustration can be found in the following example: 
Decir "soy un soldado revolucionario, miembro de las gloriosas Fuerzas Armadas 
Revolucionarias de mi Patria y estoy dispuesto a dar mi sangre por mi pueblo 0 por 
cualquier pueblo que luche contra la explotaci6n", es ser digno heredero del legado 
patri6tico de Maceo, Marti, Maximo G6mez, Camilo y el Che (Instrucchjn 1973. 
455}.42 
In this extract, it was made explicit that the members of the armed forces should 
consider themselves the heirs of the legacy not just ofCamilo and 'el Che' but of the 
great independenlistas who came before them. The listing of the mambises, together 
with the two of the most famous (and deceased) guerrilleros from the Revolution's 
insurrectionary phase, reinforced the idea that there was a continuity to Cuba's 
history of revolution. It implied that Cuba had endured a single struggle for 
independence, one which still continued under the Revolution in power, and whose 
42 Antonio Maceo was one of the foremost figures of the Cuban independence struggles. having 
played a pivotal role in both the Ten Years' War and the War of Independence. Also referred to a'! the 
'Titan de Bronce', Maceo has been described as 'one of the great heroes of Cuban nationalism' 
(Thomas 1998, 255n.). Maximo G6mez was another prominent leader in the same struggles, acting at; 
the 'principal military strategist of the Ten Year's War', and military commander in the war of 1895 
(Azicri 1988, 11). 
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reins were held by the FAR. Moreover, it created the impression that Maceo, Marti 
and Maximo G6mez were also heroic guerrilleros, given that their names were listed 
alongside, and, therefore, afforded equal status as the country's most famous 
guerrilla fighters. Of additional significance in this extract was the statement that 
members of the FAR must be ready to give their lives 'por cualquier pueblo que 
luche contra la explotaci6n'. As with the previous citation, the implication here was 
that the leadership had not ruled out the possibility of future involvement in foreign 
conflicts. 
A similar elevation of prominent guerrilleros from Cuban history was identifiable on 
the next page: 
Los soldados que hoy forman nuestras FAR, estan dotados de los mismos sentimientos 
que ten fan Cespedes, Marti, Maceo, de los mismos sentimientos y del mismo coraje 
que nos leg6 el Che. Si queremos que la patria, si queremos que la revoluci6n, que 
nuestras madres, como Mariana, se sientan orgullosas de nuestra actitud, seamos 
seguidores de los heroes del 68 y del 95, de Camilo y del Che (lnstruccil'ln 1973, 456). 
Once again, the mambises were given equal status to Camilo and Che in terms of 
their importance as revolutionary heroes. Furthermore, the reappearance of the word 
'seguidores' sustained the religious undertones established in the previous citation. 
In this instance, it was clearly asserted that, to be a good soldier, one had to 
demonstrate devotion to one's revolutionary forefathers through the emulation of 
their character. The text producer attempted to manipulate the reader into assuming 
such an attitude through the appeal to his or her emotions, as evidenced in the phrase, 
'que nuestras madres, como Mariana, se sientan orgullosas de nuestra actitiud' .43 In 
some ways, this appeal was a mild fonn of emotional blackmail in its suggestion that 
ignoring the example of the guerrilleros would lead to disappointment on behalf of 
43 Mariana GrajaJes was the mother of Antonio Maceo. 
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the soldier's mother. The employment of the emotional factor here is consistent with 
Fernandez's idea that, in addition to a 'political religion', the Revolution has also 
fostered a 'politics of passion' (Fernandez 2000,63). This type of politics, he states, 
is 'deeply affective' and encompasses the emotional and informal aspects of political 
activity (Fernandez 2000, 21). 
What is also apparent in the final chapter is the attempt by the text producer to 
underplay the significance of the recently acquired materiel from the Revolution's 
Soviet allies. The text put forward the message that the efficacy of any weapon was 
dependent upon the courage and will of the man who handled it. Indeed, the subtitle 
to one section of the chapter was 'EI arma vale 10 que vale el hombre que la maneja' 
(Instruccion 1973, 457). In this section, the inferiority of both the mambises and the 
Ejercito Rebelde with respect to their firepower was underscored, as shown in the 
extract below: 
Pero 10 que no sabian las hienas era que el Ejercito Rebelde era digno heredero del 
ejercito mambi, que luchaba por la misma raz6n que lucharon ellos. tenia el mismo 
enemigo. era el mismo criminal, el explotador, y si los mambises combatlan con eJ 
machete contra el [usil, el Ejercito Rebelde combati6 con la vieja escopeta a Ja 
ametralladora, al tanque, al mortero (Instrucci6n 1973, 457). 
Similar to the examples cited earlier from La Invasion, and several of the texts 
discussed earlier in Chapter Two, the purpose of such statements was to demonstrate 
that what mattered most in armed struggle was the will of the rebels, and not, 
therefore, the capacity of their weaponry. What can also be inferred from this extract 
is that the text producer wished to downplay the effect that the weapons obtained 
from the Soviets would have on the FAR's military capabilities. In other words, the 
intention was to remind soldiers that their greatest weapon of all was the historical 
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legacy of the mambises and the Ejercito Rebelde, and the ability to be able to draw 
strength and inspiration from this legacy. In doing so, the text producer was 
promoting guerrillerismo by stressing the centrality of the attitude of the individual 
or, put differently, the subjective conditions, in revolutionary struggle. What is 
more, in minimising the impact of the newly acquired military apparatus, the text 
producer was, in tum, undermining the Soviet influence more broadly; additional 
resources and a restructuring of the political system did not signify a change in the 
values which underpinned the Revolution, nor did they indicate that the Revolution 
had transformed into a 'militarised' system of governance. 
To conclude the analysis of the 1973 Instruccion Polilica, it would seem that the 
messages contained within the text were largely inconsistent with the practical 
changes that the Revolution was implementing at that time, and, therefore, with the 
subsequent interpretation of these changes as signifying a process of 'Sovietisation' 
or 'institutionalisation'. In the first instance, the text's focus on the one hundred 
years of struggle is interesting in that it was clearly aimed at disseminating the 
message that, though the insurrectionary phase had ended in victory in 1959, Cuba 
was still very much engaged in a battle, both to defend the Revolution against 
internal and external enemies, and to maintain it through participation in 
revolutionary activity. This message of continuing struggle would have been 
particularly resonant in 1968, the year the first edition of the lnstruccion Politica 
appeared, and not simply because it was the centenary of the commencement of the 
Ten Years' War. The year was also designated the 'Aflo del Guerrillero Heroico' in 
honour of Guevara who was killed in 1967 whilst attempting to establish a ioco-
based guerrilla campaign in Bolivia. This revitalisation of the myth of the heroic 
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guerrilla at that time was intended to encourage foreign revolutionary movements to 
persist in their attempts at armed guerrilla warfare, in spite of the overwhelming 
failure of foco-style warfare across Latin America during the 1960s. With this in 
mind, the incorporation of the 'Informe de la Delegaci6n Cubana a la Primera 
Conferencia de la Organizaci6n Latinoamericana de Solidaridad' in the 1968 edition 
is unsurprising, insofar as its promotion of foquismo reflected the leadership's 
position concerning armed struggle at a given moment. It is logical that the 
leadership would have wished to inform its soldiers, and offer them a greater 
understanding, of the Revolution's foreign policy stance in this respect. Moreover, 
the labelling of 1968 as the 'Ano del Guerrillero Heroico' served as an added 
reminder to the Cuban people that the need for heroism and action, as had been 
demonstrated by the guerrillas of the sierra, was still pertinent at that time. Cuba 
was experiencing a period of intense isolation from the rest of Latin America, 
ideological differences with its closest ally, the Soviet Union, and unremitting 
alienation from the United States. 
As we have established, however, much had changed in Cuba in the time between 
the first publication of the Instruccion Politica in 1968 and the appearance of its 
fourth edition some five years later. In 1973, the process of' institutionalisation' was 
in full swing, and the Revolution's guerrilla past appeared to be a distant memory as, 
simultaneous to becoming 'institutionalised', the Revolution also became 
increasingly 'militarised', according to the majority of foreign observers. Indeed, 
Horowitz has argued that 1973 in particular was a pivotal moment in the 
militarisation process, largely as a result of Raul Castro's increased authority within 
the Cuban government. To recapitulate the earlier citation, Horowitz states that: 
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Not only did 1973 represent a new stage in the militarization of Cuban communism, 
but it also witnessed the thoroughgoing displacement of Guevara as the number-two 
figure (even in death) by the orthodox military figure of Raul Castro ( ... ) Raul's rise 
to a place second only to Fidel's, and increasingly paralleling Fidel's role in crucial 
state and diplomatic functions, can hardly be exaggerated. Raul has become the 
spokesman for all things military and the heir apparent to the revolution itself. His 
orthodoxy extends to the cut of his uniform C ... ) and his insistence on creating ranks 
within the Cuban military that are isomorphic with military ranks elsewhere in the 
world (Horowitz 2008, 137). 
Furthermore, with this process came a weakening of Cuba's support for 
revolutionary movements abroad, which signalled the end of its period of 'Fidelista 
radicalism' (1962-1968), to use Erisman's term. The decision to re-print Inslrllccion 
Polilica, with its overtly guerrillerista and, at times, foquista rhetoric. thus now 
seems to be at odds with the Revolutionary project of the early 1970s. The inclusion 
of the 'Informe' in the re-published version in particular is highly significant. By 
1973, the Revolution had curbed its more radical tendencies, and had ceased to otTer 
its support vocally and financially for armed revolutionary movements. This new-
found restraint was, as already mentioned, part of the leadership's attempt to 
establish closer ties with the Soviet Union. Choosing to include an explicitly 
joqu;sta document in the re-published version of an earlier text thus raises the 
question as to why it was not removed, in light of the fact that it did not coincide 
with the leadership's new, more pragmatic approach. It is probable that this 
perpetuation of the encouragement of revolution overseas was an indication of the 
fact that, though more cautious in its approach, the Revolution was still committed to 
its principles ofintemationalism. Evidence of these principles was identifiable in the 
final chapter, which referred to the 'estrategia revolucionaria e intemacionalista' of 
the Revolution, and the duty of Cuban soldiers to fight for other nations. This 
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proposal that Cuba retained its internationalist outlook in the 1970s is supported by 
Valdes: 
After 1968, Cuban foreign policy was redefined and with it some of the facets of 
internationalism, but the trend away from adventuristic guerrilla plots did not signify a 
reversal of principles. Fundamental ideological beliefs were left intact; methods for 
implementing them were changed. Internationalist solidarity continued, but now it was 
founded on those movements that were already in power, or could succeed in taking 
power in a short space of time. Yet the convictions and daring outlook remained 
(Valdes 1979,89). 
Yet the greatest conformation of the Revolution's integrity with respect to its 
internationalist rhetoric was the FAR's very involvement in overseas conflict, most 
notably in Angola. 
Concerning the guerrillerista representation in the text of the campaigns enacted by 
the mambises, this was also notable for its apparent incompatibility with the 
Revolution's shift towards Soviet orthodoxy. In the texts from the 1960s analysed in 
the previous chapter, the representation of Cuban history as one of a perpetual 
guerrilla struggle was indicative of an attempt to confer historical legitimacy upon 
the leadership's continued promotion of the guerrilla ethos in its first decade. and its 
active support for revolutionary movements abroad. In the 1970s, however, such a 
portrayal of Cuban history and its prominent actors was demonstrative of an attempt 
to confer legitimacy not just on the promotion of guerrillerismo. but also on certain 
figures in the upper echelons of the Cuban government. To elucidate further. the 
purpose of shaping a guerrillerista history was to strengthen the hegemonic role 
within the government of those that had participated in the sierra. This hypothesis 
can be substantiated if one accepts the proposal put forward at the start of this 
chapter, that is, that the years 1971-1975 were a period of internal debate in the 
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government regarding the direction of the Revolution, and, specifically, whether it 
should proceed in the direction of Soviet orthodoxy. The fact that Cuba did not hold 
its first Communist Party Congress until 1975 suggests that such a debate was 
occurring behind the scenes. With this delay in mind, it is possible to argue that the 
former guerrilleros of the sierra were trying to assert their authority against those 
within the government who were pushing for this increased orthodoxy. This latter 
contingent was comprised of former members of the Partido Socialista Popular 
(PSP), Cuba's pre-Revolution Communist party, who had for many years been 
arguing for the establishment of closer ties with the Soviet Union (Mesa-Lago 1974, 
7). Having suffered persecution in 1968 when a 'microfaction' of PSP leaders was 
imprisoned for 'antigovernment activities', the Revolution's rapprochement with 
Moscow saw to it that those associated with the PSP regained their standing within 
the leadership (Mesa-Lago 1974, 8). This revival of PSP figures may have impelled 
the former guerrilleros to assert their authority within the leadership. Such authority 
could be achieved by granting themselves historical legitimacy, a legitimacy derived 
not just from having participated in the key events leading up to the Revolution's 
victory, but from establishing parallels between their actions and other heroes from 
Cuban history. The claim that other, earlier historical actors employed the same 
guerrillerisla principles of producing revolution implied that those who initiated 
Moncada, and later the insurrection, should be afforded the same level of reverence. 
There is a case to argue that the narration ofa guerrillerista history for political ends 
in the early 1970s was not a novel strategy for gaining hegemonic control within the 
Revolution. Indeed. the representation of the insurrectionary phase in Guevara's La 
Guerra de Guerrillas was a deliberate mis-representation with a similar objective in 
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the early 1960s. Guevara's account of the struggle against Batista neglected to 
afford sufficient attention to the support of the rural guerrillas' llano counterparts in 
bringing about the revolutionary victory, and instead overplayed the role of those 
who fought in the sierra. Consequently, the loco theory's central precepts were 
based upon a partially mythicised version of an historical event. Childs proposes that 
this mythification of the insurrection, and the resulting 'sierraisation' of the loco 
theory, was politically motivated, with its aim being to legitimise, to some extent, the 
so-called jidelistas' ascendancy in the formative Cuban revolutionary government 
(Childs 1995, 606). In other words, attributing a larger contribution of the 
revolutionary success to those who fought in the sierra (Castro and Guevara, for 
example) would justify their occupation of key governmental positions within the 
Cuban government. Childs argues that such a justification might have been 
necessary in 1962 when, following the declaration that the Revolution would adhere 
to a socialist ideology in April 1961, a new government was under construction, 
within which various discourses were competing for hegemony (Kapcia, 2000). The 
same former guerrilleros found themselves in a similar situation in 1973, and thus 
resorted to this tried-and-tested tactic: the re-articulation of an historical narrative in 
such as a way as to reinforce the political agenda of the narrator. 
In addition to strengthening the hegemony of those who had fought in the sierra, the 
narration of a history of guerrilla warfare undermined the practical process of the 
'Sovietisation' of the FAR, as mentioned earlier. Soldiers were informed of the long 
tradition of Cuban revolutionary leaders who had favoured an endogenous method of 
enacting revolution, as opposed, therefore, to borrowing from foreign models. 
Indeed, as the citations from lnstruccion Politica indicate, the 'cien al'ios de lucha' 
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narrated could have been alternatively titled 'cien anos de guerrillerismo'. The 
implication was thus that this Cuban 'tradition' of guerrilla struggle should be 
perpetuated by the FAR, despite its on-going transformation into a highly 
professionalised institution equipped with Soviet weaponry. The attempt to inculcate 
this message upon members of the armed forces is even more significant, in light of 
the fact that the head of the FAR was Raul Castro. As already pointed out, the 
increased political authority granted to the younger of the Castro brothers has been 
viewed as instrumental to the supposed 'militarisation' process, yet he is also seen as 
having been a leading proponent of Cuba's rapprochement with the USSR and the 
general 'Sovietisation' of the Revolution. Phyllis Greene Walker suggests that 
Raul's visit to the Soviet Union in early 1970 laid the groundwork for the changes 
that occurred thereafter, while Klepak contends that it was Raul who spearheaded the 
'Sovietisation' of the FAR, and who was 'instrumental in gaining more and better 
weapons from Moscow' (Greene Walker 1993, 122; Klepak 2005, 45). The re-
issuing of Instruccion Politica in 1973, with its explicitly guerrillerista and joquisla 
tone, is, therefore, inconsistent with the perception that the Revolution converted 
fully to Soviet orthodoxy in the 1970s, but it also questions the long-standing 
perception that Raul Castro favoured a wholesale adoption of the Soviet model. It 
could be argued that, while he may have taken advantage of the improved 
relationship with Moscow to gamer weaponry, he did not wish to transform the FAR 
into a carbon copy of the Soviet Armed Forces. Instead, as the analysis of 
Instruccion Politica has shown, he made sure that his soldiers were educated in 
Cuba's revolutionary tradition, and were encouraged to emulate the values and 
attributes of the heroic guerrilleros whose struggles has resulted in the Revolution in 
power. 
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The representation of Cuban history as a narrative of perpetual guerrilla struggle 
continued to be expressed as the second decade of the Revolution in power 
progressed. Within this representation, the elevation of the mambises as heroic 
guerrilleros also endured. One striking illustration ofthis glorification was the 1974 
book, Hombradia de Antonio Maceo, written by the historian Raul Aparicio. Unlike 
the Instruccion Politica of the previous year, this text was not directed solely at the 
members of the armed forces, but was instead published by UNEAC for the broader 
readership of the general public. It did share a similarity with the FAR text, 
however, in that it was also a re-issued edition of an earlier text, the first and only 
other edition having been published in 1966, in which year it was also awarded the 
Premio de Biografia 'Enrique Pifteyro' by UNEAC. Aparicio was a prolific writer, 
publishing articles in Cuba's leading newspapers and magazines, such as Granma 
and Bohemia, and several novels before his death in 1970. Much like another writer 
discussed in Chapter Two, Jorge Ibarra, Aparicio wrote from a position of authority 
within the Revolution, having carried out many international diplomatic missions for 
the Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores. It is likely, therefore, that the views 
expressed in his writing were consistent with those of the revolutionary leadership 
and, in fact, contributed to the reproduction and circulation of its guerrillerisla 
values. His historical work is also another revealing example of how history has 
been used in revolutionary Cuba as a means of supporting the revolutionary project. 
In the 'Preambulo' to the second edition of Hombradia, Aparicio informed the reader 
that he felt the country needed an account of the life of Maceo, or the 'heroe' as he 
referred to him, which outlined the chronology of his life (Aparicio 1974, 13). He 
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went on to state unequivocally that the overarching purpose of the text was to 
facilitate a greater understanding of the contemporary Revolution: 
Esta vida del general Antonio se desenvolvi6 a 10 largo del gran proceso 
revolucionario cubano del siglo pasado. Es por eso de singular importancia su 
conocimiento, como una contribuci6n, por la via de las comparaciones. a la 
interpretaci6n de la revoluci6n actual (Aparicio 1974, 14). 
Throughout the text, it was frequently underlined that Maceo was a master of 
guerrilla warfare, and, for this reason, he should be revered. In the second part of the 
book, 'La forrnaci6n. La guerra grande. La Protesta de Baragua', for example, it was 
stated that, in the early stages of the Ten Years' War, Maceo had initiated 'una tipica 
acci6n guerrillera' (Aparicio 1974, 76). It was written that Maceo had carried out: 
( ... ) una dpica acci6n guerrillera: con 37 hombres sorprendi6 una columna espal'lola, 
que tuvo que retroceder, y al hacerlo, se encontr6 con el fuego de 30 mambises 
estrategicamente emboscados, que Ie produjeron dal\os de consideraci6n. Una c1asica 
operaci6n de guerrilla (Aparicio 1974,76). 
Similar to many of the examples already considered, the inferiority of Maceo's force, 
in comparison with the Spanish military column, was highlighted. This emphasis 
was expressed through the foregrounding of the prepositional phrase, 'con 37 
hombres', at the beginning of the extract, and again in the reference to the '30 
mambises estrategicamente emboscados'. Also comparable to the previous instances 
in which the diminutive nature of Cuban rebel forces has been stressed, this example 
again pointed out how the combative capabilities of the rebels were disproportionate 
to their inferior size. In other words, the smaller guerrilla force was able to achieve 
military successes through using its size to its advantage, and employing the strategy 
of surprise. As the text claimed, this tactic enabled Maceo's guerrillas to inflict 
'dal\os de consideraci6n' upon the enemy. Maceo's method of launching a surprise 
attack in this example was consistent with the recommendation made by Guevara in 
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La Guerra de Guerrillas: 'Naturalmente, su inferioridad numerica hace muy 
necesario que los ataques sean siempre por sorpresa, esa es la gran ventaja, es 10 que 
permite al guerrillero hacer bajas al enemigo sin sufrir perdidas' (Guevara 2006, 27). 
The focus upon the ability of the mambises' guerrilla forces to overcome their 
supposed inferiority, military speaking, was again evident towards the end of the 
text. Aparicio asserted: 
Es la mana del general Antonio la que ha plantado la bandera cubana en el extrema 
occidental de la isla, dando cabal realizaci6n a la campana de la invasi6n. Decenas de 
miles de soldados enemigos, con el mejor equipo militar de la epoca, no han sido 
capaces de detener al pueblo revolucionario en armas, guiado por sus mejores lideres. 
La campana de la invasion ha demostrado que Cuba es capaz por SI sola de Iibertarse 
del poder colonial que la agobia. Lo ha demostrado con el esfuerzo de sus hijos 
mejores, los que han estado derramando su sangre combate tras combate. Y esos hijos 
mejores, son en su mayoria los mas humildes hombres del pueblo. Y por sobre todos 
ell os, por su cali dad de hombre integerrimo, reconoce toda Cuba al general Antonio, el 
mambf ejemplar (Aparicio 1974,456). 
In this extract, the disparity in the size and military strength of the two opposing 
forces was accentuated through the manipulation of the syntax in the second 
sentence. The foregrounding of the phrase 'Decenas de miles de soldados 
enemigos', followed by the inclusion of the prepositional phrase 'con el mejor 
equipo militar de la epoca', highlighted the extent of the military capacity of the 
Spanish colonial forces. Yet, as we are then informed, a high number of combatants 
and modem weaponry was no match for the Cuban pueblo. This latter statement 
perpetuated the message which was articulated in a large number of the citations 
analysed in the previous chapter: the Cuban people, as a collective, had the potential 
to overcome seemingly insurmountable obstacles. This idea also recalled one of 
Guevara's three fundamental conclusions regarding guerrilla warfare: 'Las fuerzas 
populares pueden ganar una guerra contra el ejercito' (Guevara 2006, 13). In this 
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example, however, the inclusion of the nonessential relative clause, 'guiados por sus 
mejores Hderes', called attention to the fact that the Cuban people had been led by a 
select group of leaders. The inclusion of this phrase was clearly intentional, given 
that it was not an essential component of the sentence, and thus its purpose was to 
underline the fundamental role of strong leaders in the victory of popular forces. It 
suggested that the combination of 'las fuerzas populares' and strong guerrilla leaders 
was undefeatable. Such a message was particularly pertinent at the time of the 
book's publication, when, as already discussed, the ex-guerrilleros were attempting 
to assert their hegemony within the Cuban leadership over the former PSP members. 
What was also noticeable in this extract was the reference to Cuba's ability to defeat 
colonial forces without any outside assistance, as pointed out in the phrase, 'La 
campafta de la invasi6n ha demostrado que Cuba es capaz por sf sola de libertarse del 
poder colonial que la agobia'. The incorporation of the adjective 'por Sl sola' served 
to emphasise this point. Again, this message would have been particularly resonant 
at a time of increasing Soviet influence. It reminded the reader that, while it may 
have been receiving military support from abroad in 1974, Cuba had a proven ability 
to defend itself against foreign aggressors. The use of the present tense in 'Cuba es 
capaz' implied that this ability was still intact at the time of the book's publication. 
It should also be noted that the strategy of invasion, outlined in detail in the text La 
InvasiOn, was pinpointed as the tactic had allowed Cuba to liberate itself. 
Not only did the text underline the crucial role played by leaders in the realisation of 
military victories, it also drew the reader's attention to the qualities possessed by 
such leaders, the prime example of which was, of course, Antonio Maceo. Of 
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particular note were the continual references to Maceo's strong will. In the second 
chapter of the book, Aparicio recounted an attempt by the Spanish to tempt Maceo to 
defect to the enemy side: 'La indignacion de Antonio bulle en su pecho: domina sus 
sentimientos apelando a la misma voluntad que anos atnls Ie ayudo a vencer la 
tartamudez' (Aparicio 1974, 76). The mention of , vol un tad' here perpetuated the 
focus upon subjective will in the hegemonic discourse, additional examples of which 
have been discussed in this and the previous chapter. In turn, this focus also 
perpetuated the promotion of guerrillerismo, seeing as subjective will was a central 
facet of Guevara's Joco theory and, later, Debray's concept ofJoquismo. Guevara's 
La Guerra de Guerrillas was also reflected in the book's references to Maceo's 
intransigent position towards his revolutionary duty. Aparicio claimed of Maceo 
that, 'Va pueden ser adversas las noticias de la revolucion, el continuara inflexible 
(Aparicio 1974, 79). This description painted Maceo as the embodiment of a great 
guerrillero, according to Guevara's characterisation of such a figure: 'La actitud de 
lucha, esa actitud que no debe desmayar en ningun momento, esa inflexibilidad 
frente a los grandes problemas del objetivo final, es tambien la grandeza del 
guerrillero' (Guevara 2006, 21). 
Similarly, Maceo was portrayed by Aparicio as always having been at the forefront 
of any revolutionary combat, as illustrated in the line: 'EI que va delante, el que no 
vacila en atacar (Aparicio 1974, 54). This idea of being on the frontline of 
revolutionary action mirrored Guevara's proposal that guerrilleros should constitute 
the vanguard of any revolution, a point which was expanded upon and further 
stressed in Debray's Revolution dans la Revolution? The mention of the fact that 
Maceo did not hesitate to attack the enemy also echoed the argument articulated by 
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both theories, that of the necessity of fomenting revolution without delay through a 
reliance on subjective conditions alone. 
Another text which sought to convey the sustained pertinence of the example set by 
the mambises was the book, Moncada, published in 1975 by the Editorial de Ciencias 
Sociales dellnstituto Cubano del Libro. Comparable to many of the previous texts in 
this chapter, Moncada was also a re-issued version of an earlier edition, having first 
been published in 1973 to mark the twentieth anniversary of the Moncada attack. 
The book's publication by the Instituto del Libro, itself a part of the Ministerio de 
Cultura, renders it a useful example of how the circulation of guerrillerisla 
statements was maintained by various practices and institutions in Cuban society. 
The reproduction of guerrillerista statements in this way is consistent with 
Foucault's previously discussed analysis of how discourses are perpetuated over time 
in certain political and historical contexts. 
The text contained no introduction or prologue to indicate the purpose of its 
publication, but it is immediately apparent that the text aimed to convey the historical 
significance of the assault on the Moncada barracks to a contemporary reader. To 
achieve its purpose, the text was made up of extracts from speeches (all of which had 
been given by either Fidel or Raul Castro), articles, historical documents (including 
photographs), and testimonies from those who had participated in the attack. 
Although the book was largely comprised of texts which related directly to the events 
of the Moncada attack, ten of the first eleven pages were devoted to images and 
citations connected to the independence struggles of the 1800s. Page two consisted 
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entirely of a photograph of Jose Marti, while pages eight and nine showed portraits 
of the Ignacio Agramonte, Maximo G6mez, Antonio Maceo and, again, Marti, 
alongside the following citation from Fidel Castro's 'La historia me absolvera': 'Se 
nos ensefio a venerar desde temprano el ejemplo glorioso de nuestros heroes y de 
nuestros martires. Cespedes, Agramonte, Maceo, G6mez y Marti fueron los 
primeros que se grabaron en nuestro cerebro' (Moncada 1975, 8). The inclusion of 
this citation and the accompanying images indicated from the outset that one of the 
objectives of the text was to highlight the connectivity between the different 
revolutionary struggles which had taken place in Cuban history. It showed that the 
Moncada attack, as illustrated by the citation from 'La historia me absolvenl', had 
drawn inspiration from the mambises, while the Revolution itself had sought to build 
upon the legacy of both these previous historical examples. 
What was also made clear in the text was that, although the previous struggles had 
failed in their objective of liberating Cuba from colonialism and dictatorship, they 
had served the necessary function of initiating revolutionary action which, 
ultimately, had culminated in the Revolution in power. This message was clearly 
expressed in excerpts from an article by Raul Castro, originally published on the 
eighth anniversary of the Moncada attack. In this one of many examples of manifest 
intertextuality included in the book, Raul Castro stated of Moncada: 
Aquel no era el asalto a una fortaleza para aleanzar el poder eon la aeci6n de un 
centenar de hombres, era el primer paso de un grupo decidido para armar al pueblo de 
Cuba e iniciar la revoluci6n. No era una acci6n para quitar simplemente a Batista y 
sus c6mplices del poder, era el inicio de una acci6n para transformar todo el regimen 
polftico y econ6mico-social de Cuba y acabar eon la opresi6n extranjera ( ... ) Que no 
se trataba de apoderarse de la sede del gobierno y asaltar el poder, sino de iniciar la 
aeci6n revolucionaria para lIevar al pueblo al poder (Moncada 1975,255). 
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These words convey the message that what was important was not achieving one's 
goal upon the first attempt, but the attempt in itself. This message recalled the idea 
expressed by both Guevara and Debray, that one should not hesitate to commence 
revolutionary action simply because the odds of success were seemingly low. 
Another extract from the article was included later in the text, in which it was 
explicitly stated that Moncada had been the catalyst which would eventually set in 
motion the insurrectionary phase ofthe Revolution: 
EI ataque al Moncada fall6 y el motor pequef\o, en ese momento, no pudo echar a 
andar el grande ( ... ) el 26 de julio ( ... ) sirvi6 de antecedente y experiencia para la 
expedici6n del 'Granma' y la acci6n guerrillera de la Sierra Maestra (Moncada 1975, 
282). 
The mention here of the 'motor pequeno' paralleled the inclusion of the same term in 
the 1973 Instruccion Politica, discussed earlier. The repetition of this metaphor, first 
uttered by Fidel Castro in the 1960s, demonstrated the leadership's intent to 
perpetuate the focus on the primacy of action, itself a fundamental value of 
guerrillerismo. 
In addition to continuing to present a linear revolutionary history, the text also 
underscored the inferior nature of the rebel group who assaulted the Moncada 
barracks. In another of the several excerpts from Raul Castro's 1961 article, it was 
written: 
No eran muchas las armas, ni mucho men os, de calidad que pudieramos conseguir 
( ... ) nadie iba a imaginarse, por inconcebible, que fuese a ser atacada una fortaleza 
militar con escopetas de matar pajaros (Moncada 1975, 86). 
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As in many of the previous examples, these words aimed to demonstrate to the reader 
that a paucity of weaponry should not be a deterrent to fomenting revolution. A 
similar sentiment was expressed in an excerpt from a speech given by Fidel Castro 
on the 26 July 1967, an additional example of manifest intertextuality in the book. In 
the speech, Castro stated: 
Ni las armas, ni el tipo de las annas, ni la experiencia, y ni siquiera los factores 
fortuitos, acompafiaron a aquel primer esfuerzos. Pero aquel primer esfuerzo signific6 
el camino que abri6 para eI pueblo revolucionario la conquista del poder ( ... ) Y esa 
caracteristica esencial del movimiento revolucionario, que surgi6 aquel dia, es hoy 
tambien la caracteristica esencial de nuestra revoluci6n: la confianza del pueblo en 51 
mismo, la fe del pueblo en su causa, la convicci6n del pueblo que no habra dificultad, 
por grande que sea, que no logremos vencerla; que no habra camino, por dificil que 
sea, que no seamos capaces de seguirlo hasta el final (Moncada 1975,284). 
The repetition of the negative conjunction 'ni' in the first sentence of the citation 
reinforced the detail that the Moncada attack had gone ahead despite a complete 
absence of auspicious conditions. The inclusion of 'ni siquiera' in the fourth 
example further strengthened this point, as did the alliteration of the fricative in the 
words 'factores fortuitos'. In turn, this underlining of the unfavourable situation also 
highlighted the courage and determination of the rebels. Additionally, the repetition 
of 'aquel primer esfuerzo' called attention to the fact that, in revolutions, it was the 
first act which constituted the most important gesture ofthe struggle as a whole. 
In this extract, it is also possible to identify evidence which challenges the notion of 
'siege mentality'. The final phrases in particular, 'Ia convicci6n del pueblo que no 
habra dificultad, por grande que sea, que no logremos vencerla; que no habra 
camino, por dificil que sea, que no seam os capaces de seguirlo hasta el final', 
revealed that the leadership was intent on instilling, once again, a sense of confident 
defiance in the Cuban people. Cuba was not a nation besieged but one whose people 
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had the will to defend it at all costs. As the citation suggested, part of this confidence 
in the people's ability to confront even the most challenging of circumstances, 
derived from the fact that the pueblo had an unrelenting faith in the revolutionary 
cause: 'la fe del pueblo en su causa'. This reference to 'fe' sustained the religious 
undertones present in a number of the texts already discussed, both from the 1960s 
and the 1970s. 'Fe' was also mentioned elsewhere in the text, in another citation 
from Fidel Castro's 'La historia me absolveni' which was the only featured text on 
page 139: 
Parecfa que el Ap6stol iba a morir en el ano de su centenario, que su memoria se 
extinguiria para siempre, jtanta era la afrenta! Pero vive, no ha muerto, su pueblo es 
rebelde, su pueblo es digno, su pueblo es tiel a su recuerdo (Moncada 1975, 139), 
Castro's reference to Marti as the 'Ap6stol' in 1953, and the statement that 'su 
pueblo es fiel a su recuerdo', laid the foundations for the attachment of religious 
symbolism to the discourse of the Revolution. That this statement was reiterated, not 
to mention the fact that it was printed across an entire page, demonstrates how the 
leadership wished to perpetuate both the image of Marti, and encourage a type of 
religious devotion to his memory, much in the same way that a similar veneration 
was encouraged of the figures of Che and Camilo. In the 1973 Instruccilin Politica, 
for example, it was written: 'Pero nuestro pueblo, tiel seguidor de Camilo y el Che' 
(Instrucci6n 1973,443). 
As a tinal point on the 1975 edition of Moncada, it should be noted that the text was 
published in the same year in which the first Communist Party of Cuba Congress 
took place. The Congress marked the beginning of the institutionalisation of PCC 
rule, while it also saw to the agreement of new economic policies and the first five-
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year plan (Dominguez 1993, 129). To all intents and purposes, the Congress thus 
seemed to serve as added confirmation of the complete 'Sovietisation' of the 
Revolution. However, texts such as Moncada continued to play up the Revolution's 
history of guerrilla struggle, and the many heroes who had contributed to this history, 
some of which were now in the newly strengthened PCC. As before, it can be 
argued that these latter figures wished to derive further historical legitimacy for 
retaining their positions of power within the revolutionary government. With 
Moncada, these former guerrilleros were basing their legitimacy not only in their 
participation in the insurrectionary phase of the Revolution, but in the fundamental 
roles they had played in the 'primer esfuerzo' of 1953. 
The linking ofthe past with the present, and the supposed linearity of Cuban history, 
was explicitly pointed out on the front page of the 2 January 1976 edition of 
Bohemia. This edition of the weekly general interest magazine distributed 
throughout the country was published less than two weeks subsequent to the close of 
the first Communist Party Congress. The following words appeared on the cover of 
the magazine: 
Recuerdese que el 56, dos decadas atn\s, marco un ano trascendente en el acontecer 
cubano, estampa de podredumbres pero tambien visi6n de luchas yesperanzas. Es el 
ano del gran reto de 'libres 0 mllrtires' lanzado por Fidel y el desembarco de 
'Granma'. Cada una de sus 52 semanas, siguiendo los diversos caminos de un proceso 
inexorable, conduce la epopeya de la Sierra Maestra y culmina victoriosamente en el 
Primer Congreso del Partido Comunista de Cuba que acaba de clausurarse (Bohemia 
1976, 1). 
The final statement in this extract is interesting in that it would seem to corroborate 
the aforementioned notion that there was a conscious attempt to remind the Cuban 
people of the origins of their Revolution and, perhaps more importantly, who had 
played a role in its embryonic stages. Of particular note was the choice to label the 
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insurrectionary phase as 'la epopeya de la Sierra Maestra'. This designation was 
telling in its implication that the Revolution had been fought and won purely in the 
mountains, thereby ignoring the other forms of struggle that had taken place in the 
llano. In tum, this emphasis on the sierra of course overplayed the role of the 
guerrilleros in the victory of the Revolution and, in tum, in the process which had 
enabled the Congress to take place. What is more, the direct connection established 
here between the Sierra Maestra and the first Communist Party Congress mirrored 
the obvious linking together of Moncada, the Ejercito Rebelde and the Communist 
Party in the 1973 Instruccion Politica. To reiterate the quotation discussed 
previously, it was claimed that: 
Moncada es el nucleo del Ejercito Rebelde: el Ejercito Rebelde es el nucleo del 
Partido. Alrededor de ese nucleo, porque existia ya ese nucleo con su propia direcci6n 
poHtico-militar, fue como pudieron reunirse a su alrededor otras fuerzas politicas que 
forman el actual Partido Comunista de Cuba (lnstrucci6n 1973, 155). 
The promotion of guerrillerismo continued to be in evidence in other editions of 
Bohemia published in the second half of the decade. In the 14 October 1977 edition 
of Bohemia, a double-page spread featured a speech given by Fidel Castro at the 
inauguration of the Escuela de Iniciaci6n Deportiva Escolar (EIDE) on 6 October of 
that same year. In this speech, Castro asserted: 
Nuestros corazones son grandes y hay en ellos espacio para el entusiasmo, para el 
deber, para el espiritu revolucionario, para la voluntad, el tes6n, la firmeza; hay en 
nuestros corazones un gran lugar para la obra creadora, para continuar el esfuerzo de 
nuestro pueblo, para combatir, para luchar ( ... ) Tenemos el deber de cumplir nuestra 
obra, la obra de nuestra generaci6n, y el deber de preparar el camino a las nuevas 
generaciones (Bohemia 1977a, 40). 
Castro's words demonstrate that the values associated with guerrillerismo - lucha, 
deber, vo/untad, and so on - were still being promoted in the late 1970s as desirable 
qualities which all Cuban citizens should possess. The lexical item, deber, was 
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particularly emphasised, having been incorporated three times. What is also evident 
is that the 'duty' of participation in the Revolution was presented as a collective 
responsibility. This message was reflected in the use of the first person plural in 
'Tenemos el deber', and also in the repeated employment of the possessive pronoun 
in 'Nuestros corazones' and 'nuestro pueblo'. 
This notion of collective responsibility was fortified by Castro's remarks elsewhere 
in the speech. As an illustration, Castro stated: 
Les pedimos un esfuerzo a los compafieros de la construcci6n de la provincia Ciudad 
de La Habana para que aceleraran las obras, y pudieramos disponer ya de la escue\a 
para este primer aniversario. Esto tiene un simbolismo muy grande, porque demuestra 
c6mo el crimen no puede matar las ideas, c6mo el crimen no puede detener la marcha 
victoriosa de un pueblo; c6mo el crimen no, por monstruoso que sea, no puede matar 
la vida, y c6mo la vida de cada uno de nosotros no pertenece a sl mismo, sino que 
pertenece a todos. Todos somos parte de algo mucho mayor que nosotros, que es la 
patria, el pueblo; nuestras vidas son partes de la vida infinita e inmortal de la naci6n 
cubana y de nuestro pueblo revolucionario (Bohemia I 977a, 39). 
The 'crimen' referred to in this address was the terrorist attack on a Cubana de 
Aviaci6n flight from Barbados to Jamaica the previous year, which resulted in the 
deaths of all seventy-eight passengers on board, including the entire Cuban national 
fencing team. In the final part of this excerpt, Castro asserted definitively that what 
mattered in the Revolution was the collective, and not the individual. In lines such as 
'y c6mo la vida de cada uno de nosotros no pertenece a sf mismo, sino que pertenece 
a todos' Castro was encouraging the Cuban people to look beyond their own 
individual concerns, and to consider the effect of their actions on the collective: the 
Cuban nation in its entirety. Castro's words were also intended to inspire confidence 
in the Cuban people, with regard to the survival of the Revolution. His declaration 
that 'el crimen no puede matar las ideas, c6mo el crimen no puede detener 1a marcha 
victoriosa de un pueblo' once again demonstrated that, far from cultivating a 'siege 
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mentality', Castro was, in fact, attempting to instil a sense of assurance in the Cuban 
people. 
A promotion of guerrillerismo was also manifest in other articles which appeared in 
the same 14 October issue of Bohemia. Given that this issue appeared just a week 
after the tenth anniversary of Che Guevara's death, it was perhaps unsurprising that 
such values were promoted at that time. Indeed, one page was devoted to the 
activities which took place during the 'Jornada Ideol6gica Camilo y Che' (Bohemia 
1977b, 48). Similarly, another page featured part of a speech given by Ramiro 
Valdes to mark the anniversary, in which he underlined the attributes of which 
Guevara's character had been comprised:44 
Uno de esos gigantes del pensamiento y de acci6n es el Guerrillero Heroico, Emesto 
Che Guevara ( ... ) Habia forjado desde nino un canicter audaz y una gran firmeza de 
voluntad ( ... ) tenia, sobre todo, la determinaci6n combativa y la vocaci6n del 
revolucionario (Bohemia 1977c, 58/59). 
Again, there was mention here of voluntad as a defining characteristic of a 
guerrillero, along with bravery, as shown in 'un caracter audaz'. This reference to 
being 'audaz' recalled Guevara's own guidelines in La Guerra de Guerrillas, in 
which he argued that a guerrilla fighter 'debe ser audaz' (Guevara 2006,56). 
Guerrillerismo was also in evidence in another speech which appeared in this issue. 
In an address to the UNEAC Congress of 1977, the renowned poet, Nicolas Guillen, 
uttered the following words: 
44 Ramiro Valdes participated in both the Moncada attack and in the insurrectionary phase of the 
Revolution. He later became a member of the Politburo, and was given the honorary military title 
Comandanle de la Revoluci6n in 1976. 
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tenemos clara conciencia de la responsabilidad que asumimos, del deber que 
contraemos, dispuestos como estamos a afianzar cada dia mas profundamente el 
proceso liberador de Cuba y su sintesis nacional: de Cespedes a Marti, de Marti a 
Fidel Castro (Bohemia 1977d, 54). 
As in some of the examples already discussed, Cuba's independence was here 
presented as an on-going process, and one which needed to be further consolidated 
by the Cuban people. Guillen was also contributing to the presentation of Cuban 
history as a single, linear narrative of persistent struggle. This presentation was 
evident in his linking together of three heroic figures in, 'de Cespedes a Marti, de 
Marti a Fidel Castro', which seemed to imply a natural progression between the 
different stages of revolutionary struggle. 
A similarly deliberate attempt at establishing commonalities between historic figures 
was evident in the 1979 book Maceo y Che, which was published by Editorial Gente 
Nueva, a specialist in books for children and young adults and housed under the 
lnstituto del Libro, which, as mentioned, formed part of the Ministerio de Cultura. 
The purpose of this short book was to highlight the similarities between Antonio 
Maceo and Che Guevara through a selection of historical texts and, in doing so, to re-
assert the relevance of these two 'heroes' to a younger audience. Specifically, it 
aimed to reveal that the two shared similar values, values which the Cuban youth 
should endeavour to emulate. As an illustration, on the back cover of the book it was 
written: 
La coincidencia hist6rica de haber nacido ambos el mismo dia no es 10 unico que une 
a estas dos figuras excepcionales, hay rasgos mas sobresalientes que a(man estas dos 
voluntades: La valentia, la intransigencia, la honestidad, el senti do de la solidaridad 
( ... ) distantes en el tiempo, pero unidas par el mismo ideal: el amor a la Iibertad 
(Alvarez Tabio and Soto Valdespino, 1979). 
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Included in the text was a speech given by Che Guevara on 7 December 1962 to 
commemorate the death of Maceo. In the speech, Guevara praised the Cuban people 
for their actions during the Bay of Pigs invasion: 
Nuestro pueblo todo fue un Maceo, nuestro pueblo todo estuvo disputandose la 
primera Ifnea de combate en una batalla donde todo seria frente y donde seriamos 
atacados desde el aire, desde el mar, desde la tierra, cumpJiendo nuestra funci6n de 
vanguardia del mundo socialista en este momento, en este lugar preciso de la lucha 
(Alvarez Tabio and Soto Valdespino 1979, 80). 
The inclusion of such a speech in a text published in 1979, and indeed the 
publication of the text itself, was significant, given that it clearly communicated 
guerrillerista ideas to the reader, such as that of the vanguard and lucha. as 
evidenced in the above citation. The text's publication suggests that guerrillerismo 
continued to be promoted until the end of the decade. Moreover, it is important to 
acknowledge that this particular text was directed solely at young people. The 
book's intended audience implies that the leadership was keen to inculcate 
guerrillerista values, and not, therefore, those associated with 'militarism'. upon the 
new generation of revolutionaries who did not have first-hand experience of the 
Revolution's insurrectionary phase. 
That said, while the above citations from 1977 and 1979 provide some evidence of a 
promotion of guerrillerismo in the second half of the decade, in general, we can note 
that a guerrillerista language became less identifiable in the hegemonic discourse 
post-1975. Where guerrillerismo was evident, it was often juxtaposed with a 
rhetoric which extolled the rapprochement with the Soviet Union. In the 7 October 
1977 issue of Bohemia, for example, articles which celebrated the legacy of Che 
Guevara (being, as it was, the eve of the tenth anniversary of his death), were 
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interspersed with articles narrating events from Soviet history, such as the Battle of 
Stalingrad and the October Revolution. Thus, it can be argued that, by the end of the 
decade, guerrillerismo and its constituent values ceased to feature so prominently in 
the hegemonic discourse ofthe Revolution. 
The above hypothesis is partly confirmed by an analysis of a text published in 1981, 
the Manual Basico del Miliciano de Tropas Terriloriales. Similar to the two core 
texts which have formed the focus of the analysis of the 1960s and 1970s - the 
1960 Manual de Capacitaciim Civica, and the 1973 Instruccion Politica FAR - this 
text was also published by MINF AR. The intended readership of the text were the 
members of the newly formed Milicias de Tropas Territoriales (MIT). Like their 
previous incarnation, the MNR of the 1960s, the MIT were a volunteer force which 
acted as an as adjunct to the FAR in the task of defending the nation. The MIT also 
served as a back-up force of reservists for MINF AR, and aided it in the 'construction 
of defences, delivery of supplies and other efforts' (Mazarr 1990, 277). The revival 
of a volunteer 'army' was deemed necessary in 1980 owing to the increase in US 
hostility following the election of Ronald Reagan. Kapcia contends of the period 
that, 'while no one believed that invasion might result (since Pentagon studies had 
repeatedly indicated that military action would be impractical and costly), the signs 
pointed to a new 'siege', renewed pressure, and 'the revival of vendetta politics' 
(Kapcia 2000, 204). The creation of the MIT was a key strategy in the new defence 
stance launched by the leadership in 1980, the Guerra de Todo el Pueblo. As its 
name suggests, the aim of this stance was to increase large-scale mobilisation around 
the task of defending the island to ensure that, in the event of an attack, the Cuban 
nation would be able to 'wage total war' against an invader (Klepak 2005, 46). 
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These new defensive capabilities were based primarily around a more effective co-
operation between volunteer milicianos and serving members of the FAR than had 
previously been witnessed, and received the full support of MINF AR (Klepak 2005, 
46). The opening paragraph of the 1981 Manual provided clarification concerning 
the role of the MIT: 
Las Milicias de Tropas Territoriales fonnadas por obreros, campesinos, estudiantes, 
amas de casa, jubiJados; por hombres y mujeres del pueblo cubano, que acudieron al 
lIamado de nuestro Comandante en Jefe en momentos en que el imperialismo yanqui 
aumenta sus amenazas agresivas contra nuestro pais, constituyen conjuntamente con el 
resto de las FAR, el brazo annado de la Revoluci6n y su misi6n fundamental es 
defender a nuestra Patria de las agresiones imperialistas, al mismo tiempo que 
garantizan la continuidad de la producci6n y eI desarrollo econ6mico del pais (Manual 
1981,7). 
The principal aim of the Manual itself was to act as an accompaniment to the 
practical military training the new milicianos were undergoing at the time of its 
publication. In other words, the Manual served as something of a handbook for 
transforming citizens into military men and women. The introduction directly 
addressed the reader in its explanation ofthe book's purpose: 
Tu, como miliciano, fonnas una parte importante de nuestras FAR y por ello 
constituyes uno de los pilares sobre los que descansa la seguridad y la tranquilidad de 
nuestro pueblo ( ... ) Para eso recibes la preparaci6n combativa, para que puedas 
desempel'lar exitosamente las misiones combativas que te asignen y cumplas ese 
sagrado deber de vivir por tu Patria y por tu pueblo ( ... ) Ese es el objetivo de tu 
preparaci6n, pero para lograrlo tienes que poner todo tu empef'io, tu atenci6n y tu 
entusiasmo en las clases y ejercicios que recibas y ademas estudiar y practicar 10 que 
te ensef'ian. Para ayudarte en ello se hizo este manual (Manual 1981, 7). 
The Manual was divided into thirteen chapters, all of which, bar the first chapter 
'Generalidades', were concerned with the practical, rather than the ideological, 
aspects of military training. The chapter titles included: 'Distribuci6n del Tiempo y 
Orden Diario'; 'Disciplina Militar'; 'Instrucci6n de Infanteria'; 'Preparaci6n 
Tactica'; 'Preparaci6n de Tiro'. 
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Despite the text's explicit focus on the practicalities of military service, some, albeit 
few, elements of guerrillerismo were still discernible. Most noticeably, the emphasis 
on deber, so omnipresent in the hegemonic discourse throughout the 1960s and 
1970s, continued to be expressed frequently in the Manual. An example of the 
incorporation of this 'lexical item' is identifiable in the following citation: 
Ese deber dimana de mi lealtad a los principios de la Revoluci6n Cubana, a la 
tradici6n mambisa de nuestro pueblo ( ... ) y al ejemplo del glorioso Ejercito Rebelde. 
de las milicias obreras y campesinas, de los combatientes intemacionalistas. y de los 
heroicos miembros de las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias (Manual 1981. 8). 
This extract also demonstrates a sustained use of Cuban history as a means of 
inspiring a new generation of revolutionaries. Here, the text encouraged an 
emulation of the examples set by pre-Revolution revolutionaries with its references 
to the 'tradici6n mambisa', and also the 'Ejercito Rebelde'. 
Additionally, the text sporadically promoted values associated with guerrillerismo. 
An illustration of such values was manifest in the chapter 'Preparaci6n Tactica': 
'Debes tener presente que la tenacidad, la disciplina, la valentia, la ingeniosidad y la 
firme voluntad son condiciones indispensables para obtener la victoria sobre el 
enemigo' (Manual 1981, 75). The mention of voluntad, in particular, reflected the 
stress on subjective will central to the ioco theory, and maintained the emphasis on 
this attribute in the hegemonic discourse of the 60s and 70s. Indeed, the excerpt's 
focus on the essential values which a miliciano should possess was indicative of the 
attention that was still being paid to the role ofthe individual in revolutionary action. 
Overall, however, and unlike in the two previous MINF AR training manuals, a 
promotion of guerrillerismo was conspicuous by its absence in the Manual Basico 
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del Miliciano de Tropas Territoriales. As stated, the text's focus was largely on the 
finer details of military service, on guiding its readers in their development as 
military reservists. Within this focus, there was seemingly little room for any 
ideological or political instruction. What mattered was that these volunteers 
possessed a sound grasp of what it meant to be a soldier. In this way, the 1981 
Manual serves here as something of a counterpoint to the other training manuals 
discussed in this thesis. Its distinct lack of guerrillerista elements, along with the 
conscious or unconscious phasing out of a guerrillerista rhetoric in texts which were 
published after 1975, suggests that, by the early 1980s, guerrillerismo no longer 
encompassed the values or the ethos which the leadership wished to inculcate upon 
its citizens. 
What also differentiated the Manual Basico del Miliciano de Tropas Territoriales 
from the previous two manuals, and, indeed, from the majority of the texts from the 
1960s and early 1970s, was its portrayal of Cuba as a nation besieged. While in 
earlier texts the references to potential aggressive attacks from the United States 
were always counter posed with a tone of confident defiance, expressed through 
allusions to the strength of the Cuban people in resisting imperialist domination, the 
MIT Manual conveyed a sense of resignation to an enemy strike on Cuba, and, in 
place of emphasising the collective power of citizens, it instead focussed on the 
military capabilities of the FAR and the Tropas Territoriales combined. In other 
words, it stressed the importance of meeting the enemy on an equal footing, of 
responding to an inevitable military strike with comparable military force. 
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Indications of a 'siege mentality' were present from the first page of the text. In the 
previously discussed citation from the Manual's introduction, for instance, it was 
stated that the volunteer milicianos: 
( ... ) acudieron al llamado de nuestro Comandante en Jefe en momentos en que eI 
imperialismo yanqui aumenta sus amenazas agresivas contra nuestra pais ( ... ) su 
misi6n fundamental es defender a nuestra Patria de las agresiones imperialistas 
(Manual 1981 , 7). 
The contention that the United States was, at that moment, increasing its aggressive 
threats against Cuba set the tone for the rest of the text, as did the statement that the 
'misi6n fundamental' of the MTT was to defend the nation against imperialist 
aggression. 
The text also underlined the possibility that an attack could involve weapons of mass 
destruction, as demonstrated in the title of Chapter Twelve: 'Protecci6n contra las 
Armas de Exterminio en Masa y los Medios Incendiarios'. The introduction to the 
chapter stated: 
En caso de agresi6n contra la Republica de Cuba, el enemigo imperialista y sus 
aliados pueden recurrir al empleo de las armas de exterminio en masa. 19ualmente 
pueden ser empleados los medios incendiarios (Manual 1981, 249), 
The chapter then listed the types of weapon which could be employed against Cuba 
- nuclear, biological, and chemical - and how milicianos could learn to detect and 
protect themselves from such weapons. This concentration on aggressive measures 
which had the potential to annihilate the Cuban nation compounded the siege 
mentality which the text promoted. 
252 
Also in contrast to the guerrillerisla rhetoric expressed in previous texts, the MTT 
Manual did not downplay the weaponry available to the FAR and to the MIT. Many 
of the examples discussed in the analysis attributed the strength of the Cuban people 
to their deep-rooted values, and to the historical legacy of resistance from which they 
could draw inspiration. It was these elements which would allow the Revolution to 
resist imperialist aggression and, ultimately, survive. In this text, however, the 
potential of the FAR and the MIT to defend the island effectively was based largely 
upon their combined firepower and the cutting-edge weaponry both forces possessed. 
The following citation illustrated this new focus: 
La calidad del armamento que posee tu batall6n y su gran volumen de fuego, 
conjuntamente con tu alta moral combativa. hani que tu unidad sea invencible en el 
combate (Manual 1981, 171). 
In this excerpt, the main clause - 'La calidad del armamento que posee tu bata1l6n y 
su gran volumen de fuego ( ... ) hani que tu unidad sea invencible en el combate' -
clearly stated that it was the quality of a batallion's weaponry which determined its 
invincibility. Conversely, while the moral factor was still included, it was 
incorporated only in the subordinate clause. This grammatical construction gave the 
impression that the role of morality in combat had been included as something of an 
afterthought. 
Thus far, it has been established that the MIT Manual largely deviated in message 
and tone from the texts which had come before it. Yet there was one aspect of the 
language employed in the text which recalled the rhetoric of the 1960s and 70s, and 
which has been identified in a number of texts already discussed: religiosity. The 
religious undertones of the text were apparent from the outset. The first page 
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following the Introduction featured the 'Juramento del Miliciano'. This 'oath' began 
with the words: 
EI juramento militar es un compromiso de honor que hacemos can la Patria, con la 
Revoluci6n, con los heroes, can los martires y con la tradici6n combativa de nuestros 
«CIEN ANOS DE LUCHA» (Manual 1981, 8). 
The opening of the text with a 'Juramento' had obvious religious connotations, given 
that oaths tend to call on a divine witness in the act of their declaration. The 
obligation of the miliciano to take such an oath implied that the leadership expected a 
religious devotion to the Revolution from its volunteers. The formality of the oath, 
and the sense that the miliciano was entering into an unbreakable agreement, was 
reinforced by the requirement to sign and date the document. Furthermore, the 
religiosity ofthe citation was further compounded by the reference to 'los martires'. 
The religious lexicon underpinned the entire text. In Chapter Five, 'La Bandera 
(Gallardete) de Combate', an additional example of religious language can be 
identified: 
La Bandera (Gallardete) de Combate de la unidad (pequefia unidad) de las MIT es un 
simbolo de honor, heroismo y gloria del miliciano; representa un recordatorio a cada 
miliciano de su sagrado deber de servir fielmente a la Patria, defender valiente y 
abnegadamente cada palmo de la tierra natal contra los enemigos, sin escati mar su 
sangre ni la propia vida (Manual 1981, 31). 
The reference to 'sagrado deber', in particular, is significant here, and in numerous 
other examples in the text. The attachment of the modifying adjective 'sagrado', 
with its obvious holy connotations, to the 'lexical item' deber, added further weight 
to the moral commitment of the miliciano to serve the Revolution and the palria. 
The accomplishment of one's duty was presented as though it were an act of 
devotion to some higher power. In this case, such a higher power was an 
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anthropomorphised vision of the patria. What is more, in this construction, the 
historicity behind the meaning of deber, and the pre-existing weight of the tenn, was 
further compounded, insofar as it suggested that the idea of revolutionary duty was 
so inscribed in Cuban history as to have become sacrosanct. The religiosity of this 
extract also comes through in its declaration that it was the sacred duty of the 
miliciano to 'servir fie1mente a la patria'. As before, this phrase reinforced the idea 
that the exercising of one's duty was symbolic of a quasi-religious veneration of the 
homeland. It should also be acknowledged that the previously discussed citation 
from the Introduction established the religious element to the text from its opening 
lines. To recall this citation, it stated: 
Til, como miliciano, formas una parte importante de nuestras FAR y por ello 
constituyes uno de los pilares sobre los que descansa la seguridad y la tranquilidad de 
nuestro pueblo, que trabaja por el futuro, conflado en tu capacidad para cumplir el 
sagrado deber de defender nuestra Patria y nuestra Revoluci6n. Para eso recibes la 
preparaci6n combativa, para que puedas desempef\ar exitosamente las misiones 
combativas que te asignen y cumplas ese sagrado deber de vivir por tu Patria y por tu 
pueblo, para aniquiJar al enemigo agresor y aun lIegar al sacriflcio de la vida si es 
necesario, como tantos heroes y martires para garantizar la felicidad de esta 
generaci6n y las futuras ( ... ) (Manual 1981, 7). 
In this extract, the repetition of the term 'sagrado deber', in addition to the 
employment of the words 'sacrificio' and 'martires', applied religious undertones to 
the Manual which, in tum, underscored the gravity of the task which the volunteer 
force had opted to undertake. 
Conclusion 
The extensive analysis of a cross-section of texts carried out in this chapter leaves 
little doubt that guerrillerismo continued to feature heavily in the hegemonic 
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discourse of the 1970s, at least in the early part of the decade. A close inspection of 
a range of texts published by various institutions has revealed that, through the 
reproduction and repetition of guerrillerista statements, the ideas and values 
associated with the guerrilla ethos remained in circulation throughout Cuban society, 
and thus in the public imagination, well into the second decade. Similar to the 
rhetoric of the 1960s, the promotion of guerrillerismo was largely achieved through 
statements that supported the teleological re-presentation of the Cuban historical 
narrative. Specifically, the portrayal of heroic figures from this history allowed for 
the presentation of guerrillerismo's constituent values, namely courage, deber, Ilicha, 
voluntad, derecho, among others. Readers, both civilian and military, were 
encouraged to emulate such values in the task of supporting and defending the 
Revolution. In turn, this active support of the Revolution would ensure the 
independence of the Cuban nation, an independence which was, at times, depicted as 
a vulnerable condition. The communication of these guerrillerista messages to a 
military audience was of particular significance, given the FAR's profound 
transformation into a more professionalised institution from the late 60s onwards. 
The elevation of the mambises and the guerrilleros of the Sierra Maestra 
demonstrated that, while the FAR might have re-organised itself around the Soviet 
model, the values which had underpinned the institution in the 1960s, and which 
motivated its members, remained unchanged. 
Another aspect which the discourse of the 1970s had in common with that of the 
previous decade was the sense of defiance it communicated to its audience. Any 
mention of outside threats to Cuban sovereignty was always juxtaposed with 
references to the strength of the Cuban people, and their historically proven ability to 
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overcome seemingly unbeatable odds. The expression of this confidence challenges 
the notion that the leadership's principal means of mobilising its citizens has, since 
1959, involved a constant overplaying of the Revolution's susceptibility to attack 
from its enemy neighbour to the north. Such a notion, as discussed in the 
Introduction, has been espoused by numerous scholars, notably Fernandez, who 
contended: 
Threats from the U.S. and the Dominican Republic and from within ( ... ) in the initial 
hours led to militarization and the perception of Cuba as a besieged island. Thereafter, 
the regime has exploited this image to rally support and exert control through popular 
defense mobilization (Fernandez 1989, 3). 
What the evidence from the first part of the 1970s reveals is that, far from 
encouraging a permanent 'siege mentality', the leadership instead sought to cultivate 
the strength of its own people through the use of positive examples of courage and 
bravery borrowed from Cuban history. Moreover, rather than simply battening down 
the hatches in anticipation of an enemy attack, the Revolution asserted itself as an 
agent of revolutionary action. To its soldiers, it stressed the necessity of foquisra 
warfare in countries dominated by imperialist forces, and the duty of the Cuban 
people to express their solidarity with such struggles. The confirmation of the 
Revolution's continued commitment to its principles of internationalism came in the 
form of its participation in the Angolan Civil War, commencing in 1975. 
After 1975, however, the presence of guerrillerista (and, at times, foquisra) 
statements in the hegemonic discourse became less apparent. The few examples in 
which a more implicit guerrillerismo was promoted in the second half of the decade 
tended to be juxtaposed with messages which extolled the flourishing relationship 
between Cuba and the Soviet Union. The starting point for the gradual 
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disappearance of guerrillerismo from the official discourse seemed to coincide with 
the convening of the First Communist Party Congress in 1975. As previously 
mentioned, the Congress heralded the greater institutionalisation of PCC rule, in 
additional to the implementation of new economic policies, both of which seemed to 
confirm the Revolution's increasing commitment to Soviet orthodoxy (Suchlicki 
1997, 185). 
The phasing out of guerrillerismo as a means of bolstering citizen morale seemed to 
be complete by the early 1980s. The absence of a guerrillerista language in the 1981 
Manual del Miliciano de Tropas Territoriales provided evidence that the leadership 
no longer employed guerrillerismo to inspire revolutionary action. Instead, the text 
encouraged a religious devotion to the Revolution, while concomitantly nurturing a 
'siege mentality' through an increased focus on the potential of an enemy attack, and 
the means by which the Revolution could defend itself from such an attack. 
The attempt to develop such a mentality in the mind of the reader, and the 
requirement that milicianos possess an abiding faith in the cause of the Revolution, 
reflected the changes that were taking place within the Revolution, and in the country 
more generally. Between 1975 and 1985, a process of 'coherent institutionalisation' 
took place, within which the rule of the PCC was well and truly established (Kapcia 
2000,222). This process put an end to the debate which had afflicted the leadership 
in the early 1970s regarding the course of the Revolution: thereafter, it would 
subscribe to the Soviet model of communist rule. The new-found stability meant that 
the fonner gue"illeros within the Cuban government were no longer forced to 
defend so finnly their hegemony in the political vanguard. In other words, they no 
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longer had to derive historical legitimacy from their guerrilla activity in the sierra. 
What is more, for Cuban citizens, the public face of the Revolution was now the 
Party itself, and not so much the individuals of which it was comprised. For this 
reason, the former guerrilleros could not be seen to be actively strenbJthening their 
own historical legacy through the promotion of guerrillerismo. 
Where guerrillerismo now seemed to be irrelevant to the Revolution's new political 
project, an increased religiosity acted as an effective substitute. In the same way in 
which guerrillerismo had encouraged Cuban citizens to emulate the heroic 
guerrilleros who had featured throughout Cuba's history of guerrilla struggle, the 
religious language found in the 1981 Manual, for example, implored the reader to 
honour the revolutionary legacy through a religious-like devotion to the Revolution 
in power. This devotion could be expressed through a commitment to defending the 
pa/ria from imperialist aggression. In this way, the strengthening of the religious 
element to the hegemonic discourse went hand in hand with the promotion of a 
'siege mentality'. The presentation of Cuba as a nation besieged was understandable 
at that point in the Revolution's trajectory. Not only had the US stepped up its 
hostility to Cuba under the presidency of Ronald Reagan, but Cuba had experienced 
its own internal crisis in 1980: the Mariel boatlift (Klepak 2005, 46). The boatlift 
took place between April and October of that year, and saw a mass exodus of 
125,000 Cubans to Florida (Gott 2004, 266). This crisis, combined with the 
increasingly aggressive stance of the United States, shook the foundations of the 
Cuban government. With this context in mind, it is unsurprising that the leadership 
should seek reassurance in the devotion of its people, not to mention their physical 
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involvement in the task of defending the Revolution, the latter being most clearly 
evidenced in the launch of the Guerra de Todo el Pueblo in 1980. 
The preparations put in place for waging a potential 'total war' and the cultivation of 
a 'siege mentality' in the early 1980s in many ways seem to conform to the defining 
characteristics of 'militarism' which were outlined in the Introduction. Yet, at this 
point in the thesis, it has already been made abundantly clear that, with its origins in 
a guerrilla army and its commitment to serve the Cuban people, the FAR does not 
conform to standard definitions of military institutions, particularly those in other 
Latin American countries (Klepak 2005, 56). Thus, while the FAR did preside over 
the implementation of large-scale defence strategies in the 80s, and a 'garrison state 
mentality' was seemingly encouraged, the term 'militarism' remains inappropriate to 
the Cuban context (Fernandez 1989, 3). Though an explicit promotion of 
guerrillerismo was not in evidence, the guerrilla legacy was still manifest in the 
physical presence of the former guerrilleros in the Cuban leadership, Moreover, and 
as stated in Chapter Two, while the present work considers guerrillerismo to 
constitute one of the defining codes which make up cubania, it also accepts that the 
values and beliefs that make up cubania may be modified, or feature more or less 
prominently in the hegemonic discourse, at difference junctures (Kapcia 2000, 18). 
With this point in mind, we can propose that, in the 1980s, guerrillerismo did not 
disappear entirely, it was simply displaced, temporarily, by other codes which better 
served the needs of the leadership at that particular stage in the trajectory of the 
Revolution in power. This conclusion is confirmed by the evidence presented in the 
following chapter, which will reveal that the third decade was but a parenthesis in the 
leadership's on-going perpetuation of the guerrilla ethos. In the 1990s, when the 
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Revolution was confronted with a very real threat to its survival, guerrillerismo was 




The Cuban Revolution in the 1990s: A Return to Guerrillerismo? 
The evidence discussed thus far in this study has con finned that the presence of 
guerrillerismo in the hegemonic discourse of the Cuban Revolution was palpable in 
the first decade of the Revolution in power and, somewhat surprisingly, in the 
supposedly 'Sovietised' period of the early 1970s. What we can sunnise from these 
findings is that the recourse to this ideological code occurred at times when the 
Revolution was under threat. This threat derived both from internal pressures, often 
related to disputes among the leadership concerning the direction of the Revolution, 
and increased external hostilities to the revolutionary programme which, at times, 
saw the country isolated from its Latin American neighbours (and in the world more 
generally). While the latter threat could be considered a constant in the Revolution's 
history, given the unyielding political stance of the United States, at certain moments 
the belligerence emanating from the north was more vocal and direct than at others, 
perhaps the most obvious example being the failed Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961. 
This heightened aggression influenced other nations to turn their backs on Cuba, 
leaving it to stand alone on the world stage. The present work has so far 
demonstrated that, at such moments of isolation in the 1960s and 1970s, the leaders 
ofthe Revolution employed a discourse which actively promoted the values of which 
guerrillerismo is comprised. Such an endorsement constituted an attempt to steel the 
population for resisting the pressures placed upon the Revolution at times when its 
future seemed uncertain or, to borrow the more commonly used tenn, when the 
island appeared to be under 'siege'. 
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With this trend in mind, it is reasonable to ask whether this type of rhetoric was 
evident at other points in the Revolution's trajectory. From the texts already 
examined, we have established that there was little indication of a promotion of 
guerrillerismo during the late 1970s and the 1980s. In its third decade, the 
Revolution was indeed facing up to a new challenge which threatened to destabilise 
it: the intensification in US hostility towards the island under the newly-elected 
President Ronald Reagan. Yet, as we have seen, an examination of the Cuban 
leadership's discourse from the early part of the decade soon confirmed that 
guerrillerismo was not invoked as a means of mobilising the population around the 
task of defending the Revolution. Instead, those in power appeared intent on 
stepping up the island's military capabilities, and on conferring a more military 
mindset upon the Cuban people. Citizens were encouraged to become 'soldiers' of 
the Guerra de Todo e/ Pueblo, the militias of the 1960s were revived as territorial 
'troops', and mobilisation on the whole decreased. This shift to a more 'militaristic' 
approach can be explained by the continued support Cuba was still receiving from 
the Soviet Union, both militarily and in more general terms. Though ostensibly under 
'siege' from the United States, the Revolution could still count on the backing of the 
world's other superpower, rendering it less vulnerable than it might otherwise have 
been. What is more, in the first half of the 1980s, the Revolution was no longer 
plagued by the in-fighting which had marked the leadership during the first decade 
and a half in power. The First Communist Party Congress of 1975 saw to it that 
revolutionary rule was concentrated in the hands of the Communist Party, and 
brought with it confirmation that the Revolution was firmly headed in the direction 
of Soviet orthodoxy. This consolidation of the leadership put an end to the 
competition for hegemony within the ranks of power. In short, it was no longer 
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necessary for the former guerrilleros to employ guerrillerismo as a means of 
legitimising their dominance. 
In the 1990s, however, there is no denying that Cuba stood alone. The collapse of 
the Soviet Union in 1991 saw the Revolution face its greatest test since the 
counterrevolutionary invasions of the 1960s: the so-called 'Special Period'. Cuba 
faced unprecedented economic hardships following the dissolution of Comecon and 
the subsequent loss of approximately eighty per cent of its trade, the withdrawal of 
Soviet troops from the island signalled the end of Moscow's military support, and the 
Revolution lost its principal ideological ally, leaving it further isolated in its defence 
of socialism (Yaffe 2009, 265). 
Cuba's economic woes were exacerbated by the aggressive measures of the United 
States. In October 1992, the US administration introduced the Cuban Democracy 
Act, also known as the Torricelli Act, which strengthened the existing embargo by 
prohibiting subsidiaries of US companies in third countries from trading with Cuba 
(Blight and Brenner 2007, 175). These sanctions would only be lifted if the Cuban 
government introduced free and fair (as judged by Washington) elections (Gott 2004, 
303). The measures were further tightened with the passing of the Helms-Burton Act 
in 1996 which also laid down more specific guidelines for the imposition of 
democracy in Cuba, including the stipulation that both Fidel and Raul be forbidden 
from participating in any future democratic government (Gott 2004, 304). The strict 
resolutions did much to discourage the investment of foreign capital in Cuba at a 
time when the country needed it most. The future of the Revolution was thrown into 
question, especially by countless external commentators who wasted no time in 
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proclaiming that the end was nigh for Castro's government. A notable example was 
the Miami-based journalist, Andres Oppenheimer, who predicted the imminent 
breakdown of Cuban Communism in his 1992 book, Castro's Final Hour: The 
Secret Story Behind the Coming Downfall of Communist Cuba (Oppenheimer, 1992). 
Marifeli Perez-Stable was similarly sceptical regarding the Revolution's future, 
writing in 1993: 
by the early 1990s, Cuban socialism was becoming increasingly untenable. The 
international conditions that had buttressed it rapidly disappeared. ( ... ). The end of the 
cold war had also weakened Cuban national security. The world that had allowed the 
Cuban Revolution to consolidate and the Cuban government to sustain socialism had 
come to an end (Perez-Stable 1993, 174). 
Yet, in spite of the gravity of the problems it faced, the Revolution did survive the 
challenges of the Special Period, with its socialist principles still largely intact. As 
Perez-Stable herself stated, 'when the government declared the special period in 
peacetime, it signalled a commitment to socialism against all odds' (Perez-Stable 
1993, 158). The leadership was prepared to go to extreme lengths to protect the 
Revolution, and committed itself to mobilising the popUlation into supporting and 
defending it. Specifically, and as had begun with the Rectification process, those at 
the helm of the Revolution looked to the 1960s for inspiration as to how to solve the 
monumental problems the country faced. Cuba had survived countless challenges 
during its first decade, and had successfully rallied Cubans around the cause of 
defending the Revolution at all costs. It appeared, therefore, that lessons could be 
learnt from the actions taken in those formative years. Consequently, with the onset 
of the Special Period came also a conscious resurgence of the writings of Che 
Guevara and a renewed glorification of Cuban history, while Cuban youth once again 
became the focus of the leadership's mobilisation drives (Kapcia 2000,207). 
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As will become clear with the ensuing analysis, there is much evidence to support the 
hypothesis that the economic crisis of the 1990s engendered a revival of 
guerrillerismo within the official discourse in an attempt to maintain support for the 
Revolution, and to encourage greater efficiency in the workplace with a view to 
rescuing the failing economy. Furthermore, the clear evidence of guerrillerismo in 
the 1990s in tum undermines the notion that the Cuban leadership has persistently 
depended upon the cultivation of a 'siege mentality' as its principal mode of both 
mobilising the population and of garnering its support. As in Chapters Two and 
Three, this evidence can be derived from through an analysis of the discourse 
featured in a range of texts issued by the leadership in the 1990s. One of these text 
types is a number of speeches delivered by Fidel Castro. As discussed in the opening 
section of Chapter Two, key speeches made by figures of authority are useful 
indicators of the general mood of the Revolution and, from a Foucauldian 
perspective, of the 'true' statements that may come to be repeated and distributed 
throughout Cuban society by different practices and institutions. In the 1990s, when 
the Revolution faced possible collapse, speeches took on an added significance as the 
leadership made every effort to reassure the Cuban people, not to mention the rest of 
the world, that the Revolution would not be defeated. Speeches became a powerful, 
direct and immediate means ofrallying Cuban citizens around the cause of defending 
the Revolution, and of informing them of the leadership's imminent plans for its 
reconsolidation. In this way, official speeches possessed a resonance not seen since 
the 1960s, when they served as the principal medium through which the leadership 
could communicate its programme for the construction of the Revolution in power, 
as well as its cubanista (and thus guerrillerista) beliefs and values. 
266 
To showcase how the utterances made on behalf of the leadership were reproduced 
and at which moments during the 1990s, the chapter presents evidence from Cuba's 
leading daily newspaper Granma and, given the increased attention afforded to the 
Cuban youth during the 1990s, the weekly newspaper of the UJC, Juventud Rebelde. 
While the analysis does include excerpts from editions that appeared on key dates in 
the revolutionary calendar, examples from non-significant dates will also be featured 
as evidence that guerrillerismo was consistently identifiable during this decade. It 
should be noted here that access to other, similar texts from the 1990s can be limited. 
The MINF AR periodical Verde Olivo that was examined in the previous chapter, for 
example, ceased to be published on a weekly basis during the Special Period as a 
result of a paper shortage; it will not, therefore, be included in the analysis in this 
chapter.45 
Textual Analysis (1990-1999) 
From the opening days of 1990, there was little confusion as to the message the 
Cuban leadership intended to promote: the Cuban people were engaged in a battle to 
defend the Revolution at whatever cost. Citizens were encouraged to resistir and, 
above all, luchar if the Revolution was to stand any chance of survival. These 
messages all added up to an unmistakeable tone of defiance. 
In the 2 January 1990 edition of Granma, the first issue of that year, we can identify 
an emphasis on 'being prepared' for every occurrence, and, specifically, on being 
prepared to 'resist'. On page four, the headline across the double-page spread read: 
'Nos preparamos para la obra que estamos lIevando a cabo para defender el futuro 
45 Similar to the case of Verde Olivo, the shortage of paper during the Special Period also affected the 
output of Juvenlud Rebelde, forcing its transition from a daily to a weekly newspaper in 1990. 
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que estamos construyendo' (Granma 1990, 4). These words were Ii fted from a 
speech given by Fidel Castro on 29 December 1989 at the 'inauguraci6n de cinco 
plantas de materiales de construcci6n'. The speech was printed in its entirety below 
the headline. In this example of direct discourse representation, the phrase selected 
as the headline was significant in its summary ofthe intended message of the speech: 
to lay emphasis on the necessity of collective action to maintain the Revolution. By 
beginning the phrase with a first person plural, 'nos preparamos', Castro's address 
was immediately inclusive: Cuba was preparing itself as a people, thus it was not 
only the government that had to take action. This stress on the collective was 
underlined twice again with additional use of the first person plural in 'estamos 
lIevando a cabo para defender el futuro que estamos construyendo'. Though he was 
directly addressing those who worked in the manufacture of construction materials, 
the wider meaning of the verb 'construir' is noteworthy here; Castro conveyed the 
idea that the Cuban people were 'constructing' the future of the country. This notion 
is interesting in that it related to the guerrillerista precept of creating 'subjective 
conditions', and of being in charge of one's destiny through action. Castro seemed 
intent on underlining his point that it was in the hands of the Cuban people, as a 
collective, to shape their own futures; they would not be crushed by the 'objective 
conditions' which threatened the Revolution. Moreover, the present continuous 
tense employed in 'estamos construyendo' was effective in its implication that the 
Cuban people were already engaged in the process of building their future. This 
notion might have been encouraging for Cuban citizens, insofar as it suggested that 
the future was something attainable and concrete, and for which the foundations had 
already been laid. The statement was further underlined by the mention of 
'defender'. Again, the sense here was that the future was something which could be 
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controlled, and defended, through action. As has become evident through the 
discussion in the previous two chapters, the potential strength and power of the 
collective was a recurrent theme in the hegemonic discourse of the 1960s and 1970s. 
The 'future' was again referred to in the opening lines of Castro's speech: 
Estamos preparados para todo, para grandes avances en el futuro, y trabajamos para 
eso con optimismo ( ... ) Nos preparamos para resistir 10 que sea necesario resistir, nos 
preparamos para defender la Patria ( ... ) (Granma 1990, 4). 
Once more, the repetition of the first person plural (on four occasions here) 
highlighted the importance of collective action, and the inclusive nature of Castro's 
address. In both sentences, the idea of 'preparation' was foregrounded ('estamos 
preparados'; 'Nos preparamos') which served to underline the portrayal of the Cuban 
people as ready for whatever challenges lay ahead. The projection of this image 
aimed both to bolster the confidence of the Cuban people in a moment of crisis, and 
to inform foreign observers that the Revolution was in a position to withstand any 
aggression directed its way, as reflected in, '10 que sea necesario resistir'. There was 
a definite mood of defiance to these statements, in addition to a tone of positivity in 
the face of adversity, clearly conveyed in, 'trabcUamos para eso con optimismo'. 
This sense of optimism casts doubt upon the idea that a 'siege mentality' was 
prevalent at this stage, although it should be remembered that this speech was given 
before the pronouncement of the Special Period, and prior to the intensification in 
US hostility towards the island. 
The tone of defiance and the conviction that the Revolution would succeed was 
similarly evident in a speech given by Fidel Castro on 7 March 1990 to mark 'la 
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Clausura del V Congreso de la Federaci6n de Mujeres Cubanas'. Throughout the 
speech, Castro made continual reference to the resilience of the Cuban people and to 
their ability to defend the country, and underlined his bel ief that Cuba was not, and 
nor would it become, isolated. Castro contended: 
Y la teoria de la soledad ... Nunca quien defienda una causa como la que defiende Cuba 
estara solo ( ... ). Esperen, y si quieren nos 10 dan despues que estemos muertos, porque 
al mismo tiempo, van a tener que levantar una bandera, rendirle un homenaje al 
pueblo que supo ser todo 10 valiente que necesitaba ser en esta era y que supo defender 
con la fuerza y el heroismo necesarios la causa que Ie ha tocado defender en esta 
epoca ( ... ) No vamos a estar solos, pero esa es una respuesta que les doy a aquellos 
que se preocupan de que si por todos estos problemas y 10 que pas6 alIi y alIa nos 
vamos a quedar aislados ( ... ) EI hecho de que nos preparemos y de que estemos 
dispuestos a vivirlo y a hacer 10 que se corresponda en ese momento, es 10 que nos 
hace sentir seguros y tranquilos, y es 10 que nos da la convicci6n de que saldremos 
adelante, aunque pueda venir un periodo de ese tipo, como tenemos tambien la 
convicci6n de que saldremos victoriosos (Castro, 1990b). 
It is notable here that 'soledad' was referred to as a 'teoria', rather than a reality. 
Castro unequivocally stated that 'No vamos a estar solos', again employing the first 
person plural to underscore the collective nature of Cuba's predicament. The sense 
of optimism was also retained in these words, indicated by the phrase: 'EI hecho de 
que nos preparemos y de que estemos dispuestos a vivirlo y a hacer 10 que se 
correspond a en ese momento, es 10 que nos hace sentir seguros y tranquilos'. 
Consistent with the December 1989 speech, the emphasis was on preparation, and 
how, through being prepared, the Cuban people were able to feel 'seguros y 
tranquilos'. Moreover, the use of parallelism found in 'Ia convicci6n de que 
saldremos adelante' and 'Ia convicci6n de que saldremos victoriosos' further 
highlighted the message that the Cuban people were unwavering in their belief that 
they would overcome the obstacles confronting the Revolution in the early 1990s. 





survival of the Revolution because the Cuban people, through their actions, 
possessed control over its destiny. 
The theme of defiance and the notion that the Cuban pueblo determined the 
Revolution's future was sustained in another of Castro's speeches given on the 26 
July 1990, shortly before the official pronouncement of the Special Period. Castro 
stated: 
EI pasado aflo ( ... ) aborde estos temas y expJique cmil era nuestra actitud, CUlII debfa 
ser nuestra aetitud; eUlil era y emll debia ser la aetitud de nuestro pueblo y cual debia 
ser la aetitud de nuestro pueblo; cual era y eual debia ser la aetitud de nuestro Partido 
y de nuestros militantes revolucionarios; eual debia ser la aetitud de los eomunistas, 
eua) debia ser la aetitud de los patriotas; eual debia ser )a actitud de los millones de 
hombres y mujeres de honor de nuestro pais: jLa da luehar, luehar, luehar; la de 
resistir, resistir, resistir en cualquier eireunstancia! (Castro, ] 990b). 
In this extract, Castro reiterated his words from a speech given in the previous year 
in order to underline their continued relevance. The primacy of an 'actitud de lucha' 
was particularly apparent. This recurrent reference is indicative of a promotion of a 
code of guerrillerismo, insofar as it underlined the subjective nature of the task of 
defending the Revolution. Castro was attempting to instil the notion that the actions 
and SUbjective will of each and every Cuban were fundamental to the survival of the 
Revolution. This message was accentuated further by the listing of the different 
sectors of society of which the Revolution was composed (for example, 'nuestro 
pueblo'; 'nuestro Partido'; 'nuestros militantes revolucionarios'). By naming each 
group separately, Castro intended to produce, once again, a sense that the defence of 
the Revolution was a duty of each citizen, regardless of their role in society. 
Furthermore, the employment of the possessive pronoun 'nuestro' compounded the 
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attribution of a collective responsibility to the Cuban people, particularly in the 
repetition of 'nuestro pueblo'. 
Further evidence of the presence of a code of guerrillerismo in the above extract can 
be found in the parallels with Guevara's own words in La Guerra de Guerrillas. 
Guevara wrote: 'Ia actitud de lucha, esa actitud que no debe desmayar en ningun 
momento, esa intlexibilidad frente a los grandes problemas del objetivo final, es 
tambien la grandeza del guerrilJero' (Guevara 2006, 21). Castro's continued 
emphasis on 'actitud' clearly echoed Guevara's original statement. Moreover, in 
addition to recalling the words of the guerrillero heroico himself, Castro invoked the 
Cuban traditions of deber and lucha in the parallelism employed in the phrasing of 
this extract. It has already been well established in the thesis that these two terms are 
'lexical items' within the context of the Cuban Revolution, and are often juxtaposed. 
In other words, they are terms which have a fixed meaning with recognisable 
connotations, and thus would have resonated with the audience. It is telling that 
Fidel Castro continued to employ these terms in the ] 990s as a means of mobilising 
citizens, much as he had done in the 1960s and early ] 970s. By its fourth decade, the 
Revolution was markedly different to what had come before it, having adapted over 
the years to address the innumerable challenges it had confronted. Yet, as this 
citation demonstrates, the language employed by the leadership in times of crisis 
remained unchanged. Specifically, it drew on incontestable terms which were firmly 
rooted in the Cuban psyche, and whose meaning derived from pre-Revolution 
history. 
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Elsewhere in this particular speech of Castro's, it is possible to find additional clues 
that point to a promotion of guerrillerismo by the revolutionary leader. As an 
example, Castro stated: 
creen los imperialistas yanquis que no podremos resistir. jQue poco conocen a 
nuestro pueblo!, a este pueblo que cuando empezaba, cuando no era todavia una 
naci6n total mente formada sostuvo una guerra de 10 ailos, en la manigua, contra una 
de las potencias militares mas poderosas de Europa en aquella epoca (Castro, 1990b). 
In this instance, Castro made an appeal to the collective historical memory of the 
audience through his allusion to the Ten Years' War. As established in the 
discussion of the ] 960s and ] 970s, this period in Cuban history was often evoked by 
the revolutionary leadership as a means of legitim ising the perpetual call for 
revolutionary action. The purpose of this particular reference was no different. 
Castro intended to inspire Cuban citizens by reminding them of the country's 
revolutionary tradition, by underscoring the fact that, despite facing a far superior 
enemy in terms of strength and size, the fragile and divided nation of the late 1800s 
had stood firm for ten years in its war against the Spanish colonial power. It is clear, 
then, that Castro's objective was to draw parallels between the Ten Years' War and 
the crisis of the 1990s. If Cuba had successfully challenged a formidable enemy in 
the past, there was no apparent reason that it could not do so again. 
This notion regarding the ability of el pueblo to defeat a much larger, more organised 
enemy was undoubtedly linked to the key precept which underpinned Guevara's 
guerrilla warfare methodology: 'Las fuerzas populares pueden ganar una guerra 
contra el ejercito' (Guevara 2006, 13). Castro seemed intent on promoting this tenet 
at this point. The use of the possessive pronoun in 'nuestro pueblo' reinforced the 
idea that the Cuban people had a collective ownership of their history, and a 
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collective duty to defend the legacy of their ancestors. What is more, the 
demonstrative pronoun applied in 'este pueblo que cuando comenzaba ... ' added a 
sense of immediacy to Castro's words. The past and present were fused in this latter 
phrase, insofar as Castro did not differentiate between the audience standing before 
him and the pueblo which had participated in the Ten Years' War. This phrasing did 
much to strengthen the implication here that the Cuban people, through their actions, 
continued to write the historical narrative of revolutionary struggle begun in the 
previous century. 
Castro achieved the effect of conflating the moment of crisis in 1990 and the Ten 
Years' War through the use of presupposition, an inherent feature of the hegemonic 
discourse of the 1960s and early 1970s. He assumed that his audience would have 
sufficient knowledge of the events and significance of the struggles of the 
independence period to understand and recognise the parallels he hoped to establish. 
This 'general appeal to "background knowledge'" had an ideological function, in that 
it sought to promote guerrillerismo by praising those that had previously struggled 
against much larger enemies (Fairclough 1989, 154). 
Additional characteristics of a discourse of guerrillerismo are discernible in the 
speech. There was reference, for instance, to the voluntad of the Cuban people, 
expressed in the phrase: 'Les demostramos nuestra voluntad de lucha a los 
imperialistas, y les demostramos que cualquier aventura tend ran que pagarla a un 
precio impagable' (Castro, 1990b). The concept of voluntad was consistent with the 
pre-eminence of subjective will and the creation of SUbjective conditions proposed by 
guerrillerismo. In this instance, voluntad was portrayed as a feature of the collective, 
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as denoted in the possessive pronoun 'nuestra' which preceded it, in addition to the 
use of the first person plural employed twice in 'Ies demostramos' . 
The primacy of voluntad can also be identified in the book A problemas viejos 
soluciones nuevas: El Perfeccionamiento Empresarial en el MINF AR, published in 
1990. This brief text was produced by the FAR to provide additional guidance to its 
members on the economic changes which has been proposed by Rectification; given 
the FAR's increased role in economic matters during the Special Period, this text was 
directed first and foremost at those members who assumed such non-military 
responsibilities. The text, made up a collection of short essays, was edited by Julio 
Casas Regueiro, the aforementioned former guerrillero and long-standing raulisla 
who was promoted to the Council of Ministers when Raul Castro assumed the 
Presidency in 2008. One of its five chapters, written by Jose Cazaiias Reyes, a 
journalist and one-time war correspondent for Verde Olivo in Angola, was entitled, 
'Voluntad Joven', which demonstrated not only the importance afforded to 
subjective will in turning the economy around, but also the key role bestowed upon 
young people at that time. Furthermore, the text characterised the FAR on more than 
one occasion as forming 'una sola voluntad a la hora de acometer un empeno' (Casas 
Regueiro 1990, 95). In this way, the text was consistent with the idea discussed in 
the previous speech; subjective will was presented in relation to the collective which, 
as a body, could alter the course of the Revolution, whether it be through combat or 
the reconstruction of the Cuban economy. 
To return to Fidel Castro's discourse, in a speech given on the 26 July the following 
year (1991), Castro continued to push forward similar ideas regarding the primacy of 
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action and how, through action, the Cuban people could control the destiny of the 
Revolution. As was typical of his rhetoric, Castro again invoked the Cuban historical 
narrative, both as a means of adding weight to his words and to inspire his listeners. 
He asserted: 
lCon que nos pueden amenazar a nosotros que somos los descendientes de Maceo y 
de Marti, de Maximo G6mez y de Agramonte, del Che y de Camilo, de Abel 
Santamaria y Frank Pais? ( ... ) Mas bloqueo y mas sufrimiento que los que padecieron 
nuestros antepasados no los podremos sufrir jamas, porque hoy somos dueftos de la 
tierra, ya no pertenece sino al pueblo. 
Y la Revoluci6n Cubana es responsable, hist6ricamente, de sus propios hechos y de 
sus propios aetos. Y vean bien que decimos 'sus', porque fueron nuestros y no de 
otros, tenemos nuestras ideas, nuestras eoneepeiones, y hemos heeho las cosas a 
nuestra manera ( ... ) No habia, ni hay, ni habra nadie en el mundo que nos pueda dar 
6rdenes ( ... ) En esas condiciones tenemos nosotros que abrirnos paso. Es nuestro 
deber mas sagrado y mas elemental si queremos tener patria (Castro, 1991). 
As in the previous speech, the purpose here was to inspire and to reassure Cuban 
citizens by reminding them that they belonged to a tradition of revolutionary action. 
The continued employment of the first person plural, a distinguishing feature of 
Castro's rhetorical style, reinforced this message, for example in the first line, 'a 
nosotros que somos los descendientes ... '. The syndetic listing of significant figures 
from Cuba's history of revolutionary struggle was effective in allowing emphasis to 
be placed on each of these individuals, thus giving them equal weighting in terms of 
importance, while also accentuating the multiplicity of Cuba's national heroes. The 
overarching message of these citations, that of taking responsibility for one's destiny 
and of subjective action more generally, was evident throughout, perhaps most 
notably in the line, 'la Revolucion Cubana es responsable, historicamente, de sus 
propios hechos y de sus propios actos'. Here, Castro seemed to have been 
suggesting that, as the Revolution was responsible for its actions, it was also partly 
accountable, therefore, for the dire situation in which it found itself. Responsibility 




following sentence: 'decimos 'sus', porque fueron nuestros y no de otros, tenemos 
nuestras ideas, nuestras concepciones, y hemos hecho las cosas a nuestra manera' . 
In the final line, there is further indication of consistency with the code of 
guerrillerismo where Castro stated that, 'tenemos nosotros que abrirnos paso'. This 
statement, imploring Cubans to take steps towards protecting the Revolution, 
recalled the guerrillerista precept that one had to create the necessary subjective 
conditions for revolution; one had to take the initiative regardless of unfavourable 
objective conditions. This idea of making one's own way, of performing the first 
revolutionary action, was accentuated by the subsequent line, 'Es nuestro deber mas 
sagrado y mas elemental si queremos tener patria'. Once again, Castro invoked the 
Cuban tradition of deber to confer responsibility upon Cuban citizens for taking 
action to defend the Revolution. Such statements were reminiscent of the strikingly 
guerrillerista assertions of the I 960s. Specifically, they echoed the 1962 'Second 
Declaration of Havana' in which Castro proclaimed: 'EI deber de todo revolucionario 
es hacer la revoluci6n' (Castro 1962, 169). Moreover, another 'lexical item', that of 
patria, was also referenced, as an additional means of stirring the conscience of the 
listener. 
In the first years of the 1990s, clues which point to the presence of guerrillerismo 
can also be uncovered in the editions of Granma published on or after the date 
commemorating the anniversary of Guevara's death. 8 October 1967. The 8 October 
1991 issue, though not overflowing with articles devoted to 'el Che', did include the 
front page headline: 'Che: ejemplo vivo y presente'. Underneath were printed the 
words: 'Es nuestra determinaci6n de hacer mas con menos que tambien esta incluido 
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en el concepto que tanto defendi6 el Guerrillero Heroico' (Granma 1991, I). In this 
example, the reference to Guevara as an 'ejemplo vivo y presente' is interesting in 
terms of the promotion of guerrillerismo, insofar as it reveals how the leadership 
considered the archetypal guerrilla figure to hold continued relevance during the 
period in question. Through elevating Guevara as the model revolutionary, the 
leadership intended to encourage citizens to emulate the values and actions of the 
figure of the guerrillero. What is more, the idea of 'hacer mas con menos' was 
consistent with the principle which underpinned guerrillerismo: fomenting 
revolution with just a handful of combatants and little weaponry. 
The following year, on the twenty-fifth anniversary of Guevara's death, the 
promotion of 'el Che' as a model whose values and attitude should be appropriated 
by the people continued. On the back page ofthe 8 October 1992 edition of Granma 
the headline read: 'Che esta mas presente que nunca' (Granma I 992a, 8). The 
leadership's recurrent technique of fusing the past and present was in evidence again 
here in the way in which Guevara's legacy was portrayed as having a continued 
relevance two and a half decades after his death. Another headline in the edition 
exclaimed: 'jNos dej6 su ejemplo!' (Granma 1992b, 8). The article accompanying 
this headline was unequivocal in its intention to present Guevara as an 'ejemplo'. It 
stated: 
Nos dej6 su pensamiento revolucionario, nos dej6 sus virtudes revolucionarias, nos 
dej6 su caracter, su voluntad, su tenacidad, su espfritu de trabajo. En una palabra, jnos 
dej6 su ejemplo! jY el ejemplo del Che debe ser un modelo para nuestro pueblo el 
ejemplo del Che debe ser el modelo ideal para nuestro pueblo! (Granma 1992b, 8). ' 
Similar to numerous other examples, the concept of voluntad was mentioned in this 
extract which, as discussed, was inextricably linked to guerrillerismo's primacy of 
278 
subjective will. There was also reference to 'tenacidad', a fundamental quality of 
any guerrillero. The inclusion of the indirect object pronoun 'nos' sustained the 
unfaltering prominence of the collective, and served to implicate the reader in the 
'duty' of emulating Guevara's example, which was no longer just that, but 'el 
modelo ideal para nuestro pueblo!'. The foregrounding of 'nos' at the beginning of 
the extract accentuated the effect of including the reader in carrying forward the 
legacy of 'el Che'. 
Another article in the same edition further substantiates the hypothesis that a code of 
guerrillerismo can be uncovered at this stage. The headline, 'EI primer voluntario 
para las tareas mas dificiles, mas duras', was compatible with the guerrillerisla tenet 
of creating subjective conditions, and of enacting one's revolutionary duties without 
hesitation (Granma 1992c, 8). The ensuing text followed through with the idea of 
realising one's revolutionary commitment: 
si haee falta un ejemplo a imitar para lIegar a esos tan elevados objetivos, son 
imprescindibles hombres como el Che, hombres y mujeres que 10 imiten, que sean el, 
que piensen como el y se comporten como el en el cumplimiento del deber, en cada 
cosa, en cada detaIle, en cada actividad; en su espfritu de trabajo (. .. ); en el espfritu de 
ser el primero voluntario para las tareas mas dificiles, las mas duras, las mas 
abnegadas ... (Granma 1992c, 8). 
The repetition of 'ser el primer voluntario' reinforced the encouragement to take 
initiative with respect to revolutionary activity, while the reference to the tradition of 
'deber' produced a similar effect to the previous examples we have seen; the idea of 
carrying out one's revolutionary duty was awarded historical legitimacy through the 
inclusion of this' lexical item'. 
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In the issue published the following day, we can find an example of direct discourse 
representation of Guevara's words. A short article on the front page asserted that 
Guevara's example was present in the repudiation of the Torricelli Act. Manifest 
intertextuality was incorporated in the line: 'Y asi se dijo: "Careceremos de recursos, 
pero sobranin voluntades para sobreponernos'" (Granma 1992d, I). The 
representation of Guevara's words was clearly an attempt to promote the idea that 
what Cuba lacked in material goods, it made up for with the subjective will of the 
people. The guerril/erista element is overtly apparent here in the lesson that one 
could overcome obstacles through the application of subjective will, or vo/untad, 
which could, in turn, produce the necessary subjective conditions. The explicit 
attribution of these words to Guevara, the heroic guerrilla himself, afforded them 
added legitimacy. The declaration of one of the main headlines on the front page _ 
'Sobranin voluntades para sobreponernos'- further buttressed the key point which 
the leadership wished to communicate (Granma 1 992d, ]). 
Thus far, the analysis has considered texts which were issued in the opening years of 
the decade. These years were undoubtedly a testing time for Cuba as it came to 
terms first with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the accompanying economic 
hardship, and secondly with the implementation of the Torricelli Act which only 
exacerbated the existing problems. However, it was the year ] 994 which arguably 
marked the lowest ebb for the Revolution during the Special Period. Not only was 
the economy still in decline, but in August ] 994 the government had to contend with 
a riot on the Malec6n, later referred to as the Habanazo. The riot was largely 
catalysed by the 'continuing ambivalence about migration policy shown by both the 
Cuban and the US government', although, beneath the surface, it was also an 
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outward demonstration of the frustration felt by Cubans at the increased hardships of 
the Special Period (Gott 2004, 298). Added to this problem of visible internal 
dissent, the leadership would also have been aware of the disconcerting presence of 
thousands of US troops in neighbouring Haiti.46 
The growing threats to the stability of the Revolution, both domestic and external, 
were reflected in the discourse of the leadership at that time and in subsequent years. 
The language emanating from the organs of power seemed to be more emphatic in its 
explicit calls for the participation of each and every Cuban in the struggle to defend 
the Revolution. Within this language, there was a more active promotion of 
guerrillerismo, insofar as its characteristics were more readily discernible. This 
strengthening of a guerrilla discourse was consistent with the hypothesis posited at 
the beginning of this chapter; that is, that the Cuban revolutionary government, at 
moments of crisis, unearthed its guerrilla roots in order to provide its citizens with an 
inspirational guide for enacting revolutionary duties. 
The content of the speech made by Fidel Castro on 1 January 1994 substantiates 
these claims. Typical of his discursive style, in this speech Castro made constant 
reference to past revolutionary heroes to legitimise the continued struggle of the 
Cuban people. Speaking about the independence struggles begun in the I 860s, 
Castro commented: 'Sf, larga ha sido la lucha, pero esa lucha no ha cesado' (Castro, 
1994). The invocation of lucha occurred frequently in this speech, as did the calls 
for the Cuban people to 'resistir', thus echoing the previous speeches already 
considered, specifically that given on the 26 July 1990. An image was also created in 
46 US troops invaded Haiti in 1994 to remove the military regime which had assumed power following 
a coup in 1991. They remained on the island until March 1995. 
281 
this speech of the Cuban people as being 'dispuestos a dar nuestra sangre y nuestras 
vidas sin vacilacion alguna en defensa de nuestras ideas' (Castro, 1994). This 
representation of Cuban citizens as being ready to defend the Revolution with their 
lives was characteristic of the attributes required of a guerrillero. To remind 
ourselves of Guevara's words regarding this issue, he stated: 'Cada uno de los 
guerrilleroseste dispuesto a morir, no solo por defender un ideal sino por convertirlo 
en realidad. Esa es la base, la esencia de la lucha de guerrillas (Guevara 2006, 21). 
The parallels between Castro's and Guevara's words indicate that Castro was 
purposefully encouraging Cubans to emulate the disposition of the guerrilla fighter. 
Elsewhere in the speech, evidence that the endorsement of producing 'subjective 
conditions' continued at this stage is tangible. Castro implored the Cuban people to 
be strong in order to overcome the objective conditions they faced. He stated: 
'debemos ser 10 suficientemente fuertes ( ... ) para ser capaces tambien de vencer los 
obstaculos objetivos del mundo de hoy' (Castro, 1994). This phrase conveyed the 
idea that the collective strength, or perhaps 'subjective will', of the population had 
the ability to alter the situation faced by the Revolution. The summoning of the 
lexical items 'deber' and 'veneer' added further weight to Castro's argument, a 
technique characteristic of his discourse. 
The promotion of the idea that subjective will could overcome any challenge 
continued throughout 1994; specifically, references to the primacy of voluntad were 
ubiquitous. In the 1 May edition of Granma, four pages were devoted to the 
Asamblea Nacional del Poder Popular of that year, one of the principal conclusions 
of which was that the will of the people would ensure the survival of the Revolution. 
To illustrate this point, the article on page two stated: 
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El gran consenso nacional que brot6 claramente de esas reuniones, afirm6 el 
Presidente de la Asamblea Nacional, es la voluntad de la inmensa mayorfa de los 
cubanos de seguir resistiendo, de seguir luchando para salvar la Patria y la Revoluci6n 
(Granma 1994b, 2). 
In the 27 July issue of Granma, a comparable moral was communicated. The front 
page included direct discourse representation of a speech given by Raul Castro on the 
forty-first anniversary of the Moncada attack. Raul was reported to have contended: 
La permanente enseftanza de Fidel es que sf se puede, que el hombre es capaz de 
sobreponerse a las mas duras condiciones si no desfallece su voluntad de veneer, hace 
una evaluaci6n correcta de cada situaci6n y no renuncia a sus justos y nobles 
principios (Granma 1994c, I). 
The emphasis on the importance of the sUbjective action of the individual was 
explicit here, although, unlike in numerous other examples, the primacy of 
'subjective will' was expressed in terms of 'el hombre', rather than 'nuestro pueblo'. 
The alliteration employed in 'voluntad de vencer' further accentuated the focus upon 
this concept as the key to the Revolution's survival. 
The discourse issued in the following year continued to promote similar values 
which were consistent with those of guerrillerismo. In the 26 November 1995 issue 
of the newspaper Juventud Rebelde, for example, further instances of a focus on 
voluntad came to the fore. As already mentioned, Juventud Rebelde is the official 
newspaper of the UJC, originally established in 1965 and stilI distributed for sale 
throughout the country. The paper, which refers to itself as the 'Diario de la 
Juventud Cubana', features both national and international news stories, alongside 
articles discussing issues such as sport, politics, economics and sex education. 
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In an editorial on the revival ofthe Milicias Universitarias, it was written: 
este retorno a nuestras luchas mas recientes, se produce en los momentos en que la 
naci6n cubana reafirma su voluntad de construir el socialismo y cuenta con el apoyo 
mayoritario de los estudiantes y del pueblo. No se trata ni de militarizar las 
universidades C ••. ): preservemos, con este paso, la tranquiJidad de nuestras aulas y 
demos un lugar a todo revoIucionario - que de manera voluntaria - este presto a 
defender los intereses de su pueblo C .•. ) Nacer como Milicia activa ... dependeni en 
gran medida del protagonismo que sepamos darIe a profesores y trabajadores C ... ) La 
escalinata, escenario hist6rico de mil batallas, ha de ser testigo de otro momento de 
honor, de testaruda voIuntad de los estudiantes de defender su suefto universitario 
(Juventud Rebelde ] 995, 2). 
Here, the notion of subjective action was once again directed at the population as a 
collective, as exemplified in 'Ia nacion cubana reafirma su voluntad de construir el 
socialismo'. The mention of 'construir' in this phrase echoed the citation from Fidel 
Castro's I January 1990 speech, discussed earlier in the chapter. The idea of 
'constructing' socialism, and, therefore, the Revolution, afforded the Cuban people 
an active participation in pushing forward the revolutionary project. Additional 
weight was placed upon the concept of voluntad towards the end of the citation with 
the inclusion of the modifier, 'testaruda'. 
These words also demonstrated a rejection of the idea of a 'militarised' Revolution. 
Though the article referred only to university students, it is perhaps significant that it 
was deemed necessary to deny actively the militarisation of universities in the line , 
'No se trata ni de militarizar las universidades'. Instead, the reader was informed 
that the militias were open to every revolutionary that was ready to defend the 
Revolution 'de manera voluntaria'. The interpolation of 'que de manera voluntaria' 
between two dashes was effective in highlighting this point, particularly as it was not 
an integral component of the sentence but was something of a tangential remark. Its 
inclusion thus indicates that the text producer fully intended to stress the point that 
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each revolutionary should be participating of their own will. Such an explicit 
refutation of the existence of a 'militarisation' process in one of Cuba's leading 
newspapers, albeit in reference only to its efforts to mobilise students, greatly 
reinforces the challenge posed by this study to the notion of a 'militarised' 
Revolution. 
The emphasis upon doing things 'de manera voluntaria' also mirrored the 
underscoring of Guevara's willingness to be the 'primer voluntario', referred to in 
the 8 October 1992 issue of Granma already discussed. The inclusion here of the 
word 'protagonismo' is also significant. Again, it connoted a kind of 'subjective will' 
in its implication that the people should take a leading role in revolutionary action. 
Reference to the term was common during the Revolution's fourth decade. In the 1 
January 1994 issue of Granma, for example, the front page headline declared: 'Otra 
vez, como el dia del glorioso advenimiento de la Revoluci6n, nuestro pueblo 
protagoniza una batalla sin par' (Granma 1994a, 1). The insertion of 'nuestro 
pueblo' provided additional evidence of the leadership's intention to underscore the 
agency of the Cuban people in order to compel them to enact their revolutionary 
duties. As a final point, the focus on the role of students in the article itself is 
indicative of the wider initiative to pay greater attention to the Cuban youth in the 
1990s. 
The centrality of protagonismo and voluntad in the hegemonic discourse was 
sustained throughout the ] 990s and, if anything, became more prevalent in the latter 
part of the decade. Indeed, there is much to suggest that, from 1997 onwards, the 
resurgence of guerrillerismo is more perceptible than at any other time in the 1990s. 
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The leadership's discourse during this period indicates a growing confidence, one 
that was accompanied by a greater conviction to remain defiant in the face of US 
hostility. The possible explanations for an upshift in the tone of the official rhetoric 
are fourfold. First, the country's economic situation had ameliorated to a significant 
extent compared with the dark days of 1993-1994. This turnaround had much to do 
with the cultivation of a successful tourist industry which had come to overtake sugar 
as the country's principal generator of capital. Secondly, the government had 
achieved what could be termed a propaganda coup with the visit of the Pope to the 
island in 1998. In Pope John Paul II the Revolution appeared to have found an 
important ally in the fight against capitalism, and in the on-going conflict with the 
United States more broadly. Perez-Stable confirms this view, writing that 'Cuba saw 
the Pope's presence on the island as a moral slap at the United States, particularly 
since John Paul II had recently denounced the social ills of unfettered capitalism with 
almost the same fervour he had mustered against Communism' (Perez-Stable 20 II, 
61). Thirdly, the closing years of the decade brought with them the return to Cuba of 
Che Guevara's remains to the island, some thirty years after his death in Bolivia. 
The event did much to strengthen feelings of nationalism and to bring to the fore the 
optimism of the 1960s. Kapcia asserts: 
the episode ( ... ) inevitably recalled the heroism and sacrifice of the 1960s in a more 
productive and meaningful way than all manner of official speeches and slogans could 
do, either reviving memories nostalgically for those who had lived through the decade 
or reviving interest in the writings of, and on, those years for those who were t o ~ ~
young to remember (Kapcia 2000, 262). 
Finally, there is a case to argue that the increase in confidence of the leadership was 
also related to the emergence of the so-called 'Pink Tide' phenomenon in Latin 
America. The election to the presidency of the populist, left-wing candidate, Hugo 
Chavez, in Venezuela in 1998 heralded a wave of left-wing governments in the 
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region which promised potential new allies for the Cuban Revolution. Similarly, the 
rise of new social actors across the continent, notably the Zapatista armed movement 
in Mexico, seemed to afford added legitimacy to Cuba's alternative political 
discourse (Levitsky and Roberts 2011, 1). Once more, Cuba was able to position 
itself at the helm ofa continent-wide 'revolution'. 
The front page of Granma on 1 January 1997 partly validates this proposal. 
Sandwiched between a photograph of Camilo Cienfuegos and Fidel Castro on the 
one side, and the title, 'Mensaje a nuestro pueblo' on the other, the front page article 
read: 
Nuestra Revoluci6n arriba, a su trigesimoctavo aniversario. Ciertamente, como nos 10 
previno tempranamente Fidel, ha sido entonces un camino dificil, de com bates 
constantes, de herofsmo cotidiano C···) Viene el recuerdo aquel ejercito de j6venes e 
incluso de adolescentes, convertidos en alfabetizadores, que escenific6 una de las 
jornadas mas nobles y dignas de la Revoluci6n, y convirti6 a Cuba en el primer 
territorio Iibre de analfabetismo del continente americana ( ... ) (Granma 1997a, I). 
It is the final part of this citation which is of interest here: the reference to 'el primer 
territorio Iibre de analfabetismo del continente americano'. The concept of the 
'Territorio Libre' recalled the insurrectionary phase of the Cuban Revolution during 
which Castro's headquarters, La Comandancia de La Plata in the Sierra Maestra, was 
designated as the first 'free territory' of Cuba. The phrase also echoed a similar 
statement uttered by Fidel Castro in his 'First Declaration of Havana' in 1960, 
discussed in Chapter Two: 
Junto a la imagen y el recuerdo de Jose Marti, en Cuba, Territorio Libre de America 
el pueblo, en uso de las potestades .inal.ienables ~ u e e dimanan del efectivo ejercfcio d ~ ~
la soberanfa, expresada en el sufraglO dlrecto, universal Y Pllblico, se ha constituido en 
Asamblea General Nacional (Castro 1960b, 346). 
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As already pointed out, this earlier example established a parallel between the 
Revolution's insurrectionary phase and the situation in which Cuba found itself in 
1960. In other words, Castro presented the Revolution in power as constituting the 
first step in the continent-wide revolution for which the 'Declaration' called. Put 
differently, Castro was implying that Cuba was the first foco of the Latin American 
revolution. 
While, in the 1997 citation, the wording did not state 'primer territorio libre' but 
'primer territorio Iibre de analfabetismo', it should be taken into account that the text 
in question was expressed in written form and thus its particular syntax created a 
visual juxtaposition of the words 'primer territorio Iibre' for the reader. Similar to 
the statement in the 'First Declaration', the reference to Cuba as the first 'free 
territory' in the Americas brought to mind the memory of the armed struggle of the 
1950s, yet it also emulated the language of the formative years of the Revolution 
when, as we have seen, the hegemonic discourse was infused with the code of 
guerrillerismo. The parallel with one of Castro's most famous speeches from the 
I 960s now seems aimed at reminding the Cuban people of the Revolution's 'glory 
years', a time when it could claim, with conviction, to be at the vanguard of 
revolutionary struggle in Latin America and, in many ways, the rest of the Third 
World. It is significant, therefore, that the leadership was reviving this language at a 
time when the Latin American left appeared to be experiencing a resurgence. 
Moreover, the reference to 'el ejercito de j6venes e incluso de adolescentes ( ... ) que 
escenific6 una de las jornadas mas nobles y dignas de la Revoluci6n' was a 
deliberate attempt to inspire the Cuban youth. It demonstrated to young people the 
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potential outcome of the revolutionary action of youth; that is, allowing Cuba to 
continue to be at the forefront of revolutionary struggle, whether that be in the realm 
of literacy, or otherwise. The description of the young 'alfabetizadores' as having 
'staged' one of the greatest days in the Revolution's history attributed the 
transformation of Cuba into the 'primer territorio Iibre de analfabetismo del 
continente americano' entirely to the agency of the Cuban youth of the 1960s. As in 
previous examples, the use of presupposition in this citation added to the effect of the 
message being conveyed to the reader. The text producer had assumed that the 
reader would have sufficient knowledge of the events of the Cuban Revolution to 
immediately recognise the parallels drawn between the insurrectionary phase, the 
early years of the Revolution in power, and its present-day circumstance. This 
recognition would, in theory, have enabled the reader to digest the image of Cuba as 
being at the vanguard of the continental struggle against imperialistic forces. This 
notion of the vanguard was central to Guevara's guerrilla warfare methodology and 
constitutes a key component of guerrillerismo. 
The argument that Cuba began to re-envisage itself as a revolutionary leader in the 
late 1990s is further reinforced by the discourse employed in the 17 April issue of 
Granma from the same year. The following words appeared in an article 
accompanying the 'Convocatoria al V Congreso del Partido Comunista de Cuba': 
Cuba representa un baluarte inconquistable y una esperanza para cuantos en el mundo 
empiezan a reagruparse para la lucha contra los terribles males de la globalizaci6n 
neoliberal (Granma 1997b, 4). 
This quotation is notable for being markedly reminiscent of the language of the 
1960s, which made frequent allusions to Cuba as being at the forefront, or the 
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'primer territorio', of revolutionary struggle. Additionally, the idea of Cuba as a 
'bulwark' against tyranny in Latin America can be traced back to Fidel Castro's 
'Historia me absolveni' speech from 1953, in which he stated: 'Cuba debia ser 
baluarte de Iibertad y no eslab6n vergonzoso de despotismo' (Castro 2008, 47). 
In this particular example, the idea was to promote an image of Cuba as being at the 
vanguard, or, indeed, the first/oeo of the lueha against globalisation. The mention of 
those that 'empiezan a reagruparse' appeared to be a direct reference to the people of 
Latin America. This issue of Granma appeared at a time when the neoliberal 
economic reforms which had been implemented throughout Latin America were 
being called into question by the aforementioned counter-hegemonic voices. It 
might seem fitting, therefore, that the Revolution would wish to portray itself as a 
guiding light for those engaged in political struggle. This image could provide 
political actors with an inspiration to continue with their campaigns, which would 
grant them the potential to transform into influential allies of the Revolution. What 
is more, the image of a 'baluarte inconquistable' in a wider revolutionary struggle 
could have contributed to legitim ising the leadership's continued calls for the 
perpetuation ofthe revolutionary struggle at home. 
In the same article, the parallels with the rhetoric of the 1960s were evident 
elsewhere. Specifically, reference was made to Guevara's concept of the 'new man', 
as evidenced in the following citation: 
Estos dias tan dificiles, en que solos habriamos de enfrentarnos a la tarea de lIevar 
adelante 10 que soMbamos, en heroica resistencia, permite que ha surgido un pueblo 
nuevo (Granma 1997b, 5). 
290 
In this instance, the attributes which Guevara had hoped would characterise the 
'hombre nuevo' were implicitly projected onto the Cuban people as a collective, not 
as individuals. By stating that a 'pueblo nuevo' had emerged, the article suggested 
that the Cuban people had reached a stage where they were making sacrifices in the 
name of the collective, and, therefore, the Revolution. Furthermore, if we take into 
account another characteristic of the 'new man' according to Guevara, it was implied 
that they devoted themselves tirelessly to their revolutionary duties: 'EI 
revolucionario, motor ideologico de la revolucion dentro de su partido, se consume 
en esa actividad ininterrumpida que no tiene mas fin que la muerte' (Guevara 1965, 
382). Informing the population that they had become 'un pueblo nuevo' constituted 
an attempt to bestow upon them a sense of achievement and pride; they had realised 
Guevara's dream. This sense of pride may, in turn, have led to an increase in 
mobilisation as the population would have wished to continue fulfilling the criteria 
established by the heroic guerrilla. Presupposition was again at work here as the 
assumption is made that the reader would recognise the allusion to one of Guevara's 
most famous works. 
A similar allusion to the concept of the 'new man' can be found in the I February 
1998 issue of Juventud Rebelde. The main article on the front page, entitled 'Para 
jovenes del tercer milenio', contained the line: 
se plantea desde la vanguardia, la necesidad imperiosa de funcionar, crecer, 
revolucionar, haciendo al mismo tiempo hombres y mujeres nuevos y economia 
eficiente' (Juventud Rebelde 1998, I). 
In this instance, the youth were not presented as having yet transformed into 
'hombres y mujeres nuevos'. Rather, the aim was to mobilise youth by suggesting 
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that, through carrying out their revolutionary work, they would simultaneously be 
conforming to the ideal of the 'new man'. 
Other references which echoed Guevara's work were manifest in speeches and 
articles from the same year. In Fidel Castro's 26 July speech, for instance, he 
contended: 
Marti tiene que llegar en un botecito con Maximo G6mez y un reducido grupo de 
hombres, por Playitas, porque aunque les habian confiscado las armas en Estados 
Unidos, las condiciones subjetivas en el pueblo estaban preparadas, habian 
transcurrido un numero de afios desde el 78, desde el Pacto de Zanj6n, y el pueblo 
cubano estaba preparado para iniciar de nuevo la lucha por la independencia ( ... ) 
(Castro, 1998). 
As already firmly established in the present and preceding chapters, the concept of 
creating 'subjective conditions' for revolution was paramount to Guevara's writings 
on guerrilla warfare. In this example, the concept has been retrospectively applied 
by Castro to the events of the independence struggle at the close of the nineteenth 
century. Also outlined in the previous two chapters, the use of guerrillerista 
terminology to describe historical events previous to the insurrection of the 1950s 
was a key feature of the hegemonic discourse throughout the 1960s and early 1970s. 
We have also seen that the purpose behind this guerrillerista portrayal of past 
struggles was to present guerrilla warfare as a tradition firmly rooted in Cuban 
history. In other words, the re-presentation of previous rebellions, most notably the 
independence wars, as adhering to the same principles of guerrilla warfare as those 
applied by the Ejercito Rebelde conferred historical legitimacy upon the values 
encompassed by guerrillerismo, and the guerrilla approach to struggle more broadly. 
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A comparable intention motivated the use of guerrillerista language in this extract. 
Castro aimed to underline the idea that it was possible to defeat a much larger enemy 
through the creation of 'subjective conditions', even when relying solely on the force 
of 'un reducido grupo de hombres'. This notion underpinned this particular speech 
in its entirety. Throughout, Castro made similar allusions to the view that it was 
possible to achieve much with very little. Later in the text, when referring to the 
insurrection of the late 1950s, Castro made sure to underline the inferiority of the 
guerrilla forces in comparison with Batista's troops. For instance, he stated, 'los 
rebeldes no teniamos mas que fusiles y minas', adding a few minutes later: 'sin 
contar con armas ni mucho menos para aquellos hombres - si acaso al final un arma 
y media por cada 10, y no arm as de guerra precisamente, sino arm as que pod ian 
adquirirse en las armerias' (Castro, 1998). This stress upon the dearth of weaponry 
and manpower, both in the Revolution's insurrectionary phase and in the 
independence wars, was highlighted frequently in texts published by the 
Revolutionary leadership of the 1960s and 1970s. In the 1964 text, Historia de 
Cuba, for example, which formed part of the analysis of the 1960s, it was written of 
the Ten Years' War that: 
Los espafioles no se atreverian en 10 adelante a salir al campo en pequei\as columnas. 
Sabian que los cubanos, apenas sin annas, contaban con dos factores poderosos: la 
sorpresa en el ataque y el valor en la lucha (His/aria 1964, 197). 
Similarly, the 1973 Instruccion Politica stated: 'y si los mambises combatfan con el 
machete contra el fusil, el Ejercito Rebelde combati6 con la vieja escopeta a la 
ametralladora, al tanque, al mortero' (lnstruccion 1973, 457). What is more, the 
inferiority of the Cuban forces in both conflicts was underlined continually in the 
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first two decades through the reference to los doce, discussed at length in the 
preceding two chapters. 
In addition to the stress upon producing subjective conditions when faced with a 
superior enemy, the aforementioned confident tone was apparent in this speech. 
Towards the end of his oration, Castro contended: 'seguiremos luchando, tenemos 
razones para sentimos confiados'. Moreover, Castro posited that the Cuban people 
had been fighting in their 'trench' throughout the history of the Revolution: 
Creemos que hemos cumplido nuestro deber, toda una generacion, al haber luchado 
sin tregua ni descanso durante 45 alios desde aquel 26 de julio de 1953, 
manteniendonos firmes en nuestra trinchera, en nuestros principios, con las mismas 
ideas que nos inspiraron aquel dia (Castro, 1998). 
While the employment of trinchera here may contain obvious military connotations, 
the metaphorical comparison it established between Cuba and a 'trench' was also 
reminiscent of a famous quotation attributed to Jose Marti: 'trincheras de ideas valen 
mas que trincheras de piedras' (Marti 189 I, 307). In the 5 May 1998 issue of 
Granma, in an article which recounted an interview with Fidel Castro, the leader was 
reported to have recalled these words, with reference to the Moncada attack: 
A las mujeres se 10 dije aquel dia, recordando la frase de Marti que trincheras de ideas 
valen mas que trincheras de piedra. A mi me lIarnaba la atencion que Marti, un 
soldado de la Revolucion, un combatiente, un hombre que muere en combate, en una 
carga de caballeria, dijera un dia: 'trincheras de ideas valen mas que trincheras de 
piedras' (Granma 1998,5). 
The manifest intertextuality in this citation, whereby the incorporation of Marti's 
words was clearly demarcated, was effective in adding weight to these words (in the 
eyes of the Cuban reader) as they were attributed to the 'Ap6stol' of Cuban 
independence. Though Marti referred to a figurative trench of ideas (and did not 
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necessarily refer to Cuba as a trench in itself), his words can still be considered 
consistent with the/oeo theory. It is safe to assume that, in the 1990s, Cuba's 'trench 
of ideas' referred to its socialist principles. At a time when much of Latin America 
appeared to be sympathetic to socialist ideals, but was not necessarily taking up 
arms, the advance of Cuba's trench could occur through the spread of a shared 
ideology, rather than a physical struggle for power, as such. Castro had already 
made reference to Marti's words in his speech to mark the return of Guevara's 
remains to Cuba on 17 October 1997. Employing presupposition, a characteristic of 
his discourse, Castro exclaimed: 
jBienvenidos, companeros heroicos del destacamento de refuerzo! jLas trincheras de 
ideas y de justicia que ustedes defenderan junto a nuestro pueblo, el enemigo no podni 
conquistarlas jamas! (Castro, 1997). 
The metaphorical use of 'trinchera' can also be noted in other texts from 1998. In 
the 25 July issue of Granma, a short article implored the reader to 'hacer del barrio la 
primera trinchera de combate y la conciencia' (Suarez Ramos, Granma, 1998). The 
inclusion of the ordinal adjective 'primera' to modify 'trinchera' was significant in 
its implication that the trench established in the barrio would be but the first in a 
sequence of trenches established throughout Cuban society. In this sense, the 
trinchera of the barrio was almost akin to the first/oeo, which, it was hoped, would 
transform into a network of /oeos. The suggestion that the barrio was the starting 
point for revolutionary activity is also interesting in its promotion of grassroots 
activity. It conferred agency upon the average Cuban citizen, as part of a collective, 
to push forward the revolutionary agenda. A similar sentiment was evident in the 3 
December 1995 issue of Juventud Rebelde, in an article on page three entitled, 'No 
hay dogmas para el barrio'. The article proposed that: 
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EI pais comienza y termina en el barrio ( ... ) La mejoria nacional tendra que pasar 
inevitablemente por la esquina de la casa, pero saldra tambien del vecindario ( ... ) solo 
con la participacion comunitaria, con el protagonismo del propio pueblo, se pueden 
impulsar muchos proyectos de cambio. EI barrio no se puede gobernar desde afuera. 
Los diagnosticos hay que hacerlos alii. Las propuestas deben surgir de sus moradores, 
y las acciones tambien, con espontaneidad ( ... ) (Rodriguez, Juventud Rebelde, 1995, 
3). 
The message that it was the people who were the driving force of the Revolution was 
unmistakeable in this instance. Like the article in the 26 November 1995 issue of 
Juventud Rebelde discussed earlier, this citation made reference to the 
'protagonismo' of the people. In other words, it endorsed the idea that citizens 
should be at the helm of any attempts to improve the country's situation. The 
inclusion of the adjective 'propio' to precede 'pueblo' further emphasised the point 
that it was the responsibility of the Cuban people to act. The incorporation of 
vocabulary such as 'participaci6n' and 'impulsar' produced a similar effect, insofar 
as both terms hinted at the concept of 'subjective will' as driving factors in the 
progression of the Revolution. 
Conclusion 
The evidence presented in this chapter clearly demonstrates that guerrillerismo was 
actively promoted by the revolutionary government during the 1990s. Moreover, it 
reveals that the means by which guerrillerismo was endorsed in the hegemonic 
discourse remained largely unchanged from those that had been employed in the 
1960s and early 1970s. The focus on sUbjective will, for instance, was revived in the 
fourth decade, most notably through a sustained reference to voluntad. Significantly, 
the appeal to subjective will was largely directed at the collective throughout the 
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decade, there being few instances in which the individual was singled out as the 
bearer of the responsibility for revolutionary participation. This emphasis on the 
collective can be said to reflect the extent of the crisis confronting the Revolution. It 
was vital that the revolutionary leadership mobilised the population as a whole as 
quickly as possible, through encouraging citizens to act in the name of the people, 
and not on behalf of individual concerns. The reaffirmation of the Revolution's 
socialist principles in the 1990s may also have influenced this focus on the 
collective, standing in stark contrast as it did to the individualism endorsed by 
neoliberal capitalism. Furthermore, events such as the Habanazo highlighted the 
necessity to remind Cubans, amidst unprecedented hardship, of the wider objectives 
of the Revolution: a struggle for the greater good. 
Also in common with the hegemonic discourse of the first two decades of the 
Revolution in power was the promotion of guerrillerismo through the inclusion of 
presupposition and lexical items. Deber and lucha were permanent features of the 
leadership's rhetoric in the 1990s, while the frequent parallels drawn between the 
challenges of the Special Period and previous revolutionary struggles legitimised the 
sustained promotion of guerrillerismo. However, it should be taken into account 
that, in the Revolution's fourth decade, the leadership was partly addressing a new 
generation of young Cubans, for whom certain references to past struggles, 
revolutionary heroes or ideas, would not necessarily have constituted 'background 
knowledge' (Fairclough 1989, 154). Specifically, for those who had not lived 
through the early years of the Revolution, allusions to the work of Guevara would 
not have been instantly recognisable and would not, therefore, have been as effective 
in inculcating guerrillerismo upon the text recipient. Thus, rather than constituting 
297 
presuppositions, these references symbolised a conscious attempt by the leadership to 
introduce Cuba's history of revolutionary struggle to those who would guide the 
Revolution forward in the years that would follow. The collapse of the Soviet Union 
and the onset of the Special Period had focussed the leadership's attention inward, 
forcing it to look to the past to find the answers to Cuba's problems, as demonstrated 
in the revival of the writings and image of Che Guevara. As shown, this return to the 
ideas and values ofthe 1960s was communicated through the repetition in the official 
speeches and media of statements and words that echoed that era. This reproduction 
of statements had the effect of reconsolidating the 'reality', or the political culture, in 
which these traditional values, and thus the leadership's continued authority, made 
sense. In this way, the study of the discourse of the 1990s seems to confirm 
Foucault's proposals regarding how ideas are communicated over time in a given 
context. 
Finally, the promotion of guerrillerismo in some ways precluded an intensification of 
the so-called 'siege mentality' in the 1990s. While the leadership did not hesitate to 
highlight the dangers which threatened the security of the Revolution, 
guerrillerismo's overarching lesson, that the collective subjective will of the Cuban 
people was sufficient to overcome the challenges posed by the Special Period, 
underpinned the official discourse. As discussed, in the latter part of the decade in 
particular, the evidence suggests that Cuba's isolation was not presented as a state of 
'siege' as such. Rather, the leadership's rhetoric conveyed an image of the 
Revolution in the 1990s as a reincarnation of the Revolution of the 1960s: the 
'baluarte inconquistable' of the Latin American 'revolution'. 
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Conclusion 
Cuba: A Guerrilla Nation? 
From the moment the Cuban revolutionaries entered Havana in January 1959, the 
image of the guerrillero became instantly emblematic of the Cuban Revolution as a 
whole. The ubiquitous olive green uniform, worn by those who had descended from 
the mountains to take power in the cities, served as a constant reminder, both at home 
and abroad, of how the Revolution had been fought and, more crucially, won. Those 
at the helm of the nascent Revolution in power did little to dispel the perception that 
their leadership was comprised not of experienced politicians, but of members of the 
Ejercito Rebelde, men (and a handful of women) whose only qualifications for the 
job that lay ahead were founded in a hard-fought guerrilla struggle. The guerrilla 
warfare origins of the Cuban Revolution afforded it a level of romanticism, insofar as 
it seemed to offer proof that the underdog - a band of poorly armed revolutionaries 
from a small island - could take on a world superpower and emerge triumphant. It 
was also a truly Latin American revolution, providing a home-grown, unorthodox 
model of insurrection that appeared to draw upon the specificities of the Latin 
American context. As Radu and Tismaneanu have noted: 
Cuba was perceived as Latin America's redeemer, the Caribbean David who slayed 
the norteamericano Goliath (U.S. lack of support for Batista notwithstanding), but did 
it so in a flamboyantly Latin manner ( ... ) while Guevara's involvement gave Castro's 
endeavour 'a definitely continental flavour (Radu and Tismaneanu 1990,43). 
In the first months, and even years, of the Revolution in power, the Ejercito Rebelde 
leadership retained this flamboyant image by approaching the task of constructing a 
revolutionary government as a continuation of the guerrilla campaign in the sierra. 
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Perez has argued that, for the rebeldes, 'The conflict had not ended on I January 
1959; on the contrary, the scope of struggle had widened considerably' (Perez 1976, 
257). As a leading figure in the insurrection and subsequently in the revolutionary 
leadership, Che Guevara was central to the representation of a guerrilla-led 
Revolution. His charisma and good-looks only added to the romanticism already 
associated with the revolutionary movement, while his writings on guerrilla warfare 
methodology were a key contributor to the promulgation of the 'myth of the heroic 
guerrilla' (Wright 2001, 18). When speaking about the need to defend the 
Revolution in January 1959, Guevara's statement that 'todo el pueblo cubano debera 
convertirse en un ejercito guerrillero, pues el Ejercito Rebelde es un cuerpo en 
crecimiento cuya capacidad s610 esta limitada por el numero de seis millones de 
cubanos de la republica' effectively encapsulated the governing style of the 
revolutionary leadership in its formative years (Guevara 1959, 21). 
Beyond this initial period, however, many foreign observers have argued that the 
somewhat erratic, guerrilla-style management of the Revolution in power, and the 
insurrection itself, appeared to have become a thing of the past for the Cuban 
leadership. While the olive green fatigues remained an enduring symbol of the 
foundations of the Revolution, it seemed that, in many other significant ways, the 
Revolution had been transformed into an entirely different entity, one that attempted 
to follow rigidly the path to Communism signposted by the Soviet Union. Gone 
were the unmethodical and often seemingly spontaneous organisation of 
revolutionary institutions and the application of the laws of the sierra to the task of 
revolutionary governance. In their place came a period of 'institutionalisation', in 
line with Soviet orthodoxy, that, in turn, laid the foundations for a profoundly 
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bureaucratic political system. The idealistic image of the guerrillero appeared to 
have become a distant memory, as those who had fought in the sierra now held the 
reins of the newly professionalised armed forces, the FAR, which played a 
fundamental role in the organisation of these recently established institutions, and in 
managing the mobilisation of Cuban citizens. For the majority of commentators on 
the Cuban Revolution, the widespread involvement of the FAR in the running of the 
Revolution was evidence enough that the Revolution was now well and truly 
'militarised' . 
This study set out to challenge this widely accepted concept in Western academia 
that 'militarism' can appropriately define the leadership style within the Revolution 
from the late 1960s onwards. It took as its point of departure the few scholars, 
discussed in Chapter One, who have suggested that 'militarism' is an overly 
simplistic notion that does not account for the idiosyncratic style of governance 
adopted by the revolutionary government or the specificities of the Revolution's 
historical roots. Such scholars have instead pointed to a supposed legacy of the 
sierra which, in practice, translated into the leadership's radical, and often risky, 
approach to revolutionary governance and decision-making. It was also reflected in 
the way in which the FAR was developed out of the Ejercito Rebelde, and in the 
political education provided for its soldiers. Yet, while these scholars identified a 
legacy that problematised the concept of 'militarism', the majority based their 
arguments solely on a study of the Cuban Revolution in the 1960s. In this way, their 
work sought to account for the aforementioned revolutionary fervour of the 
immediate post-insurrection period, but did not apply to the Revolution's trajectory 
thereafter. It was thus the aim of this study both to challenge the concept of 
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'militarism', and to build upon the pre-existing arguments that disputed its relevance 
as a term to characterise the way in which the Revolution was organised and 
maintained. Specifically, it aimed to question whether the legacy of the guerrilla 
struggle extended beyond the Revolution's first decade in power, and into the period 
of so-called 'Sovietisation' I 'institutionalisation' . 
As has been noted throughout the present study, far from being forgotten, the lived 
experience of guerrilla warfare continued to inform the world-view which 
underpinned the Revolution long after the physical guerrilla campaign of the 
insurrectionary phase had ended. This on-going influence was clearly and 
consistently identifiable in the language expressed by the Cuban leadership, that is 
the hegemonic discourse, throughout the 1960s and in the first half of the second 
decade, before being resurrected in the 1990s. Moreover, we have seen that, within 
this discourse, there was found to be a continued emphasis on certain values, which 
not only directly echoed the guerrilla warfare methodology articulated by Che 
Guevara, but which also tapped into and recalled revolutionary guerrilla struggles 
that occurred prior to the insurrection of the 1950s. The promotion of such values 
aimed to contribute to the shaping of the revolutionary consciousness of both Cuban 
citizens and members of the armed forces (Judson 1984, 2). In other words, it 
encouraged an emulation of the values and attributes associated with the guerrillero 
as a means of mobilising the population and steeling them for the task of defending 
the Revolution. 
Following Guevara and Kapcia, this study has conceptualised this on-going 
promotion of the guerrilla ethos as guerrillerismo (Guevara, 1963; Kapcia, 2000, 
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2008). In one sense, the elevation of guerrillerismo on key dates, for example 26 
July or I January, is perhaps unsurprising; anniversaries commemorating the success 
of guerrilla activity are more likely to stir up a language of guerrillerismo than any 
other dates in the revolutionary calendar. However, the presence of a guerrilla 
discourse on other, less notable dates offers proof that there was a consistent, 
conscious promotion of a code of guerrillerismo through the reproduction and 
circulation of statements as an attempt to mobilise the population at points of greater 
instability, while at the same time helping to secure preserve the control of the 
revolutionary leadership. At times, where the intended recipients of such messages 
were external to Cuba's shores, it has been shown, in particular in Chapter Three. 
that the promulgation of the precepts of Guevara's methodology was tantamount not 
to guerrillerismo, but to joquismo, given that the latter term encompasses the 
principles of both Guevara and Debray's work, while also heavily connoting the 
struggles that occurred elsewhere in Latin America in the I 960s and 1970s. 
The detection of the presence of guerrillerismo in the hegemonic discourse of the 
1970s constitutes one of the principal contributions of this research to studies of the 
Cuban Revolution. As stated, it is generally accepted within Western academia that, 
in its second decade in power, the Revolution became thoroughly 'Sovietised'. This 
judgement is based entirely on the Revolution's adoption of the Soviet political and 
economic model from the late 1960s onwards. By contrast, the present study has 
shown in Chapter Three that, while it may have begun to transform structurally at 
that time, the beliefs and values which underpinned the Revolution remained 
unchanged. In other words, though foreign principles were applied to the practical 
management of the Revolution, at its heart, the Revolution was driven by values 
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which were rooted in Cuban history, specifically, Cuba's history of struggle, or 
lucha. The discovery that a resurgence of guerrillerismo was actively pursued by the 
leadership in the 1990s, as outlined in Chapter Four, further strengthens this study's 
contribution to scholarship on the Cuban Revolution. It showed that, when the 
Revolution appeared vulnerable, guerrillerismo was employed as a way of reminding 
Cuban citizens of where the Revolution had come from and why it was worth 
fighting to save. 
Another important contribution of this thesis to academic work on the Cuban 
Revolution is the challenge it poses to the notion that the cultivation of a ·siege 
mentality' has been at the root of the leadership's successful mobilisation and 
defence drives. The thesis has demonstrated that the key to this success has not been 
based solely on the leadership's presentation of Cuba as a nation besieged, thereby 
creating a climate of fear, but rather on the exaltation of the guerrilla ethos. The 
promotion of this ethos has encouraged citizens to emulate the values and attributes 
of the guerrillero, and has presented the defence of the country as a duty which must 
be carried out in order to fulfil the legacy of the heroes of the revolutionary historical 
narrative. What is more, when viewed through the lens of guerrillerismo, Cuba's at 
times almost complete isolation has been presented as a positive condition, and one 
which has allowed the Revolution to assume its position at the vanguard of the Latin 
American revolution. Thus the evidence which supports the existence of 
guerrillerismo in some ways concomitantly undermines the presence of a 'siege 
mentality'. That is not to say that Cuban citizens have not been consistently 
reminded of Cuba's apparent 'sitting duck' status. Rather, what this study reveals is 
that the survival of the Revolution, and the leadership's ability to mobilise its 
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citizens, is not simply born out of the fostering of a negative mindset in which Cuba 
is constantly on a 'war footing'. Instead, guerrillerismo has offered a model, and 
consists of a set of values, that are entirely positive, and that have allowed for the 
defence of the Revolution to be seen not just as a necessity in a climate of 
aggression, but as a moral, almost religious, obligation which will maintain Cuba's 
status as a 'free territory'. Moreover, as the intermittent promotion of foquismo has 
revealed, the leadership has also conveyed the survival of the Revolution as vital to 
the advancement of the Latin American 'revolution', thus affording it a wider 
significance beyond the island's shores. 
While this study has taken important steps towards unpicking and rethinking the 
established notion of a 'siege mentality', there still remains work to be done on this 
subject if we are to evaluate fully the pertinence of the concept to the Cuban 
Revolution. Such work might benefit from a comparative analysis of Cuba and other 
nations to which this term has been ascribed, for example, Israel (Arian, 1995; Bar-
Tal and Antebi, 1992), in order to identify how far Cuba resembles or differs from 
these other contexts. Furthermore, the obvious psychological connotations of the 
word 'mentality' suggest that a more Social Psychology based approach might be 
useful in assessing the evidence for or against the perpetuation of this 'state-of-
mind'. It goes without saying that both these approaches fall well beyond the scope 
of the present work. 
The present work also leaves room for a more in-depth analysis of the hegemonic 
discourse of the 1980s. While the initial research conducted on this decade suggests 
that a marked presence of guerrillerismo in the hegemonic discourse is unlikely, 
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there is still scope to investigate whether it is absent throughout, and particularly 
during the period of Rectification commencing in 1986. Briefly mentioned in 
Chapter Four, this campaign heralded the distancing of the Revolution from Soviet 
orthodoxy and the return to the 'moral economy' of the 1960s. With this shift to 
previous, home-grown solutions to the country's problems came also a revival of the 
writings and image of Che Guevara. This instance of 'looking backwards' may well 
have brought with it a resurgence of the language of guerrillerismo, and thus may be 
worthy of additional attention. Another era which would perhaps merit analysis is 
the 'Batalla de Ideas' phase of the post-2000 period. First launched by Fidel Castro 
in 2000 on the back of the mass mobilisation drive to demand the return of Elian 
Gonzalez to Cuba from the United States, the Batalla's wider aim was to re-unite a 
somewhat divided nation following the ordeal of the Special Period, and to revive 
revolutionary participation and morale (Kapcia 2012, 70176).47 In order to do so, the 
leadership looked to the methods adopted in the very first years of the Revolution in 
power, a time in which mass mobilisation, and, therefore, support for the 
revolutionary cause, was at its peak. Again, this revisiting of the ideas and 
approaches of the first decade may well have been accompanied by a guerrillerista 
discourse, evidence of which would further support the claim of this thesis that 
guerrillerismo becomes prevalent at times in which the Revolution is most in need of 
consolidation, and in which the nation itself is undergoing a process of re-building. 
However, though a study of these periods may offer further validation of the 
47 Elian Gonzalez was a five-year-old boy who was rescued from the waters off Florida's coast in 
November 1999 after the boat he had been travelling in from Cuba with his mother capsized, resulting 
in the drowning of ten of the twelve passengers on board. Gonzalez was taken in by relatives in 
Miami, but his citizenship status soon became the subject of great controversy between the 
governments of the United States and Cuba. The boy's father requested his return to Cuba, a request 
supported by Washington but vehemently challenged by Florida's community of Cuban exiles. 
Debate over Gonzalez's future dragged on for over six months, until it was finally decided that he 
should return to Cuba, following an intervention by the US Supreme Court (Gott 2004,310). 
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conclusions drawn in this thesis, it is not essential to this work. The evidence already 
uncovered from the I 960s, 70s, and 90s not only provides sufficient confirmation 
that guerrillerismo has been promoted by the leadership at different stages, but it also 
responds directly to the literature on the 'militarism' of the Revolution, and the 
arguments which support the notion of 'institutionalisation', thereby shedding new 
light on these much studied periods. 
An additional element that has not been addressed here is the reception of 
guerrillerismo by the text recipients themselves, the Cuban population. Measuring 
the level of acceptance and the impact of the messages contained within the 
guerrillerista discourse would require an extensive, qualitative research-based study, 
a task well beyond the reach of this particular project. Such a study might yield 
interesting results regarding the extent to which the hegemonic discourse has 
contributed to shaping the consciousness of the Cuban people, and how such 
consciousness-raising has been reflected in revolutionary participation. 
Nonetheless, while the research presented here has focussed solely on the 'top-down' 
dissemination of guerrillerismo by the Cuban leadership, rather than how its 
messages have been received as such, the very survival of the Revolution and the 
continued support offered by the population suggest that guerrillerismo has 
functioned successfully as a means of mobilising citizens and steeling them for the 
sacrifices and hardship involved in maintaining the revolutionary project. That the 
Revolution endured the crisis of the Special Period intact, for example, can be 
attributed partially to the leadership's rallying cries for increased participation, its 
show of defiance in the face of adversity, and its invocation of historical antecedents 
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as testament to the fact that the Cuban nation had survived such moments of trauma 
previously and could, therefore, do so again. Needless to say, the leadership's 
discourse is but one contributing factor among many that account for the 
Revolution's longevity. Yet, if we are to accept Fairclough's proposal (following 
Foucault) that 'discursive practice, the production, distribution, and consumption 
(including interpretation) of texts, is a facet of hegemonic struggle', it follows that 
the language emitted by the leaders of the Revolution has played a crucial role in the 
acquisition and the preservation of the hegemony of the Cuban revolutionary project 
(Fairclough 1992, 93). 
As a significant feature of this language, guerrillerismo has thus assisted in the 
preservation of this hegemony, a contribution achieved through the promotion of its 
constituent values, such as lucha, deber, voluntad, and self-sacrifice. The thesis has 
argued that the perpetual elevation of these values, or beliefs, within the 
guerrillerista rhetoric, significant evidence of which has been presented in the 
preceding chapters, and their rootedness in pre-Revolution history, has transformed 
them into 'lexical items', that is, terms which have a given ideological significance 
within the Cuban context (Fairclough 1992, 191). The ideological significance 
attached to these values - for example, deber - has rendered their meaning 
unquestionable. In other words, they have become part of the collective 'background 
knowledge', or, to use Foucault's term, they are taken to be established 'truths' in the 
specific context of revolutionary Cuba (Fairclough 1989, 154). This fixity of the 
meaning of guerrillerismo's values is further strengthened by the way in which they 
have been constantly linked to historical figures and events in the hegemonic 
discourse. Text recipients are frequently reminded that heroes of both the 
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independence struggles and of the Revolution's insurrectionary phase have 
demonstrated the possession of such values and attributes as tenacity, a sense of duty, 
strong will, self-sacrifice, and so on. The invocation of pre-Revolution figures is 
particularly effective, insofar as these historical figures are, in many respects, 
untouchable. Similar to the way in which 'lexical items' such as deber possess a 
degree of fixity with respect to the meaning they encompass, so too do the heroes of 
Cuban history. Jose Marti, for example, represents Cuba's long-standing struggle for 
independence, a duty to the revolutionary cause, and an unyielding anti-imperialism. 
This image of Marti is accepted as fact in revolutionary Cuba, and the temporal 
distance which exists between his death and the onset of the Cuban Revolution in 
power means that this fact has remained, and will likely continue to remain, 
unchallenged. 
In contrast, the heroic status of the former guerrilleros of the Revolution's 
insurrectionary phase who then went on to assume posts with the revolutionary 
leadership, can be contested. The errors committed by the leadership over the 
decades of the Revolution in power somewhat tarnishes the memory of the historic 
feat of the insurrectionary phase. For this reason, the invocation of the ethos of pre-
Revolution guerrilleros or, for that matter, guerrilleros who passed away in the early 
years of the Revolution in power, Guevara and Camilo Cienfuegos most notably, has 
been an effective means of safeguarding the almost sacrosanct values attached to 
guerrillerismo. The revival of the writings of Guevara in the 1990s, for instance, 
illustrates this use of 'incorruptible' heroic figures. Guevara's premature and violent 
death in 1967 conferred upon him the status of martyr to the revolutionary cause, 
while also absolving him of any blame for the subsequent failures of the Revolution. 
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His fellow comrades from the sierra, however, at least those who were then serving 
in the revolutionary government, could not escape such blame, and neither did they 
necessarily attempt to absolve themselves of it. Yet the references to Guevara did at 
least divert some attention away from the crisis of the period, and provided the 
Cuban people with a figure upon which they could project their hopes for the future 
of the Revolution. Guevara, as the archetypal guerrillero hero ico , symbolised the 
'glory days' of the first years of the Revolution in power, when participation was at 
its peak, and the nation rallied around to ensure the survival of the Revolution. In a 
similar way, the frequent allusions to the events of the Ten Years' War during the 
1990s performed a similar function. The independence struggle of the late 1800s 
could be invoked as the model of revolutionary activity, particularly given that the 
heroic legacy of its participants pre-existed the Revolution itself. 
As an ideological code, then, guerrillerismo has been effective in stirring up the 
support of the Cuban people as it is rooted in pre-Revolution history and thus its 
values cannot be called into question. The rootedness of these values, and their 
'common-sense' quality, leads one to conclude that the efficacy of guerrillerismo as 
a mobilising tool lies in the act of simply pushing certain cognitive buttons; in other 
words, in calling to mind certain terms and historical events and reminding Cubans 
of what they already know and believe, but, as Foucault has highlighted, without 
necessarily drawing their attention to the fact that such 'reminders', that such a 
'structuring' of their 'reality', are taking place (Mills 2003, 55). This continual 
'button pushing' in the 1960s, early 1970s, and, later, in the 1990s, was intended to 
ensure that guerrillerismo's values were firmly internalised and could not be 
forgotten by the text recipient. 
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The intemalisation of these values increased the likelihood that they would be 
outwardly perfonned by said text recipient through their revolutionary participation. 
Yet, what this thesis has demonstrated is that, though text recipients have been 
targeted on an individual level using certain discursive techniques, the overall 
message of the hegemonic discourse was that the active contribution of the 
individual to the revolutionary project would only be of worth if it occurred 
alongside, and within, collective action. That is not to say that an encouragement of 
individual action has been deemed less important by the leadership, or that it has, in 
any way, been discouraged. On the contrary, the promotion of revolutionary 
participation on an individual level has been an obvious preoccupation of the 
leadership. The well-known phrase from Fidel Castro's 'Second Declaration of 
Havana' discussed in Chapter Two, 'EI deber de to do revolucionario es hacer la 
revoluci6n', epitomised the leadership's attempts to confer agency upon the 
individual actor in the task of 'making' revolution (Castro 1962, 169). On the whole, 
however, the overriding message within the hegemonic discourse in the periods 
examined was that this agency could only produce an impact if it complemented, and 
fonned a constituent part of, a greater collective agency. 
This notion that individual action derives its impact only in relation to the collective 
encapsulates the essence of guerrilla warfare and, more specifically, the loco 
methodology of revolutionary guerrilla warfare. Guevara's method encouraged the 
reliance upon subjective will, yet this 'will' could only produce successful action if it 
was acted upon within the collective (albeit a 'collective' comprised of only a 
handful of men) of the guerrilla/oco. In turn, the guerrilla/oco could only survive, 
and launch a revolution, if it succeeded in establishing a wider network of Jocos. 
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Finally, this network of focos could only meet its revolutionary objectives if it 
interacted with the masses to form a popular army. These sequential layers of 
activity which would lead up to the creation of a whole, the ejercito regular, have 
been continually reflected in Cuban society since the onset of the Revolution in 
power, and in the way in which the leadership has stressed the need for participation 
at various levels. While citizens have been encouraged to act as individuals, as we 
have established, appeals have also been made for them to involve themselves in 
collective action at a local level. An example of such an appeal was highlighted in 
Chapter Four when, during the Special Period, the leadership laid emphasis on the 
barrio as the focal point of participation at a community level. The wider initiative 
for citizens to join Comites de Defensa de la Revoluci6n (CDRs) since 1960 also 
illustrates how Cubans have been incited to act within a local collective. Beyond 
these community-based organisations, the creation of mass organisations, such as the 
Federaci6n Estudiantil Universitaria (FEU) and the Federaci6n de Mujeres Cubanas 
(FMC), has promoted participation on a national scale. Just as in Guevara's loco 
methodology, all these different organisations and means of participation together 
form part of one whole: the Revolution. Taking this idea further, and as the 
leadership has perpetually underlined, it is, therefore, the actions of the Cuban pueblo 
as a collective, and, more importantly, as a nation, which determine the fate of the 
Revolution. 
This positioning of the Cuban people as the true leaders of the Revolution leads one 
to conclude that, while guerrillerismo as an ideological code has, at times, become 
less visible within the hegemonic discourse, the values and beliefs it encompasses 
have underpinned and shaped the political culture of the Revolution since its 
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inception. Indeed, the very fact that the Cuban pueblo, guided by the vanguard of the 
revolutionary leadership, controls the destiny of the Revolution is, in itself, a 
representation of the essence of guerrilla warfare methodology outlined by Guevara. 
That is, the potential for 'popular forces', led by the guerrilla vanguard, to be 
victorious over more powerful adversaries. While the majority of Cubans, 
particularly those of younger generations, may not have experienced physical 
combat, the mass participation of Cuban citizens in the revolutionary project 
throughout the trajectory of the Revolution seems to have fulfilled Guevara's 
aforementioned prophecy that 'todo el pueblo cubano debera convertirse en un 
ejercito guerrillero' (Guevara 1959, 21). In many ways, this role ascribed to the 
Cuban people was predetermined well before the onset of the insurrectionary phase 
in 1956. In the struggle both to acquire and maintain its independence, Cuba, as a 
small, island nation, and suffering the 'geographic fatalism' of its positioning just 
ninety miles from the shores of its superpower enemy, has always been destined to 
assume the role of the guerrillero (Debray 1965, 146; Gott 2004, 191). To elucidate 
further, if we accept that Joco-style guerrilla warfare is only applicable to situations 
in which the rebel force is far smaller and less powerful than its opponent, then Cuba, 
in fighting for its sovereignty, has existed in a perpetual state of such ready-made 
conditions. It follows, therefore, that the Cuban nation has been necessarily assigned 
the role of acting as a 'guerrilla people', of perpetuating Cuba's image as one of the 
plucky underdog determined to stand its ground in the face of tremendous obstacles. 
With the victory of the Revolution. and the leadership's presentation of the 
Revolution in power as the closing chapter in Cuba's quest for independence, the 
transformation of the Cuban people into a guerrilla army became increasingly crucial 
for it to survive. The expression of guerrillerismo in the hegemonic discourse has 
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been key to this survival, serving as it has done not only to provide citizens with a 
model for revolutionary action, but as a reminder of the Cuban condition. In this 
way, it has constituted a vital component of cubania, insofar as it has contributed to 
anchoring the Revolution in an historical context, and has, in turn, consolidated the 
legitimacy of the revolutionary project. This central role of guerrillerismo, as 
identified by this study, suggests that the following words, uttered by Fidel Castro on 
21 May 1959, were not only applicable to the immediate post-insurrectionary period, 
but have remained relevant over several decades: 'Nuestra revoluci6n, que no es de 
ningun color, ni roja, sino verde olivo que es el color del uniforme del Ejercito 
Rebelde, que sali6 de la entranas de la misma Sierra Maestra' (Castro 195ge, 42/43). 
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